

title: Dialectical Anthropology Vol. 2, Politics of Culture and Creativity : a Critique of Civilization / : Essays in Honor of Stanley Diamond

author: Diamond, Stanley

publisher: University Press of Florida

isbn10 | asin: 0813011175

print isbn13: 9780813011172

ebook isbn13: 9780813019703

language: English

subject Political anthropology, Marxist anthropology, Diamond, Stanley,--1922-

publication date: 1992


lcc: GN492.D53 1992eb

ddc: 301

subject: Political anthropology, Marxist anthropology, Diamond, Stanley,--1922-

The Politics of Culture and Creativity:
Volume 2

A Critique of Civilization



Stanley Diamond
photo by John Ganis 1990

DIALECTICAL ANTHROPOLOGY

Essays in Honor of Stanley Diamond

Volume 1

CIVILIZATION IN CRISIS:
ANTHROPOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVES

Volume 2

THE POLITICS OF CULTURE AND CREATIVITY:
A CRITIQUE OF CIVILIZATION

The Politics of Culture and Creativity: Volume 2

A Critique of Civilization

Edited by Christine Ward Gailey

Dialectical Anthropology
Essays in Honor of Stanley Diamond

GAINESVILLE

TALLAHASSEE

TAMPA

BOCA RATON

PENSACOLA

ORLANDO

MIAMI

JACKSONVILLE

UNIVERSITY PRESS OF FLORIDA

Copyright 1992 by the Board of Regents of the State of Florida

All rights reserved.

Printed in the U.S.A. on acid-free paper ♻

The University Press of Florida is the scholarly publishing agency for the State University System of Florida, comprised of Florida A&M University, Florida Atlantic University, Florida International University, Florida State University, University of Central Florida, University of Florida, University of North Florida, University of South Florida, University of West Florida.

Orders for books should be addressed to University Press of Florida, 15 Northwest 15th Street, Gainesville, FL 32611.

CONTENTS

Contributors	ix
Introduction: The Politics of Culture in Civilization <i>Christine Ward Gailey</i>	1
I. The Politics of Culture	
1. The Practice of Politics and the Study of Australian Kinship <i>Peter Worsley</i>	25
2. From Consanguinity to Heredity <i>Claude Meillassoux</i>	67
3. The Finding and Fashioning of Cultural Criticism in Ethnographic Research <i>George Marcus</i>	77
4. The Economic Memories of Harry Watt <i>Diane Rothenberg</i>	103
5. Persona Non Grata: Ethnicity and Nationalism in Romania <i>Sam Beck</i>	119
6. Class Struggle in the Squared Circle: Professional Wrestling as a Working-Class Sport <i>Donald M. Nonini and Arlene Akiko Teraoka</i>	147

7. Voodoo, Ethnography, and the American Occupation of Haiti 169

Steven Gregory

8. What I Learned from the Parrott's Egg and the Bull Who Crashes in the Kraal: The Senses of Time Binding and Turn Taking in Being with the Other <i>James Fernandez</i>	209
9. With Respect to the Primitive <i>Barbara W. Lex</i>	217
II. Ethnopoetics and Ethnomusic	
10. Search for a Primal Poetics <i>Jerome Rothenberg</i>	229
11. Diamond's Quest for Earliness in Seven Early Poems <i>Harold Bloom</i>	239
12. Going West: Poetry, Poetics, and Anthropology <i>Linda Levalley Cervantes</i>	249
13. Our People after the Whites Came <i>Dell Hymes</i>	281
14. Ethnographies I: Fragmentary Annotations on the Hyperborean Peoples <i>Nathaniel Tarn</i>	297
15. The Participant Observer <i>David Mcallester</i>	301
16. Weber and the Rationalization of Music <i>Ferenc Feher</i>	309
17. Culture, Music, and Collaborative Learning <i>Charles Keil</i>	327

III. A Critique of Civilization

A Beat of 1-2-3 <i>Sarah Diamond</i>	336
18. The Human Condition <i>Agnes Heller</i>	337
19. Witchcraft Trials and Stalinist Trials: Reflection on a Parallel <i>Emmanuel Terray</i>	357
20. Soviet <i>Etnografiia</i> : Marxist Methodology or Evolutionist Ideology? <i>Peter Skalník</i>	391
21. Marx and the Question of Anthropology <i>Ulysses Santamaria and Alain Manville</i>	407
22. Marxism, Feminism, Deconstruction <i>Ben Agger</i>	427
23. Toward a Prophetic Radicalism: Notes on a Necessary Theory of Domination <i>Wolf-Dieter Narr</i>	451
24. In Pursuit of the Postmodern <i>Richard Falk</i>	487
25. Our Endangered Species <i>Alger Hiss</i>	509
Epilogue <i>Gary Snyder</i>	513

Published Works of Stanley Diamond	515
Index	523

CONTRIBUTORS

Ben Agger is Professor of Sociology at the State University of New York, Buffalo.

Harold Bloom is Professor of English at Yale University.

Sam Beck is Director and Senior Lecturer, Field and International Studies Program at the New York State College of Human Ecology, Cornell University.

Linda Levalley Cervantes is Professor of Anthropology at Oxnard College.

Sarah Diamond, poet and artist, is the youngest daughter of Stanley Diamond.

Richard Falk is Albert G. Milbank Professor of International Law and Practice at Princeton University.

Ferenc Feher is Professor of Philosophy at the Graduate Faculty, New School for Social Research.

James Fernandez is Professor of Anthropology at the University of Chicago.

Christine Ward Gailey is Associate Professor of Anthropology at Northeastern University, Boston.

Steven Gregory is Assistant Professor of Anthropology at Wesleyan University.

Agnes Heller is Professor of Philosophy at the Graduate Faculty of the New School of Social Research.

Alger Hiss is a former lawyer and civil servant, and past president of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.

Dell Hymes is Professor of Anthropology and English at the University of Virginia, Charlottesville.

Charles Keil is Professor of American Studies at the State University of New York, Buffalo.

Barbara W. Lex is Associate Anthropologist at the Alcohol and Drug Abuse Research Center, McLean Hospital, and Associate Professor of Psychiatry (Anthropology) at Harvard Medical School.

Alain Manville is an Associate of the Maison des Sciences de l'Homme, Paris.

George E. Marcus is Professor of Anthropology at Rice University, and editor of the journal *Cultural Anthropology*.

Claude Meillassoux is Directeur de Recherche in Anthropology at the Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, Paris.

David P. McAllester is Professor Emeritus of Anthropology and Music at Wesleyan University.

Wolf-Dieter Narr is Professor of Anthropology at the Free University of Berlin and Director of the Center for the Study of Bureaucracy, Berlin.

Donald M. Nonini is Assistant Professor of Anthropology at the University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill.

Jerome Rothenberg is an ethnopoet and anthropologist.

Diane Rothenberg is Professor of Anthropology at the State University of New York, Binghamton.

Ulysses Santamaria was an anthropologist and Associate of the Maison des Sciences de l'Homme, Paris, until his death in 1991.

Peter Skalník is Professor of Anthropology at the Charles University, Prague.

Gary Snyder is an ethnopoet.

Nathaniel Tarn is Professor Emeritus of Modern Poetry, Anthropology, and Literature at Rutgers, the State University of New Jersey.

Arlene Akiko Teraoka is Associate Professor of German Language and Literature at the University of Minnesota, Minneapolis.

Emmanuel Terray is Directeur d'Etudes at the Ecole des Hautes Etudes en Sciences Sociales, Paris.

Peter Worsley is Professor Emeritus of Sociology at the University of Manchester.

INTRODUCTION

THE POLITICS OF CULTURE IN CIVILIZATION

Christine Ward Gailey

The struggle for culture is, by definition, against all those forces that reduce people to productive and reproductive social mechanisms.
(Diamond 1987:270)

In recent years there has been a tendency to despair that the world system of capitalism now extending into the socialist world as well creates a homogeneity of culture, a culture of domination and alienation that obliterates local diversity. Stanley Diamond described the circumstances that encourage this posture:

Certain conditions have become acute under industrial monopoly capitalism. These are: socioeconomic alienation and exploitation; imperialism, colonialism, and neocolonialism; the hypertrophy of state power, of bureaucratic and technocratic organization; the isolation and atomization of the person . . . ; the degradation of the symbolic dimension of human experience; the loss of cultures and languages, the quantitative and qualitative shift in the character of war. (Diamond 1980:309)

But Diamond's work opposes essentially functionalist positions that assume the inexorable march of capitalism around the world. It focuses instead on culture as emergent, as continuously created. Culture in this sense is the forging of shared meanings out of everyday conditions as people experience and understand them. Themes in his work that resonate with the essays in this volume are the politics of exploring culture (the problems of writing ethnography), efforts at culture creation in alienated conditions, the consequences of bureaucratic and state domination, and the possibility for emancipatory

practices in keeping with our shared humanity. Let us consider, then, the reasons for posing the critique of civilization in this way.

"A New Barbarism":

The Costs of Modern Civilization

The alienation inherent in civilization takes a particularly virulent form in capitalism, given its minutely fragmented specialization of labor and the pervasively bureaucratic quality of civil society.

Diamond addressed this problem in his studies of cultural psychodynamics and in a pathbreaking chapter on schizophrenia. His research on the relationship of culture to the construction of person-hood and psyche posed a critical counter to the culture and personality school as practiced by several of Boas's students. ¹ His work on schizophrenia and on personality dynamics on an Israeli kibbutz avoided the racism that colors many of the "national character" studies done in that tradition.²

Diamond's concern with cultural psychodynamics centered on the effect of bureaucratic and economic structures on human potentialities. His two years of fieldwork in the early 1950s on an Israeli kibbutz and in an Arab village provided the basis for his discussions of the deleterious effects of collective, as opposed to communal, relations.³ For example, on the kibbutz, bureaucratically collectivizing childcare separated from adult activities that remained gender-segregated in ways that diminished women's authority was itself a response to the perceived claustrophobic maternalism and authoritarian paternalism of the *stetl*. But the structure did not emancipate women or children because it did not challenge the division of labor, it merely mimicked it; at the same time, it denied children's needs for attention and nurturance. But Diamond did not call for a return to the family of the *stetl*. Instead, the contrast lay in other models of child care: the spontaneous or age-grade play groups and the pervasive and tactile richness of early childhood nurturance by adults in a range of primitive societies as well as among the neighboring Arab mountain peasants.

His introduction to Jules and Zunia Henry's *Dollplay of Pilaga Indian Children* takes up the theme of children's interactions and the formation of a supportive environment for cooperation and personal exploration in communal settings even one marginalized in a dominant capitalist society (see Diamond 1974b). The thwarting of

the autonomy and security required for individuation becoming a person, developing a processual and integrated identity beyond the social roles in which one is inserted is a central problem in capitalist civilization. Instead there is the ideological emphasis on "individualism," that is, the collapsing of persons into social roles, rather than a process of maturing through reciprocal, sustaining relations. But more generally, Diamond takes up the theme of contrast between primitive and civilized senses of personhood, humanity, and morality in the article on "Job and the Trickster" (1972). The figures embody the opposition between the ambiguous and ambivalent, relational, and processual concepts of becoming a distinct human in a communal setting, and the abstract-authoritarian insignificance accorded the random individual in civilization.

Schizophrenia

The human costs of this civilization are devastating; they include breakdown, addictions of all sorts, pathological gender relations, chronic violence, truncated life chances, and pervasive emotional or material deprivation. Diamond delved into the cultural dimensions of schizophrenia at the National Institutes of Mental Health in the early 1960s. He studied the relationships of analysts and patients and patients' families in an experimental program. "Schizophrenia and Civilization" confronts the insistent medicalization of what is diagnosed as schizophrenia and challenges its purported similar incidence in all societies (1974a:22754). The insistence on rigid role specialization frames the deviant, and, thus, chronic breakdown does not occur with any frequency in societies that have structured flexibility in roles and accepted arenas for public expression of ambivalence, anxiety, and contradictory emotional states. Moreover,

Whatever else schizophrenia, alcoholism, or drug addiction may be, they are the unconscious symptoms of a thwarted politics, art in suspension, . . . rituals of resistance on the verge of creative formulation. (Diamond 1982:876)

In seeking the cultural milieus that shape the personal responses considered to be schizophrenia, Diamond opposed the biological reductionism that remains the prevalent explanation. This rejection of biological reductionism also characterizes his analysis of warfare.

War

The most obvious symptom of civilizational malaise is endemic war or militarism. When in the midst of an imperial war in Southeast Asia, American anthropologists began to make claims about the universality of violence and warfare, Diamond became embroiled in the dispute. He contrasted the meanings of war in communal societies, where fatalities are not on a massive scale and killing is an event. To kill, one must be prepared for it psychically, confront an immediate and irreducibly human enemy, and be reintegrated ritually into human society afterward.

Diamond took exception to Anthony Wallace's claims that the modern state created a condition of perpetual preparedness for war among the citizenry. He argued instead that it is precisely unpreparedness that the modern state conditions (1968a). The bureaucratic military requires a dehumanizing basic training, making men into machines to kill. But this can only be done by stripping them of identities outside the killing context, while using their efforts to be humanly connected to forge mutual loyalty and, thus, "bravery" among the fighters in the smallest-scale units.

The abstraction and specialization of warfare in civilization create the "great psychic distance" from which the modern soldier kills, at the cost in the postwar setting of his unprepared confrontation with having taken lives without even thinking. Diamond also points out that preparedness on the part of citizens would challenge the very premise of modern state warfare, namely, that the population is expendable. In a setting where total, obliterating war is technically possible, a citizenry that understands its consequences is dangerous to the powerful few who control that destiny:

Most people don't want to die, but power [to annihilate] is in the hands of a few. The reality of this will burst inside consciousness unless a whole contorted package of nationalism, patriotism, and the like are endlessly promoted. But there will be an eventual confrontation. (Diamond, interview, April 1989)

Widespread popular support for nuclear disarmament even before the recent events in the Soviet Union bespeaks how ineffectual have been efforts to convince people that nuclear war is survivable. Moreover, the considerable grassroots refusal to consider Guatemalan, Salvadoran, and Nicaraguan people as enemies and the active, diso-

bedient outreach to people attempting to create societies in their own images bespeak a more entrenched, if decidedly unflamboyant, rejection of imperialism than we have seen before.

The Politics of Culture

Language itself is the transcendence of the biological, it is the medium of culture and culture is a rope-bridge thrown across a biological chasm. (Diamond 1987)

Culture for Diamond stood in opposition to ideologies promoted by the state, by the corporate imperatives, by the bureaucratic structures of civil society, and by the detritus of these in everyday practices. In class-based, state societies, however, culture can never be homogeneous, since the basic conditions of everyday life are not shared. The direct producers and the dispossessed are rendered relatively powerless, but in their very marginalization their lives are drastically different from those who benefit materially from the structures of domination. In this setting, ideologies justifying the existing conditions or presenting limited avenues for amelioration are promoted by the state apparatus and the corporate bureaucracies. But so-called mass culture stands apart from the plethora of spontaneous commentaries and visions produced from below. This outpouring can be incoherent or muted, or parasitized and commodifiedindeed, the music industry depends upon the latter two but culture creation cannot be obliterated.

Alongside and in opposition to the envy or imitation of the wealthy and powerful, one can hear in the flow of street language, in song and gesture, the "rituals of resistance," a longing for emancipation. In capitalist society whether these yearnings remain inchoate, or become directed toward a romantic or fascist unity or revolutionary and liberationist movements, depends on conscious human action. The corporate state promises to break the bonds of isolation on a superficial level, by promoting an image of community, but in an exclusive and defensive sense of "us" versus "them." Emergent, emancipatory efforts must grapple with the antagonism of hierarchical identities created by the division of labor, the polity, and the ideological apparatuses.

The outcome depends on circumstance. It is naive to assume that cultural practices alone bring social transformation. If one rejects the imagery of a perfectly tuned system but senses that the global market

is sustained ultimately by an incomplete militarism, a collapse might occur one has only to think of the international debt crisis. What replaces the dominant structure in such a case? Implicit in the politics of culture in Diamond's work and as discussed in these essays, is the importance of structure, agency, and contingency in history (see, e.g., Diamond 1974a:33251). There are no stages or predictions of an evolutionary sort, only historical processes and human struggles, informed engagement.

Authorship, Responsibility, and Representation

In *In Search of the Primitive* Diamond posed the question of the "new ethnography" a decade before others would raise issues of authorial responsibility and representation derived from poststructuralist and postmodernist literary criticism. ⁴ He claimed early that ethnography is textual and can be read as literature, and that literature is ethnographic. But in contrast to some deconstructionist writing, he also holds that responsibility is inherent in writing and that responsibility demands a politically engaged position of the writer in his or her own society (see Gordimer 1985). He situates writing and reading within this context:

The written word is no longer the logos of the community but a symptom of the condition of civilized alienation, which in turn overburdens the author and the reader with the private construction of sustaining tradition(s). (Diamond 1981a:172)

Advocacy for the peoples about whom one writes is part of this. Diamond, at the request of the Seneca, fought with them unsuccessfully to stop the construction of the Kinzua dam in upstate New York that displaced people and flooded reservation lands.⁵

He wrote eloquently about the Biafran independence movement and, again at their request, accompanied food-relief flights in the final days (Diamond 1970). He first became involved when the Eastern Regional Government of Nigeria invited him to write on the refugee problem, precipitated by the pogrom in the North against the Igbo people. When Biafra emerged, Diamond asked Conor Cruise O'Brien to accompany him to Biafra, which he did. Diamond says he became involved also because the movement represented a

profoundly anticolonial call for independence, and because the Igbo had a history of explicitly anticolonial activity. He went to Biafra for the last time in 1970. At that time, a report was published in the United States, vilifying most American Africanists for their de facto collusion with colonialism: Diamond was one of two who were exempted from condemnation.

Because of the global effects of our civilization, however, the author has a broader responsibility: on behalf of peoples you haven't worked among, on behalf of humanity. As such, Diamond's activism intertwined with his scholarship and teaching in an unpromoted but consistent way. He was prominent in the anti-Vietnam war teach-in movement, in the militation at the New School against the Cambodian invasion, and in more recent years, he lent a consistent voice to anti-imperialist and antinuclear efforts.

But Diamond was not a utopian, nor did he think the solution could be found in any of the "really-existing" socialist countries:

A utopia detached from . . . a sense of human nature and a sense of the precivilized past . . . becomes a nightmare. For humanity must then be conceived as infinitely adaptable and thus incapable of historic understanding or self-amendment. (Diamond 1974a:208)

The repression seen in attempts at socialist transformation through the state is painfully obvious. The task, for Diamond, was not to abandon the project, but to humanize it through a critical anthropology, an understanding of what basic human needs are and how they have been addressed or ignored in the range of "known" societies. He argued, for example, that it is unlikely "that any state organization can serve as the mediation for a varied, culturally creative socialism" (letter, March 18, 1988). This position was drawn in large measure from his thinking on the Paris Commune (Diamond 1976) and from his perception of "the primitive" within civilization:

The term "primitive" is not confined to single societies of a certain era, but also [includes] processes that exist in contemporary society and which may well serve as the basis for revolutionary change, as Gramsci and Marx implied. (Letter, March 18, 1988)

For example, while kinship becomes divorced from community and biologized in capitalism, one can discern its more dynamic forms in

the interstices: extended circles of reciprocity, sustaining friendships that involve responsibility for others, engagement in efforts to forge inclusive identities.

The authors in the first section of this volume, on the politics of culture, address dimensions of studying culture and culture creation, including problems of representation and conducting fieldwork. The first two essays examine the most traditional ground of anthropology, kinship studies. Both Peter Worsley and Claude Meillassoux present critiques of structuralist interpretations of kinship, using different types of societies, in different historical periods.

Worsley situates the study of aboriginal kinship in the repressive context of Cold War anticommunist politics in Australia. State repression had little to do with the content of their research, but focused on Fred Rose's and Worsley's communism and their advocacy of indigenous rights. Worsley argues that the study of such "arcane" areas as aboriginal kinship cannot be judged by a utilitarian measure, or fitted to a Procrustean bed of politics of any stripe. There is a more profound politics: kinship matters to its practitioners, but this is not the reason for repression either. The practice of politics in one's own milieu may be inherently threatening to the state, and so any research is deemed a threat as well. The research on Groote Eylandt peoples that Rose did in the 1940s and that Worsley did (under Rose's aegis a decade later), followed by David Turner's work in the early 1970s, made possible a longitudinal evaluation of changes in kinship practices and structures among aboriginal peoples subject to pressures of missionaries, wage labor, and other incursions. Rose and Worsley, through their detailed work on kinship, called attention to contradictions and inconsistencies in kinship practices and structures, especially clans and marriages: whatever the rubric of "ideal" structure, there was "massive deviance" in practice. This was not simply a disjunction between "ideal" and "real," but a dynamic example of the ambiguity of structure that allowed a range of inconsistent practices. Their analyses stand in opposition to functionalist, evolutionist, and structuralist formulations of kinship.

Meillassoux explores the construction of heredity, at the same time writing an appreciative evaluation of Marc Bloch's research on kinship in France in the Middle Ages. He argues that, far from embodying some inevitable expression of a structural logic, changes in kinship that created the notion of heredity expressed and reflected shifts in class relations, struggles and accommodations of church and state, and the disintegration of producing communities. Dynastic and fa-

miliar kinship were innovations, derived from social transformation and oppositional practices over time. He goes on to trace the development of "naturalized" heredity with the later rise of the new capitalist class in the nineteenth century.

From the politics of kinship and kinship studies, we turn to other problems of developing a reflexive and critical anthropology. George Marcus takes up Richard Terdiman's concept of counter-discourse to discuss different ways of posing opposition to dominant characterizations of society. He argues that an empirically derived counter-discourse is needed and could emerge as a new critical ethnography using reflexive methods and acknowledging the influence of values in the construction of social facts, and the ambiguity of resistance and accommodation in counter-discourses. This counter-discourse also would venture beyond the current interpretive trend in anthropology, in "explicitly looking for and representing counter-discourses" in their field research. He then examines, in fieldwork with "dynastic" American families who iconize wealth, "talent," or power how counter-discourses can be constructed in the relations among the political and economic context of the family, histories written by or for the family, and the biographical or autobiographical oral narratives of particular members.

Diane Rothenberg continues this exploration of autobiography and ethnography in a setting that is consciously oppositional, namely, the Allegany [*sic*] Seneca reservation in upstate New York. She retrieves an insistent voice from her fieldwork, that of Harry Watt, a Seneca who, despite the author's priorities in research, presented his own. His narrative, revolving around work, themes of adaptation, cultural integrity, and maturation, centers on an implicit responsibility to the requirements of an accepting community. Watt and the Seneca have faced unavoidable, continuous "contact" in the form of incursions by Quakers and demands by the state and capitalist development. Watt's story, like that of the Seneca, is one of having to work in the capitalist world but refusing to be of it, adapting to more powerful structures but creating an identity which rejects them. While Watt's autobiographical narrative shows a clear sense of personal autonomy, of individuation, there is no individualism. His story contrasts sharply with those of Marcus's dynastic families.

Sam Beck continues this examination of ethnography and cultural identity within a dominant state society. Through his own experience of state intervention, by which his fieldwork was temporarily terminated, and in his research on ethnicity in Romania, Beck discusses the

predicament of promoting nationalism in a (now crumbling) socialist state. He considers ethnicities as historically shifting identities, at times imposed by the state or interstate rivalries, at times emerging in opposition to civil priorities. The crisis in Romania is that nationalism calls into question a range of ethnic communities Jews, Hungarians, German-Saxons and especially those who have been judged to have no culture the Gypsies. The priorities of state nationalism focus readily on those deemed to be most different, even barbaric and, in their stubborn persistence, defiant. But while the Gypsies present the most dramatic case, similar policies of resettlement and migration have decimated other national minorities. The effect has been to recast the character of rural communities, creating a vacuum in some areas and homogeneity which is not always welcome or viable in others.

Donald Nonini and Arlene Akiko Teraoka explore the representation of professional wrestling as a study in middle-class denial and the practice of professional wrestling as a metaphor for the strength and superiority of working-class existence. Their investigation goes beyond the commercial control of wrestling to consider what wrestling presents and represents for its practitioners and audience apart from the rhetoric and practices of agents and promoters. They explore the construction of "low culture" and popular sport, while at the same time delving into the conditions that make such a sport appealing to a particular social class.

Steven Gregory examines the search for the primitive and the politics of representation in the popular travel account of William Seabrook, based on his experiences in U.S.-occupied Haiti. Gregory's contention is that in Seabrook's text we can see the tensions between scientific and narrative discourses, on the one hand, and cultural relativism and imperial supremacismthe "Africanist" genreon the other. These tensions produce a dialectical ethnography in which Seabrook's own ambivalence is clear, and the colonial milieu is openly acknowledged and at times supported. But the experience of participant-observationthe need to engage the subjectivity of particular Haitians and, thus, appreciate their irreducible humanityruptures the conventional tenets of both Africanist travelogue and colonialist dogma.

James Fernandez explores the intricate politics of time and learning in fieldwork. The challenges to his sense of time were simultaneously demands for turn-taking, for relating to other persons in their own milieu, on their terms. These terms included the insistence that he appreciate, that is, learn through turn-taking, the ritual, enacted inte-

gration of urban into rural and past into present. The contexts were colonial and postcolonial domination by the South African state, on the one hand, and the wake of missionary suppression of religious practices, on the other.

Barbara W. Lex closes the section with an appreciation of how pivotal teachers formal and informal can foster a critical anthropological perspective. Through fieldwork with the Onondaga, Lex presents us with the rituals of cultural reproduction, and thus recreation, under conditions that constantly threaten the integrity of identity.

Expression:

The Politics of Creativity

All art, worthy of the name, is subversive, subversive of civil society, of civilization. (Diamond 1982a:854)

The expressive dimensions of culture embody, for Diamond, the creativity inherent in all humans, a potentiality iconized, reified, and specialized as "genius" in our society to the point of denying the creative potential of most people. Again, this position derives from the pervasiveness of expressive activities language, music, dance, and other aesthetic dimensions in the ritual dramas and daily existence in primitive societies.

Stanley Diamond's critical anthropology in prose and poetry are two dimensions of the same revolutionary impetus, but they should not be confused or reduced to a program. In prose a writer can express what Roland Barthes terms "his essential gesture as a social being" (1977). Writing originates in the taxation-conscription-census complex Diamond identifies as the core of state domination (Diamond [1951] 1992). But before writing there is language; in the absence of civilization language is poetic, with metaphors that make the world animate. For Diamond poetic metaphors are the language of transformation. 6

Both facets of his writing are self-reflective not in the self-indulgent sense of an "anthropology of me," as too much of the "new ethnography" seems to exemplify but in their purpose: assessing the situation with a view toward sustaining the potential for profoundly oppositional, not simply inverted, cultural process. The view is one steeped in appreciation of other ways of being, an emancipatory vision informed by experience in other cultures and political engagement.

The poesy of "the primitive" is not mere projection. The ambiguities of metaphor are rooted in conditions of existence, embedded in an unspecialized division of labor and the multidimensional, rather than fragmented, social identities of the people. While certain persons may be seen as more skilled in a form of expression, they are not qualitatively different. Each person has the perceived capacity, enacted in the scheme of things, for poetic or other aesthetic improvisation and expression (Diamond, 1982a:856).

Beginning with his article on Plato and the Trickster, written for Paul Radin (see Diamond 1960), Diamond sought reasons for Plato's insistence that poets and dramatists should be exiled from the state. Diamond argued that the vehement rejection of poetry and drama was not, as Plato claimed, because poets imitate "the real," but because they draw on and express the ambiguities of creativity and existence. In exploring multiple identities, poets implicitly reject the specialized division of labor that is the hallmark of civilization. They subvert absolutes of any kind, including the abstraction of the human and the divine. In short, within civilization poets invoke the primitive and deny creative exclusivity to the state and its minions.

Essays in the section on ethnopoetics and ethnomusic consider cultural expression under conditions of domination and alienation. The ethnopoets, ethnomusicologists, and social critics explore the conscious constitution of meaning in the face of civilization. Jerome Rothenberg sets the theme of the section when he describes the search for a primal poetics as rooted in the continuing modernist hope that "transformations in art and life are inextricably connected." Such a poetics both reflects the everyday and impinges upon its development, influencing "the way we live in this world or this world lives in us." He purposefully blurs the formal boundaries of poetry, theater, music, and painting the language, visual, and aural arts in this experimental quest for the human within us, and points to the ways in which ritual as a constituting, ambiguous, communal process is the model. The materials used are not the point, except as a challenge to the conventional forms reified as art, but the reinterpretation of the received knowledge of this world and past ones to invoke and explore the immanence of common and diverse human possibilities, "what it is to be human."

Harold Bloom's commentary on seven poems from *Totems* situates Diamond in a quest for an earliness that is not nostalgic, but akin to Sartre's sense of authenticity in the "pathos" and "urban poignance" of his Jewishness. But, surprisingly if this is the situation,

Bloom seems disturbed by Diamond's emotional involvement when the subjects are familial. Bloom points to the way "Whale Song" embodies a critique of structuralist polarities, insisting on a sense of life and death (as in the Winnebago Trickster stories), of and against nature, opposing all modes of reductionism. But the poems are not romantic except in the Enlightenment sense of empathic, since they are not nostalgic. Diamond's sense of the primitive, according to Bloom, is concrete, existential, nominalist, and personalistic opposed fundamentally to Platonic thought and he sees these qualities in the poems. Anthropology and poetry are not the same: Diamond has brought the "prophetic vision" of his anthropology to bear on his poetry, but "his poetry knows what . . . anthropology cannot know."

Linda LeValley Cervantes contextualizes Diamond's poetry as anthropology, concluding that *Going West* signals the end of the conventional, positivist discipline. She delves into how deeply anthropological the poetry is: we can learn from the consciousness of various animals if we acknowledge them without either anthropomorphizing or homogenizing them, as the peoples who lived in relation to them and through them understood. The intimacy of the world of the two-and four-legged, sung and danced and lived in ordeal and celebration by Native Americans remains impenetrable in its poesy to the range of settlers, missionaries, or anthropologists who have represented the dominant society. She writes, "It is not the idea of poetic consciousness within the primitive that he [Diamond] is refuting . . . It is the wasted anthropological attempt to reduce such poetry to interpretation, to replace poetic vision with hermeneutics." The poems ring true because they evoke a submerged but shared historical experience and a politics that is not anaesthetized by scientism.

Dell Hymes strengthens the contention that the language and the narratives of Native Americans are poetic. He retrieves a story by a little-known people, the Kalapuya, about their culture in the face of capitalism. True to the Boasian endeavor not to do violence to indigenous ways of thought, he provides us with the transcription, but he goes beyond the Boasians' efforts in remaining faithful to its nonprose narrative structure. The retrieval is necessarily for an audience that is not Kalapuya; their descendants no longer stand as a people but others to whom the original texts matter. Hymes's recovered text serves not only as a reminder of "a way of life to which oral discourse was central" but also as a scathing critique of Western civilization and an unsentimental account of ethnocide.

Nathaniel Tarn plays with prose and field notes as a genre, invoking a people and an encounter with civilization (and the ethnopoet). The Hyperborean people, said by the Greeks to live beyond the north wind, are and are not mythological. These "Hyperboreans" recall one of Diamond's poems: "Eskimo / self-conceived animal / haloed / in fur of white fox . . . " 7 The performance even in alien surroundings embodies the sense of shared and pervasive aesthetic expression held by Diamond to characterize communal societies. Bubble gum may be chewed and planes taken, but Willow is resilient and rooted.

David McAllester discusses a range of dilemmas faced by ethnomusicologists, who, as more fully participant than most participant-observers, have to confront their own otherness continuously. They are not and cannot be of the cultures whose music they perform; the more they learn about the music, the greater the complexity and contextuality they must admit. "Can you perform correctly a music meant for communicating with the ancestors when they are not your ancestors?" At the same time, the immersion in performance in another culture celebrates a diversity and poses a challenge to the self-proclaimed primacy of the music of the imperium. Attempts to make this sharing of music more fully cross-cultural enmeshes both sponsors and resident artists in the range of ethical and personal upheavals entailed in confronting the context of American society. Like others who are committed to celebrating and, in performance, invoking diversity, ethnomusicologists without academic positions have difficulty in making a living related to that commitment, since it contradicts the dominant values of their civilization.

Much of Diamond's anthropology stands counter to the tendencies in the Frankfurt School to universalize solutions to social and cultural dilemmas along a Western trajectory, thereby denying the vitality, complexity, and creativity of other cultures. Ferenc Feher writes on Theodor Adorno's and Ernst Bloch's critiques of Max Weber's thesis on the rationalization of music. Feher holds that Weber's influential essay parallels his larger project on modernity; Western music epitomizes rationality. Rebellion against its rationality as in the Romantic movement cannot supersede the system, although it can destroy it. Progress occurs as an unfolding of implicit structure, not through human action except as a vehicle. Adorno shadowboxes with Weber in portraying Western music as the cycling of a negative dialectical kind of inverse progress where even the atonal rebellion indicates a higher rationality. Bloch denies the progress of rationality, focusing instead on the affective elements tied to a historically chang-

ing subjectivity. Implicit in this, however, is another form of progress, aiming at either an ultimate transcendental ego or a unified humankind beyond history.

In collaborative, participatory learning, Charles Keil argues, we can try to empower people with the sense that they can create what Edward Sapir called "genuine culture." Keil adopts Sapir's concept, because of his suspicion of nationalist or elitist claims to exclusive culture creation. To help others "reclaim their gifts" demands a clarity about culture and culture creation that is informed by critical anthropological engagement. Music is necessarily collaborative, although this collaboration is denied in hierarchical societies in their elevation of the artist. Still, one can see both the practice of collaboration and, thus, musical empowerment (and a rooted transcendence) in generations of informal jazz education in African-American communities. Sources of imposed difference—race, class, gender, ethnicity—are simultaneously sources of diversity which can inform each other, beyond. the efforts to package the mutual influence as a new product, and Keil considers these styles to accelerate collaborative learning and, thus, the creation of genuine culture.

Capitalism, Socialism, and Emancipation

The flatness of this society makes you despair of the human race, but we are flexible. Perhaps this is a 'fatal flaw' that we are flexible to the grave, but I think not. It is a wager that human nature is not the enemy, that our society can be changed from inside. (Diamond, interview, April 1989)

Diamond did not accept the notion of an invincible globalized state and an intractable market. Much of his work serves to reveal the basis for this positionthe recovery of local oppositions on the peripheries, emergent culture even at the heart of the "core." But, at the same time, he perceived Marx as fluctuating between two errors: a forced optimism, on the one hand, and a devastating pessimism, on the other:

Marx assumed the collective would dissolve into community. None ever has, for two reasons: The collective becomes self-reinforcing with reference to the production of "necessary" commodities, or the community

poses the ultimate threat to the continuity of the state. (Diamond, interview, April 1989)

While no anticommunist, Diamond never accepted the ideological uses of Marxism in defense of repressive bureaucratic state structures in the Soviet Union and elsewhere (Diamond 1979; see also 1975b). If socialism is to be realized, it cannot rest on the continuation of class relations and the exploitation of the vast majority of the people. He held hope for the People's Republic of China, despite the repression and recent capitalist ventures, for a deeply historical reason. No government has succeeded in ruling the country, and therefore there cannot be as thoroughgoing a suppression of cultural potentials as in other states. In addition, Mao at least recognized that bureaucratic entrenchment would destroy the revolution as a dialectical process (Diamond 1980b :309).

The call for a dialectical and critical approach is necessary:

The positive task of this critical anthropology is to help generate an alternative sense of human possibilities based on concrete cultural-historical inquiry, while interpreting and, where justified, supporting the multiplex reactions against [dehumanizing conditions] in our own society. (Diamond 1975b)

The essays in the final section of the book discuss dimensions of this formidable task. The authors explore the dimensions of domination in modern state societies and the danger to life and the multiple expressions of humanity that they pose. Agnes Heller opens the section with her evaluation of the concept of human nature as a metaphor for three different proposals: two are inherently reductive; the third, bound to an evolutionism, is also objectionable. For this reason, she proposes the concept of "the human condition" as a way to avoid reducing the human to the social or to the natural/genetic. The "living in tension" that is part of the concretized human condition is not between the genetic and social givens, but within historicity the accident of social setting, transformed culturally and socially into determination and self-determination in the process of maturation. The self, constituted through reflection and relations with others, through memories of experience, orients the ways in which the person recognizes and lives in the world. In situations of profound disjuncture between the person's selective recognition of the world and the range of what is considered normal in that particular world,

either the discrepancies become thematized or problematized, or life is seen to have no meaning.

Emmanuel Terray and Peter Skalník delve into the problems of state domination in the Soviet Union. Terray focuses on the nature of repression and the parallel effects of ideological domination within a bureaucratic structure whether medieval church or self-styled socialist state in rendering the expression of opposition or simply difference as heresy. He also offers reasons why the obvious analogies between witchcraft and Stalinist trials were noticed at first, but soon dropped. Skalník discusses the ways orthodox Marxism in the academy fossilized Soviet anthropology, a theme Diamond pursued in his debate with Alvin Gouldner. The academicians Skalník discusses include those whose efforts to question orthodoxy through a more dialectical engagement with the subjects of study through fieldwork and participant observation were thwarted by the establishment. Fortunately, today voices critical of a lockstep evolutionism are beginning to be heard, although they are as yet unable to reformulate Soviet anthropology to focus on more dynamic senses of culture creation.

Ulysses Santamaria and Alain Manville trace the origins of the stultifying trajectory of associating development or progress with increasing productivity in the misreading of Marx on human nature. Far from glorifying labor, they argue, Marx saw labor as inherently alienating, not to be confused or conflated with creative or transformative activity. What was human was the capacity to create a world, to transform the circumstances of existence, but it does violence to reduce creativity to the labor process. What is human is meaningful activity productive in the sense of creative or constitutive, rather than obsessive or compulsive. Any transformation based on the glorification of labor is intrinsically repressive; we are right to shiver when presented with variations on "Arbeit macht frei."

Ben Agger unravels the forms of positivist domination in social science, particularly American sociology, despite claims of postpositivist hegemony. Science is possible only when authors are aware of their own artifice in constructing an unprivileged view. In keeping with Santamaria's and Manville's critique of orthodox Marxism, Agger sees in some arenas of feminism the critique of wage labor as a privileged masculine bastion that negates other forms of constitutive activity. He seeks in the conjunctions among Marxism and feminism, and the decentering that can come from deconstruction, the necessary underpinnings for constructing a critical practice appreciative of

human diversity. One expression of this effort is writing against the disempowering ideology of science without reproducing the claims to an unaccountable expertise.

Wolf-Dieter Narr calls for a deconstruction of modern bureaucratic and technocratic domination, both structural and in practice. He presents a symptomology of the global crisis and offers a sketch of what a "prophetic radicalism" might be and glimpses of it in the interstices of civilization. Domination is viewed not solely as the political impositions and economic overlordship of capitalism or state socialism, but as the promotion of Platonic modes of abstraction, quantification and other technocratic thinking, scientism, atomization of the person, and the irresponsibility of bureaucratic organization.

Richard Falk pursues the possibility of a radical postmodernism and a politics based on the refusal to act in accord with the specialization that is the hallmark of civilization and the metaphor for the hierarchical divisions of race, class, gender, and the state. Yet he is critical of postmodernist politics that psychologically distance proponents from "ongoing struggles against injustice and suffering" stances he calls "Disneyland postmodernism" since they unwittingly contribute to an acceptance of the destructiveness of modernity. Instead, he sees in emergent political practices at the margins of modernity the potential for an ethically grounded, holistic, profoundly democratic, feminized, and dialectical opposition independent of a goal of state power. Such a politics builds on certain achievements of modernity while recovering the premodern past, infusing its "understanding and wisdom," and, thus, building a consciousness that "simultaneously inhabits premodern, modern, and postmodern realms of actual and potential being."

Alger Hiss, in a gentle, principled essay, stresses the threat of militarism and interstate rivalries for human survival. There are voices in opposition, and actions as well, but the threats from environmental degradation and war call into question the survival of our and all species. Efforts to stem the violence have been through organizations relying on states, and their inadequacy has been demonstrated. The danger is unprecedented and so must be the response.

The struggle for culture under alienating conditions, then, is a central concern in the work of Stanley Diamond. His writings and engagements against colonialism and its capitalistic and militaristic aftermath attest to a commitment to the kind of social transforma-

tion that would facilitate the shift or better, dialectical return of struggle to one of existential rather than political contradictions.

In this struggle for culture, what is emancipation? In an article on language and convention, Diamond argued that freedom does not refer to

some sort of technologically determined somatic immortality, nor to the achievement of a consumer's paradise, nor the mechanical deployment of an established religious formula, and certainly not to the successful escape from the contradictions of existence. (Diamond 1981a:172)

It is "the maturation of the spirit," a process dependent upon fundamental social transformation, where language and meaning become centered, once again, in community. Emancipation, then, becomes "the continuous creation of culture and the social resolution that is, transcendence of existential contradictions" (Diamond, interview, April 1990).

Notes

1. Beyond his attraction to the holism of Boas's four-field approach to human societies with culture at the core, Diamond's ties to two of the radical Boasians were both intellectual and personal. He studied with Gene Weltfish at Columbia until the school forced her out as a communist in the McCarthy era. Decades later, when he was in a position to hire, he brought her to the New School and edited a volume of essays (1980) in her honor.

While he never studied with Paul Radin, the congenial fit of many of their concepts drew them together. In 1957 Radin arranged for the publication of Diamond's dissertation in the Basso anthropological series. As it turns out, Radin died while Diamond was in Nigeria; Diamond shelved the project. Diamond had brought the peripatetic Radin to Brandeis and introduced new editions of two of his works on primitive society. He also edited *Culture in History* (1960) in Radin's honor and later wrote the entry on Radin for the *Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences* (1968b) and an intellectual biography of him for *Totems and Teachers* (1981).

2. Peter Suzuki (1981) examines the national character studies done on incarcerated Japanese-Americans during World War II.

3. See Diamond 1957; 1969; 1975a. In a different context, he uses the same contrast to criticize state-sponsored collectivities, which do not include communal control.

4. See, e.g., the essays in *Writing Culture*, edited by James Clifford and George Marcus (1986). More extended discussions of postmodern and

poststructuralist representation in ethnography can be found in Clifford 1988 and Paul Rabinow 1985, respectively; the dialectics of studying culture through informants are explored by Kevin Dwyer 1979 and Renato Rosaldo 1989.

5. See Diamond et al. 1964. This report was submitted at the request of the Seneca Nation to the Joint Senate-House Subcommittee on Indian Affairs, and read into the Congressional Record.

6. On anthropological poetics see, e.g., Iain Prattis (1985) and the special issue of *Dialectical Anthropology*, "Poets/Anthropologists, Anthropologists/Poets" (1986:24).

7. In the 1980s Diamond planned to begin fieldwork in the northernmost inhabited area of Greenland among a people who thirty years before rejected the American development projects associated with the Dew Line militarization of the Arctic "self-marginalizing" people who moved beyond Ultima Thule to avoid Western civilization. His plans were scuttled by the U.S. State Department.

References

Barthes, Roland

1977

Writing Degree Zero. New York: Hill and Wang.

Clifford, James

1988

Predicaments of Culture. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.

Clifford, James, and George Marcus, eds.

1986

Writing Culture: The Poetics and Politics of Ethnography. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Diamond, Stanley

1951

Dahomey: A Proto-State in West Africa. Ph.D. dissertation in anthropology, Columbia University. Ann Arbor, Mich.: University Microfilms.

1957

Kibbutz and Stetl: The History of an Idea. Social Problems 5.

1960

Plato and the Definition of the Primitive. *In* Culture in History: Essays in Honor of Paul Radin, ed. Stanley Diamond. New York: Columbia University Press.

1968a

War and the Dissociated Personality. *In* War: The Anthropology of Armed Conflict and Aggression, ed. Morton Fried, Marvin Harris, and Robert Murphy, 18389. New York: Natural History Press.

1968b

Radin, Paul. Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences, 300303. New York: Macmillan.

1969

Collective Child Rearing. *In* The Family: Structure and Function,
ed. Rose Coser. New York: St. Martin's Press.

1971

Introduction to *The World of Primitive Man*, by Paul Radin. New York: E. P. Dutton.

1972

Job and the Trickster. In Paul Radin, *The Trickster* (new edition), xixxii. New York: Schocken Books.

1974a

In Search of the Primitive: A Critique of Civilization. New Brunswick., N. J.: E. P. Dutton /Transaction Books.

1974b

Introduction to *Dollplay of Pilago Indian Children*, by Jules and Zunia Henry, ixv. New York: Random House.

1975a

Personality Dynamics in an Israeli Collective: A Psychohistorical Analysis of Two Generations. *History of Childhood Quarterly* 3(1):141.

1975b

The Marxist Tradition as Dialectical Anthropology. *Dialectical Anthropology* 1(1): 16.

1976

The Paris Commune in Communist China. *Dialectical Anthropology* 1(4):38386.

1979

Introduction: Critical versus Ideological Marxism. In *Toward a Marxist Anthropology*, ed. S. Diamond, 110. The Hague: Mouton.

1980a

Anthropological Traditions: The Participants Observed. *In* Anthropology: Ancestors and Heirs, ed. S. Diamond, 116. The Hague: Mouton.

1980b

Theory, Practice, and Poetry in Vico. *In* Theory and Practice, ed. S. Diamond, 309-29. The Hague: Mouton.

1981a

Beyond Convention. *New Literary History* 13:171-77.

1981b

Paul Radin. *In* Totems and Teachers: Perspectives on the History of Anthropology, ed. Sydel Silverman, 67-100. New York: Columbia University Press.

1982a

Subversive Art. *Social Research* 49(4):854-77.

1982b

Totems. Barrytown, N.Y.: Station Hill Press.

1985

Going West: Narrative Poems. Northampton, Mass.: Hermes House Press.

1987

The Beautiful and the Ugly Are One Thing, the Sublime Another: A Reflection on Culture. *Cultural Anthropology* 2(2):268-71.

1992

Dahomey: Dynamics of a Proto-State. Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, forthcoming.

Diamond, Stanley, ed.

1960

Culture in History: Essays in Honor of Paul Radin. New York: Columbia University Press.

1979

Toward a Marxist Anthropology. The Hague: Mouton.

1980

Theory and Practice: Essays Presented to Gene Weltfish. The Hague: Mouton.

Diamond, Stanley, William Sturtevant, and William Fenton

1964

Memorandum on the Seneca Indian Kinzua Dam Case. *American Anthropologist* (April).

Dwyer, Kevin

1979

The Dialogic of Ethnology. *Dialectical Anthropology* 4(3):205-24.

Gordimer, Nadine

1985

The Essential Gesture: Writers and Responsibility. *Granta* 15 (Spring):135-51.

Prattis, J. Iain

1985

Anthropological Poetics: Reflections on a New Perspective. *Dialectical Anthropology* 10(12):107-17.

Rabinow, Paul

1985

Discourse and Power: On the Limits of Ethnographic Texts. *Dialectical Anthropology* 10(12):11-4.

Rosaldo, Renato

1989

Culture and Truth: The Remaking of Social Analysis. Boston: Beacon Press.

Suzuki, Peter

1981

Anthropologists in the Wartime Camps for Japanese Americans: A
Documentary Study. *Dialectical Anthropology* 6(1):2360.

PART I

THE POLITICS OF CULTURE

1

The Practice of Politics and the Study of Australian Kinship

Peter Worsley

After a quarter of a century, I cannot pretend to provide the technical exegesis that is required of anyone who enters that most arcane of fields of intellectual inquiry, the theory of Australian kinship. The empirical data on the particular kinship system that Fred Rose and I and later David Turner studied, moreover, are now almost as remote from my consciousness as they would be to someone coming to them for the first time. I can present some of the problems thrown up by the different interpretations of that data by the three field researchers (and several other students); spell out some of the wider intellectual assumptions that inform those studies; and situate the experience of doing fieldwork within the framework of the wider Australian society.

The social context of research and the researcher's personal commitments are normally omitted in reports of fieldwork. Here, I deliberately interweave the intellectual problems I was working on and the political constraints that impeded my research. 1

Any account of an anthropologist's work involves a double dialectic: the interaction between the anthropologist and the people under study, their perceptions of him and vice versa, and the anthropologist's relationship to his or her own culture. If the setting under which research is carried out is necessary to our understanding of the process by which a report of that research is constructed, at best, it is usually reduced to the first dialectic: the relationship of anthropologist and subjects. The assumption that the culture the anthropologist is studying constitutes a consistent whole, however, is something we need to take as a problematic. Aborigines do not impute such a spurious unity to our culture, nor do anthropologists, except when they are theorizing. The aborigines distinguish between a missionary, a government officer, and an anthropologist. Nor is the anthropologist simply determined by an occupational identity in some one-dimensional way. Anthropologists are members of overlapping sets

of subcultures within a culture. Indeed, in one sense, it is not necessarily "one's own" culture at all, for what is normally referred to as "the" culture of white Australia is in reality the hegemonic subculture of those who dominate that society both materially and ideologically, and who diffuse (with some success) their values, ideas, and codes of behavior throughout the rest of society. But there are other subcultures that differ from the dominant one, the majority simply different or "accommodative,"² some conscious, "deviant," or even in active opposition to the dominant subculture. Rose and I were radically opposed, for instance, to the dominant value system of Australian culture.

I had been an officer in the King's African Rifles in World War II, and a member of the Communist Party. As the Cold War developed (and the war in Korea), that kind of compatibility became increasingly problematic. When I went back to teach in Africa, on the Groundnut Scheme, my mail was opened, and I had security officers in my classes. They reported that I was teaching Swahili. Despite that clean bill of health, when later I was appointed to a research post in then Northern Rhodesia,³ the appointment was vetoed by security.

One encounters the view, these days, that anthropological research was indeed what its radical critics accuse it of being: a child of imperialism. Where imperialism has given way to independence, the new conventional wisdom has it that liberal attitudes to research vanish, too.

"The empire," we are told,

was the traditional laboratory of anthropology, and, as colonialism disappeared, the emergent states were wary of anthropologists. Many of the African states, aiming for modernization, are hostile to studies of tribalism in their country [*sic*]. (Mack 1976:75)

It is true that colonial authorities promoted and permitted research which they thought would benefit them. They reacted equally swiftly when they thought research might do them harm. Of the tiny handful of left-wing anthropologists in the United Kingdom in the Cold War epoch, Ronald Frankenburg was prevented from entering St. Vincent; he was kept under surveillance and returned to the United Kingdom. He was eventually obliged by his university, not by security to do fieldwork near the university,⁴ where his professor could keep an eye on him, a verdict conveyed to him by that professor,

without the courtesy of an interview. Earlier, Frank Girling had succeeded in carrying out field research in Uganda, ⁵ but he was expelled before he had finished. Clifford Slaughter, who later participated in a pioneer study of a mining community,⁶ did so because he was assured he would never get into the colonial field. Leading professors openly declared that they would do their best, positively, to ensure that known communists never became anthropologists or, negatively, that they would not support them in applications for jobs.

Banned from Africa, I had to switch continents and was lucky enough to obtain a research studentship at Australian National University. As our ship entered the Great Australian Bight, we received news that Menzies' proposal to outlaw the Communist Party had been rejected in a referendum. But the offensive was soon to be resumed by more underhanded means.

I spent the first year preparing for fieldwork in New Guinea. The day before I was due to follow my luggage to the ship in Sydney, I was informed that I would not be given an entry permit. I decided to fight. Then began a nightmare of invasion of privacy, exposure to the tender mercies of newsmen, and unchallengeable accusations in Parliament. My fellow students' defense of the right of left-wingers to do research contrasted with the supine failure of senior colleagues to publicly stand up in a similar way. (On taking up the Headship of another department a little later, the incoming professor was told that one major task was to get rid of a distinguished known communist.)⁷

It was indicated to me, however, that if I were to publicly acknowledge my communist affiliations, it might do some good. But if one had the formal right to be a communist, the reality was very differentthe right to withhold as well as express one's political position is a key civil liberty, as the history of the struggle for the secret ballot shows. There were enough people trying to cut my throat without my doing it for them. Some people genuinely seemed unable to appreciate that political orthodoxy was no part of the job specification for ANU students. One colleague, who had intended to use me as an interviewer, was disturbed not at the attack on me, but at the damage to her research that my reputation might cause. Others could not understand why it was important to refuse to accept inquiries into one's private opinions, even less renounce them under duress, even thoughas the McCarthy hearings in the United States had shown, and as the Petrov Commission was to show shortly

attacks on communists were the first move in a smear campaign that later engulfed not only noted social democrats, but liberal democrats of all hues.

The Left in Canberra, the government city, was a tiny minority; public servants were virtually "underground," though not from choice. Since there exists a paranoid image of communists as proponents of nihilismauthoritarian personalities with a somewhat contradictory proclivity for both disorder and repressionit is worth recalling that despite our partial illusions about the Soviet Union, my comrades in Canberra were singularly humane and decent people, dedicated to improving the lot of their fellow men, and commonly pleasant and creative personalities. This is not to excuse bad faith, or to justify the adoption of unacceptable means in pursuit of noble ends. Nearly all of them, a little later, were to walk out of the Communist Party precisely because they did not believe in socialist values. But neither did they relapse into that other bad faith: the denunciation of "the God that failed" and the concomitant renunciation of an effort to overcome exploitation and inequality.

One of these people was a fairly senior civil servant in the Department of Territories named Fred Rose, widely respected by his colleagues, as I came to discover, and a warm and hospitable person. 8 None of that was to prevent him from being arraigned before one of the Cold War instruments of political intimidation and personal character assassinationthe Petrov Commission on "Espionage." When I was banned from New Guinea, it was Rose who suggested that I study the Groote Eylandt aborigines whom he had studied over a decade earlier. He would make all his field data available to me. A few weeks later I was on the island.

Fred Rose's major contribution to social anthropology, his meticulous and systematic analysis of the kinship system of the Wanindiljaugwa* of Groote Eylandt, Northern Territory (see Rose 1960), has been described by one eminent scholar as

not only a new *contribution* of kinship studies, but . . . a new *approach* to them. . . . The reader can follow the reasoning step by step and what is more, he can check it by means of the masses of factual data which accompany every stage in the build-up of the theory. . . . For the Wanindiljaugwa at least we now know exactly what is observed fact and what anthropological inference. (Josselin de Jong 1962:6667)

The kinship system was subsequently restudied by myself in 1953 and by David Turner in 1969 and 1971 (see Worsley 1954; Turner 1974).

Rose's techniques of fieldwork reflect his natural science training. They also reflect the *reasoned* quality of his research, as well as the care he takes to base himself on empirical data. Using photographs, rather than names or other descriptions, as a means of identifying individual aborigines, he elicited the kinship terms used by each aborigine he interviewed for the person in the photograph, and recorded these on a matrix form, together with data on the informant's membership of the key social groups and categories: age; sex; children; father and mother; clan, moiety, and local territory affiliations, plus totems; together with circumcision and cicatrization data.

Rose collected nearly 25,000 identifications out of some 50,000 possible, relating to 221 aborigines out of over 300 at that time. I collected over 11,000 identifications, from 36 interviewees, of some 300 other individuals, including children born since Rose's day who were old enough to make identifications. I was unable, however, to include young people born since Rose's day who lived at the Mission, because I was refused permission to go there. Twenty-eight of my subjects were people whom Rose had also interviewed. I was therefore able to calculate the extent of change over time. Six-hundred-forty terms out of 5,589 roughly 11 percent had changed in about fourteen years. In addition to following this method of Rose's, which was ego-centered, I used genealogical techniques employed by anthropologists in Africa that recorded descent, patrilineal kinship connections, and affinal relationships. These turned out to be, effectively, maps of relationships within the clan. 9 Through marriage links, the ties to other clans were traceable. The end product was a single chart for each clan, usually several feet in width. What is normally recorded as an "individual" genealogy in Australia is therefore by no means self-explanatory.¹⁰

Marriage relationships were determined by rules codified into a pattern of ideal relationships in the form of a system of kinship terminology. Sets of relatives were distributed over the different clans, which were further grouped into two moieties. "Correct" marriages, then, entailed alliances between clans, across the moiety divide.

These successive and cumulative sets of data provide a body of material unique for Australian kinship studies, both in terms of quantity and because they enable us to examine change over time in

societies so often treated as both timeless and friction-free by functionalist and structuralist students of "kinship algebra." 11 The sheer volume of data also overcame some of the usual problems of representativeness and of sampling and made it possible for other students to go to that data and rework it.12

But data, however plentiful, are not ready-organized and interpreted. What sense is made of them depends upon the theoretical framework within which they are analyzed. Rose was guided by an evolutionist model, drawn from the writings of Lewis Henry Morgan and Frederick Engels. For him, any particular kinship system was part of a wider succession of types of kinship system that had evolved successively over time. Each of these had different ordering principles. (In the case of the Groote Eylandt system, the preferred marriage category was that between persons belonging to clans in the opposite moiety, who stood in the relationship *neninja** / *dadinja** (MMBDS/MMBDD) to each other.)

Of English origin, Rose had been an undergraduate at Cambridge just before World War II and had originally studied natural sciences. Later, he had taken his Diploma in Social Anthropology. He then emigrated to Australia, and found employment in Broome, Western Australia, where he met Dr. A. T. H. Jolly, with whom he began research into aboriginal social organization and in particular into the intricacies of aboriginal kinship systems, long the principal aspect (apart from religious institutions) of interest to students of social anthropology the world over.

It may now seem paradoxical that anything as complex as Australian religion and kinship should ever have been taken as the epitome of the "primitive,"¹³ but this becomes comprehensible when set in the context of a world saturated with evolutionist thought, as a result of the Darwinian revolution in biology. Australian aborigines were thought to represent a survival into our own times of forms of social organization that had long disappeared elsewhere, and which constituted a distinct phase or stage in general social evolution. At the same time, and despite later assertions that synchronic and diachronic studies were mutually incompatible, nineteenth-century ethnographers also often studied such societies as functioning wholes and were often able to observe interrelationships between institutions in societies that were still nomadic. Kinship, for them, was not a phenomenon "in itself," but had to be related to the social organization and the values of the culture.

Ideas about Australian "uniqueness" also informed studies of ab-

original religion labeled "totemism" which were regarded as different in kind from other, more advanced religions, an assumption that persisted until well after World War II when Claude Lévi-Strauss finally demonstrated not only the resemblance of totemism to other religious systems but also, more widely, to general modes of thought used in classifying the world in all cultures (Lévi-Strauss 1969b). If this was a step forward, his "over-integrated" assimilation of the plurality of aboriginal modes of thought to one overall system was less happy, 14 as was his treatment of aboriginal kinship as a system of marriage and descent rules that fitted, unproblematically, with each other and that further regulated real-life relationships between small local groups of nomads, also in unproblematic ways. Just as aboriginal thought was presented as proceeding according to a unitary cultural logic and that logic, in turn, to a binary proclivity of the human mind (and even brain), so, it seemed, aboriginal kinship could be reduced not merely to a few abstracted, ideal principles but ultimately to one single formula.

Aboriginal kinship systems, of course, were not all alike. The normal response of the nineteenth century to this variety was not just to classify them into a limited number of types but to fit these types into a *succession*: to transform taxonomy into a sequential typology. Hence, though there were great debates as to where a specific system belonged, as to the nature of the types, and the postulated sequences, there was general agreement that each type must represent a stage in an evolutionary progression, not only of kinship, but also, more widely, of social organization as a whole.

Rose and Jolly, seeking guidance from Marxist theoretical work, had to fall back on the model elaborated by Engels in his *The Origin of the Family, Private Property and the State*, itself a reworking of Morgan's *Systems of Consanguinity and Affinity of the Human Family* (1871) and *Ancient Society* (1877), since, over half a century later, virtually no serious subsequent Marxist work had been added. Given the Marxist emphasis upon the economy as the crucial causal institution, Rose and Jolly were led, too, to ask how these different types of kinship systems correlated with differences in social and, above all, economic organization. In a small pamphlet, written by them under an aboriginal pseudonym, "Jagara," due to the political intolerance of the time,¹⁵ they tried to relate the distribution of types of kinship system to forms of the family through various phases of "primitive communism."¹⁶

These changes in family and kinship organization were conceived

of as successive stages in the transition from a once communitarian and egalitarian system of production and consumption to, ultimately, one in which the domestic unit was scaled down to the nuclear family. The stages involved the successive debarring of categories of kin from membership in the producing group and thereby from access to the goods produced by social labor within such groups.

The major category disenfranchised along the way comprised women, though categories of men who also lacked the means of production were further victims of the rise of private property. When Rose returned later to the problem of relating the almost obsessive regulation of kinship to production arrangements, he did not emphasize differential access to material resources for land was readily available and tools easily made nor "communal" production for in the aboriginal economy, to invert Marx's characterization of capitalist society, production was individual, but appropriation social (by members of the local group). Hence the hunter might, in some cultures, get nothing; in others, only a share similar to anyone else's, and had to distribute most of his production to relatives.

But the crucial economic activity was not hunting at all. It was the collecting of vegetables, an activity performed by the women. Citing the non-Marxists Webb and McConnel, Rose argued that polygyny was an "economic necessity," since a woman with a young child could not cope with food-gathering at the same time. 17 The age disparity between husband and wife was similarly explained as a mechanism, in a virilocal society, for ensuring that a child-bride would learn about the economic resources of her husband's territory at an early age, so that, when mature, she might fulfill her food-gathering role (Rose and Jolly c.1946:90).

Such attempts to explain variations in systems of kinship in terms of differences in production systems are unconvincing when aborigines the continent overallowing for ecologically determined adaptations had broadly the same methods of producing their subsistence and other needs, whereas the ways in which they organized their social life differed considerably which differences by no means coincided with ecological zones. Under the influence of Soviet ethnographers and physical anthropologists (Rose 1960:239ff., 480ff.), Rose later tried to rescue this kind of explanation by resorting to the conjecture that the transition from group to individual marriage had occurred in the Paleolithic as a consequence of the change from using a thrusting spear to using a throwing spear. This not only "enabled man to break the economic bonds that held him in

the primitive commune" (482), but also altered the structure of the brain, led to the end of cannibalism, and so forth.

Such arguments are late additions to Rose's major text, which is actually a palimpsest of overlaid ideas spanning twenty years. But it is actually heartening to note that in the last pages of his Postscript, he rejects the "idealized conception of equality" in the sexual division of labor among early hunting and collecting peoples (Rose 1960:483); rejects the notion that production was "collective"; and insists that group marriage has not existed since the Upper Paleolithic, being excluded by gerontocracy / polygyny (239).

It was probably because of these heresies that Rose's study, despite its publication by the East German Academy of Sciences, never got reviewed in the USSR. (Nor, equally scandalously, has it been reviewed in Australian scholarly journals.) Following the death of S. P. Tolstov, former director of the Institute of Ethnography of the Academy of Sciences of the USSR and editor of *Sovietskaya Etnografiya*, Soviet anthropology took on a new lease of life, and Morganist orthodoxies are now strongly criticized.

Less happily, Rose also rejected the notion of the exploitation of one sex by the other, and defined the division of labor between the sex-genders as simply "a completely different role for each sex in the production process" (Rose 1960:483), i.e., a functional differentiation, not an exploitative relationship.

Rose has now shifted his evolutionist conjectures to a more appropriate plane and object: human paleontology. These forays into science fiction, in any case, are marginal to his analysis of the empirical data he collected; his discussion of the possible influence of contact with Makassarese, for instance, is grounded in historical fact (1960:48790).

Like most writers on aboriginal kinship, he tries to explain inconsistencies in contemporary kinship arrangements in ways that do not necessarily depend at all upon assumptions about changes in production arrangements or property relationships, but which allow kinship a certain autonomy. Thus Rose writes of the "imposition of the patrilocal horde with its strong patrilineal tendency onto a kinship and marriage class organization that is essentially matrilineal" adding that this in its turn was "antedated by the breakdown in group marriage" (Rose 1960:166). Such arguments, though they may include speculations about economic causes of change in forms of the family, do not necessarily depend upon them any more than, say, Turner's speculation concerning the "possible origins of the moiety

division" (Turner 1974:9698). They also allow for both internal and externally induced change. Both writers, too, make it quite clear when they are speculating and what the grounds for their conclusions are.

There is good Marxist precedence for eschewing models that depend on the notion that one always has to look to economic relations in order to explain kinship and marriage. Engels himself observed:

The less the development of labor, and the more limited its volume of production, and therefore, the wealth of society, the more preponderatingly does the social order appear to be dominated by ties of sex. (Engels 1884:preface)

Pace McConnel, monogamous wives perform their economic roles perfectly effectively, as Rose, citing Webb and Kaberry, acknowledges elsewhere. 18 In any case, the division of labor the way work is carried out and the ensuing division of the product is itself a function of authority structures through which older men dominate younger men, and men collectively dominate women. It is not of some necessity immanent in a "nonpolitical" "mode-of-production-itself" as if people produced and consumed without reference to the authoritative distribution of rights and duties, institutionalized, sanctioned, and codified as cultural norms but by virtue of a *political* economy, in which cultural values are not a determined part of an alleged "superstructure," but, since they express relations of authority, themselves condition the division of labor, and hence are integral ("basic") to production.

Just as there is nothing in the nature or use of lathes that determines whether such machines are owned by capitalists or by the Ministry of Heavy Engineering, it is a cultural logic that converts biological birth into relations of descent and group memberships, sex into gender, and that further ensures that economic relationships like religious and other relationships are not independent of the cultural values and norms that regulate other activities.

But if the economy does not exist "in itself," or determine kinship structure, neither does the latter exist "in itself." Like all cultural values, kinship terminology systems are ideal codes that are liable to be contradicted by actual behavior, in the Groote case, by demographic imbalances, by deliberate flouting of the rules, and by external influences (here, the Makassarese, government, and missionaries). If the first model is a one-sided materialism, the second is a

one-sided idealism. Dialectical social science requires us to focus on the interplay between the subjective and the objective: in this case, between the ideal world embodied in rules that have to be applied to the real world of small groups of nomads. The ensuing accommodations cannot be explained simply in terms of some overall cultural logic that legislates, coherently and unproblematically, the conflicting interests of diverse social groups and that suffers no problems from change over time. One can no more "read off" the pattern of actual marriage or relationships within marriage from a table of kinship terms than one can deduce British marriage practices from a table of prohibited degrees, or infer from terms used in soccer what actual positions people bearing such labels will today take up on the field or how they will play, in those positions.

Discussion of change in aboriginal society is always open to the charge classically leveled by Radcliffe-Brown that it is merely "pseudo-historical" "conjecture and imagination" (1957:3). It is true that we have little worthwhile evidence as to what social life was like in the Stone Age; nor is there any scientific warrant for the nineteenth-century assumption that Australian aboriginal society provides us with a privileged insight into what Paleolithic social organization might have been. In the first place, the Australians are not the only foragers in the world, and such peoples in Asia, North and South America, and Africa apart from their organization into nomadic bands bear little resemblance in their forms of social organization to those encountered in Australia. The famous marriage-classes, for instance, are not universal features of social organization in foraging societies. Further, Ernestine Friedl has distinguished four *different* patterns of sexual division of labor among foragers (1975:1819).

If twentieth-century functionalism had driven out conjectural history, it also discouraged concern with any other kind of developmental and temporal framework, too, and thereby not so much refuted as suspended or "bracketed" legitimate discussion of history and evolution. And if functionalists were able to refute both the assumptions and the specific schemas of conjectural history, they only replaced it with holistic interdependencies that emphasized the uniqueness of cultural configurations. Where these *were* compared, they were only placed within a synchronic framework, not in any kind of developmental sequence. Whilst rejecting the narrow economic determination of kinship systems, the Marxist attempt to relate forms of kinship to the structure of the system of social groups

was, however, perfectly acceptable to functionalist and "structuralist" (actually culturalist) anthropologists. Lévi-Strauss, notably, emphasized exchange between social groups as the essence of Australian kinship. But functionalists and structuralists substituted for the "over-determination" of the base- and superstructure model a holistic overintegration of the social system.

In the Groote case, though Rose did connect the use of kinship terms to the basic framework of the clan system, only the barest outline of the latter was known. I was able to map the clans and their mythological charters in greater detail and depth, but there was still room for the marked improvement, even on quite factual matters, that Turner supplied later.

None of us was able to study aborigines still living as hunters and collectors, though we all spent periods in the bush with small groups of settlement aborigines. We were therefore forced to try to reconstruct the presettlement society with the aid of informants who had lived that kind of life. With reconstruction came the perils of conjecture, lapses of memory, and partiality: the conscious and unconscious revision of history.

Groote Eylandt was one of the first parts of Australia sighted by white explorers in 1623 (hence the Dutch name). But this involved no social contact. Contact with non-Aborigines only became significant when fleets from Makassar in the Celebes began to visit Arnhem Land and the Gulf, eventually annually. Flinders encountered them there in 1804, and they continued coming until 1907, when they were banned under the racist "White Australia" policy (see Berndt and Berndt 1954; Worsley 1955:111). By that time, white Australian penetration from the south had become much more important, especially after the opening of the Overland Telegraph line in 1879. By 1886 A. Searcy could write of Borroloola that

the district was in a state of terror [and] the crimes committed were beyond description. . . . in fact this country was a sanctuary for every ruffian in Australia. (Searcy 1909:169)

Aboriginal lands were steadily appropriated to form cattle stations, 19 their occupants killed or driven off or turned into "labor."

Groote Eylandt came under the effective control of the federal government only in this century. Even then, direct administration devolved to the Church Missionary Society, which had a base at the Roper River on the mainland opposite, and which eventually estab-

lished a settlement on the island in 1921, not for the aborigines, but for half-caste children.

In 1921, N. B. Tindale saw remains of stingray whips that had been used on the aborigines by the Makassarese. But by 1953 the Makassarese period was idealized as a time of plenty in terms of consumer goods obtained by working for the visitors, collecting trepang, shells, and so on, and by supplying services. Preoccupied with their contemporary dissatisfactions, the negative side of this relationship had been forgotten by the aborigines: severe conflicts over property, rewards, and work, and in particular over aboriginal women, resulting in resort to superior means of violence on the part of the Makassarese, and by equally ready recourse to armed counterviolence by the aborigines.

Flinders had found the aborigines in the Gulf suspicious and often hostile, and in a confrontation on Woodah Island, probably with the ancestors of the Wanindiljaugwa *, a native was killed. The very first white contact was thus bloody. Friction of this kind was to continue into our own times, with the killing of Japanese pearlers at Caledon Bay in 1932, again over aboriginal women, in the area where the Flinders incident had occurred over a hundred years earlier. Shootings, racist violence, and flagrant miscarriage of the machinery of "justice" in the Northern Territory were common throughout the 1930s (Berndt and Berndt 1954:14070).

In Rose's day the aborigines had only been settled recently, the westerners and Bickerton Islanders at the CMS station at "Anguruku" (Anwurgwa*); the rest, some 125, mainly from eastern and southern Groote Eylandt clans, at "Umbakumba" (Ambugwamba), under the authority of Fred Gray, an ex-pearler who had employed many of them in his pearling days, but who remained on the island after the outbreak of World War II, when the pearling industry collapsed. He established a kind of personal dominion quite common in nineteenth-century Pacific island history; he concentrated the formerly dispersed and mobile population in one place, and exercised effective control over them, initially with cautious de facto acceptance by government. When security in this area suddenly became vital, as the eventual Japanese offensive against Darwin proved, the situation was regularized by making Gray a "Protector" of aborigines. Gradually, government recognition was extended to actual support, as the settlement, which initially supported itself by hunting, fishing, and selling curios, finally became economically dependent upon welfare payments to the aborigines, mediated and controlled by Gray.

Rose had been a meteorologist stationed at the seaplane base across the bay from Umbakumba settlement, where flying-boats on the U.K.Sydney route stopped (see Rose 1968: chap. 7). Despite rules forbidding contact with the aborigines, Rose succeeded in persuading Gray that he had a genuine interest in studying the aborigines. He had made initial attempts in Broome, using orthodox genealogical techniques, but soon realized that the ideal differed considerably from the actuality. Lacking the languages, problems of identification and the unreliability of memory drove him to devise a method that would be as direct as possible: the use of photographs and the matrices of kinship terms. In 1941 he was able to return to Groote and put these techniques into operation, which yielded the data contained in his book. In 1948, and by then an official in the Department of Territories, he returned with the National Geographic Society's Australian-American Arnhem Land Scientific Expedition, which collected much useful natural-science material, including valuable material on nutrition, some aboriginal bark paintings, and a substantial amount of misinformation on Wanindiljaugwa * religion, much of which got subsequently published under the auspices of UNESCO (see Mountford 1956).

By the time I arrived on the island in 1953, no aborigines were living in the bush. All of them were living at one of two settlements.

Though I passed through the Roper River settlement en route to Groote,²⁰ I was forbidden to enter the Anguruku zone, as the mission had been alarmed at the prospect of a "red" anthropologist. This had very serious consequences for my work. It affected my ability to reconstruct clan structure, my knowledge of Wanindiljaugwa religion, and my study of the kinship system.

The majority of the Bickerton Islanders had settled at the mission. They were also the majority of the entire population there (372 out of 417 in 1969). Conversely, clans from Groote proper constituted the majority of those who settled at Umbakumba. Of these, the Wanindiljaugwa and two closely related clans from the south of the island were the largest component. The size, and therefore importance, of the Wanindiljaugwa is reflected in the fact that their clan name is also used for the tribe as a whole. This skew as between the two settlement populations accounts probably for the major divergence between Turner's account of the clan system and my own. His is significantly rich in detailed place-names for Bickerton and Woodah islands, and lacking in such detail for Groote proper (figs. 1, 3, pp. 4, 12). In my study, I regarded Groote and the adjacent islands as one

society, within which the Bickerton Islanders (who also had territories on Woodah Island) were merely another group of clans. In Turner's account, the Amagaljuagbathe collective name for the Bickerton people constitute much more of a tribe within a tribe, whose subsystem, however, was articulated with a parallel subsystem on Groote proper. 21 To the majoritarian main islanders among whom I lived, the relative autonomy of the Bickerton Island subsystem was not so salient in their consciousness. But it was to the people at the mission, among whom Turner principally worked. He therefore distinguished the "ideal model" of the clanship and kinship system of Groote proper from that of the Amagaljuagba of Bickerton. Yet the differences between the two subsystems, Turner wrote,

tended to be quantitative rather than qualitative. . . . Both . . . share a common language . . . , organize themselves according to the same principles and hold basically similar views of the world. For this reason I include both groups under the heading Wanindiljaugwa* . . . and speak of them as a 'tribe.' (Turner 1972:12123)

The most serious discrepancy between our accounts of the clan system concerns the second largest clan, the Wanunadarbalanwa*, whom Turner assimilates to the Bickerton subsystem, whereas I reported them as a Groote clan.

The problem seems to be resolved when we distinguish between the ritual affiliations of this clan and its actual territorial distribution. They had originated on Bickerton Island, and hence identified themselves for ritual purposes with places on Bickerton that figure in their "totemic" myths. But many of them had emigrated to Groote, to Badelumba on the northwest coast, probably, Turner estimates, about 100 years ago, because of the famine (Turner 1974:810). Such movements between Bickerton, Groote, Woodah, and other small islands, together with immigration from the mainland, result in discrepancies between the ritual affiliations of some clans and the actual locations they primarily used in subsistence activities though, like other Australian aborigines, they were by no means limited to these territories and roamed widely (Hiatt 1962:26786). The Wanunadarbalanwa at the mission were therefore mainly descendants of that branch of the clan that had remained on Bickerton Island. The other branch, at Mbakumnba, retained its ritual associations with Bickerton

but had long been resident on the main island. One of my key informants came from this branch; the other belonged to the Wanindiljaugwa * clan.

The history of feuding between Bickerton clans and Groote clans; the closer ties of the former with the mainland Nungubuyu; and the marked degree of endogamy within each subsystem (Turner 1974:1415) all were to be reflected in the later pattern of settlement, and, in particular, in the split between the two branches of the Wanunadarbalagwa* clan, which divided between the settlements. My information about Bickerton Island and western Groote clans was ambiguous and confused, since I could only see occasional members of these groups when they visited Umbakumba, constraints all the more galling in view of the feasibility of conducting a totally exhaustive study of a society still numbering only 450.

My inability to study religious beliefs and practices was even more serious. Religious rituals had been forbidden at the mission for many years, so exploration of religious life had to be made largely at the verbal level. Just as Christianity was introduced to Britain and became the dominant religion, so Groote religion was the end product of successive cultural importations from the mainland. All the main ritual specialists, in consequence, were westerners or Bickerton men, and lived at the mission. As a result, I never even met Balrumba, described by Turner as "the oldest and the most knowledgeable man in the Groote Eylandt area" (Turner 1974: frontispiece). Cultural repression (backed by sanctions described by the aborigines as "no pray, no tucker") and the splitting of the people into two inevitably resulted in a steady decline in the holding of the major religious rituals. The only one I witnessed unfortunately occurred shortly after my arrival, when I was only beginning to study the language and knew virtually nothing of the rest of the culture.²² Fortunately this major lacuna has been authoritatively filled by Turner's two chapters on "Man and Death." (One must enviously remark here on the vastly superior fieldwork made possible by the technological innovation of the tape recorder, which allows the user to play recordings of live rituals and other happenings at will, and to obtain glosses by expert informants, whereas my generation had to try to jot down notes literally in the dark, and supplement them by abstracted versions of texts collected later.)

Apart from religious repression, the most important interference with indigenous culture was in the sphere of marriage, where white intervention led to the abandonment of polygyny and the replace-

ment of a system of successive marriages by monogamy for life. The first serious account of the culture, by N. B. Tindale, had reported the virtual monopoly of younger women by older men:

[There was] general and strict enforcement of seclusion of the women of the tribe. No native from the time of his initiation until he is of age to marry, and no stranger, is allowed to approach the women, who are compelled to live apart in camps guarded by the older men, but they are secretly visited by those entitled to the privilege. The women are in a minority, and are monopolized by the older men, who each have two or more if possible. . . . The younger men . . . are not allowed near places where the women are likely to be . . . or to look at them, under penalty of spearing. . . . Few men under about thirty, unless they are of exceptional prowess . . . are entitled to wives. . . . Old men are sometimes deprived of their wives, and it depends on their influence whether they are assisted to find their former wives or not. . . . Several solitary old men, practically hermits, . . . have lost and been unable to regain their women. For the above reasons, no women were seen by any of our party except by accident. (Tindale 1925:7072)

No missionary saw a woman until 1925, and women only came with their children to live at the mission in 1937. Women were so effectively socialized into their roles that they shielded their bodies from even visual contact with other men, by wearing paper-bark wrappers ("like so many giant `jacks-in-the-box,' " said Tindale), whereas by my time they were much given to attracting male attention, e.g., by flashing mirrors to show where they were in the bush.

Though sheer physical prowess was undoubtedly a factor in determining who got and who lost wives, it will be noted that secret visits are described as being made by those "*entitled to the privilege*," and that old men were only "sometimes" deprived of their wives, and could retain and regain them if they used their influence, i.e., mobilized support. The norm for polygynists, moreover, was two wives (later confirmed by Rose), and only exceptionally as in most polygynous societies did "hyper-polygyny" occur, with some men having five or six wives. There is one case in my genealogies of a man who had thirteen wives as well as several liaisons which did not last long enough to merit being called "marriage." One living old man

had had at least nine wives, from seven of whom 32 children had been born.

But not all these wives were simultaneous partners. Rose was to show later that men were not allowed to marry until their late twenties. By the time they were thirty, they usually had women betrothed to them by older men to whom they stood in the relationship of *neninja* * (reciprocal, used between ego and his classificatory MMBDS), who was himself ideally the brother of ego's *dadinja**: classificatory "wife" (MMBDD). In the 3140 age range, 80 percent of the men had actually acquired wives. To secure a wife, the younger man had to present periodic gifts to his *neninja* to consolidate the relationship, and to perform various services such as carrying water, collecting firewood, and doing camp chores for him, to such an extent that the missionaries dubbed the relationship "slavery."

These figures, however, do not reveal the extent to which young men and women flouted this "gerontocratic" domination or the competition between gerontocrats themselves for women the "elopements" and abductions, particularly in the case of the very young girls, but also in later life. The result was that some three-quarters of the women in Rose's sample had been wife to two or three men. In my genealogies, several women had been partners to seven successive men. Groote Eylandt marriage, then, was both successive and "fluid."

A number of possible explanations for this state of affairs existed. One was to see it as an exaggeration of tendencies inherent in Australian kinship, due to demographic deviations from the ideal norms of kinship. A second was to regard them as merely temporary, abnormal, and historically specific deviations, rather than structurally inherent. "Foreign contact" was the main explanation of this latter kind.

Rose was able to point to comparative data that suggested that imbalances in age between husband and wife were by no means unusual elsewhere in Australia (Rose 1960:9199), and that recent as well as earlier anthropologists had ignored the extensive evidence that Australian kinship system patterns, in practice, often departed from the ideal (Rose 1960:chap. 13). Models of systems of kinship terminology, such as the "Aranda" type of kinship postulated for Groote were, then, artificial constructs of the anthropologists based on aboriginal statements of the ideal. The massive deviation from the "pure" Aranda-type marriage that Rose recorded was, he argued,

not due to "exceptional" circumstances but was a built-in consequence of gerontocracy. In the Groote case, symmetrical sisterexchange marriage and marriage with the father's sister's daughter (FZD) could not possibly have been compatible with a gerontocratic age-skew in which the average difference in age between wife and husband was 17.5 to 18 years. But averages obscured the sequential nature of marriage: the greatest difference²⁵ years occurred when the wife was twenty years old or younger. By the time she was 30, however, the difference was reduced to only between 2 and 4.3 years (Josselin de Jong 1962:43, 45, 49).

A similar pattern of "gerontocratic" monopoly of the younger women by adult males, of exclusion of the younger men, and of political challenge to these arrangements, resulting in "fluid marriage," has been reported for the Tiwi of Melville and Bathurst islands, a society similarly long exposed to intensive contact with Makassarese and white Australians (Hart and Pilling 1960).

This splendid and economical account of the politics of kinship, based on fieldwork done by Hart in 1930 and Pilling in 1952/1953, reveals remarkable parallels to Groote. The Tiwi (who, surprisingly, had no contact with the mainland until the white epoch) had had hostile relations with the Makassarese. They rarely allowed men below the age of 25 to marry. Some might be betrothed to an infant girl, at times even before her birth, but most men had to wait for older men to bestow a wife on them later. Either way, the older men used women as "political capital" rather than being primarily interested in them as sexual partners. In the extreme, there were gerontocrats with 20, 25, and 29 wives. The young men, conversely, were made to lead a

monastic existence, speaking to no one (especially not to females) and obtaining their own food. . . . the tutors guarded the boy as if he were literally a prisoner . . . taught him . . . things grown men should know and allowed him to go home . . . at intervals . . . , but otherwise he was under a strict rule of obedience. (Hart and Pilling 1960:94)

This compulsory celibacy was naturally flouted, leading to "endless charges of seduction against younger men," young wives becoming pregnant "with monotonous regularity . . . , no matter how ancient and senile their husbands," and an "enormous frequency of

disputes, fights, duels, and war parties. . . . 90 percent of legal affairs were matters in which women were in some way involved" (Hart and Pilling 1960:7980).

Large households of dependent women and younger men "meant wealth, power, prestige, and influence," the "surplus food and surplus daughters needed to increase one's influence" (Hart and Pilling 1960:67). Struggle over their possession of women was therefore the main form of political conflict. Most disputes, started as interpersonal fights, like those I witnessed, or as more formal duels, but even war parties between groups took the same form in a society where everyone is related to everyone else on both sides, so that intermediaries immediately start to bring the disputants together, and the main purpose of the shouting and the drama is highly public moralizing and recrimination. Hence the remarkable number of misses at close range by expert spearsmen.

As on Groote, the system came to an end when the missionary, Father Gsell, purchased infant widows for axes, flour, tobacco, and cloth, redistributed them to younger men, and gradually eliminated polygyny, child-betrothal, and marriages between partners whose ages were very different, though large households headed by "boss" men still persist.

Though the authors "avoid involvement in the labyrinthine complexities of Australian kinship organization," they do note that the ideal "Kariera" system of the Tiwi "could not accommodate all the complexities that had been introduced into Tiwi life by the emphasis on infant bestowal and widow remarriage where the generations kept getting badly mixed up" (Hart and Pilling 1960:27).

On the basis of his field data, Rose had argued that due to demographic variation, there was an intrinsic probability that there would be variability in the number of people to be found in each cell in the system of kinship terminology; in some cases, actually empty cells a hypothesis confirmed by his research. The crucial cell was that of potential marriage partners. Where it was empty, this could only be overcome by breaking the rules, and then rearranging the terms in use between the parties to these "deviant" marriages.

Thus I found boys in one sample with 23, 20, 14, 10, 9, 8, 7, 5, 4, 3, and 1 legitimate potential marriage partners; two with none at all. My own research pointed to a concomitant source of imbalance at the level of clanship. There were disparities between local groups, which ranged in size from the 104 Wanindiljaugwa * (including a small subgroup, the WanunAmagula*) or the largest clan in the opposite

moiety, the Wanunadarbalanwa *, with 63 members (figures, however, which include the smaller Bickerton Island branch, which, as Turner shows, were separately organized as part of the Bickerton subsystem). At the other end of the scale, the Wurengilangba* of Bickerton only had nine members in 1953; the Wanunamagadjeragba* of the opposite moiety four members.

Demographic variation was thus one cause of the breaking of the rules. But they were further broken as the result of a quite different process because men strove to appropriate and maximize their holdings of women as part of a Tiwi-type power play. Indeed, those who broke the rules most often were quite likely to be men who, far from being short of women, were ambitious "hyper-polygynists." These two sources of deviation from the ideal were probably further exacerbated by the external factor of the Makassarese connection, which, it seems reasonable to infer, led to "an increase in importance of the male side of production accompanied by a decrease in the female side" (Rose 1960:590), as Eleanor Leacock argues for the Montagnais-Naskapi [Innu] of Canada (Leacock 1954).

But although male dominance and gerontocracy may have been strengthened significantly by contact with the Malays, it cannot be assumed that aboriginal kinship had hitherto been a perfectly integrated system. Foreign influence may have only acted upon and exaggerated imbalances, including unequal relationships between older and younger men and the "stealing" of women, which may have been present already within the system of kinship and marriage. This indirect stimulus to gerontocracy was, however, different in kind from the direct intervention in the marriage system by whites, which delivered the deathblow to both gerontocracy and overt polygyny.

On Groote, men played the key roles in the other major area of social control and expression, religion. Women participated to the extent of being present, listening, and watching, but the actual intervention came from women past the age of childbearing. This group has been defined classically by anthropologists as virtually "sexless," in terms of the primary dimensions of the social allocation of roles: sex and age. The classic definitions certainly confuse sex differences with gender, failing, for instance, to investigate whether transcendence of childbearing merges previously masculine and feminine genders. Alternatively, recent studies of the Warlpiri have explored changes in women's rituals and social decision making through the life cycle, particularly through previously overlooked parallel religious engagements.²³ One can safely assume that the extent of adult

and older women's authority varied. I would hold that on Groote, the society appears decidedly patriarchal.

Age is the second major dimension grading women and men. Physical maturity by no means coincided with social maturity for men. Entry into full manhood was a protracted process, symbolized by circumcision and then by successive cutting of cicatrices on a young man's chest. Like gender grading, the other major principle running through the cultural order, this division was not merely one of function, but an inequality of status. As we have seen, men served their *neninjas* *; after this period of service to their brothers-in-law, they became independent again, following each one's (delayed) first marriage.

But in the case of women, lower social status was permanent. Their superior economic contribution was contradicted by this inferior social status. While the society was classless in the classic Marxist sense that everyone had access to land or rather to the animals and plants thereon; everyone could make the tools needed, and everyone acquired the skills needed to use them at an early age. But rights over people did not parallel this classlessness. The asymmetry and inequality that women experienced were not, of course, biological "givens" but were produced by the attachment of cultural values to attributes of age and sex, converting the former into gerontocracy, the latter into a form of patriarchy. These cultural values are not reducible to any "logic of production" or other utilitarian arguments that tend to project materialistic values from capitalist society onto possessive individualism, competition onto peoples who are not materialists.

That said, demographic variation and gerontocratic competition for women were bound to create deviations from the norms embodied in the system of kinship terminology. Such perturbations probably intensified under Makassarese and white influence. Young and older men were increasingly driven to compete not only for women to whom they had no legitimate rights who did not fall into the category of "preferred" marriage partners but who were actually specifically *forbidden* to them. I have even recorded cases of men marrying their (classificatory) mothers! What they did to legitimize these and other deviant marriages was to change the kinship labels used in respect to these partners, for example, a spouse who was a "younger sister" had now to be called by the term for the category of women from whom one's wife/wives were legitimately obtained. But changing the term one uses for a marriage partner clearly requires

concomitant changes for terms used vis-à-vis the immediate kin of the spouse, at the very least. But a limit must be set on the chain reaction that would otherwise ensue in a society where everyone is related to every other person by several close routes. The aborigines would otherwise have been faced with constantly readjusting the *whole* set of terms in use. In any case, such readjustment was impossible in practice, since "wrong" marriages were increasingly common, and new sources of disorder were constantly created.

The outcome, in my analysis, was a pattern that was not chaotic but not a coherent, internally consistent whole either. Order was restored by recourse to certain key principles that established what I called "islands of order," within which consistency existed, and that were articulated to other such "islands"; but across-the-board consistency did not obtain. The first key zone in which minimal order was reintroduced was within the spouse's family. Both the spouse and his/her full siblings were retermed *dadinja* * or *neninja* *. But halfsiblings were not; nor were spouse's parents retermed. The sorting out entailed was thus a descending reorganization, of very limited range laterally, from ego's generation downwards. Relationships outside the clan were not determined absolutely by ego's structural membership in a clan, and that clan's membership of a moiety, but situationally and relatively, by kinship: the *closest* relationship was invoked, whether it be through the father or through the mother, or constituted affinally through ego's marriages, ego's parents' marriages, or those of his/her full siblings. Within the clans, clusters of relatives were brought into relationship by classifying not only full siblings under the same kinship (those for junior and senior sibling of each sex) but also children of the father's real and classificatory brothers. In such a highly polygynous society, the codification of all these as "siblings" resulted in large agnatically related clusters within each clan. Further, since the aborigines, like working-class English people, have no interest, material or otherwise, in remembering people beyond the range of those who could be personally remembered, their genealogies are "shallow" only two to three generations deep. Further, only the more important males get remembered over time; the others get forgotten; and their descendants are assimilated, via siblingship ties, between males of the ascending generations as descendants of the few "big men" who do get remembered, in the pattern of telescoping and fusion

familiar from the classic Bedouin studies (Peters 1960). But unlike the Bedouin, the genealogies do not then recede backward toward one apical ancestor. The fusion of

these agnatic clusters therefore results in clan genealogies that represent the great majority of living persons as if they had descended from a handful of brothers a generation or two back.

In my model, then, the only place where total consistency reigned was on the ideal plane: in the normative algebraic model embodied in the kinship terminology. Actual kinship and marriage were so often at variance with this model that it did not constitute a consistent whole. But it did provide principles which were selectively used in order to rearrange kinship terms so as to provide "incorrect" marriages with the cachet of orthodoxy and respectability. 24

This picture of endemic and increasing deviance has been in part discounted by Josselin de Jong's reminding us of the essentially sequential nature of marriage in Groote Eylandt society. By taking into account the whole sequence of marriages in which people were likely to be involved, certain ideal normsthose of bilateralitycan be shown as being realized in the long run:

A typical Groote Eylandt life history might be as follows: A girl goes to live continuously with her first husband when he is in his thirties and she is about 9 years old; when he dies, she remarries someone closer to her own age; and when he too dies, and she is elderly, she marries once more, this time a much younger man who will look after her in her old age. Now if one analyses the age data for husbands and wives, one finds that a female on the average is married to a husband of 42 years, whatever her own age might be; and this tendency to be married to a 42-year-old husband reaches its peak when she is about 24. . . .

Because a woman (or rather a very young girl) first marries a man much older than herself, this husband will have died while she is still young. Therefore that woman has on average three or four husbands in the course of her life. . . .

A man could not marry his FZD [father's sister's daughter] in a primary marriage, as he is too young; but towards the end of her life an old woman marries a young man. . . . In that late marriage a young man does marry an older woman, so FZD marriages would be possible. . . . The . . . terminological 'fiction' of bilat-

eral marriage proves not to be as fictional as it first seemed. (Josselin de Jong 1962:49, 4546)

Hence the assumed incompatibility of the Aranda marriage pattern, embodied in the kinship terminology, with a gerontocratic ageskew, can be resolved. A man's "primary" marriage was with a matrilateral cross-cousin; a subsequent one with a patrilateral cross-cousin. The system of kinship terminology, Josselin de Jong argues, "appears to compress the consecutive marriages into one simultaneous primary bilateral marriage (i.e., a man marries a woman who is both a maternal and paternal cross-cousin, or an MMBDD who is also an MFZDD), ethnocentrically conceived on the pattern of the "single, monogamous permanent marriage." But the bilaterality, rather, is "consecutive, not simultaneous."

Thus order was restored in respect of bilaterality. Turner's later study went much further, portraying a system in which marriage basically occurred between two sets of clans, one in each moiety, making them virtually "semi-moieties." As we saw, Turner makes the Amagaljuagba of Bickerton and Woodah islands into a separate subsystem within Wanildiljaugwa social organization as a whole. From one moiety, the Wuramarba * clanspresumably Turner's "Wanunaungeragba*" and "Wuraliljana*" in figure 1 (Turner 1974:45)intermarry with the Wanunadarbalanwa* and the Wuragwagwa* (which subsumes two small clanlets, the Wanunamadada* and the Wurengiljanba*).²⁵ The Groote subsystem is similarly constituted by two *pairs* of clans in each moiety.

Between the four pairs of clans on Groote, two in each moiety, and the four clans that constitute the Bickerton subsystem, there is an isomorphic and systematic ideal fit. "Ideal," because, again, numbers in each clan vary considerably (and the Wanunmurugulja* are actually extinct!).

This ideal model of Turner's links together, for the first time, the system of kinship terminology with the system of clanship, by introducing a bridging entity, the "terminological classes," hitherto omitted from both Rose's analysis and my own, for the complete set of kinship terms is now seen to be parceled out in subsets attached to the clans, which therefore constitute "terminological classes" also. Observing the rules indicated by the kinship terms therefore simultaneously distributes marriages between clans in the two moieties. Clanship and kinship are perfectly integrated.

Yet Turner does label these subsystems as "ideal" and notes that they are contradicted in reality:

The same discrepancy is found to exist between marriage ideals . . . and marriage practices as between the ideal and actual assignment of kin terms. (Turner 1974:57)

Only 35.9 percent in the zero generation-level of one Bickerton Island sample conformed to the ideal (for spouses) (Turner 1974:50), whereas in the preceding generation, 75 percent of the terms were consistent with the ideal.

Most of these discrepancies, however, Turner attributes to the direct intervention of whites, who broke the power of the gerontocrats, since Gray and the missionaries persuaded the polygynists into surrendering some of their wives, in some cases via the inducement of material goods (Turner 1974:6162), at other times by the threat or use of force. These wives were then redistributed to younger men. The massive disturbances Rose and I reported, then, as long antedating settlement life, are seen as a comparatively recent "transitory phenomena during a period when traditional norms were being brought into question" (Turner 1974:103).

The aborigines themselves attempted to eliminate the contradictions in the system on one occasion at least, "just after the establishment of the Mission" i.e., circa 1943-1944 when a meeting was held between senior males of different clans, in which it was agreed that whatever terms were then in use (and often at variance with each other), they should be replaced by the ideal terms for people of the same generational level who were now to call each other elder or younger sibling (Turner 1974:94-95).

But this has not eliminated the sources of deviance from the ideal. White interference may have eliminated some of the contradictions created by polygyny, especially hyper-polygyny, but it has created fresh sources of contradiction, both for the logic of marriage and kinship and in terms of the social conflicts that inevitably ensue when incompatible rules are imposed upon such an interdigitated system. Turner argues that "the wife-distribution of the mid-1940s made worse an already deteriorating situation" (Turner 1974:65). Insofar as the new, enforced monogamous marriages followed ideal norms, no conflict was entailed. But some marriages occurred that were quite impermissible according to aboriginal norms, notably because marriage was allowed between any two persons as long as their

parents were not actual siblings. Conversely, marriages that were perfectly valid in aboriginal eyes were refused. This led eventually to attempts by young men to assert their traditional rights; conflicts with the white law, and, ultimately, to charges of "carnal knowledge" being made against several young men in the period 1959-1965. 26

Turner's model evoked my admiration at its elegance, and my suspicion of the degree to which it fit with reality. An even more "orderly" model had been developed by a Hungarian anthropologist, János Láng, who found the Groote system to be a variant of Aranda, with eight vertical groups (= clans), and marriage relationships between no less than 40 groups of sibling pairs (Láng 1960; 1963). The next student, F. E. Tjon Sie Fat, was to dismiss Láng's model of "circulating connubium and matrilateral cross-cousin marriage" as "extremely conjectural" and fitting badly with Rose's empirical data (Tjon Sie Fat 1978).

Turner's model was a much more impressive attempt to restore order. If its great strength was in the construction of an ideal model, it was less convincing in its handling of the massive deviance Rose and I had stressed. But order was not to reign for long. Using the methods of componential analysis, Tjon found that the terminological system depended upon five primary rules and seven extension rules, instead of the 34 main and seven subsidiary rules used by Turner. They agreed, however, on the existence of four patrilineages over which kinship terms were distributed and that regulated marriage (Tjon Sie Fat 1978:3235, fig. 2). But he rejected Turner's systematicity as incompatible with "establishing new relationships whilst at the same time holding on to existing ties" (48). He concluded that

[Turner's model blurred] all distinctions between different levels of analysis. [It was] . . . a total model of society in which myth *is* social behaviour, *is* kinship terminology in a direct, logically consistent one-to-one relation of elements. . . . [But] myth, social structure, terminology and behaviour [are] distinct systems, to be described by different types of models. . . . Relations between levels are not necessarily . . . simple one-to-one reflections. . . . Thus, the logical structure . . . [of] myth may even comprise a total inversion of the rules at the level of the social structure. (Tjon Sie Fat 1978:55)

With these methodological principles in mind, he reanalyzed Rose's data, and concluded that Turner's "perfect sociocentric"

model was itself a myth. Though each clan was indeed "the focal point of an area of terminological regularity . . . extending outwards and intermeshing with other patrigrp systems," these themselves were "not necessarily in perfect accord" (Tjon Sie Fat 1978:75). Though there might be *temporary* "relative consistency," "at the fluid boundaries of conflicting systems," "the possibility of choice and manipulation" rendered sterile any project of total synthesis (ibid.). To a partisan of negotiated islands of order in a sea of deviation from the ideal, this seemed convincing and more consonant with other modern studies, such as L. R. Hiatt's study of the Gidjangali (only brought under government control in the 1950s) (Hiatt 1965), which depicted kinship and marriage as a *political* phenomenon the "politics of bestowal" in which the "rules" were freely broken and thereby deviated from the ideal models of Lévi-Strauss and Josselin de Jong. Catherine Berndt, too, noted that for the Yirkalla people the ideal marriage was "not always possible"; that other types of union were "acceptable"; that "big men," by virtue of "economic considerations and physical force and threat," especially deviated from the ideal; and that those developments were "unequivocally . . . not, of course, a post-1946 development" (Berndt 1970:3941). "Even in traditional or quasi-traditional times . . . , people . . . seem to have worked on a series of priorities, or possibilities" (48). In addition to sheerly deviant marriages, then, she suggests that *various* kinds of marriage had always been legitimate.

For Groote, this question deserves more attention. Future researchers might well start with the term *narngija* * (MMBS). Rose, a most careful fieldworker, significantly never noted it at all.²⁷ I noted that wife's father was *narngiya** or *neba* in 53 percent of the cases studied, and that a further 23 percent of wife's fathers were termed *nabura* (FZS).


Similarly, spouse's mother was only 29 percent *dadidja* (MMBD) as she should ideally have been and 37 percent *dunwija** (FFBD). Obviously, these discrepancies make the operation of the ideal system impossible.

Turner's remarks on the term *narngija* are significant:

It is now used primarily to mean 'wife's father'. . . . *Few* younger informants could deduce the term from a combination of 'progenitor terms,' and *some* older ones were able to name relatives they called by this term who were not, in fact, their wives' fathers. . . . The meaning

of the term . . . is *now* being adopted into NABERA. (Turner 1974:50; emphasis added)

From my data, there were evidently three main terms *sheba*, *nabura*, and *narngija* **being* used for wife's father, and I further conflated *neba* and *narngija* because the aborigines did. Rose missed the latter altogether. The clue seems to be provided by Tiwi data: on marriage, Hart and Pilling observe, a Tiwi man immediately calls his wife by "a new and different kinship term which can only be translated 'wife.'" Unlike Groote, he also reterms wife's father and mother by "correct" terms. It was, they remark, "a system based on actual marriages, rather than kinship categories" (Hart and Pilling 1960:28).



When I got back to Canberra in 1953, after eleven months in the field, I had to write up my thesis in six months, inadequately grounded as I was in the comparative literature of Australian kinship, especially its bilateral and systemic aspects in which Turner is so well versed.

In April 1954 as I was finishing the manuscript, the defection of the Soviet diplomat Vladimir Petrov was announced and the news that a Royal Commission into Espionage was to be set up. In the atmosphere of renewed persecution of the Left, my friends were busy burying communist literature in their gardens, and as I already had been branded a "red," and had been in the embassy only weeks before, it seemed likely I might be attacked again. But the anticommunists were out for much bigger prey.

Russian spies come in two kinds: those who are, and those who are not. Of the latter, there are those whom governments believe to be spies and those whom they simply accuse of espionage in order to smear their opponents. Like the McCarthy and the earlier Zinoviev Letter and Reichstag Fire Trial scares, the Petrov Commission was used to smear many of the leading liberal intellectuals, as well as leftwing political figures, not excluding the leader of the opposition, Dr. H. V. Evatt. "Such was the McCarthyite atmosphere at the time that mere mention of a person's name at the Commission meant sensational publicity of the worst type."²⁸

Fred Rose had left Canberra the year before. I had always regarded as a little paranoid his suspicions that he was being followed and that his phone was being tapped, but in 1954 he was proved

right. After being transferred to another department, he had decided to quit, and went farming in Tasmania. He was then dragged before the Commission, but proved a "most unsatisfactory witness," in the words of the final report, because he refused to incriminate his friends. Like all the other "witnesses," no charge was ever made against this "spy who never was" in the most fatuous of smear campaigns. Subsequently, Rose went to East Germany, where his wife's parents lived, and ultimately became Professor of Anthropology at Humboldt University, where the Academy of Sciences published his now classic study.

I left Australia in 1954 and was able to follow up my interest in Melanesian cargo cults, which I had been forced to abandon. 29 I also rewrote another study that won me the Curl Prize of the Royal Anthropological Institute. But it was made very clear to me that there was no future, in a discipline where there were very few jobs anyway, for someone with my political record. I therefore moved into sociology.

I had hoped that others would be able to continue my research. Rose himself tried to do so, but was refused permission to enter a reserve in central Australia, where he had hoped to do comparative research to match his Groote work. He then went to Angas Downs, in central Australia, where he was able to do some research, complemented by further materials gathered during a 1965 visit, when he also spoke across the continent on the position of the aborigines and gathered material on their growing political activities (see Rose 1965). This tour infuriated the establishment, who proceeded to ban him from Groote on a further visit in 1968. Then the Australian press made a dramatic discovery: Rose had been tracked down to East Berlina fact well known since 1956, and he had been professor there for many years. In 1962, he had been banned by Paul Hasluck, Minister for Territories. By 1968, it was W. C. Wentworth's turn.

For the benefit of non-Australians, Hasluck is a leading Liberal (i.e., conservative), who once wrote a pioneering book on aboriginal policy; Wentworth is a scion of a leading Australian pastoralist landowning family and a leading figure on the far right. A self-appointed and utterly dedicated anticommunist, he had, for instance, organized a demonstration at Mascot Airport, Sydney, in 1954, when Petrov's wife was flying off to Moscow after her husband's defection. Backed by a group of refugees from Russia, Wentworth staged a dramatic protest at her abduction. In 1968, under parliamentary immunity, and despite the fiasco of the Petrov Commission, he accused Rose of

having a "particularly bad record of treachery." 30 He was also a member of the AIAS (Australian Institute for Aboriginal Studies) Council but had been absent when that body agreed to award Rose financial support for fieldwork. However, wearing his other hats as Minister for Aboriginal Affairs he was able to make sure that the institute's money did not get wasted by banning Rose, an act denounced by the Australian branch of the Association of Social Anthropologists of the British Commonwealth and by the Federal Council for the Advancement of Aborigines and Torres Straits Islanders. The social anthropology group of the AIAS went further, and called for an end to the system of permits altogether, since, as one leading anthropologist put it, it was an example of "State Tyranny," which assumed that aborigines needed protection from themselves and from unscrupulous whites, but never admitted that they needed protection from the authorities or that the system simply protected the administration itself from adverse criticism.³¹

The arguments for and against the system of permits were carefully considered by J. A. Barnes, professor of social anthropology at Australian National University, in an article that was such a classically judicious statement that it deserves to be more widely known (Barnes 1969:1731). Its subtlety is lost in summarizing it. He began with elemental problems: the tension between the "quest for enduring principles and underlying causes" and the necessity of "the art of the possible, Which calls for qualities of compromise and tactical commonsense" qualities needed, too, by any fieldworker. A person's religious and political beliefs, he accepted, were of relevance both for fieldwork and publishing. Nor did he go as far as most of his AIAS colleagues in social anthropology: Short-term visits to reserves should be "open," as long as aborigines were protected from interference in their daily lives (a condition at present violated by mission and administration), but longer-term visits ought to be approved by the aboriginal community concerned.

Thus far he presented the "civic case," argued as a citizen. As a professional, he noted that "social anthropology demands a substantial measure of detachment from the values of any one cultural system." Hence the discipline tended "to attract students who are already critical of their society." (I am always impressed by the conventionality of the majority.) But in the field, they *did* "have to become partial conformists" (Barnes 1969:24).

In a later work, he developed a model of the ethical problems of social science, which identified four parties to the research enterprise:

the subjects (or objects) of the study, the scientists, the sponsors, and the "gatekeepers." (One might add the audience.) A sponsor might reasonably reject a fieldworker with an "all-embracing . . . rigid ideology that blinkered him from any new interpretation that may be suggested by the facts before him" (see Barnes 1979:14ff.). Again, the fieldworker's religious or political commitments might alienate the community under study. Or he might spend his time expressing those values instead of doing research.

Rose clearly had unique expertise, and was almost obsessively, one might say dedicated to unraveling the Groote Eylandt kinship system. He was a conscientious fieldworker and had made no attempt to mobilize the aborigines for communism. The bald fact that he was a communist "was irrelevant," therefore. If he had, as the Minister for Aboriginal Affairs W. C. Wentworth claimed, "prostituted his position as an anthropologist," this was a matter to be taken up by his professional colleagues, just as it would be the proper concern of the Central Committee of the Communist Party had he used his membership in the party to improperly foster his anthropological career, e.g., by covertly studying the party. However fundamentally he disagreed with Rose's view that aborigines could never win equal rights under capitalism, Barnes concluded that Rose's anthropology and his communism were quite compatible. All that had happened, in the end, was that "some interesting anthropological work" had been prevented from being done.

At the other end of the world, observing Hasluck and Wentworth still playing their roles, one could almost be forgiven for thinking that this particular movie had been made long before the Australian "New Wave," or that, however much Australia might have changed otherwise, Australian governments, like the Bourbons, had learned nothing and forgot nothing. The world-renowned anthropologist Max Gluckman had been banned, too, from New Guinea in 1960, possibly because the cultural lag built into the dossier techniques of security services ("never remove anything from the file") prevented them from appreciating his subsequent shift rightward.

The next blow to Groote studies was delivered when Turner went back in 1971. He was intercepted by members of an apparently most unattractive tribe, the Nimda (Turner 1972:12135), who treated all strangers as enemies and used various strategies to prevent anyone passing through their territory. Devious in the extreme, harassment, delay, and accusation were used as normal devices. By the third page,

one realizes that the tribe can be identified by spelling their name backwards.

Turner never found out why he had been excluded possibly because he was wrongly suspected of having incited aborigines to protest when a survey party planted a flag on their most sacred hill; possibly because of his description of missionary interference in marriage, or his account of the rise of the "new road" (see Turner 1979:1726). But not knowing why or how is an intrinsic part of the repertoire of repression: the terror of indeterminacy. Things *had* changed in Australia. Now Turner was barred, he was told, at the request of the aborigines, a novel device that obviously pleased its makers, because they used this democratic mechanism again against Rose in 1973, when under a Labour Government, and with trade union assistance he actually got his feet on the island (as Turner, briefly, had).

By this time, there was much more to hide than merely the archaic activities of the missions. The giant Broken Hill Proprietary mining corporation was mining manganese on Groote, and a prawning factory had opened. Capitalism had arrived, and in industrial form. Minimum wages had been awarded to aborigines in 1967: 49 men were employed in mining by 1969, 11 of them as skilled or semiskilled workers, and some 20 women at the factory. Their level of commitment, however, left much to be desired, as absenteeism figures showed. But with mounting world criticism of the devastation of aboriginal reserves, through the removal of the very soil a literal "rip-off" in the search for uranium and other ores and the implantation of apartheid through the provision of very modern quarters and facilities for whites and inferior ones for aborigines, mining on Groote became a new point of sensitivity. One classic response on the part of the aborigines was to resort to alcohol.

But there were other responses, too. A continent-wide reassertion of aboriginal pride and identity, symbolized in the Canberra "Aboriginal Embassy," obviously drew inspiration from Black Power in the United States, and was strongest in the cities. In 1954 I had argued that the majority of aborigines were mainly proletarians, working in the pastoral industry of the interior.³² But they have since been steadily displaced by machines and forced back once more into settlement life, where Victorian-style missions now, however, coexist with the most modern extractive industry, and where, for the first time, the aborigines are in contact with trade unions (Pittock 1979).

On Groote, according to all accounts, there is a new mood, especially among the young, of independence from white tutelage, secular or religious.

As for kinship studies, it should be clear from the present discussion that there is one key actor: Wentworth was unqualified to express any kind of opinion upon Rose's competence as an anthropologist. Wentworth was, in any case, not really concerned with anthropology. For him, the crusade against communism was an absolute, and became a paranoia, entailing denial of any kind of civic rights to communists, even when they simply wanted to study that most arcane of topics, aboriginal kinship. So political power was used to stop them. As for propagating communism, "if it could be shown that on earlier occasions Rose had set out to make political converts and to form Communist Party cells among Aborigines . . . , it might reasonably be argued that his inquiries into kinship were only a byproduct of his political activity" (Barnes 1969:27). But as Hiatt observed, "Although he spent quite lengthy periods on Groote since 1938, he seems to have failed completely to convert the people to Marxism." And Rose himself had no illusions: the people were more likely to greet him, he once remarked, with crucifixes than with hammers and sickles.

It is commonly assumed by enemies of Marxism that Marxists are only interested in actively promoting revolution, and that they never concern themselves with any intellectual issues other than those that promise some payoff for revolutionary praxis. Much of the discussion on the part of Marxists themselves about the relationship between political commitment and intellectual work makes similar assumptionsthat social science, or art, are only worthwhile instrumentally, as tools or weapons of the revolution. In this view, the study of aboriginal kinship would be quite useless, except perhaps insofar as it contributed to the debate on social evolution.

Rose, Turner, and I were all deeply concerned about aboriginal rights, and Turner and I wrote substantially on the contemporary situation of the Wanindiljaugwa *. Yet none of us regarded the study of kinship as worthless, if only because the application of human reason to any object is valuable both because it extends the power of our reasoning and because it illuminates the object. I accept that the kinship system doesn't matter practically to anyone but the aborigines and those who deal with them. But it is a narrow-minded pragmatism that only attends to the immediately useful. The value of "pure" science, for instance, does not necessarily depend upon any

possible immediate applications. Nor, in principle, can one necessarily know the possible future applications of what is presently designated "pure" science. That left-wingers studying socially important areas are likely to find themselves blocked in the process is obvious. The present case shows that because of their politics they may get prevented from studying anything, useful or otherwise. It is important, then, that the right to study the impractical is not lost sight of in a "revolutionary" assertion of the "unity of theory and practice" that, in fact, oversimplifies the complex and often oblique and contradictory relations between theory and practice. Just as the applications of good theory may not be very obvious, so as Chinese acupuncture shows us you can have perfectly effective practice with no theoretical explanation of why it works.

Notes

1. For an exception see Alan Dawe 1973:2555.
2. "Accommodative" is Frank Parkin's (1972:88ff.) term to describe one kind of working-class adaptation to the status quo.
3. The political climate in Northern Rhodesia and its consequences for anthropological research have been described by Richard Brown (1973: 17397; 1979:52541) and by J. Clyde Mitchell (1977:30918).
4. Frankenburg later published this work as *Village on the Border*, a study of religion, politics, and football in a North Wales community (1957).

5. He even got it published by the Colonial Office (Girling 1960). Discussion of the contemporary place of the Acholi in the economic and political system of colonial Uganda were excised, however, together with observations on Engels's theory of the family.

6. See N. Dennis, F. Henriques, and C. Slaughter 1956.

7. Outside the social sciences, Dr. Tom Kaiser, expelled from the CSIRO for his support of the miners in the 1949 strike, spent five years in temporary positions, was short-listed for some 30 permanent posts (including four chairs), but did not get a permanent position until 1954.

8. The quality of Rose's work is reflected in a study he carried out on the cattle industry in northern Australia (1954).

9. Turner (1974) uses the term "local group" for what I call the "clan." I prefer to reserve "local group" for those small units which lived, hunted, and collected together, usually made up of one or two nuclear or extended families or parts of them. They belonged to the same clan and had a special ritual relationship to the clan territories. While they spent perhaps most of their time in these territories, they might from time to time recombine to form a different existential group "on the ground," and make use of other clan territories as well.

10. Catherine Berndt (1970:2850) refers to "truncated" genealogies containing nearly 500 names. If these are ego-centered networks, a handful of such charts would cover the entire society. But genealogies are maps of group relationships; hence, one does not collect them for just any individual but for descent groups.

11. See, notably, A. R. Radcliffe-Brown 1931:20646, 32241; A. P. Elkin 1938; and Claude Lévi-Strauss 1969a.

12. Rose's field data are available in his book (1960:244572) something almost unthinkable in publishing in the capitalist world. My own genealogies, kinship matrices, and other field notes are available through the Australian Institute for Aboriginal Studies [AIAS], Canberra, with the exception of one clan genealogy for the Wuramura *, unfortunately lost. It could easily be reconstructed in the field.

13. See, for example, the rich and profound cosmology and philosophy embedded in the ritual cycles of the Yirkalla aborigines, studied by Ronald and Catherine Berndt (1951; 1952).

14. See Worsley 1967:14159.

15. See Rose and Jolly c.1946.

16. See also Rose and Jolly 1932:4487; 1942:1516.

17. Rose, in Rose and Jolly c. 1946:95.

18. Rose 1960:8485. I am therefore obliged to recognize the force of the criticism by Marshall Sahlins of my own 1955 paper on Tallensi kinship (1976).

19. There seems to be no record or memory of the "pastoral holding" on Groote Eylandt in the 1880s mentioned by Rose (1960:13).

20. On asking whether there would be any Christmas festivities on the island, I was at first mystified when told that there weren't many children therethough I knew the population had been risinguntil I realized that this referred only to *white* children. Aboriginal children did not enter the missionary's consciousness as falling within the same social universe as white children: an accurate reflection of the apartheid situation.

21. The "ideal models" of the two sets of clans are given in two diagrams in Turner (1974:59, 6869).

22. I later became reasonably proficient in this language, described with Nungubuyu by Capell as "by far the most complicated language in north Australia, perhaps in the whole of Australia." See Worsley 1952:30714.

23. See, for example, Bell 1980; 1982. There were earlier views that contrasted with the prevailing descriptions: see, for instance, Phyllis Kaberry 1939; and, later, Jane Goodale 1971.

24. My approach was therefore different from Radcliffe-Brown's, which assumes a functional fit between terminology and social relationships within kinship as an ordered whole.

25. I erroneously attached the name Wuragwagwa * to another pair of clans ritually related to these two but living on the main island. I was never confident about this. For the record, though, I did mention the Woramaminjamandja* (1954:86), which Turner (1974:6) says I omitted.

26. Ibid.: 63. *En passant*, Turner resolves a classical issue in anthropology. *Pace* Malinowski, who built a large edifice on the basis of alleged Trobriand ignorance about biological paternity, the Wanindiljauwa*, at least, "do recognise a connection between sexual intercourse and conception, but say it takes prolonged intercourse over a period of two to three months to 'make a seed.' . . . From this they conclude that the genitor must be the one who has had the most intercourse with the woman who has given birth to the child" (1974:26).

27. Though he picks up a typing error in my thesis, a reference to this person as MMBDS (1954:70). For the record, the father of O on page 222 should also read "53% I," not "53% L," and on page 250, marriage with the "offspring of an N," not "offspring of an O."

28. See especially "The Rose Case," in Cedric Ralph (1956:296307).

29. The work was later published (Worsley 1957).

30. Hansard, House of Representative Debates (April 6, 1968:1886).

31. Hiatt, letter to *The Australian* (July 6, 1968).

32. I published the piece anonymously for obvious reasons (1954). Exercising my legal right as a citizen to belong to a legal political party and my right within that party to criticize its policies and to formulate alternatives, I was even invited to a meeting of the Central Committee to put my arguments, which were directed at the then dominant belief (in leading circles in the party) that aborigines were predominantly nomads living in the reserves. The debate is an interesting refutation of the view that there is no reasoned and documented discussion of policy inside Communist parties, simply "power struggles" and "factions." I wrote a similar article on New Guinea cargo cults, under Rex Chiplin's name; the last paragraph was added by Chiplin (1952). I was pleased to see that these contributions had been appreciated in the Soviet Union; see S. A. Tokarev and S. P. Tolstov 1956:53, 56, 512.

References

Anonymous (Peter Worsley)

1954

A New State in the Development of the Aboriginal People.
Communist Review 153:28285. Sydney.

Barnes, J. A.

1969

Politics, Permits, and Professional Interests: The Rose Case. The
Australian Quarterly 41(1):1731.

1979

Who Should Know What? Social Science, Privacy, and Ethics.
London: Penguin/ Harmondsworth.

Bell, Diane

1980

Desert Politics: Choices in the "Marriage Market." *In* Women and Colonization, ed. Mona Etienne and Eleanor Leacock, 239-69. New York: Praeger.

1982

Women of the Dreaming. South Hadley, Mass.: Bergin and Garvey.

Berndt, Catherine

1970

Prolegomena to a Study of Genealogies in North-East Arnhem Land. *In* Australian Aboriginal Anthropology, ed. Ronald Berndt, 285-50. Canberra: Australian Institute of Aboriginal Studies.

Berndt, Ronald, and Catherine Berndt

1951

Kunapipi: A Study of an Australian Religious Cult. Melbourne: Cheshire.

1952

Djanggawul: An Aboriginal Religious Cult of North-Eastern Arnhem Land. London: Routledge.

1954

Arnhem Land. Melbourne: Cheshire.

Brown, Richard

1973

Anthropology and Colonial Rule: Godfrey Wilson and the Rhodes-Livingstone Institute. *In Anthropology and the Colonial Encounter*, ed. Talad Asad, 173-97. London: Ithaca Press.

1979

Passages in the Life of a White Anthropologist: Max Gluckman in Northern Rhodesia. *Journal of African History* 20:525-41.

Chiplin, Rex, and Peter Worsley

1952

The Awakening of Melanesia. *Communist Review* 126:176-79.

Dawe, Alan

1973

The Role of Experience in the Construction of Social Theory: An Essay in Reflexive Sociology. *Sociological Review* 21(1):255-5.

Dennis, N., and F. Henriques, C. Slaughter

1956

Coal Is Our Life: An Analysis of a Yorkshire Mining Community. London: Eyre and Spottiswoode.

Elkin, A. P.

1938

The Australian Aborigines: How to Understand Them. Sydney: Angus and Robertson.

Engels, Frederick

1884

The Origin of the Family, Private Property and the State. First edition.

Friedl, Ernestine

1975

Women and Man: An Anthropologist's View. New York: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston.

Frankenburg, Ronald

1957

Village on the Border. London: Cohen and West.

Goodale, Jane

1971

Tiwi Wives. Seattle: University of Washington Press.

Girling, F. K.

1960

The Acholi of Uganda. Colonial Research Studies 30. London.

Hart, C. W. M., and Arnold Pilling

1960

The Tiwi of Northern Australia. New York: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston.

Hiatt, L. R.

1962

Local Organization among the Australian Aborigines Oceania
32(4):26786.

1965

Kinship and Conflict: A Study of Australian Community in
Northern Arnhem Land. Canberra: Australian National University
Press.

Josselin de Jong, P. E.

1962

A New Approach to Kinship Studies. *Bijdragen tot de Taal-, Land-,
en Volkenkunde* 118(1):4167.

Kaberry, Phyllis

1939

Aboriginal Woman: Sacred and Profane. London: Routledge and
Kegan Paul.

Láng, János

1960

Marriage System and Its Evolution in Australia and in Certain Oceanian Primitive Communities. *Acta Ethnographica* 9:36994. Budapest.

1963

The Term System of the Groote Eylandt Aborigines (Australia). *Acta Ethnographica* 12:18593. Budapest.

Leacock, Eleanor B.

1954

The Montagnais-Naskapi "Hunting Territories" and the Fur Trade. *American Anthropological Association Memoir* 61.

1972

Introduction to *The Origin of the Family, Private Property and the State.*, by Frederick Engels. London: Lawrence and Wishart.

Lévi-Strauss, Claude

1969a

The Elementary Structures of Kinship. London: Eyre and Spottiswoode.

1969b

Totemism. London: Penguin/Harmondsworth.

Mack, Joanna

1976

Students of Mankind. *New Society* 36(707).

Mitchell, J. Clyde

1977

The Shadow of Federation: 1952-1955. *African Social Research*
24:309-18.

Mountford, Charles

1956

Records of the American-Australian Expedition to Arnhem Land.
Vol. 1: Art, Myth and Symbolism. Melbourne: Melbourne
University Press.

Parkin, Frank

1972

Class Inequality and Political Order. London: Palladin.

Peters, Emrys

1960

The Proliferation of Segments in the Lineage of the Bedouin of Cyrenaica. *Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute* 90:2953.

Pittock, A. Barrie

1979

Australian Aborigines: The Common Struggle for Humanity. IWGIA Document 39. Copenhagen.

Radcliffe-Brown, A. R.

1931

The Social Organization of Australian Tribes. *Oceania* I:20646, 32241.

1957

Structure and Function in Primitive Society. London: Cohen and West.

Ralph, Cedric

1956

The Petrov Conspiracy Unmasked. Melbourne.

Rose, Frederick G. G.

1954

The Pastoral Industry in the Northern Territory During the Period of Commonwealth Administration, 1911-1953. *Historical Studies* 6(22):15072. Melbourne.

1960

Classification of Kin, Age-Structure, and Marriage amongst the Groote Eylandt Aborigines: A Study in Method and Theory of Australian Kinship. Berlin: Akademie Verlag.

1965

The Winds of Change in Central Australia: The Aborigines at Angas Downs, 1962. Berlin: Academy of Sciences.

1968

Australia Revisited. Berlin: Seven Seas.

Rose, Frederick G. G., and A. T. H. Jolly

1932

The Place of the Australian Aborigine in the Evolution of Society: A Vindication of Lewis Henry Morgan. *Annals of Eugenics* 12(1):4487. London.

1942

An Interpretation of the Taboo between Mother and Son in Law. *Man* 42(5):1516. London.

c. 1946

Lewis Henry Morgan, Frederick Engels, and the Australian Aborigines. Sydney: Current Book Distributors.

Sahlins, Marshall

1976

Culture and Practical Reason. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Searcy, A.

1909

In Australian Tropics. London: Robertson.

Tindale, N. B.

1925

Natives of Groote Eylandt and the West Coast of the Gulf of
Carpenteria. Records of the South Australian Museum 3(12):7072.
Adelaide.

Tjon Sie Fat, F. E.

1978

Wanindiljaugwa * Kinship and Marriage: An Evaluation of

Models. University of Leiden/Australian Institute of Aboriginal Studies.

Tokarev, S. A., and S. P. Tolstov, eds.

1956

Narod Avstralii i Okeanii. Moscow: Academy of the USSR.

Turner, David H.

1972

Nimda Rites of Passage: A Comparative View. *Anthropological Forum* 3(2):112135.

1974

Tradition and Transformation: A Study of Aborigines in the Groote Eylandt Area, Northern Australia. Canberra: Australian Institute of Aboriginal Studies.

1979

Fieldwork. *In* *Challenging Anthropology*, ed. David H. Turner and Gavin A. Smith, 1726. Toronto: McGraw-Hill Ryerson.

Worsley, Peter

1952

Noun-Classification in Australia and Bantu: Formal or Semantic? *Oceania* 22(4):30714.

1954

The Changing Social Structure of the Wanindiljaugwa *. Ph.D. thesis in anthropology. Australian National University. Canberra.

1955

Early Asian Contacts with Australia. Past and Present 7:111.

1957

The Trumpet Shall Sound. London: MacGibbon and Kee.

1967

Groote Eylandt Totemism and *Le Totemisme Aujourd'hui*. In The Structural Study of Myth and Totemism, ed. Edmund Leach, 141-59. London: Tavistock.

2

From Consanguinity to Heredity

Claude Meillassoux

Translated By Alide Kooy

To understand kinship systems we must examine them in themselves, in the historical, economic, social, political, and cultural context in which they are constituted and formalized, and in which they operate. In this respect the study of history is essential in order to reveal the existence of distinct systems, to demonstrate the particular circumstances in which they developed, and to open the way for a differential, rather than analogous, analysis of their content. The pathbreaking work of historian Marc Bloch (1939) provides a lively and convincing account of the evolution of kinship in France during the Middle Ages and of the way in which the notion of heredity was constructed during these transformations (see Bloch [1939] 1968).

According to Littré, in jurisprudence heredity means both "the quality of heir" and "the right to acquire the whole or part of the possessions left by a person on his or her death" (Littré [1887] 1959). But Littré adds the physiological meaning to the word: "An organic condition through which corporeal and mental patterns of behaviour are passed from ascendants to descendants." This second usage, which is equivalent to the English notion of consanguinity, has been adopted by French anthropology.

In a remarkably modern work of historical anthropology, Bloch notes that in the thirteenth century, the nobility was "finally constituted as a hereditary corps" (Bloch 1968:188).¹ The appearance of the warrior added the "new and specifically feudal relation of vassalage" to the links of kinship (184).² Heredity was the point of convergence of several movements provoked by the adaptation of kinship to this political constraint: the masculinization of family relations, the substitutes of linear father/son relations for collateral ones, and the recognition of seniority or "elderness."

In rural Europe in the high Middle Ages, the "peasant family

community" dominated, grouping together up to fifty or seventy people.

Throughout the country districts there were numerous "brotherhoods" groups consisting of several related households sharing the same hearth and the same board and cultivating the same common fields. The lord frequently encouraged or even enforced these arrangements, for he considered it an advantage to hold the members of the "communal households" jointly responsible. (Bloch 1965:12324)

Undoubtedly such arrangements were less common in the higher classes . . . Many petty lords, however, . . . practiced parcenary [impartible inheritance] just as the peasants did. . . . The great nobles themselves were not always strangers to these community practices. (13031)

The man who was brought before a court found in his kinsmen his natural helpers . . . a collective oath sufficed to clear the accused of any charge or confirm the complaint. (124)

It was, however, in "the vengeance of the kinsmen which we call *faide*" [feud] . . . that the ties of kinship showed themselves at their strongest. (12526)

The nobles, who tended to reserve the use of arms for themselves, turned the feud into a class privilege. Since the feud involved the whole lineage, its scope had to be limited to prevent interminable and bloody acts of vengeance and to protect innocents from "the most glaring abuses of collective solidarity" (Bloch 1965). The decrees of William the Conqueror restricted the feud to the murder of a father or son, thus paving the way for unilinear filiation. But under the reign of Philip the Fair, the indemnities that ended a feud still involved the entire kinship group.

It was also in the interests of the aristocracy and of the church to encourage individual appropriation so that donors could dispose of their possessions to profit either the higher nobles, "whose patrimony was swelled by the pieces of land ceded more or less voluntarily by small landowners," or the clergy, which was "continually enriched by gifts" (Bloch 1965:132). In this context Jack Goody sees the church as having a determinant role in shaping the family

(Goody 1983). Nevertheless, among the superior classes the consent of collaterals was necessary for the alienation of possessions, at least until the generalization of mercantile exchange. "From the twelfth century onward . . . changes in the economy rendered restrictions on buying and selling more and more irksome . . . genuine sale became a frequent operation" (Bloch 1965:13233). Thereafter, "*vast gentes* or clans, defined and held together by a belief whether true or false in a common ancestry," virtually disappeared in the feudal West (137). Further, Bloch found that the primacy of masculine descent, specific to the Roman *gens*, was absent: "Each individual had two kinds of relatives, those 'of the spear side' and those 'of the distaff side.'" (137). In kinship "the ties . . . through women were nearly as important as paternal consanguinity" (137).³ Such bilateral kinship attributed, as in the epics, a preponderant role to the maternal uncle. The surname, when added to the given name, is either the patronym or the matronym. Bilaterality "this double link" "had important consequences."

Since each generation thus had its circle of relatives that was not the same as that of the previous generation, the area of the kindred's responsibilities continually changed its contours. . . . How far along the lines of descent did the obligations towards [*sic*] 'friends by blood' extend? (Bloch 1965:138)

Certain customs went back as far as the common great-great-grandfather or even one generation further back: "On close examination, however, it looks as if from the thirteenth century onwards a sort of contraction was in progress [that favored] groups much more like our small families of today" (139). Bloch attributes this shift in part to the substitution of state protection for the solidarity of the extended family. State protection meant that feuds were less frequent, and "forswearing" (voluntary exit from the kinship group) less dangerous.

Other, more profound social changes were probably also at work. The lack of registered civil status meant that belonging to a kinship group could only last as long as the group itself was maintained. Invasions, as well as the clearing of new lands for cultivation or the attraction exercised by urban centers, dispersed families and led to "the early ruin of the old lineage systems." Were these factors the origin of the surname? As knowledge of genealogies was eroded by the breakup of lineages and as written acts proliferated, the

patronymic became indispensable. It was used by those wishing to preserve the support of the group even when physically distant from it. It was extended to bourgeois families for the requirements of trade. Bloch emphasizes the as yet tentative nature of the groups so formed.

It was not till much later that strict heritability of names was imposed by authorities together with civil status in order to facilitate the work of police and administration. . . . The permanent family name . . . was the creation not of the spirit of kinship, but of the institution most fundamentally opposed to that spirit the sovereign state. (Bloch 1965:141)

Above all, "the social conditions we call feudalism were also marked by a real retraction of the ties of kinship" (142).

Paradoxically, this took place on the basis of vassalage, a situation that linked two individuals without kin ties, for a period that did not extend beyond their lifetimes. "Vassalage was the form of dependence peculiar to the upper classes who were characterized above all by the profession of arms and the exercise of command" (147). Unlike serfdom, vassalage did not impose hereditary (and humiliating) ties to the lord's lineage. The lord could either feed and fit out at his own expense the men whom he attached to himself to form part of his trusted retinue or he could "house" (*chaser*) them by allocating them a plot of land. But, "since vassalage was not transmitted by inheritance, the remuneration of the vassal could not, logically, take on a hereditary character" (164). Nevertheless, it became increasingly difficult to refuse to pass on to the heir the vassal's responsibilities and, with them, the fief. It was said, "Take care not to deprive the orphan child of his fief" (196). Bloch elaborates: "To write the history of feudal inheritance would involve compiling statistics, period by period, of the fiefs that were inherited and those that were not. . . . the solution in each particular case depended for a long time on the balance of forces" (196).

This practice might have been initiated by the church in the tenth century, allowing its vassals to pass on their fiefs through inheritance. But for the laity in this period, "on the rare occasions when a lord agreed to recognize the hereditary devolution on a fief, he would have this concession set down specifically in the deed of grant" (197).

After the middle of the twelfth century, the position was inverted: presumption was in favor of heredity. Even in these circumstances, to whom should the inheritance be granted? The law of succession ex-

pressed a number of varied situations in which succession favored collaterals, but in which neither women nor, at times, fathers were excluded. In no case was primogeniture imposed. Bloch points out with considerable finesse that "centuries of feudal law and dynastic law have accustomed us to accord a certain prior right to primogeniture. . . . In reality it is no more 'natural' than so many other myths on which our society rests today" (Bloch 1965:197). Practical considerations, stemming from feudal management, transformed the notions of family and kinship. Since the fief was indivisible, the succession had to be limited to a single heir. This necessity was in "conflict with the ordinary rules . . . of succession, which in the greater part of Europe, favored the equality of heirs of the same degree. . . . In the Middle Ages primogeniture, even in royal houses, was not accepted without much opposition" (203). Sometimes custom favored not the eldest but the youngest; sometimes the lord could choose the most appropriate of his sons; sometimes the heirs preferred coparcenary. It was in the twelfth century that primogeniture was introduced, "by the roundabout route of entail" (204). 4

Even in monarchic law, primogeniture was not the prescribed form of succession at first (358). For a long time election with the consent of the clergy, rather than hereditary succession, was dominant (384). Later, other principles of heredity came to compete with this practice, but even so, primogeniture was weighed against "the rights of the child 'born in the purple'born, that is to say, when his father was already king. . . . Even in the middle of the twelfth century, Frederick Barbarosa appointed his second son as his successor" (385). Finally, with the increasing use of filial heredity, the short genealogies characteristic of the dominant families during the first part of the feudal period lengthened (28485). The most noble of these families tried to find mythical ancestors; both the Guises and the Hapsburgs retrospectively adopted Godefroy de Bouillon. From an original situation characterized by the extended family headed by the eldest of the seniors, with selective collateral succession and short genealogies, by the end of the Middle Ages we see a shift to unilineal masculine succession, the dominance of the father over the grandfather, seniority based on primogeniture, the constriction of family membership, genealogical extension, and the personification of ancestors.

We see a shift from a domestic kinship system to a dynastic one: "The triumph of heritability in this sense was the triumph of social forces over an obsolescent right" (190).⁵ But with the restriction of kinship, so-called fictive kin links proliferated. More than ever, they

were indispensable to the correction of the overly constraining or inoperative effects of heredity. Kinship, bogged down in hereditary ideology, had to be given practical ways of functioning.

The development of dynastic kinship also fixed the separation of classes. For the privileged nobility, fed by the labor of serfs, it was no longer a question of organizing the production and circulation of food between generations. The main purpose of the new dynastic kinship was the transmission of the titles and of power that perpetuated the class relation.

Thus, the notion of heredity emerged in our society from a determinate historical situation, in the geographical context of Western Europe, and not from timeless or universal factors. Indeed, other elements of the vocabulary of kinship in Europe also seem to date from the same period. We are led to conclude that the historical events described by Bloch contributed to a more precise formulation of dynastic kinship as it existed at the time. The terms *genealogy* and *paternity* seem to date from the twelfth century; the word "maternal" from about 1370 and *maternity* from 1470 (Bloch and Wartburg 1975). From the twelfth century onward, in French the term *grand'père*, replaced *aieul* (elder, or dean). The latter change is especially significant, since through the use of this structured term the notion of father (*père*) became the central linguistic point of reference, replacing the notion of *aieul* at the heart of kinship. The father (*père*) asserted himself as intermediary between his children and the *grand'père*, who no longer exercised supreme authority as had the *aieul* in domestic kinship.

In the sixteenth century, the word *heredity* acquired a physiological content, designating that which is transmitted through reproduction from parents to descendants. *Consanguinity* in the Roman sense goes back to 1277, precisely the period identified by Bloch as the one during which heredity was imposed (Bloch and Wartburg 1975). It is logical that, in the ideology of the dominant class, individual qualities transmitted by heredity went along with the possessions to whose acquisition they had contributed.

The view that transmission of personality traits took place through heredity reasserted itself in the nineteenth century, when the bourgeoisie adopted to its own advantage the nobility's notion of a hereditary mode of transmission. Hereditary transmission was modified to suit bourgeois purposes; it forcefully justified its control of the means of production. By then, the influence of transmitted characteristics on behavior was widely accepted. The idea developed into a still more

compulsive notion of atavism (1838, from *atavus*; *aieul*), according to which the individual inherits a stock of ancestral characteristics that need not be apparent in his or her immediate relatives. Soon atavism came to feed popular "wisdom"; no person could deny the kinship that was so clearly visible in his or her appearance or behavior. The literature of the period is permeated with this ideology. As Pierre Loti writes, "At that moment he was out of control: he yielded to distant and mysterious influences which came from the blood; he submitted to the law of heredity, of an entire family, and entire race." ⁷ The clamor of "the call of the blood" could be heard everywhere. Through a strange dialectic, atavism became a source of tragedy in bourgeois literature. The "drama of heredity" touched comfortable society as in Henrik Ibsen's *Ghosts* as much as the people as in Emile Zola's *La bête humaine*.

Heredity and its trail of ideological representations consanguinity, atavism illustrate the process through which the family as an institution became "naturalized." These notions paralleled and reinforced the bourgeois right to inheritance. They made possible the assertion that the right to own the means of production was transmitted at the same time as the ability to manage them. The domination of the bourgeois class, thus, was due not only to its wealth, but also to its hereditary qualities. The bourgeois adapted both hereditary kinship and its symbols, first to its own needs and, then, progressively to those of the reproduction of the dominated classes.⁸

Nevertheless, for the bourgeoisie it was more a matter of transmitting capital than honors or titles. Capital has two forms, personal and real. While the transmission of an enterprise is easier through primogeniture, stocks and shares can be divided. At the stage of developing capitalism, capital was held first and foremost in the family. Originally, it overlapped with patrimony, which was essential to maintain the family. Yet there was a contradiction between patrimony, which was private, and capital, which was social. The justification for the private appropriation of a social good was found in the ideology of blood relation, in heredity. In these terms, a social class, the bourgeoisie, could be presented as singularly competent and, thus, singularly justified in hereditary ownership. The atavistic transmission of superior qualities was to accompany the legal transmission of property.⁹

Thus, naturalist ideology triumphed with the "conquering bourgeoisie." The family became the "natural" foundation of society; family ties were defined as the product of nature. The man as

inseminator was reincarnated in his son, at the expense of the relation of parturition (which, although also naturalized, was presented as subordinate). The woman was glorified as mother, but had to be subordinated as a wife (and as receptacle), so that the purity of the "natural" link between father and son could be preserved. Women had to be protected from all taints, condemned to premarital chastity and absolute marital fidelity. The Christian Church's relation to the bourgeois family was similar to its earlier relation to the nobility, and it made a similar accommodation. Promoted by an emerging genetics and supported by the Christian Church, naturalism became the irrefutable scientific and moral base of the bourgeois conception of the family, until it gave way to the present cooptative capitalism and to sociobiology as its new ideology.

Notes

1. ". . . définitivement constituée en un corps héréditaire."
2. ". . . la relation nouvelle et proprement féodale de la vassalité."
3. In Roman law, as in French, consanguinity applies only to the masculine side.
4. An entail (*majorat*) is an inalienable and indivisible estate set aside in a family patrimony to be passed on to the eldest, inherited by him through *fideicommiss*, without prejudice to the division of the remaining possessions.
5. These transformations, with respect to marriage, are highlighted by Georges Duby 1981.
6. 1549 Wartburg in Robert 1972.

7. "A cet instant, il'était irresponsable: il cédait à des influences lointaines et mystérieuses qui lui venaient de son sang; it subissait la loi d'hérédité de toute une famille, de toute une race" (Loti 1925: lxxix).

8. See Meillassoux, *Les spectres de Malthus* (forthcoming).

9. With the development of corporate capitalism, recruitment is no longer hereditary but cooptive. See Meillassoux 1982.

References

Bloch, Marc

[1930] 1965

Feudal Society. 2 vols. Trans. L. A. Manyon. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul.

[1939] 1968

La société féodale. Paris: Albin Michel.

Bloch, M., and W. von Wartburg

1975

Dictionnaire étymologique de la langue française. Paris: Presses Universitaires de la France. Duby, Georges

1981

Le chevalier, la femme, et la prêtre. Paris: Hachette.

Goody, Jack

1983

The Development of the Family and Marriage in Western Europe.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Littré, E.

[1877] 1959

Dictionnaire de la langue française. Paris: Hachette/ Gallimard.

Loti, Pierre

1925

Mon frère Yves. Paris: Claman-Lévy.

Meillassoux, Claude

1984

La reproduction sociale. Cahiers internationaux de sociologie
77:38395.

Robert, P.

1972

Dictionnaire alphabétique et analogique de la langue française.
Paris: Société du Nouveau Littré.

3

The Finding and Fashioning of Cultural Criticism in Ethnographic Research

George E. Marcus

This paper is intended as a tribute to Stanley Diamond's career-long efforts to keep the critical edge of American anthropology sharp when the discipline has looked back on its own society, culture, and habits of thought. During the 1920s and 1930s, anthropology in the United States did participate in the exciting and fashionable cultural criticism that characterized the social sciences and documentary media in general (see Stott 1973). However, through the chilling effects on academia of domestic Cold War ideology and the reinvigoration of a strictly apolitical positivism during the immediate post-World War II decades this old and periodically energetic reflexive side of anthropology's primary concern with others elsewhere was either forgotten or practiced without much vitality. During the quiescent 1950s, in particular, Diamond was one of the few who represented within anthropology and to the American intellectual community at large a provocative domestic cultural criticism grounded in a knowledge of other cultural experience. And then, during the later 1960s when a radical critique style was again à la mode, Diamond was not only a reference point for this work in anthropology but exemplified its most intellectually responsible expression. Now we are once again at a moment when turning the critical eye of American anthropology on its own society of origin holds promise but only if we build on Diamond's example.

Ethnography as Probing for Counter-Discourses

The recent critique of ethnographic rhetoric in anthropology is just one expression of a more general crisis of representation affecting virtually all the human sciences as practiced in the United States

during the 1970s and 1980s (see Marcus and Fischer 1986). By asking what larger intellectual purpose or project ethnography serves, this critique enriches ethnography's practice. To compose a sensitive and sophisticated comparative register of changing human diversity to be sure, but in aid of what broader program of knowledge? The conventional answer is given in terms of some paradigmatic scheme, metanarrative, or encompassing theoretical vision. In more settled times intellectually, the practicing scholar does not worry about such a question, finding it both vacuous and diverting from his or her specific inquiries. However, now the authority of master narratives, playing out from nineteenth century formulations, do seem to be in doubt as they are presently grasped in an ironic situation of mutually juxtaposed alternatives that defy any generally compelling synthesis. In the West, what has historically come to justify inquiry in the midst of a breakdown of authoritative centers is a critical posture toward the analysis of social reality that tries to evade essences, foundations, and systems, at least those depended upon by the epistemologies against which it reacts. Of course, one or another critical style has been a constant dimension of all varieties of modern Western thought. Consequently, many genealogies can be constructed to lend depth and tradition to the critical posture one creates in the present.

Today's classic concerns are with the links between power and knowledge, the demystification of ideology (especially concerning the modern construct of the individual), and attempts to deal with the loss of community in modern life by finding and reinforcing its remnants or by inventing imaginative substitutes. The modern Western critical tradition is, of course, ethnocentric in its very conception of modernity, but it has not been dogmatically so. Most important, for any critical practice, it has been open to critiques of its own mystifications.

My concern here is to single out anthropology's long-standing but underplayed critical dimension and to argue for a recasting of its central method and genre, ethnography currently the ground on which the self-examination of anthropology is occurring anyhow. On one side, anthropology has long participated in the modern liberal version of the critical tradition by teaching the lessons of relativism through its emblematic technique of critically comparing us and our ways, against culturally "other" forms of life. On the other side, by giving ethnography and the interpretive theories that inform it a distinctly critical purpose, anthropology has an untapped potential for lending existing critical discourses a badly needed empirical

basean engagement by the critic with specific subjects in the landscape of the social reality that is the constructed object of such discourse.

Critically oriented intellectual work can be conceived of as the production of *counter-discourses*. The term implies a primary analytic interest in language and in the uses of language that are contestatory, that arise in reaction or opposition to other discourses. But I want to distinguish two more specific senses of counter-discourse within the domain of cultural criticism. In one sense, counter-discourse is the intentional and crafted product of literati who develop techniques of argument in writing to challenge official and dominant informal discourses and given states or conditions of society. I will call this *intellectualist counter-discourse*. The other sense of the term is the empirical probing for counter-discourses and their representation as products of the practical consciousness of the masses out there, so to speak, the subjects of research in multitudes of social situations. These are not necessarily only the counter-discourses of the historically inarticulate peasants, working classes, and other subjects of social history who do not write but *any* counter-discourses that are developed in the oral action contexts of everyday life and that are resistant to textualization. These include the counter-discourses of quite literate and articulate middle and upper classes, for example, the subjects of my current work on dynasties. I will call these probed and represented counter-discourses, discovered by systematic inquiry out there, *empirically derived counter-discourses*. The two kinds of counter-discourses intellectualist and empirically derived are of course interrelated, and the best critical works should mesh counter-discourses in both senses. But in fact the two sorts of counter-discourses have rarely been linked, for reasons I want to make clear.

Intellectualist Counter-Discourses

The most common kind of counter-discourses have been intellectualist. Sometimes such counter-discourses concentrate on discursive or poetic form and invent highly imaginative strategies of writing to contest dominant discourses, as in the French literature of the later nineteenth century that Richard Terdiman has described in *Discourse/Counter-Discourse* (1985). Sometimes they are merely efforts to keep certain critical ideas alive, as in Freudian or Marxist writing that has been adapted to varying historic conditions. The production of counter-discourses by the adaptation of classical critical theories often verges on nostalgia and

poses the problem of personal or political action for academic writers when perceived possibilities for such action are dim, to say the least.

Anthropology's long-standing version of intellectualist counter-discourse has been the kind of text that juxtaposes a critically probed "us" with a "them" that the author usually has studied. While it has worked effectively as a technique of counter-discourse for Anglo-American readerships in the past, its present status is precarious. For sophisticated readerships, the once powerful figure of the primitive has lost much of its appeal. Feminist counter-discourse, for one, has taken over the critical space from which otherness can be used to critique taken-for-granted domestic cultural assumptions. Furthermore, too many popular stories about dramatic cultural change in the Third World have been told for the exoticism of other cultures to shock us by contrast or challenge.

In virtually all of the kinds of intellectualist counter-discourses I have noted, society is referenced but rarely directly investigated, except by the writer's impressions gained from reading and empathetic introspection. The most appealing effect of much of such criticism is symbolic resistance staying one step ahead of the powerful appropriative mechanisms of bourgeois and, now, mass culture, especially those that domesticate language through popularization and endless commentary. Significantly, the most creative attempts to produce counter-discourse seem to flower *after* social movements have failed, as in France following the revolution of 1848, when symbolic resistance became the only practical alternative for action among literati. In Terdiman's (1985) discussion of the array of creative discursive forms of literati resistance to bourgeois culture, we find experiments with form that presage virtually every critical move in intellectualist counter-discourses of the twentieth century. Fueled by reaction to forms of discourse that were constantly absorbing them, the French counter-discourses of that period were important in establishing the (ironic) foundations of a durable modernism that is now part of popular middle-class culture. The problem for the more imaginative, less nostalgic intellectualist counter-discourses today is not so much staying ahead or outside of dominant discourses by the shock of the new an effect difficult to create nowadays, anyhow but developing counter-discourses from within hegemonic discourses that speak to generally acknowledged problems in effective rhetorics.

Such effectiveness requires the production of intellectualist counter-discourses that are more in touch with the actual counter-

discourses formed in society. Thus we arrive at the second sense of producing counter-discourse that is, their discovery and representation through empirical investigation and the possibility of linking intellectualist counter-discourses with empirically derived ones. This has always been the blind spot of intellectualist counter-discourse the absence of an empirical connection to social reality. To connect would involve a recognition that counter-discourses are to be found in the speech and action that emanate from practical consciousness operating in various contexts, and not just from distanced systematic reflection. While finding critiques true to the voices and experiences of subjects situated in society holds great moral appeal in liberal democratic societies, so that intellectualist counter-discourses have always justified themselves by conjuring up social conditions as an object, no engagement with the counter-discourses found in practical consciousness has occurred.

One problem has been that in the West the tradition of empirical inquiry is much newer than are the projects of critical social theory. Another problem is that the influence of social theory has been channeled into empirical work in a way that has blunted or submerged the critical possibilities of research, at least in Anglo-American social science. There, the major key sounded has been positivist and the minor key interpretive, and while not completely incompatible as Weber, among others, demonstrated they have been treated as such. Thus social science inquiry has mostly been intolerant of value considerations in determining social facts and of a reflexive dimension to method, favoring instead a rather superficial version of natural science method. Such tolerances and inclusions would otherwise have opened empirical inquiry to a fuller connection with the critical tradition. To be sure, during the 1920s and 1930s and to some degree during the 1960s periods when political action and social movements were imagined as possible among American intellectuals and academics there was a flurry of critically oriented empirical inquiries and empirically derived counter-discourses rivaled the more common intellectualist production of cultural criticism. Still, while each acknowledged the other more thoroughly than in other times, no breakthrough or substantive connection was made.

A fully empirical social science practice oriented to the ideas of a more detached tradition of critical social thought has yet to be realized. The great contribution of such an empirical form would be to demonstrate that counter-discourses exist already in the experience

of those collectively referenced in much intellectualist counter-discourse. These counter-discourses may or may not confirm the insights of intellectualist cultural criticism, but they are at least on a par with them. The methodological problem for such empirically derived counter-discourses is, of course, how to find and validly define them in the welter of social experiences probed by research. Ethnography, redirected and rethought, is the empirical method that meets the needs of critical analysis in this sense, not the least because it is so self-critical about attributing meanings to subjects that are more their own than those of the ethnographer. The development of a critical ethnography would involve a recasting of recent interpretive trends in cultural analysis, predicated on the doing of ethnography, to the critical purpose of *explicitly looking for and representing counter-discourses*.

Before outlining a particular approach to ethnographic probing of counter-discourses, I will touch on the advantages of empirically derived counter-discourses over intellectualist ones. Most importantly, they offer a more complex and richer treatment of representation than do most intellectualist counter-discourses. The latter are constrained by certain discursive and rhetorical conventions. Strong and impassioned arguments, for example, tend toward closure to achieve the most powerful effect and tend to draw clear lines between hegemonic discourses opposed and counter-discourses developed positively. In intellectualist counter-discourses, syntheses of ideas are valued above fragments and unresolved, ambiguous relationships between dominant discourses and counter-discourses. In contrast, counter-discourses found in fieldwork dialogues tend to be bound up with what they oppose, and the analysis of any counter-discourse involves both resistances and accommodations to what is opposed. Ethnographic representations of counter-discourses are obliged to bring these complexities out, and to accept them as givens of the contexts in which social counter-discourses develop. In comparison, intellectualist counter-discourse are tone-deaf to the multiple possibilities, some pressed, some not, in any social context. They rather seek to develop the power of their own textual voices against a perceived hegemonic discourse.

This tone-deafness in intellectualist counter-discourses is associated with two other classic problems they have confronted: the positioning of the critic in the generally acknowledged absence of any Archimedian point, and the critic's obligation to offer satisfying alternatives to the criticized object of counter-discourse. While not re-

solved, both of these problems in the practice of social and cultural criticism are at least more adequately addressed by empirically derived counter-discourses than by intellectualist ones.

Intellectualist critics stand apart from the critique object that they have constructed; this leaves them precisely nowhere. Critical ethnographers represent a counter-discourse found in dialogue with subjects who are its putative authors. They thus stimulate collaboration and are engaged in the forms of life out of which the counter-discourse is fashioned. The problem of positioning then becomes the complex one of representation, a major concern of current ethnographic writing, rather than the more basic and less interesting problem of the vulnerability of the intellectualist producer of counter-discourses, who has only his own rhetoric of virtue on which to stand.

As for the problem of posing alternatives, the intellectualist producer of counter-discourses looks to a more satisfying state, separate from the object of critique to a past time (e.g., classical Greece), to another place (e.g., Tahiti), to a Utopia, to an ideal standard of justice of communication, or to a program of action leading to radical personal or political changes. The intellectualist producer of counter-discourses who spurns any of these alternatives as pie in the sky often appears as a pessimist painting a bleak landscape or a nihilist closing off venues of further inquiry. While not immune from injecting these habits of classic critical discourse into their representation of subjects' counter-discourses, ethnographers mostly avoid the problem of finding the alternative elsewhere or transcendentally by a certain gritty realism in relation to the settings of their work. Potential alternatives to dominant discourses are always already there, embedded in the situation. The complex relationships between the expressions of counter-discourses and hegemonic discourses that the critical ethnographer tries to sort out lead to a refusal of both pessimism and idealism in favor of a critical vision. This critical vision sees a world of possibilities in a cultural condition, some dominant, some residual, others emergent to evoke Raymond Williams's (1983) sophisticated remaking of fixed-state cultural analysis.

A negative illustration will make more concrete these points about the advantages of critical ethnography over intellectualist counter-discourses. *Habits of the Heart* (Robert Bellah et al. 1985) is a much-discussed recent work that places itself squarely in the U.S. post-World War II tradition of criticism with such writers as Daniel Bell, David Reisman, Philip Rieff, Christopher Lasch, and Richard Sennett, among others, which concerns itself with the changing status of

the ideology of individualism at the core of U.S. culture. *Habits of the Heart* masquerades as an empirically derived work of criticism: working off data, consisting of a set of interviews from among the affluent middle class, cuttings from which provide evidence for the argument of the book. However, it remains centrally a work of intellectualist counter-discourse, unabashedly nostalgic for the particularly U.S. tradition of such criticism in which it places itself. The United States is a soulless place, the authors say, lacking possibilities for the warmth of collective participation. Yet these can be found in its past, and they make a strong argument for their redemptionrepublicanism, Christianity, and civic virtue are the stuff of a counter-discourse against the self-centeredness at the heart of success in this country. While impassioned and eloquent, this work provides none of the sophisticated improvements offered by critical ethnographic research over intellectualist criticism. It fails to consider other points of view than that of its middle-class subjects and renders their points of view far too narrowly. However uncomfortable it may be for us to acknowledge, privileged middle and upper classes resist and accommodate, just as do laboring and other classes. In posing a bleak present cut off from the more satisfying roots of our past, the authors fail to see that alternatives are always already there in any cultural situation. They have no sense of the irony and contradictions of everyday life that the ethnographic acknowledgment of counter-discourse among subjects anywhere directly confronts. The point of finding counter-discourses is to render appropriately complex the cultural analysis embedded in ethnographic description. Thus, in whatever setting individualism is enacted, there is also a process, however masked and submerged, that challenges it.

The academic writers of *Habits of the Heart* fail to address their own position relative to the social landscape that they represent. A fine contribution to the contemporary tradition of intellectualist counter-discourse, this work raises a question about the continuing viability and persuasiveness of the distanced practice of high cultural criticism altogether. It is interesting that in this moment of keen suspicion of metanarratives the most telling critiques of the book have dwelt precisely on the inadequacies of intellectualist counter-discourse that I have noted, most deriving from the simplistic portraiture of the subjects whose discourse is offered as evidence of malaise but not of insight among themselves, however distorted it might be.

An intellectualist counter-discourse on the state of hegemonic American individualism exists in books such as *Habits of the Heart*. But the effort here is to locate a counter-discourse that problematizes individualism within indigenous American narratives, as elicited through ethnographic dialogue. Such narratives might concern the ambiguities of rendering autobiographical accounts by persons in the shadow of powerful collective family histories. This indeed is the ethnographic milieu of the dynastic family which I want to discuss in the second part of this paper.

Ethnography and Counter-Discourses

Within a project of critical ethnography, what are the techniques and analytic resources for probing counter-discourses in the process of fieldwork conceived mainly as dialogues? From the array of disciplines that might inform such ethnography, I find contemporary debates in literary criticism a stimulating source of concepts. While much literary theory has become too arcane, too abstract, and too inaccessible, some literary critics make persistent attempts to relate to a broader domain of cultural studies, including history and anthropology. For me, the chief attraction of literary criticism is precisely that it has developed a sophisticated and focused concern with the function of criticism as an intellectual practice. The challenge for an ethnographic sensibility and ingenuity is to adapt ideas from the domain of literary criticism to its own quite different practice. The fact that ethnographic investigation is becoming widely appreciated as a process of collaborative textualization, which is then usually masked in the single-authored production of an ethnographic text, heightens the appeal of literary perspectives that make the process more visible.

As my interest in the ethnographic finding of counter-discourses converged with my grappling for some perspective on the hold of dynastic tradition on descendants in American dynastic families, I came across Peter Brooks's deceptively pedestrian treatment of narrative in his book, *Reading for the Plot: Design and Intention in Narrative* (1984). As he points out, "reading for the plot" has long been considered a distinctly low-brow approach to literature, particularly in the face of various structuralist and formalist approaches to narrative. His effort is to revive this plain storytelling appreciation of narratives in his concern to understand the phenomenological dimensions of narrative systematically underplayed in more formalist

approaches. There is indeed a freshness in the accessibility and plainness of Brooks's focus, but his treatment is far from simplistic. He derives a set of stimulating accounts of narrative process in works ranging from Stendhal, Dickens, and Conrad to Freud, by an elegant use of the distinction that originated in early twentieth-century Russian Formalist criticism between the story (*fabula*) and plot (*sjuzet*) in any written or oral narrative. The story is the order of events referred to by the narrative and the plot is the order of events as presented in narrative discourse. In any rendering of narrative, the writer or speaker is operating on these two levels simultaneously. Critical analysis should concern itself with the complex relationships between story and plot and how their very different orderings are motivated by the author or speaker in the playing out of any narrative. Both a story and a plot unfold in the telling, and in the oppositions between them I have found an interesting way to think about the counter-discourses embedded in the narratives of dynasts, whether in the vast literature about themselves that they have tended to produce and that has been produced about them by family historians, or elicited by me in the course of fieldwork.

I believe that the story/plot approach has much to recommend it as a general critical practice in analyzing the sort of reflective commentaries and texts one removes from practical consciousness, so to speak that ethnographers routinely elicit in the field. Indeed, in the intentioned design of fictional narrative, the Russian Formalists understood the difference between story and plot as a motivated defamiliarization, itself the major characteristic marking any discourse as counter or contestatory. The story that is constructed or referred to as the plot unfolds is an official or conventional one, opposed by the unconventional sequencing of events in the actual telling itself. The plot is thus always a counter-discourse that, through its own unfolding as narrative, opposes a referred-to object a story with whose themes and content it is entwined. The craft and rhetorical challenge in this sort of criticism is both a clarifying discourse/counter-discourse in narrative movement, regarding the relationships between story and plot, and an arguing for a particular intention or motivation to such a narrative design among the myriad possibilities for relating story to plot. For me, the important notion is that the dynastic descendant, encouraged by me-the-ethnographer to talk about family history or autobiography, develops a narrative that plays off some understanding of official or conventional culture that

is, the descendant puts together events (the plot) that contest the story simultaneously evoked in the telling. There is nothing definitively internal to a narrative, in my view, that reveals a motive of counter-discourse in the play of plot against story. This must be attributed by the ethnographer's understanding of the context beyond the text, in my case an independent sense of the historical and political-economic dynastic milieu that is both informed by and informs my reading for the plot, which I identify as counter-discourses in the narratives of those who have lived in dynastic worlds.

Finally, the major advantage of the Russian Formalist/Brooks approach to narrative as a way to probe counter-discourses in field dialogues is precisely that it locates critique in collage to evoke the expression of counter-discourse through experiments with form that French writers pioneered. Even in critical ethnography, which, after all, finds a source of stimulation in critical social theory and intellectualist counter-discourses, there is a profound temptation to discover the arguments of such intellectualist critiques in the narratives of informants. Sometimes one literally does, but often the critique is bound up in the concerns of practical consciousness, captured in the momentary reflections of elicited fieldwork dialogue. These concerns, in terms of their explicit themes, are often only remotely recognizable as kin to the fully conceptualized arguments of theoretical criticism. The temptation is for the ethnographer to make this kinship more obvious or closer than it is. The aim of probing for counter-discourses in the field is indeed to find a fellowship between the criticism of everyday life and that of the intellectual, and even more to find that the former has something different and more strikingly original to say than does intellectualist discourse. But this aim is most often disappointed. Rather, the originality and depth of the ethnographically derived counter-discourse of subjects lie in the *form* of such discourses, the juxtapositions and twistings in narrative between referenced story and performed plot in the telling, and not particularly in the message or argument that can be read into them. As with the highly original French counter-discourses discussed by Terdiman, informant counter-discourses must be read primarily in terms of performance, as cultural collage rather than as considered and closed argument. Finding the counter-discourse in the relationship between the order of events in story and plot in performed narrative is precisely what Brooks's *Reading for the Plot*, appropriately adapted, offers the critical ethnographer.

The Invention of Tradition and Counter-Discourses within American Dynastic Families

My work on contemporary American dynastic families began as a limited study of two old business families in Galveston, Texas, who, though feuding amongst themselves, have been the patrician benefactors of a once vibrant port city. Each family originated in cotton factoring during the postCivil War period of national economic expansion, one descended from a Jewish merchant and the other from a southern planter. They are themselves in a prolonged period of dissolution as organized, corporate entities as they proceed through their third- to fourth-generation transitions. Their trajectory confirms the common wisdom that assigns a three-generation life span to capitalist dynasties as organizations. From the start, I read the large perennial literature on the rise and fall of American dynasties during the same time period, as well as comparable literatures for other European societies.

My project broadened to a more general concern with American dynasties of great wealth over the past century as I saw clear developmental and thematic connections between the Galveston families and their contemporaries, some grander, some comparable in fame and fortune. When questions arose about dynastic families known for intellectual or artistic talent and for political power, I expanded my study in these directions.

All dynasties invent a collective tradition whose expression is a master narrative of family history. I am applying an analytic scheme that offers a framework for comparatively describing families of wealth, talent, and power, for I have found that all three elements are at work in the formation of most dynastic families but that by circumstance and intent, one element comes to be hyperdeveloped. I examine each case in terms of the following key partial narratives, which give substance to the master narrative of family history: a narrative of shared property, a narrative of "right stuff" a dynasty's ideology of self-esteem and a narrative of shared purpose a dynasty's ambition, the way it views its domain and public responsibilities.

It is significant that this scheme could perhaps be used for any American middle-class family. Far from being markedly different from the middle classes, dynasties in theme and substance are mythified objectifications of tendencies and longings perceptible in middle-class families, especially frustrated possibilities for continuity. This explains, I believe, the love-hate ambivalence of Ameri-

can middle-class readers of dynastic sagas. The first-generation hope for dynasty turning into early and slow decline amid luxury is a tragic passion play that is particularly satisfying to its mass, middle-class audience, and provides the real-life cultural niche for the families I have studied.

While I have taken a historian's interest in these families, I have focused on their third- to fifth-generation maturation, climax, and decline, their remembrance of origins, and their attempts to sustain and constantly reinvent tradition. This indeed has been the ethnographic present for my inquiry into the Galveston families from which my most diverse and intensive material comes. The hope for perpetuation, often assumed to be the inherent orientation of dynasts, seem very much in the minds and hearts of first-generation founders only; from the second generation on, I found that a vision of slow decay pervades dynasties. While this generates melancholy, it equally is a key source of satisfaction and superiority, especially for those families and expert managers who oversee the dissolution of the dynasty's resources. This elite self-confidence amid and arising from ruins-in-the-making is a major component of a dynasty's broader social outlook.

Furthermore, contrary to conventional images of dynastic social dramas, I found that the consciousness and hold of family tradition is strongest among descendants during the years when its decline and withering are most apparent. Furthermore, albeit by the unintended consequences of the intrafamily struggles that often climax processes of dissolution, the power of dynastic wealth is often most strongly felt by the communities and locales that it touches, not in the period of ancestral accumulation but in its waning. In dissolution, dynastic power is transformed through both dispersion and concentration into institutional uses with the presumption of permanence.

These are just some of the ironies that impressed me about the dynasties I have studied in a research subject that is dominated by irony. But perhaps the most salient and persistent puzzle for me in pursuing this inquiry has concerned the sources of efficacy and authority of dynastic culture, particularly among contemporary descendants. These descendants are at least three generations from the ancestor, are in the midst of a dissolving dynastic organization, and are full-bodied participants in the therapeutic, self-oriented mass culture that has been the subject of so much recent American culture criticism. Holding the loyalty and commitment of descendants has been a challenge for American dynasties through the century of social

changes that they have experienced, but never a more imposing one than at present. Schooled in the dynamics of clanship and lineage in so-called traditional societies particularly ones in which the circulation of wealth, talent, and power, rather than their accumulation and hoarding, dominated collective representations I was puzzled by the efficacy of ancestor-focused lineage formations for descendants who have generation by generation been increasingly drawn to an individualism that values self-fulfillment above all else.

To be sure, contemporary dynastic families enact rituals of solidarity and sacrifice, they sacralize primordial ethnicity when relevant, and their authority still cloaks itself in patriarchy. But like myself, contemporary descendants, including those in positions of authority, are "knowing." A pervasive and more powerful popular culture that has placed claims to authenticity in doubt, especially for those who would achieve the distinction of sophistication above the masses, has penetrated the little worlds of dynastic culture. This sophisticate's suspicion has thoroughly undermined the performance of tradition in dynasties. Such performances are tolerated, even appreciated nostalgically, by those who enact and receive them, but they do not in themselves move and hold descendants. Overt forms of clanship, I was convinced, thus were not the place to look for the efficacy of dynastic tradition. Its obvious power in some families was communicated through some other medium.

For a while, I accepted that tradition or culture was an ironic, counterfeit phenomenon for family members within a dynastic organization, and I looked elsewhere for the strength of dynastic commitment. I moved from the center to the periphery, so to speak, from dynastic descendants to those who serviced them, those who do the work of managing the resources of dynastic distinctiveness whether it be wealth, talent, or power and who in effect construct insulated worlds for descendants (see Marcus 1980, 1983, 1985, 1986). These middle-class inside-outsiders, I suspected, were far more likely to be committed to dynasty, because they were selected to be so, because furthermore it was their job to be so, and because, as I noted among the middle class looking in, there is often a reservoir of awe for dynasties within a dynastic setting in spite of repeated experiences of facing up to deceptions and penetrating veils of mystification. So, I argued, dynastic ideology most powerfully becomes embedded in the work of policing or more appropriately for upper classes, of servicing the family. Lawyers and bankers manage the formal structures of dynasty; therapists, servants, and caretakers reinforce

the fact of dynastic authority in descendant lives; and aides and assistants of all kinds insulate dynastic worlds. Through finding the strength of dynastic commitment in this elaborate division of hired labor who become committed to their dynastic charges in different ways, I provocatively dismissed the significance of an efficacious dynastic culture within family process itself.

While I believe there is much validity to this line of argument, and it did allow me to explore the nonfamilial sides of dynastic organization (a perspective systematically elided in the literature on dynasties), I remained dissatisfied with leaving family process itself as an empty center just because the conventional enactment of lineage ritual and authority were so transparent to descendants. Eventually, my thinking about counter-discourse constructions in narrative stimulated a breakthrough. I had been aware all along of two key issues concerning the predicament of dynastic families in the context of a broader American culture, but I only came to specify these issues as I found a way to see them, so to speak, in the narratives I collected from my subjects.

One issue has to do with the longstanding and increasing frustration among upper classes in Western liberal societies concerning outlets for the social expression of a family-nurtured sense of superiority. To me, the most salient sociological observation about the predicament of upper classes in modern mass liberal societies is that they lack legitimate opportunities to assert and glorify their distinctiveness in public. This predicament is usually understood cynically by liberal sociologists, who hold that upper classes have become sophisticated in public relations when they are visible, but mainly they try to remain invisible, and in private they are not frustrated or stifled at all; in their own little worlds, they indulge bias, prejudice, and self-glorification. There is a certain truth to this, as there is for the private lives of all middle-class people. However, I prefer to see such frustration as a real predicament in families that cultivate ideologies about their own distinctiveness. This has led me to the notion that from the late nineteenth century on, the once conspicuously cultivated public mystique of notable families has, with few exceptions, come to be recultivated in powerful private familial narratives about character, especially for dominant males in such families.

These narratives for any dynastic family constitute a discourse that both resists and accommodates a dominant public modern liberal discourse that makes self-aggrandized elitism a matter of bad taste. The family construct gave way to individualismwent

underground, so to speak and reappeared in the heavily moral precepts about character that permeate dynastic family narratives about the person what it is to be a Rockefeller, a Kempner, a Moody, or a Guggenheim. (As I will discuss at the end of this section, upper-class discourses about character that once had considerable power in shaping descendants' commitments have also withered in very recent times. The most affecting embodiments of collective tradition have become stories about eccentricity that are common knowledge within mature contemporary dynastic families.)

The other key issue regarding dynastic families concerns the ideology of individualism, perhaps the major object of American cultural criticism. Dynastic families strive for the opposite commitment and sacrifice for the group. Such families are one of the few settings, perhaps the only one in American society, where the cultural production of the person and the group are equally and powerfully matched, entwined, and simultaneously competing as accomplished cultural productions. It is certainly the only setting in which there is a complex effort to give a priority to the reality of collectivity over the autonomous selves of its members. The culturally normalized construction of autonomous selves, corresponding on the textual level to the autobiographical narrative, becomes intractably problematic for individuals, in this case, dynastic descendants. This establishes the ground for a sophisticated counter-discourse about American individualism arising from dynasts' attempts to tell their own autobiographies. Autobiography in the dynastic context is a contestation of dominant American cultural emphases on the self above all else and simultaneously of dynastic family tradition, communicated as moral narratives about particular views of the self, expressed as notions of distinctive character. Unlike most intellectualist counter-discourse, this counter-discourse in descendant narratives never resolves itself in argument but endlessly explores the oppositions it expresses, as the experience that stimulates it continues to be lived by descendants.

Another delicious irony about dynasties that makes them a setting for a profound counter-discourse about American individualism is that descendants trying to define their own selves are immersed in a collectivity that paradoxically communicates in mythic terms the virtues of individualism. The collective legacy of any dynasty is the achievements of ancestral individualsthe work of an entrepreneur, the artistic or intellectual brilliance of a forebear, or the legacy of a Machiavellian's or noble crusader's political exploits. For most

American individuals success is a decontextualized ideal or dream apart; for the dynastic descendant, it is the objectified social context for dynastic tradition and corporatism that impedes the culturally approved and expected realization of a unique self.

Initially, I addressed this issue about the autonomous self with an anthropological question/observation: Why in other societies has it been relatively easy for the ethnographer to write in terms of collectivity, but difficult to retrieve the biographical person, whereas in writing about Western societies, the ethnographer easily conjures unique biographical persons but finds it much more difficult to establish a discourse about the groups of which they are a part? This question struck me most in my readings of a multitude of histories of great American families. In this well-established genre, authors always reference their subjects as something like a clan, a tribe, a dynastya group, above all elsebut in writing about them, they never adopt the sort of concepts comfortable to anthropologists when they study real clans abroad or to historians when they study lineages in the distant past. Partly because the appeal of this genre is popular, the authors of such works follow an official, albeit informal, narrative of a family that familiarizes, rather than defamiliarizes, their subjects for a mass readership. The family construct for itself falls through the cracks. The only fully autonomous self in such accounts is the founder/ancestor whose life and deeds are unencumbered by a family past that matters (at least to the account of what he engendered). Far from being faceless tribespeople, descendants are discussed in this standard narrative of the dynastic saga as biographically autonomous selves linked together as siblings, cousins, sons, and daughters in primarily idiosyncratic ways. The familiar, broader cultural narrative about family development blends with and lends coherence to these dynastic sagas, carrying them along without examination of the dynamics of relationship between what secures dynastic collectivity, always in the shadows, and the primary construct of unique autonomous selves. Kinship is the self-evident answer, but it is precisely the usual assumptions about the binding qualities of kinship that dynastic descendants hold in suspicion.

An obvious but important characteristic of dynastic sagas then is that only the biography of the founder is whole and autonomous in its presentation. The biographies of descendants do not have this status. But why can't they be treated in the same way as the founder? This is more than a bind of the genre; there is a real problem of

cultural representation here that led me to rephrase my initial question about the representation of groups relative to persons in the telling of family histories in this culture and in others.

This rephrasing has as its concern the problematic rendering of autobiographical narratives by descendants within mature dynastic families, and it is in these narratives that I discovered an interesting application for the Brooks/Russian Formalist approach to narrative, based on the distinction between story and plot. The rephrasing avoids juxtaposing the collectivity to the person but asks rather about the difference between collective cultural models of the person and the insistence on autobiography (self-construction by the telling of a unique biography). Therefore, to rephrase my question in two parts: Why, in other, mostly non-Western societies, is it relatively easy to retrieve cultural constructs and typifications for the person, but difficult to retrieve texts of biographically unique selves without the stimulus and collaborative function of ethnographic elicitation? And relatedly, why, at least since the late eighteenth century in the West, is the insistent uniqueness of biographical detail in representing individual lives so resistant to convincing class-interested or academic attempts to typify this elusive, unique self as a morally enshrouded, cultural construct? This question addresses the clash of dynastic autobiography with the most powerful embodiment of collective dynastic tradition, not in collective rites or solidarity rituals enacted, but in terms of morally prescriptive constructs of the person told as tales of character. (I imagine this is not that different from how collective representations are most powerfully communicated in so-called traditional societies.)

I saw an interesting disparity between responses to my questions about collective family history and those to my questions about personal history or biography. Here I refer to narrative responses by either dominant males or other males who might conceivably wield or resist authority in dynasties. Women, in-laws, black sheep, and youthful rebels are often the second-class citizens in dynasties; the authoritative narratives about character apply to them in complex ways. They generate the most marked and explicit counter-discourses within dynasties, but here I am more interested in the counter-discourses that arise more subversively and subtly among those who are the central objects of dynastic culture—the men who are the primary heirs to the resources of a dynasty.

When I asked about family history, I received a narrative response that told the family's experience in terms familiar to any American

family origins of a founder and then the history of autonomous selves who happened to be kin, or the emblematic association of the family with some other cultural model (e.g., we are like a tribe or clan; one of my Galveston families celebrates its Jewish ethnicity as providing its heart or solidarity, and a Victorian English style as defining its public presentation). There was always a winking, humorous tone to such responses; there may have been a kernel of seriousness in them, but just as overt ritual-as-tradition is received transparently by dynasts, even by its promoters, so are embellished stories or frameworks of distinction. At this explicit level, at least as it is expressed to an outsider, family narrative does not earnestly assert identity. This undoubtedly has something to do with the illegitimacy of such explicit self-glorification among upper classes in mass liberal societies, except as self-parody.

Responses to questions about personal history that generated autobiographical narrative were much more interesting in that they worked as counter-discourses in the story/plot framework. In Brooks's terms, the story as order of events referred to by the descendant autobiographical narrative is that of character, which also exists in its own framework of telling as moral tales about the lives of dynastic family members past and present. It is this narrative redundantly embedded in dynastic conversation, historically adapted to the problems of status expression for such upper classes, that powerfully communicates traditional authority to descendants, rather than the anemic, parodic, and more overt family history discourse. At its own level, this embedded narrative is a kind of upper-class counter-discourse against dominant liberal ideology. This narrative only emerges in a self-conscious reflective way as the story part of autobiographical narrative, as the authoritative dynastic narrative about tradition that is contested by the plot narrative. The plot narrative is the effort to render an autobiographical account, elicited by the ethnographer, that unfolds parallel to the referenced story of dynastic character. Again in Brooks's terms, the autobiographical account as plot is the order of events presented in the narrative discourse, which in the pattern of associations and connections of its telling challenges the conventional life history sequence of a dynasty's authoritative story about character.

Dynastic autobiographical narratives construct such story and plot levels simultaneously. The plot level of the telling contests by its form the story of character with which it is bound up thematically and from which it attempts to distance itself in evolving the plot of a

unique autonomous self. That the contestation by plot of a story in autobiographical narratives is endlessly ambiguous and unresolved is what makes them so interesting as a kind of ethnographically derived cultural criticism. As I read more and more published autobiographies by members of dynasties, I was impressed with how problematic the self became as it ambiguously competed with the family itself as the central object of such works. The mystery in autobiographical narratives, especially for those self-consciously trying to differentiate themselves from the collectivity, is the ironic and growing awareness that in creating an autonomous self-identity, one inevitably makes use of the story narrative about dynastic character and winds up reproducing in whole or part what the counter-discourse of dynastic autobiography mightily struggles to contest. The novelty and broader cultural sense of counter-discourse in these narratives lies in the dramatic forms created to constitute the ideal autonomous self and in the ultimate failure to do so definitively. What is finally in doubt is the American master cultural narrative of the autonomous self, diversely and powerfully apparent in virtually all social contexts. To see if and in what ways it is contested, just as it is also affirmed, in other such contexts would require an ethnographic probing for counter-discourses similar to that I have outlined here.

I conclude this discussion by commenting about the relationships between levels of counter-discourses within dynasties that I perceived with the use of the story/plot distinction in autobiographical narratives.

The Story:

*The Narrative about Character as Collective Counter-Discourse
against Society*

Appropriate to a culture of extreme diversity whose central theme was the ideology of the individual clannish, family-oriented American upper classes, particularly of the north-east, reorganized themselves during the early nineteenth century around their own private, nonprofit educational and charitable institutions. They adopted an ideology focused not on an overt collective identity but on the shaping of virtuous and morally appropriate character, molding the broader cultural emphasis on the individual to their own upper-class image. Through the cultural institutions that they founded, character-building along certain lines became the prestige sort of individual or autonomous self to be. Upper-class notions of character were something for middle classes to aspire to. Within the confines of clannish and private families of wealth and power, oriented to their own unique distinctiveness, normative dis-

courses about character in effect, a dynastic mode for developing and regulating biographies became a powerful way to embed and transmit collective tradition to their members who were participating in a broader culture in which the figure of the individual was so pervasive.

Character served well as a morally concerned and prescriptive discourse about individualism through the nineteenth century, but one rarely hears it today, and when one does, it has a musty, anachronistic quality. Critics like Philip Rieff, T. J. Jackson Lears, and Christopher Lasch have emphasized that the therapeutic vision of the self has triumphed. What has happened to authoritative traditional discourse in dynastic families that had found an effective vehicle in narratives about the character of their members? Frankly, I'm not sure dynasties no longer have as coherent a means to constitute and transmit tradition effectively, now that the narrative about character verges on the sort of transparency and suspicion with which dynastic ritual and patriarchal style have long been received. However, in the course of the decline in power of character narrative, I have been impressed by the continuing power and subtlety of an associated narrative of eccentricity that had always been present as a variant on character narrative. Eccentricities defined family strengths and weaknesses as exhibited by individuals, but they were read off the central tendency of character. Now that such a central tendency is growing transparent like solidarity rituals and displays of patriarchy before it, eccentricity comes to the fore as an effective narrative form through which a dynastic family not only accommodates to a broader cultural narrative of the therapeutic self but also expresses its own distinctive and superior status.

Eccentricity as an emergent core dynastic narrative that communicates the family's distinctiveness both to its members and to the world manifests itself in two ways. There are those families that pride themselves on being a collectivity of eccentric mavericks. Certain forms of eccentricity *are* their character, or they make a tradition of the quirky independence of their members. And then there are those families that adopt a more anachronistic, stuffy aristocratic image for themselves that breeds eccentricity as a form of rebellion. In the old days, for such families, character would be the central narrative, with a tolerated but marginalized construct of eccentricity. Today, the eccentricity of rebellion becomes the central narrative of such families. Whether eccentricity has become the prideful collective narrative or whether its importance as rebellion is the focal concern,

it constitutes a most subtle and impressionable vehicle, based on discourse about the person, that invades the otherwise independent and self-oriented psyches of contemporary dynastic descendants. Heavily morality-tinged stories of character are easy to cast off; good-humored and somewhat mysterious stories of character are easy to cast off; good-humored and somewhat mysterious stories of eccentricity, which still construct a person in which the power of collective dynastic tradition and continuity is preserved, are much more difficult for descendants to distance themselves from. While continuing to adapt dynastic authority to the age of the therapeutic self, the narratives about dynastic character, now got up as eccentricity, challenge attempts by descendants to render autobiographical accounts that try to establish uniqueness separate from dynastic narratives of the person.

In families of great wealth, eccentricity as collective family narrative usually concerns the extreme predicaments of spending often as stories of miserliness or profligacy; in families of talent, eccentricity celebrates nonconformism and originality; in families of power, however, eccentricity is not embraced because, unlike the other two kinds of dynasty, political families of power must relate to mass liberal constituencies in an open way. Such families must present themselves in sober terms as part of and for the common good. The eccentricities that achieve distinctive status for the other two sorts of dynastic family do not work for the political family, whose internal life and public life are often merged.

In sum, the good-natured and mysterious character of eccentricity preserves an opportunity for dynasties to express a uniqueness of status, directed both internally and externally, without much reason to probe or question it. The humorous tone of eccentricity narrative protects its considerable effects on descendants from a serious challenge by them. The acceptance by descendants of the story of family eccentricities, unlike their suspicion of authoritative and morally pressuring character narratives, is what makes such a story narrative so formidable when descendants try to render autobiographical narratives in its shadow. The power of constructs of eccentricity is exposed at the intersection of story and plot within the autobiographical narrative. The eccentric character is a family type that entails and strengthens a collective tradition, while the autobiography insists on its own uniqueness. Where these two levels intersect is the site of counter-discourse in the telling of descendant autobiography.

The Plot:

The Autobiographical Narrative as Counter-Discourse against Dynasty (and the Coherent Master Cultural Narrative of the Autonomous Self)

My understanding of the way counter-discourses are expressed within autobiographical narratives has been advanced by my reading of a number of recent scholarly works on literary autobiography, especially Paul John Eakin's *Fictions in Autobiography: Studies in the Art of Self-Invention* (1985). Modernist works within the genre of autobiography have the posture of contesting master cultural narratives of life. Most interesting to me are those manifestly experimental autobiographies that have altered most radically the plot of life the narrative sequence by which it is told in contrast to the story the master narrative of how a life unfolds through time. Such experiments proceed by their own associations and connections that juxtapose events by the dictates of memory, impression, and fantasy, rather than by the conventional stages and staging of a life in autobiography. Perhaps the most famous such autobiography is that of Michel Leiris (1984); more recent examples are the works of Maxine Hong Kingston (1977) and Saul Friedlander (1979). These works are written, planned, strategized; they are interesting intellectual projects meant to construct counter-discourses. Their value for me is the idea that the contemplation of memory is the key to the development of counter-discourses in the rendering of autobiographical narratives. The self-conscious use of memory in such works challenges the fixed cultural narrative of the self.

While there exists a rich genre of published autobiographies by members of dynastic families to be probed as counter-discourses, in the fieldwork process autobiography is oral, given in fragments and in response to elicitation. Such autobiography is thus close to the more experimental written efforts, since memory is the main organizer of plot, and the ethnographer does not insist on the standard narrative of autobiography as a frame of elicitation. In a sense, then, autobiographical narratives from the field are comparable to the most experimental of the literary autobiographies, conceived as one variety of intellectualist counter-discourse.

I am reexamining autobiographical materials from my fieldwork among dynasties with the intent of reading them as counter-discourses. Perhaps the most striking feature that I have noted so far in these narratives is that the figure of the unique self being narrated and the family tradition, referenced as character or eccentricity, continually are conflated, mistaken for one another, as the main subject

of such narratives. Thematically then, these narratives stand as a critique both of the dynastic desire to be enduringly collective and different as families, and of American individualistic ideology, now constructed as the therapeutic, autonomous self. What I have yet to probe is how the form of the autobiographical narratives themselves constitute such a critique, in the manner of the more experimental literary autobiographies whose purpose is to represent the workings of memory, which might be understood as the compelling focus for the finding and fashioning of any counter-discourse, intellectualist or ethnographically derived.

Continuing Note

The second section of this paper introduced the way in which I am trying to apply the hopes I have for a practice of critical ethnography. But in ending, I would like to come full circle to make the point that the most ambitious works of critical ethnography must convert finally this sort of analytic manipulation of data that exposes counter-discourses among the ethnographic subjects into an ethnography as text that rejoins the medium of intellectualist counter-discourse with which I tried to contrast critical ethnography. The inevitable move is from problems of ethnographic analysis to problems of ethnographic representation.

In my dynasty project, I have found that the salient problem in producing a complex representation of dynasties is overcoming conventional common knowledge about them, which is indeed highly developed among potential American readerships. I also need to present structural accounts of the political economy of dynastic organization before I can intelligibly address, in different conceptual terms, the cultural issues with which I am now concerned. The point is that at my own level of intellectualist counter-discourse, that of ethnographic text-making, I must reference the official stories of dynasty just as I render counter-discourse plots. In this effort, my analysis of how counter-discourses are generated in dynastic narratives may give me some hints about how to organize my intellectualist counter-discourse as ethnographic text.

References

Bellah, Robert, Richard Madsen, William Sullivan, Ann Swidler, and Steven Tipton

1985

Habits of the Heart: Individualism and Commitment in American Life. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Brooks, Peter

1984

Reading for the Plot: Design and Intention in Narrative. New York: Knopf.

Eakin, Paul John

1985

Fictions in Autobiography: Studies in the Art of Self-Invention. Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press.

Friedlander, Saul

1979

When Memory Comes. Trans. Helen Lane. New York: Farrar, Straus, and Giroux.

Kingston, Maxine Hong

1977

The Woman Warrior: Memoirs of a Girlhood among Ghosts. New York: Vintage Books.

Leiris, Michel

1984

Manhood: A Journey from Childhood into the Fierce Order of Virility. Trans. Richard Howard. San Francisco: North Point Press.

Marcus, George

1980

Law in the Development of Dynastic Families among American Business Elites: The Domestication of Capital and the Capitalization of Family. *Law and Society Review* 14:859903.

1983

The Fiduciary Role in American Family Dynasties and Their Institutional Legacy: From the Law of Trusts to Trust in the Establishment. *In* *Elites: Ethnographic Issues*, ed. George Marcus. Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press.

1985

Spending: The Hunts, Silver, and Dynastic Families in America. *European Journal of Sociology* 26:22459.

1986

Generation-Skipping Trusts and Problems of Authority: Parent-Child Relations in the Dissolution of American Families of Dynastic Wealth. *In* *The Frailty of Authority*, ed. M. J. Aronoff. New Brunswick, N. J.: Transaction Books.

Marcus, George, and Michael Fischer

1986

Anthropology as Cultural Critique: An Experimental Moment in the Human Science. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Stott, William

1973

Documentary Expression and Thirties America. New York: Oxford University Press.

Terdiman, Richard

1985

Discourse/Counter-Discourse: The Theory and Practice of Symbolic Resistance in Nineteenth-Century France. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press.

Williams, Raymond

1983

Writing in Society. London: Verso.

4

The Economic Memories of Harry Watt

Diane Rothenberg

We first met Harry Watt in December 1967. Stanley Diamond prepared a letter for us to carry along and telephoned ahead to introduce us. Diamond was interested in the experiments in translation that my husband, Jerome Rothenberg, was doing and thought that a meeting with some of the singers of the Allegany Seneca, a group in western New York among whom Diamond had worked, might be conducive to further explorations in translation. Harry Watt received us in his warm house on a very snowy evening and, because of his fond memories of Diamond, made an effort to acquaint us with the community. We went back several weeks later and the next summer rented a barely converted gas station just outside the Steamburg relocation area. During that summer, Jerry engaged in productive translation projects with several of the leading singers and song makers, and our relationships with many people intensified and expanded. Toward the end of the summer, we were honored by clan adoptions in the Longhouse, and Harry Watt became my uncle in the Blue Heron clan.

We returned regularly to western New York in the following years to visit, to participate in ceremonies, and to talk with friends. Some of the best talk was with Harry Watt. We would meet at his house, or around his sister's table, or, in better weather, at the old house several hundred yards away through the woods, where Harry Watt and his wife had their gardens, and where he most liked to be. This was the house that he had preserved when the forced relocation in 1965 caused by the building of the Kinzua Dam required that everyone occupying a house within the flood plain move. The misery of the time of removal was vividly felt and the new houses generally resented. Harry Watt's old house was the almost singular representative of what had been a very recently transformed way of life and, as such, conveyed layers of meaning and emotion that we could hardly begin to appreciate. It was located high on a bank overlooking the

Allegheny River, with the gardens on one side and woods all around, and Harry Watt would point to places when he talked about his childhood, about herbal knowledge, about encounters with animals.

He talked about his experiences at the local Indian school and his running away from it for a perceived injustice, about his experiences traveling around the country doing construction work, about the skills and men involved in his work, about his encounters with Indians in other parts of the country, about Indian sovereignty, and about his hopes and fears concerning a retention of Indian identity by those who were losing the Seneca language and ceremonial knowledge. He talked about schemes for teaching the old ways, about his respect for those who were educated and knowledgeable in those ways, about his own sense of deprivation in having chosen paths that led him away from early immersion in Seneca language and culture, only to return in his later years with an eagerness and a sense of responsibility toward a goal of Seneca cultural preservation.

Harry Watt's dedication in these matters was essential to smooth the running of the Longhouse religion and, most important, to the preparation for the annual cycle of Six Nations meetings that preserved and carried the message of the prophet Handsome Lake throughout the intertribal circuit of believers. Harry Watt was a model of a traditional Iroquois peace chief (although he did not have such a title): dignified, courteous, reasonable, personally available and generous, highly intelligent, and responsible to the community. For these, and many other reasons, strangers were sent to see him, and he was accustomed to representing his community to visitorsjournalists, scholars, students. We witnessed many of these encounters and grew familiar with some of the regular turns the interviews would take, so that, over the years, we heard him discourse many times on some of the same subjects. Two of his favorites were religious epistemology and working, and I began to feel that I could hum along when he introduced one of these topics, although I tried not to seem inattentive and not to interrupt.

In June 1972, we rented a house in Salamanca on the Allegany Seneca reservation for the beginning of a new project, this time the fieldwork toward my dissertation. Again Stanley Diamond was most helpful, furnishing me with copies of his field data collected while he was attempting to assist the Seneca in their efforts to prevent the construction of the Kinzua Dam. The interviews and details of the community before the transformations produced by the relocation were useful to compare with my postrelocation observations. We had

no clear idea of how long we would stay, but the work was going well, and there was no other place we needed or wanted more to be, so we stayed for two years. My own work turned more and more toward historical research and archives and away from a systematic accumulation and recording of fieldwork notes. I regret now the tapering off of these detailed notes; when I reread them I hardly recognize my own voice, as if I were reading the experiences of some other person. Our social interactions and participation were intense but became less instrumental, and the participant activity quite assuaged my early 1970s discomfort with the observation part of the anthropological enterprise.

Harry Watt frequently remarked that "people say I should write a book." I had heard that statement often enough to feel some impatience whenever I heard it again but also to feel that maybe he really should tell the story of his life in writing and that I should help facilitate that ambition. It also seemed to me that hearing a systematic account of life on the reservation at the turn of the twentieth century might be of use to my research; I was already more focused on the turn of the nineteenth century, so that my own goals were of secondary concern in this project. I offered to come around with the tape recorder that I rarely used, transcribe his recollections, and collaborate with him on editing them for potential publication. It seemed like a tidy project.

On November 16, 1972, I sat on the sofa in Harry Watt's living room, hunkered down for some serious descriptions of his early life on the reservation. He sat in his rocker, eyes slightly closed in an attitude of remembering and, to my distress, began, "When I was a boy, we really knew how to work." I had heard that many times before and I was sure that that was not the way to start this project. I tried to divert him, to suggest he talk about his grandparents, his memories of being a little child, events and people in his family. He responded briefly to my inquiries, but seemed determined to continue talking, in what seemed to me platitudinous ways, about working. The tape recorder ran on and he talked on, while I sat enveloped in a cloud of frustration. When he tired of talking, I turned the machine off, went home and transcribed what was on the tape, gave him a carbon of the transcription the next day, and never mentioned the autobiography again. My copy was filed away, and that other filing system in my head contained only a record of my frustration, amended slightly by my feeling of superior wisdom about what a real autobiography should be.

About five years later, friends who were editing an issue of a conceptual-art magazine proposed that contributors from various disciplines should consider the subject of memory from the perspective of their work. My experience with Harry Watt's autobiography still rankled, and so I began an essay exploring the generalizing tendency of the elderly in relation to their own pasts and the related problem of using oral history as data. After I had completed several paragraphs, I remembered that I had the transcript in my files and thought to search it out for relevant examples.

Harry Watt's words flew out at me as a reproach both for my incomprehension and for the opportunity I had missed. The organizing principle of work was for him a primary value and a life metaphor. It was through working that he defined himself, and it was through the core of economic behavior that the rest of life was elaborated. Because I did not open my ears and my mind, as the Seneca invocation directs one to do, I missed the opportunity to know more about it. The transcript that exists represents in small measure a homage to the man who died in 1986. I include it as I have it to convey both the spoken cadences of the oral delivery and the richness of ethnographic detail.

The Text

When I got a little bigger I worked, I had things to do. I always had things to do. When I got back from school I always had something to do. I started before I even went to school. I used to bring wood in. I had a bunch of sticks and carried them in. I piled them higher on my arms when I got bigger.

I carried wood and I carried water, helping my mother by bringing water. I carried water for her for washing and cooking. My dad used to tell me, "Always watch the water pail. If you see it empty, fill it up." He said, "Always have it full."

I always worked. For instance, milking cows; we had cows. I went after cows. And in the summertime, I had to go after cows. In the winter they didn't go out.

But as I grew older, there was more work. Many times when other kids would come along and ask me to go along with them, go fishing or go somewhere, "I can't go, I'm too busy." There was times when the kids would help me to do something to get it done so I could go with them. Those kids didn't have the farm like we had. They didn't

have no stock, and they didn't have to have chores. They had to get wood; we all had to do that. We all knew how to cut wood, how to use an axe. I knew how to use an axe by the time I went to school.

They all burned wood, and they had to go out to cut wood. The wood near the houses was just brush and wouldn't last more than a few days. I went out to cut trees. Maybe they would be so big I had to cut them three times to get them into the wagon. I cut maybe seven, eight trees at that, and that is a good wagon load.

I didn't have a saw. We didn't have power saws in those days. But there were hand saws that two men used together. But I went after wood alone with just an axe. I would hitch the horses to the wagon and used to go up the hill to cut wood. I would be wasting wood by cutting and letting it lay there and rot, so we would cut it and then I would get the logs clear down to the foot of the hill, and then get the horses and load it up. It was work. I don't think anyone works like that now, today. One thing, though, I had to learn to harness the horses, and there was a time I couldn't do it, and when I wanted to use the horses, why the old man had to hitch them up.

In my family, there was three more boys older than me. They went to school. I had one brother that went to Carlyle, the Indian school. And then another brother that went to Hampton; that's in Virginia. And the oldest one, he graduated that Quaker school. He graduated the sixth grade. A lot of them graduated from that school from the eighth grade.

But I didn't. I went to the Quaker school, and then I got away from there. I ran away from there, after about three years. What happened to me some time ago, I met a Quaker. He had my records, and he said, "Oh, it's you, Harry Watt. You ran away from school." I said, "Yes, I ran away from school; I didn't like the idea." I said, "I had to work all day, and after that I was hungry, and I was punished for something I didn't do, and I was kept out until I was late. I was late, and they didn't feed me. And I was hungry, and I didn't like that. So I said to myself and four other boys, we got ready and we took off. And I never went back. I was sorry I didn't go back. Maybe I could have learned a little bit more. But instead," I said, "I went to work." I came home, and I told them what happened. Well, my dad wasn't too much about going to school, and I suppose he thought if I went to work, why it would be that much less on his hands. So I went to work.

I was fifteen years old when I went to work. It was about this time of year, in the fall, when I ran away. And just about that time there was a man going around. He was looking for me to go to work.

They

were laying railroad tracks down to below our city. Petroleum Center is the name of the little town. They were laying railroad track there going down to Titusville. So I went over there looking for that man. I found that man and he said, "Yeah. How old are you?" "Oh, nineteen." Yeah, I lied four, five years. He looked at me. "Yup. You big enough. You be ready Monday morning when we start to go, your pay begins."

Oh, I was all for it. But we got there, you had to work. It wasn't too hard work, but I worked hard. My job was men's work, and that is everything. I pick up rails, and I had to learn how to drive spikes, and I didn't know how to work with my hands with tools, and I had to learn. But it didn't take too long. I knew how to chop with an axe and use a hammer, and that helped me a lot.

We worked all winter and we lived in a camp. I often thought of that. Just the other day I said, "There's something I'm hungry for." We used to have at the camp, we had a man cook. He used to fry potatoes and bread crumbs and fish, canned fish. He would empty that fish in the great skillet where the potatoes were cut up and add some bread crumbs and cover it and let it fry. He had to turn it over. And the bread got kind of brown, toasted like, and everything is brown, and the fish get all mixed with the other things. Oh, I used to like that. I looked for that in the morning, for breakfast. You had to eat to work. In a place like that you don't get fat. You eat all you can; you wear it out. We come back for dinner. But when we had to go out, they had lunches in bags. They generally had a place, a shanty or two shanties, where we put our tools, and they had a stove in there.

There was about thirty men from here. We had about three hundred men. I met a boy he was a Mexican. There was a Mexican camp nearby. This boy, I used to see him quite a bit. There was a big store and we used to all go there. They had ice cream and all that and some of that candy. But this guy, he was about my age. He must have been, but I never asked him. He kind of liked me, and he would try to talk to me, and he couldn't because he couldn't talk English. There was a bridge close by there as we used to go to the bridge and just sit down there and let our feet hang down. And we'd talk. We tried to learn each other's language. I talked English and I taught him to say the meaning of different things, the names of things in the store. He asked me, "Como se llama?" I got so I could understand, too. I could understand his language. I used to know quite a bit, but since that time I lost interest of it, and I didn't see anybody I could talk to. But

when I was talking to him, I could almost talk right along. He learned finally.

There were about one hundred Mexicans. And also Italians, pretty near a hundred of them, too. And about a hundred Indians. Each group stayed apart and didn't mix. Oh, they had fights. There was two killings down there. The Mexicans had two or three and the Italians, they had some, too. They killed each other inside the groups. In our group, there was two, killed in a fight. One of them was the cook. He was stabbed. The other guy, he was beat up and I think the train run over him.

I worked down there all winter and I got me some nice warm clothes, because I bought them myself. I always wanted some clothes, some warm clothes. I got my own money, and when I got back I gave some to my mother. "Oh," she said, "I'll keep it for you."

After I came back from there I had cows, and I had young stock, and I had a horse. I kept the cows on my father's land; didn't have to pay him for it, but he used the milk. My first calf was given to me. My grandmother on my mother's side give me one when I was about eight years old. When I first went to school I had a horse, a little horse. I used to ride. The horse got bad after a while, but he lived quite a while. I consider myself a good rider. For a long time I didn't have a saddle, so I rode bareback. Finally, I got an old saddle I bought myself. My father and mother, they saved their money, and they worked hard. My father, he never went out to work for days' wages. He's working on the farm and what money he got, he went to work for others for a day or so at a time. But he had milk and from the milk he had an income. I remember when he had about thirty cows. We all milked. My mother used to milk, my sisters, my brother, myself. At first I had one cow I used to milk. That one cow, my sisters started in to milk that cow; my brothers started in to milk that cow. It was easy. After a while when you grab the teats, the hand gets strong from milking cows all the time. It's a lot of exercise. We used to have some hard milkers.

I had some cows. Oh, she was a good cow. I sold that cow and I got horses for it. I sold that cow and two yearlings and I got big horses out of that. They weighed thirty-two hundred pounds, about sixteen hundred pounds apiece. So they were pretty big horses. I worked them horses. I wanted them because if I had big horses I could do this and that. If I had big horses I could go and skin logs, go and haul lumber; I could go and haul wood. So the old man said, "You get

yourself horses and a harness, and I'll buy the wagon." So one day I went shopping for horses. I bought this heavy pair of horses; made a trade. I got a good price on this cow because it was good. I told the man how much she give, and he didn't quite believe it. So I said, "You come down in the evening, and I'll show you." She used to milk two pails full of milk in one milking. I sold the cow to a guy named Underwood. He was a farmer, and he was a dealer, too. You have to watch how you dealt with them guys. I got a good deal. I told him that one of the heifers was coming in, and it didn't come so he told me, "You got me." So I said, "It'll still come."

In those days, I stayed home for a while after I came back from working, and I did a lot of things then. That was the year they started to pick up the track. There used to be a railroad track down to the park and when they got through with it and there was no more lumber, they tore up the tracks. And I worked there. And that was work. We used to pick up the rails and put it on the railroad car. After you got one up there, you give it a good push into the car. I used to get so tired, I slept at noon. There was an old man there I knew well, and wherever he said I should go I went there and I said, "Wake me up about quarter to one." And I'd go to sleep. I'd wake up, hurry up and eat, get through and get back to work. To get to work I had to walk several miles. I wasn't the only one who had to walk. Every day walk down there, work ten hours, walk back. When I get back, eat, sit around a little bit, then go to bed. That job lasted all summer and they shut down after it started to snow.

After that I worked on the railroad. I worked there for quite a few years. I can't describe exactly railroad work. Railroad work is a certain kind of work. When you work on the railroad, you don't do that on the farm. Railroad work is its own work. It's railroad work. We laid the rails, and then we spiked them. Gauged them, then spiked them. Sometimes we had to put down plates on the ties, and sometimes we put them every other tie. And there was times we had to put them on every tie; that's around a curve mostly. It's all heavy work. Sometimes we laid new tracks, sometimes maintenance. Sometimes maybe a broken rail. They get that rail out and put a new piece in there. Or else when just a piece off the end is broke off, then they cut it off and fit one in there. I've done that. I've stood on the railroad track and just pound, swing that pounder all day long. The first day you get awful tired, just don't want to get up the next morning. It hurts, hurts to move. My back hurt. But two, three days, maybe four

days, you feel better. Finally it's gone. In the morning you wake up, and why, you feel just as good. You might feel a little tighter.

I worked uptown as a carpenter's helper and mason, and I poured concrete and worked around concrete. And I did plastering. And that's hard work. That first day I thought my neck was broke. Sometimes when I get through with a job, by the next day I'd have another job. I'd heard about them by going around and different men would say, "There's a job over there." I'd keep that in mind and when I'd get a chance I'd run over there and, "Sure, come to work tomorrow." They were building houses quite a bit in Salamanca in 1917, 1918.

The old bridge went down in Quaker Bridge in 1917. That year we had a cold, cold winter. We had zero weather for about two weeks continually. One day it was about 35 below. I had a Model A Ford, a roadster, and the starter couldn't turn over. I had to crank, tup, tup, tup. It got started, warmed up, and I went down the road. The people, some had cars, and they were cranking. The ice was four, five, six feet thick and when it came down the river it hit the bridge. It hit that bridge, and the bridge lay on the ice, and it carried it to an island down below, down to the point of that island, and that's where it stopped. They got most of that iron. The bridge was built around 1878. The same company built the new one. The old one was wide enough for automobiles, but the iron that laid in there weren't bolted down, and even the boards were not tied down. So when the cars came, the boards would loosen and slide one way and the other and finally they had to fasten them down. And the floor beams began to slide off one way and the other and drop off. With the new bridge we put up, it was all concrete floor so it was solid. So that was my first bridge job. I worked with it until it got through. We finished it about the last of August 1920.

I worked the last day on that, and the next day I had a job over at the Quaker School. I painted the roof. They had a tin roof, and they wanted that painted before it got too cold. I went and got a partner for myself, and we painted the roof for about two weeks. There was a lot of roof there.

My father told me I should go into farming, but it's that payday. The railroad, they paid every two weeks, and the farmers they paid once a month. Only a few jobs paid once a week. There used to be a tannery in Salamanca, and they paid every week.

In those days, after I came back from the railroad, I had horses. And I got a course from a school for horse trainers. I wrote for

instructions, and I studied, and finally I graduated. I was a horseman. I could train horses, break horses to work. One time I had nine horses. I bought some, I traded some. In those days there were quite a few horse traders. I got into that a bit. I had two teams. My Dad used to use them but he had his own, too. He always had his own.

Then I raised young stock. I raised bulls. One time I had four of them, and they got to be a good size, about two years old. There was one of them that you just couldn't hold him in a fence. I was feeding them for meat and I sold them. I had to feed them at night and in the morning before I went to work.

In those days I used to watch the first automobiles come around, when I was eight years old. We used to see a truck come by. We used to hear that coming way down the road. Maybe two cylinderschug chug, chug chug. And then we'd go down to the road and watch that thing go by. It had high wheels, same size front and back. And the motor was crossways, and it had a crank and a heavy chain in there. It made me think, standing there watching that car go by, and I'd think, "Someday I'm going to have one of those. Someday I'm going to learn exactly how that thing runs." And I'd stand there, and I'd think that, "Wouldn't it be nice if I could do that. Every body'd say, 'Harry Watt can fix that.'" I used to have that in mind. Finally I bought a car when I was about seventeen years old. When I was working on the bridge I got pretty good pay. On this bridge here I got about 60 cents an hour while the others were getting about 30 cents, 35 cents. Then when I worked for American Bridge Company I made a dollar an hour. The railroads were paying around 30 cents, that was good pay. I remember before I went to work, my brother was going to work on the highway, working for a contractor. It was good wages, two dollars a day.

I was about the only one around here to go into iron work. Later on they did. Before the 1930s there were some from the other reservations who were iron workers. They were down there putting up a new bridge, just this side of where the Kinzua Dam is now, a railroad bridge. About four Indians worked there, and that's about all the iron workers there were in them days. I would be the only Indian that worked on iron in some places.

Commentary

Had I been listening, I would have realized that what Harry Watt was describing in his own life coincided with my interpretation of what

the Seneca Indians had been doing a hundred years earlier that is, adapting as well as they could to changes being imposed by the colonizers, while attempting to retain social cohesion, some measure of significant cultural content, and a sense of control. It is appropriate, in the context of honoring Stanley Diamond for a lifetime of work that in large measure has involved an examination of the consequences of capitalist colonial expansion, to discuss from this perspective a people that he knew well and on whose behalf he had worked.

My own investigation focused on the reexamination of the interaction of the Allegany Senecas and the Quaker missionaries who arrived in 1798 in response to the Seneca invitation to establish a mission. The Quakers came to civilize the Seneca and understood by civilization the eventual necessary goal of a commitment to "distinct property." From a matrilineal, communal society in which economic viability was achieved through a complementary division of labor in which female horticulturists produced subsistence crops while men engaged in cash derivative activities (we are, after all, talking about several hundred years of world market extensions into the American continent), the Quakers hoped to forge a society in which men would farm private property to be inherited by sons while women would engage in household tasks appropriate to the "gentle sex" (Rothenberg 1976, 1980).

The Quaker goal of civilization through male agriculture and private property was not only an expression of an eighteenth-century agrarian idealism. It was specifically an imperialist governmental policy designed to open western lands for sale to settlers both to satisfy land hunger and to raise money to pay war debts. If Indians could be induced to farm, they would be both pacified and reconciled to drastic land reductions. But the federal government could not afford to fund the program, and so the Quakers undertook, as a private society, to accomplish these goals. I believe their willingness to do so was related to their need to restore their former position of influence, which had been diminished by their reluctance to participate in the American War of Independence. (Rothenberg [1976] discusses Quaker activities at length.)

Because the Quakers were an exclusive society proscribed from seeking converts, their emphasis was on assisting the Senecas in this world rather than in the next. Their emphasis, like Harry Watt's, was on appropriate work as a measure of human worth. They were critical of "idlers" and eager to reduce economic reciprocity and resource distribution. And they were very eager to move into an exclusive

domestic sphere. Harry Watt strongly objected to this orientation and used to say that he believed that a scrupulously clean house would indicate that a woman had wrong values. He recognized the important contribution of women to the life of the community in general and to the management and continuation of the Longhouse, and he predicted that it would be the energy and effort of the women upon which a continuation of traditional Seneca life would depend.

The centrality of the nuclear family reflected in Harry Watt's narrative was promoted by the Quakers and endorsed by the prophet Handsome Lake. The prophet's visions established the terms of social restructuring that are now the foundation of the contemporary Handsome Lake Longhouse religion and of the conservative "old way" among the various groups adhering to that religion. Unlike the Quakers, Handsome Lake encouraged the establishment of clustered settlements, following the older residence patterns, and he rejected the Quakers' urging that economic reciprocity be abandoned, a goal to be accomplished through dispersed agricultural homesteads. Developments during the nineteenth century resulted in what William Fenton (1967) has called a "rural neighborhood" pattern, with nodes of settlement occurring between dispersed homesteads. Osteological evidence from nineteenth-century cemeteries indicates that these homesteads were patrivirilocal, in contrast to the normative part of a matriuxorilocality, which was probably situationally variable over time (see Lane and Sublett 1972).

The issue of whether males engaged primarily in agriculture as a result of the Quaker influence was a crucial point in my investigations. Harry Watt's father, Hiram, was, in fact, a farmer, although, as the narrative indicates, "what money he got, he went to work for others for a day or so at a time." According to his daughter, Hiram Watt was a first-generation farmer who as a destitute boy of twelve began to clear, and hence claim, available reservation land to support himself and his widowed mother. He did this after the 1860s, when dairy farming had become a viable industry for both whites and Indians. The coming of the railroads made possible the shipping of cheese produced in the local factories that bought fluid milk (see Ellis 1879). As Harry Watt says, "But he had milk and from milk he had an income."

The Quakers made much of the cultural inhibitions that men felt regarding farming, and the story of women taking up guns to mock men who took up hoes is often repeated. The evidence, however,

reveals reasons more economic than cultural for men to resist farming. With no access to markets for agricultural products, men could not generate the cash the community needed. Men engaged in whatever work they could find, including farm work for wages. ("It's that payday.") Although dairy farming had become an economically viable activity, Hiram Watt's almost total dependence on farming was unusual among the Seneca. Harry remarks this when he contrasts his responsibilities with those of his friends, who "didn't have the farm like we had."

Harry Watt's remarks about horses ("I wanted them because if I had big horses I could do this and that. If I had big horses I could go and skin logs, go and haul lumber; I could go and haul wood.") reflect a long tradition of the use of horses in the Seneca community, an ongoing source of friction with the Quakers. They encouraged livestock production but complained that cattle were neglected in the winter when men were away hunting. They also complained that horses proliferated in a way that was of no use to the community. Horses were of no use in such numbers if men were to concern themselves with agriculture, but they were of great use if the men were to engage in lumbering. Much to the Quakers' disapproval, this is what men did after 1812 and what the first white settlers did as well. The Seneca word for horses translates as "he hauls logs," and such crops as men raised (e.g., oats and hay) were horse associated. The activities of the Indian and white loggers were intermeshed in terms of both labor and access to the natural resource. Jurisdiction over the sale of logs from communal reservation land became a source of tension within the community. Conflicts over authority to alienate both land and natural resources were central to the displacement of the traditional political system of lifetime chiefs by the creation in 1848 of the Seneca Nation with its elected government.

Harry Watt's experiences as a laborer in western New York at the beginning of the twentieth century reflect the history of that region. Settlement of the area began late and slowly and relied on lumber. The convergence of three railroads, the Atlantic and Great Western, the Erie, and the Rochester and State Lines, established the conditions for more rapid growth of the area around Salamanca after 1860. Local products could be transported out of the area by rail, also the conduit by which oil from Pennsylvania was distributed (Ellis 1879). Employment was available not only in laying and maintaining track, but also in the repair shops, the car shops, and the stockyards

maintained by the railroads. Small factories with loading platforms facing the tracks were established. Although the area had been deforested by the late nineteenth century, stripping bark for local tanneries continued to provide work in the former forests. Wage labor employment was available in the expanding economy. Seneca women, using the skills they had learned at the Quaker school, were employed as domestics by local families. Indian workers provided a steady and reliable source of cheap labor. More highly skilled work paid better, but this was rarely available to local Indians. As a result, many young adults left the local area to seek employment elsewhere and frequently returned, if at all, only after retirement. Lack of suitable employment has been the cause of an ongoing drain of educated and able people away from the reservation community, which needs them.

When Harry Watt remarked that he regretted that he didn't go back to school, he does not add what he so often did, that he also envied those who had never gone to school. In his later years, he came to believe that school learning was a distraction from learning the intellectual content and practice of the traditional Seneca culture and particularly of the religion. He could speak Seneca, although not as well as he would have wished, and he would note that speaking Seneca was a punishable offense at the Quaker school.

A formal school for children was established at Tunesassa, the Quaker farm, in about 1816, and problems and opposition to it arose from the beginning. The school became the central symbol around which fundamental divisions in the community expressed themselves. The situation became so tense that by 1821 the schoolmaster felt his life was threatened. There were several abortive openings and closings and locational shifts until the middle of the 1840s, when the Quakers concluded that only a boarding school would reduce community and home influences on students and permit the program of acculturation they were advancing. This school was a significant experience in the lives of many now elderly Allegany Seneca, remembered with both the pleasure and the pain of most Indian boarding school experiences.

Finally, Harry Watt's experiences with representatives of the white world were continuous and varied. So has been the Indian experience from the inception of the reservation in 1798. The reserved land is a strip forty miles long and a half mile wide on each side of the Allegheny River. Although they did not stay, emigrants used it as a

highway to bring trade goods to Pittsburgh and other centers. The shape of the reservation made the Seneca country all boundary with no interior, affording no place to avoid contact with whites and the influences of white society. Harry Watt's early observations of the automobile and the desires it provoked in him are examples of that influence. The Quakers looked with favor on Allegany as the site of a mission because they believed it stood outside of the area of white influence, and Handsome Lake had hoped to shape his people into an encapsulated and protected community. Both views were shortsighted; there would be no place to escape white expansion. Colonization from the beginning necessitated continual readjustments. That the Seneca have remained a vital social unit for so long is a testimony to their adaptability.

But Harry Watt was always concerned with the loss of cultural content, a loss that he saw intensifying with technological development and language loss. The viability of the social unit itself he felt to be tied to and protected by the intellectual content of the culture. He used to say that when white men come around asking what it is to be a Seneca and no one can tell them, that will be the signal for the reservation to be terminated. For Harry Watt the final defense of Indian life depended on what people had in their heads and in their hearts.

References

Ellis, Franklin

1879

History of Cattaraugus County, New York, with Illustrations and Biographical Sketches of Some of Its Prominent Men and Pioneers. Philadelphia: L. H. Everts.

Fenton, William

1967

From Long-House to Ranch-Type House: The Second Housing Revolution of the Seneca Nation. *In* Iroquois Culture, History, and Prehistory: Proceedings of the 1965 Conference on Iroquois Research, ed. Elizabeth Tooker. Albany: New York State Museum and Science Service.

Lane, Rebecca, and Audrey Sublett

1972

Osteology of Social Organization: Residence Patterns. *American Antiquity* 37(2):186-201.

Rothenberg, Diane

1976

Friends Like These: An Ethnohistorical Analysis of the Interaction between Allegany Senecas and Quakers, 1798-1823. Ann Arbor, Mich.: University Microfilms.

1980

Mothers of the Nation: Seneca Resistance to Quaker Intervention.
In Women and Colonization, ed. Mona Etienne and Eleanor
Leacock, 6387. New York: Praeger.

5

Persona Non Grata: Ethnicity and Romanian Nationalism

Sam Beck

Reflexivity generates heightened awareness and vertigo, the creative intensity of a possibility that loosens us from habit and custom and turns us back to contemplate ourselves just as we may be beginning to realize that we have no clear idea of what we are doing. The experience may be exhilarating or frightening or both, but it is generally irreversible. . . . Once we take into account our role in our own productions, . . . [we] may achieve a greater originality and responsibility than before, a deeper understanding at once of ourselves and of our subjects.

Barbara Myerhoff and Jay Ruby,
Introduction to A Crack in the Mirror

September 16, 1984:
Persona Non Grata

"Persona non grata. You are a persona non grata! Did you know?

What did you do?"

"I didn't do anything."

"You must have done something!"

"I didn't. No one told me that I did something. I've not been told anything. What did you do?"

"I didn't do anything."

The tone of the dialogue remained calm. I was a participant in a card game where we were not to show our hands or indicate through a smile or a raised eyebrow what possibilities we held. The critical problem for me, however, was that I held no hand.

We walked in the dark space between the stationary trains, one resting on the track going toward Bucharest, the other headed toward the Banat and the Yugoslav border that I had left that afternoon.

When my train reached the second stop, I knew something unusual was happening, since people around me had passports in hand while I felt compelled to ask a conductor about my unreturned passport. I said, "They took my passport to put a visa on it." No sooner had the words left my lips than I heard voices behind me.

"You must come with us now."

I saw them pointing at me as I turned around. The command seemed friendly enough. I was sweating, and the dust of train travel mixed with the natural moisture, leaving a grimy trace on my skin. I could taste the dust. I was not totally surprised when they came to take me off the train, but I was emotionally unprepared.

The last time I had left Romania the authorities demonstrated their displeasure with me at the airport, and I remembered thinking then that I would find myself in difficulty the next time that I attempted to enter the country. This time I purposely did not request a visa in advance of my trip, preferring to take my chances at this kind of border crossing. As I walked in the shadow of the trains, I wondered why they had not taken me off at an earlier stop.

A uniformed boy was put in charge of escorting me as we walked toward the train station. My bags felt heavier now than when I had carried them into the second-class compartment. The boy soldier saw my difficulties and reached for the largest and heaviest bag. I was struck by my own calm as I sought to imagine future events and considered my ambiguous circumstances. My mind skipped from the present to the past and back again, attempting to grasp what was happening to me. I had done nothing except carry out research on a topic sensitive to the Romanian establishment. Three years before, I researched interethnic relations and economic specialization in Romania and came across the Gypsies. I had not been secretive about my work, and a Romanian scholar with whom I worked was regularly questioned by the authorities about his and my activities. The authorities knew about the work I was carrying out.

Trudging along in the dark, I felt anger mixed with deep disappointment. These people in uniform were going to stop me from seeing my friends and colleagues. I thought about the terrible things that I had learned from people who had recently carried out research in Romania: poor food supplies, inadequate sources of fuel, and general poverty. As we came to the northern end of the train station, I noted that the two doors we faced had bars on them. I found myself surrounded by four men and the boy soldier. A policeman joined the group. They seemed on edge. Did I look like a threat to them? I

thought they were probably bored and tired and really wanted to be somewhere else and not take responsibility for me.

"What did you do?"

"Go in there," the man in charge said, pointing toward one of the doors with bars. I requested a call to my embassy. In a flash I considered that I was a living cliché: American without a visa detained at border and denied a telephone call. I was not allowed to dwell further on this momentary diversion, frequent interruptions, too, being a cliché of tormentors. The boy reached into the doorway and flicked on the light. The fluorescent light tubes on the ceiling permitted no shadows. This was light in which I could find no pleasure, solace, or diversion. It served its function without aesthetics.

I saw a chair behind a desk. "Bring the chair out here," I told them. "I'll just sit here until you find out what you will do with me." It was clear that they were searching for an authority to take responsibility over me or to be instructed to take me to my next destination.

"You have to go in there. Who is going to watch over you out here?"

I was frustrated and delighted that they put the issue in that way. I obviously inconvenienced them, and I would be even more troublesome were I to sit outside. They would have to put a watch over me. The cell was more to their liking. They had made a game of it by asking me a rhetorical question. I refused to play.

"You should be ashamed," I said. "I am a foreign scholar, and you treat me like this! I learned your language and lived with your people for three years." This embarrassed me, because as I spoke I realized that Romania owed me nothing. I was using my knowledge of Romanians and their sense of hospitality to provoke them into favorable action. I tried hard to make them approach me as a human being, someone who had lived with them, rather than an object. This was more than a game for me because I knew that the situation in which I found myself was ambiguous enough for me to be concerned. Anything could happen, I reminded myself.

"For nothing you are telling me your dissatisfaction," said the leader in the group. "Tell it to your embassy!"

I laughed to myself because he was serious and because we all knew that no one was going to call my embassy. They got more edgy at my refusal to follow their directive.

The man who seemed to be in charge gripped my arm. As he did, the others formed a tighter circle around me, as if I might try to go someplace.

"You are here and we are in charge now! You will do as I say!" said a bulky, fully uniformed figure. "Now go into the room or we will make you go!" I did not want to escalate this any further, and so I allowed myself to be moved into the cell. They must have had experience in circling, I thought to myself, since they had accomplished this maneuver quickly, with me not noticing it until there they were.

The last time I was in a situation like this was at the Otopeni Airport outside Bucuresti three years before. I was on my way out of Romania and traveling with a large bundle of wrapped notes that I was carrying through the border for an American anthropologist who had been unable to carry them through herself. I had been detained in customs so long I missed my flight. Since this had not happened to me before, I was particularly concerned by what appeared to be unpredictable behavior in that portion of the frontier controlled by customs officials and the security police and who knows what other organs of state.

I remembered the customs agent holding his walkie-talkie over my head, ready to strike. He held me by my arm, exactly where *this* uniformed man was holding me. I thought, these people must get special assertiveness training for such occasions. I wondered to myself whether intimidation techniques are quickly learned. I couldn't believe this was happening again.

I then wondered whether I should consider this as part of my fieldwork experience. The second time around I realized that quite obviously these events shaped my understanding of Romanian society and that in some measure I was part of that society. Of course this was part of fieldwork.

They promised to return and talk to me further. "If you have a particular problem, just hit the wall." With that, they locked the ironbarred door and left me by myself. I gingerly tested the wall and judged that if I hit it hard enough, people would hear me.

They went into the room next to mine. No one ever really came back to talk to me. The uniformed boy was sent out. I saw his arm reaching into my cell, his hand attempting to grasp the wooden door that I had purposely kept wide open. It was a humid night and I wanted more air. By keeping the door open, I was comforted by a sense of connection with some outer world. This is what Romanians must feel like as they watch non-Romanian television productions and films or when they speak with tourists, I thought. Their isolation is pierced by media gaps and contacts through interruptions from

beyond Romania's borders. "Don't be angry," he said. "I have to close the door."

"Close the door? No! Not this, too! Leave it open so that I can breathe," I appealed to him.

"But people can see you!"

"I don't understand what you mean." Here they had taken me off the train and had put me into a cell, and now they were worried that people would see me? Kafka would have enjoyed this, I thought.

"Don't you feel bad to be locked up? Aren't you ashamed?" He pointed to the grillwork and the lock he had put on the cell door, which now kept me from leaving the 12' by 18' room. It had not occurred to me to be ashamed, and I was puzzled that he would think that I felt dishonored by this incarceration. It did occur to me that they wished to humiliate me and reduce me to an object, rather than a person with whom they would have to interact.

While the room was outfitted with a number of lighting fixtures, only one pair of fluorescent lights was operating. Thank God, they weren't flickering the way they do before they fail. Nothing is more irritating than one of those blinking fluorescent lights. I couldn't believe I was thinking about such things, but I realized that it kept me calm. Another fixture had only one tube set into the socket. The Romanians have shortages, I had heard from friends. I supposed that a detention cell is not important enough to equip fully.

A bentwood coatrack was standing on its three legs in one corner. I had three chairs to myself and two large tables. A couple of used fluorescent tubes were leaning against the corner walls toward the front, out of sight of those looking in. They looked as tired and worn out as I felt. I walked over to the window, hoping to connect with the outside world. I wouldn't have been able to see through the glass, even if it had not been covered by small curtains. Greasy dirt on the outside blocked everything.

"No, I don't feel badly," I told the boy soldier. I asked him why I should feel shame. You're the ones who locked me in, I thought. The young Saxon woman who shared my train compartment had been right: "The channel narrows as Romania gets closer."

The soldier and I were interrupted by the officer who had promised to return to ask me further questions. He came back into the detention room with a twinkle in his eyes. "Boy," he said, "you really must have done something!"

The only thing I could think of was the work I had carried out

about Gypsies, about which they must have been quite irritated. I was not going to tell this person about that, since it would have made matters worse for me, I thought.

"You were born in China?"

"Yes, that's what it says on my passport."

"This is a new passport?"

"Yes, my old one expired." He must have thought to himself, "Ahahere he is, using all the tricks." What tricks? I didn't do anything!

"Have you been in Romania recently?"

I couldn't believe it. Why was he asking me this? Don't they have current information? "Well, don't *you* know this?" I asked him.

"You have the list, don't you, of all the people who aren't supposed to come in?"

"These things aren't dated."

"Well, perhaps you have an old list then, and I am no longer on the new one."

I was trying to get this man to tell me what his channels of communication were. I offered to give him telephone numbers of people who would verify who I was. Perhaps he was trying to get me to incriminate myself. The more I talked, the more I would reveal. I knew that this was a strategy that officials use, but usually this sort of thing is accompanied with liberal doses of alcohol and coffee.

"We are just doing our jobs, you understand," the officer said apologetically.

I was not surprised by this remark since it was clear that these people were not dealing enthusiastically with me. Yes, I've heard this before: It's not personal, but I am going to have to lock you up. Don't take this personally, but I have to shoot you in the head. Their officious nature disturbed me more and more and my incarcerated state less and less.

The one fly in the room was a constant nuisance, landing on my face and arm. It was late, close to midnight. I was tired and irritable sitting there; at first a jumble of phrases from the day came back to me:

"Yes, we have to lock you up now."

"Yes, we have to close the door now."

"Yes," he said, "we have no tea or coffee. You see it's twelve and everything is closed now."

"Go into the room now."

"No," I told him, "I would like to stay outside, thank you."

"Where are you going to sit?"

"Just bring one of those chairs out here and I'll sit here."

"But who are you going to have watch over you?"

That really isn't my problem, now, is it, I thought.

Then, more coherently, I thought of the contrast between Romania and Yugoslavia. The Fifth International Congress of Southeast European Studies had just ended and my paper on Gypsies was well received. The Yugoslavs invited me to participate in the press conference they had organized. Members of the media asked me to appear on television and radio to elaborate on my paper and to discuss my participation in the Congress and the nature of social anthropology. Yugoslavia, but Serbia in particular, has a sizable Gypsy population, many of whom live at a level of poverty that can be found in any peripheralized social formation. I was asked about my understanding of Gypsy history in Yugoslavia, but without the defensiveness displayed by the Romanians.

Romania appeared to me a vibrant society when I carried out my research in an upland village in the early 1970s. I did not find the rigidly Stalinist society I was led to believe I would find, certainly not in my village. However, by 1979, I sensed a strain among people as their affairs increasingly became a matter of state interest. Their economy had suffered and the inefficiency of their system, whatever its basis—corruption, poor management, resistance to communism, greed—was venting itself on the people, while the leadership turned tighter the screws of repression. The elite saw themselves as international power brokers, keeping the Romanian nation safe from the encroachment of both the Soviet Union and advanced capitalism. "They" were punishing everyone. I knew this, but thinking about it now didn't make things any better for me at the train station.

What are you going to do with me now, anyway? I thought. "You took me off the train," I said to them.

"Wait until the morning and then we'll send you back."

He put a vice-like grip on my arm. The Romanian delegation did not show up at the Congress, except for a few individuals who came unofficially. I killed the fly, slapping it between the palms of my hands. It lay on the dirty, worn floral-patterned rug that covered a parquet floor. I realized they had never bothered to finish the room. The floor had not been sanded or oiled. On the wall were two big boot prints, one up and one down, at a height where I could imagine

another traveler had vented his anger by seeing how high he could jump in order to leave his mark.

"How many other Americans did you take off the train?" I asked him.

"I don't know." I knew he wouldn't answer me. "Were you born in Romania? You were born in America?" He asked.

No, I was born in China, which is the truth. My ability to converse with Romanians always took officials by surprise. I suppose they could not imagine someone actually *wanting* to learn Romanian. For such people I had to be a Romanian-American or an emigré who was returning home for a visit, and that is why they received orders to take me off as an unwelcome visitor. They were as confused about what was going on as I was and were looking for a way to explain it to themselves and justify their actions.

"Why do you ask? Don't you let Romanian-Americans into your country?" I queried.

They ignored my question, keeping their poker faces. His grip got a bit tighter. I remembered that grip from Otopeni Airport three years ago. The threat of violence was the same.

"We will use force! We will use force!" they said.

Three men in green uniforms looked at me. Concern registered on their faces; their eyes darted back and forth and they looked around to see who else was observing the scene. For the time being, no one was in our section of the train station platform, but people did move about. They avoided us, shifting their gazes forward and to the ground to avert an accidental meeting of eyes. A policeman had come up behind me and repeated, "We will use force!" I wondered what this would look like to a passerby.

I turned to him and said in English, with all the bravado I could muster, "Oh, you are going to use force, are you? Who do you think you are?"

I knew this would make no difference one way or the other, since no one appeared to speak English, and even if they did, they were pretending not to know it. At this point, it did not matter to me. I had to give vent to my anger and frustration, since I knew that I would end up in that room with the bars. One of the uniformed men took one of the bags that had been placed beside me and took it into the room. I followed. Resistance was of little use, I had decided. Neither I, nor they, would learn more than we had. The officer in charge looked me in the eye as the others filed out. "We are doing our job," he

apologized and shrugged his shoulders. "*Ce se fac!*" [The appropriate Romanian remark when people acted in ways not of their choosing: What is to be done!]

"Well, my friend," I said sadly, "you're the one who should feel the shame." I actually felt sorry for him and them. I believed them; they were doing what they were told to do.

"It really is much easier for us to let you go and stamp the visa into your passport," he said.

"than to hold you here and go through all of this." I finished his sentence for him. I knew he was right. "Still," I said, "one person to another, this sort of thing only brings shame to your country. I only want to tell you, so that you can tell the others. You must share the responsibility for what happens here."

Perhaps he understood what I was saying. If he did, he probably would dismiss it.

Until the overthrow, the Ceausescu regime remained in power with only an occasional brief rebellion here in Hunedoara or there in Brasov. Had Romanians accepted the culture of intimidation and terror as a way of life? Were they willing to adapt themselves to conditions of mistrust and subterfuge and silence? Somethose who could no longer stand their condition and who had the resourcesleft the country.

Time moved slowly. They had worn me down. I put my small briefcase on top of the longer of the two tables in the room, got out my trench coat, and prepared for bed. I put on a tape and fell asleep listening to the music. I left the lights on, and the door remained open. Morning came quickly, and the train was on time. This time, I carried my own bags. The boy soldier sullenly accompanied me to the train. I wondered whether he had gotten any sleep. I was handed my passport and put into a first-class car. I had time to think, now. September had been warm in Europe. We had a bit of rain as we traveled back to the border.

I thought to myself, the role of the scholar is precarious in carrying out research in a country like Romania. I could have carried out neutral research. I had asked for trouble looking at Gypsies. I could have lied about my work and secured an extended possibility of carrying out research in Romania. However, such a priority prevents scholars from voicing their opposition to human rights violations or just plain disregard for people and their lives. So, you behave yourself and do what is necessary to reduce suspicion. What you discover

about people in the course of doing research does not question the legitimacy of states or their policies and the underlying conceptualizations that prevent change. Certainly under such conditions of neutrality you neither discuss such matters openly nor present papers that attempt to analyze the situation.

As I carried out my survey on Gypsies, I found myself confronted by prejudice in the process of acquiring support from the state. The implementation of Romanian policies at the local level indicated that Gypsies were perceived as a social, economic, and cultural problem. They were being forced to settle, take jobs, and to Romanianize. While this prejudice was debilitating enough for the people who suffered its consequences, the matter had a more sinister quality to it. I found a culture of prejudice fostered by the conditions of state formation whose bearers had thrust this sentiment upon a variety of people over the last one hundred years and more. Gypsies, I discovered, were not the only or even primary recipients.

I wondered, are there still safe topics? Does a safe approach to research exist? Did I become a subversive in the eyes of the authorities? I suppose that to some Romanian authorities, all foreigners are potentially subversive. They are unable to trust their own people; why should they trust others?

People knew that I recorded conversations, since I did this as we spoke. They knew I was going to use the information they were giving me. I concluded that my behavior as a researcher had nothing to do with my new status in Romania. The Romanian authorities discovered their own culpability concerning the treatment of Gypsies, and clearly they were sensitive about ethnic minorities in their country.

I became drowsy as the train moved toward the border. My pen stopped. The uniformed boy was on my mind as I fell asleep. I had asked him his age.

"I am twenty years old," he said.

"Where are you from?"

"Vaslui. They bring us from all over to work here."

He grimaced and shrugged his shoulders. " *Ce se fac.* " His uniform looked as if he had been standing in it since he had put it on that morning. Not that it was well ironed, but it was stiffly standing at attention with him as the train pulled away.

Although the tension of potentially aggressive interaction was present, I did not wish to feel the presence of physical danger. This ambiguity remains difficult for me to explain. Perhaps it had more to do with my desire to be out of danger, while I faced it.

I was very much aware that I was isolated and that my captors wanted to keep me that way. I was intimidated by the event, but as I had moments to myself, I wondered how I would be perceived by members of my discipline as a result of being turned out of the country where I carried out fieldwork. In part, this prevented me from publishing until recently on what I believe is the central reason for Romania closing its borders to me, my work with Gypsies.

By not publishing, I thought, I could more easily ensure my reentry into Romania. My silence concerning my treatment, but more importantly, my understanding of what was going on in Romania, would demonstrate to the powers controlling my research destiny that I respected their *claim* of legitimacy. This same silence would also protect me within my discipline, I thought, where my status in Romania would much too easily be interpreted as a failure in fieldwork. I was led to this conclusion from the experiences of other anthropologists about whom I had knowledge. In one case a researcher was thrown out of his village and in another case the person, like me, was prevented from crossing the border into the country where he had devoted years of work. The response of colleagues in both cases was gossip. Their anthropological ability or skill was called into question. People speculated that altered behavior could have prevented such events and that the result of their actions could cause field sites to close for other anthropologists. No one with whom I spoke was willing to accept the idea that these two people were caught by circumstances not necessarily under their control; that they were victims, rather than perpetrators of bad research. Of course, some anthropologists do transgress, step over the invisible line of propriety, a line that remains ill-defined until moments of crisis, when the people with whom anthropologists work are placed in jeopardy as a result of their actions.

Finally, I decided that through my silence I was supporting a system of repression in Romania that I was obliged as an anthropologist not only to come to understand and explain, but to do something about. Furthermore, my silence within my discipline would not prevent rumors from circulating unless I met this challenge head on. By not addressing the matter, I was accepting the conditions that entrapped me. Questions concerning whether I had properly carried out fieldwork in Romania had already started to circulate among my colleagues. When I asked the carriers of such gossip how they learned of the matter and on what basis they were making their judgments about me and my work, the gossip stopped.

Research on Ethnicity in Romania

These events and my reflections upon them led me to ask more critical questions about Romanian nationalism. The reaction of the authorities was not merely a response to my work with Gypsies. It concerns a matrix of beliefs that was generated through the formation of Romanian national identity and the struggle to repel, or at least contain, the foreign. This matrix was produced over a period of time in which regional identities were assimilated into ethnic and national ones and then appropriated by the state. The struggle for power over the state by a variety of social groups over the course of the last one hundred years or so has shaped a discourse concerning the relationship of Romanians with the civilizations that have influenced their historical trajectory, Eastern or Western.

While I was prevented from returning to Romania, the understandings that I generated during my trip enabled me to confront my work with Gypsies and the displeasure I met from the Romanians and organs of state. I was questioned by Romanians from all levels of society: peasants, workers, Communist party members, professionals, academics, and government officials. How could I be interested in Gypsies? Why focus on a half-empty glass? Then, why was I a *persona non grata*? My own questions parallel theirs. How is it possible for me not to be interested in Gypsies, given their substantial numbers and their importance in Romanian society? Is it a matter of perspective, or are there absolute human rights? Under conditions present in Romania, is it possible *not* to be *persona non grata*? (A visiting Romanian colleague told me in April 1989, "Almost everyone these days is *persona non grata*.")

Ethnicity and interethnic relations have been among the most politically sensitive of issues not only in contemporary Romania, but the world over and for many centuries. In Romania, issues related to ethnicities and particularly religious minorities are considered research topics of considerable danger. The political forces of ethnicity, including its nationalist variants, remain a recognizable threat to the existence of states. This danger is echoed by U.S. funding agencies, which treat with considerable skepticism topics that address ethnic relations in Eastern Europe.

Most will agree that the topic of ethnicity is a flag that has deterred Eastern European agencies supporting foreign research projects from accepting ethnicity-related research under their aegis. Such signals have been read by U.S. agencies, whose agendas must be to

support and recommend research projects that are feasible, not ones that are certain of rejection. This built-in conservatism reduces the likelihood of significant work on ethnicity and interethnic relations, except under covert or disguised conditions.

Whether or not to disguise research projects is often discussed among graduate students preparing for fieldwork. The disparity between what graduate students would like to study and what will be funded raises a rather common dilemma in anthropological work. The discipline's ethical standards and personal moral commitments militate against abusing formal research agendas. We learn to represent our research truthfully to our hosts. However, all of us know that, once in the field, anthropologists tend to redirect their research as actually lived conditions provide new parameters for even the most well-focused projects. Disguised research also occurs rather frequently. For example, how many of us have carried out fieldwork with tourist visas in countries that require research permits?

In the 1970s, the Romanians permitted a rather significant number of U.S. and European researchers to carry out long-term fieldwork in a number of villages, mostly ones that were or appeared to be homogeneous and predominantly Romanian in ethnicity. ¹ I find it incomprehensible that interethnic relations would not be a part of anthropological work carried out in virtually any part of Romania, since they play a crucial role in society and since Germans, Hungarians, and Jews have been crucial in the development of Romania. Equally implausible is to carry our research among Romanians and not to discuss the place of Tigani (Gypsies) in Romanian society and culture, because they are a presence in virtually every settlement and have played significant economic roles for some time. The study of other groups was not forbidden.

While Gypsies in Romania are a taboo subject for research, Gypsies make up possibly the second, certainly the third largest ethnic minority in the country. They do not enjoy the rights of "cohabiting nationalities," whose identities are related to nation-states with the authority to protect and aid their brothers and sisters. The Hungarians, German Saxons, and Jews of Romania are prime examples. These groups have benefited from state-supported institutions that publish in minority languages and provide for cultural manifestations in traditions seen to be characteristic of ethnic minorities. Until the recent resettlement programs, these groups lived in acknowledged ethnic territories or enclaves, even ghettos. Only Gypsies have not been perceived as territorial, despite their presence in Tigania.

(Gypsy quarters) in settlements of various sizes villages and cities throughout the country.

In the eyes of the Romanian state, Gypsies have no history except that connected with Romanians. The appropriation of Gypsy identity in this manner by the state has served to misinform people about Gypsy history and cultural development. Moreover, by being confined as a class, Gypsy cultural identity has been delegitimized and politicized as an inhibition to the building of a nationalized socialist state. Those who struggle for a distinct Gypsy ethnic identity, for example, were perceived as creating an alternative to the Romanian Communist Party structure, the only legitimate political body. This kind of delegitimation and appropriation of culture by the state and this disguising of actually lived experiences of a people is a common process.

States attempt to impose their points of view upon a culturally diverse citizenry, and at the same time, use ethnicity to further nationalist claims. As a result, in rejecting state domination, ethnic cleavages emerge or deepen, creating alongside their opposition the conditions under which negative stereotyping becomes acceptable. I believe the potential for developing a socialist Romania was scuttled by such a policy and hegemonic process, which fostered disparities of privilege and hostilities grounded in cultural differences. In Romania today there are ethno-nationalists emerging who express xenophobia with racist and anti-Semitic language. At the same time, ethnic minorities, such as Gypsies and Jews, are manifesting their identities in public and through the media in ways forbidden in the past. Recently, for example, Romanian Jews commemorated the fiftieth anniversary of the pogroms in Jassy, and in a major parade and demonstration in Bucharest, Gypsies celebrated the centenary of the end of slavery.

Most Eastern European countries have recognized Gypsies as an ethnic group and have more or less supported their expressing themselves as an ethnic group through publications and certain cultural practices. Research concerning Gypsies in most of these countries, while uncommon, has been conducted and has established a publications record that Romania cannot approach. But research concerning Gypsies by foreign scholars in socialist Eastern European countries is rare indeed, except for incidental analyses within other research agendas (see Stewart n. d., Bell 1984, Sampson 1984, Beck 1989).

For a brief period in the 1960s, work concerning Gypsies was

being published in Romania. Although in the 1970s, research was carried out by historians and folklorists, according to Romanian scholars, the censors did not permit publication, sending firm signals that this type of work would not find public access. By the time I began my fieldwork in 1974, the pervasive view was that the Gypsies were merely a materially and culturally impoverished population that would benefit from assimilation into and absorption by the Romanian mainstream, once they learned how to work.

In my initial two years of research, I withheld my judgment concerning the nature of life in Romania. I was willing to concede the official view that if life was difficult, it was difficult for all people equally, regardless of ethnicity. Subsequently, I found myself assuming a more critical position, questioning officials concerning the structural inequalities that I found accentuated under conditions of "actually existing socialism." I still agree with the proposition that the severity of political and economic forces and reforms is fundamentally shared by all ethnic groups in Romania, including Romanians. However, some groups clearly suffer more than others.

Jews in Romania

I cannot dwell on the great variety of Jews and the numerous communities that have ceased to exist in Romania and in those parts of the Soviet Union that had been part of the Greater Romania. Relative to other countries, Romania's treatment of Jews, even during the last world war, has been better than most. Mass migrations were allowed in the early 1950s, ended, and then allowed again in the 1960s. Romania never cut its ties to the Israeli state, while the other socialist bloc countries did, despite President Nicolae Ceausescu's support of the Palestine Liberation Organization (P. L. O.).

However, it is difficult to forget the pogroms in Jassy, and, at an earlier period, the absence of civil rights for Jews in Romania until international pressures forced the state into a more democratic domestic policy through the imposition of Article 7 of the Treaty of Saint-Germain. During World War II, while Jews in Northern Transylvania suffered the fate of Hungarian Jews (Northern Transylvania was part of Greater Hungary during the fascist period), the Jews of Romania were not handed over to Nazi Germany. Even Marshal Antonescu, the fascist dictator during World War II, was opposed to the extermination of Romanian Jews. International political expediencies and ethnic ambivalence notwithstanding, from 1950 into the 1980s Romania's *Jews* have chosen to leave for Israel and the United

States. From an estimated 800,000 Jews distributed in every province of Romania before the war, the population has dwindled to 20,000 or so concentrated in Bucharest.

Ruth Wisse (1987), reflecting on her visit to Poland, used the metaphor of the "phantom limb," the feeling left behind after the loss of a limb. She discussed the "presence" of Jews in Poland without their presence. The "presence" of Jews in Romania is similar. For example, the memory of Jewish friends and neighbors in the Maramures (the northwestern portion of Romania), where Jews lived in a multicultural and multilinguistic region, remains strong among the aging members of the population.

However, since the Romanian state has not adequately dealt with its role in the Holocaust but has portrayed itself instead as a victim of Nazi terror, sentiments related to former Jewish community members are ambivalent. It is unclear whether Romanians felt a collective sentiment at the departure of Jews as they do for Saxons who are leaving in large numbers. I would like to think so. Certainly, individual Romanians cared for Jewish friends and neighbors.

After the war, Jews tended to collect in urban centers. Many had committed themselves to departing for Israel at the earliest opportunity rather than reestablishing themselves in their homeland. Of course, Jews made up cadres of the Communist Party, but some held firm to another political agenda, rebuilding a democratic Romanian state. Romanians saw Jews as transient, without a deep history in, nor attachment for, the country.

Saxons in Romania

In my third year of research, I experienced life in the context of Transylvania's German-speaking Saxons, whose social position in the country had declined since World War II. In many areas of their ancient homeland even in their own localities Saxons no longer were able to maintain cultural hegemony, due to insufficient numbers. Those who were able to migrated to the West.

When the war ended, the socialist Romanian state had taken punitive measures against the Germans as a class. Over the course of forty-five years, the Saxons were dislodged from the lands settled by their ancestors as early as the twelfth century. After the Communist Party gained power, most adult Saxons were sent to work camps in the Soviet Union, still referred to as the *Verschleppung*. Those who survived returned home or moved to West Germany or Austria. By the 1970s, West Germany's *Ostpolitik*, combined with an increasing inability or lack of desire of Saxon Germans to cope with their new

circumstances, brought on a continuous migration out of their ancient homeland.

Since the war, the cultural quilt of the Transylvanian landscape has been transformed. Some Saxon villages were virtually emptied by *Familienzusammenführung* (family reunification) and "repatriation." Other villages attempted to adjust to the new circumstances, even as the younger adults left for West Germany, moved to cities, or adapted themselves to the tedious route of commuting to urban workplaces. Life for Saxons was now a fragmented existence in which their new identity as an ethnic minority in a host country was isolating and demoralizing, an experience shared by all ethnic groups whose communities were being demographically, socially, and culturally restructured.

To be fair, the disorienting impact of the transformation was experienced by all people in Romania, including ethnic Romanians. People who retained connections to their natal villages and extended families have managed the transition with less strain. Yet, this is precisely the point: under these circumstances, the Romanian ties have been much easier to maintain. The cultural quilt has come apart at the seams.

Among Saxons, the pull from West Germany and Austria has brought about the resettlement of entire extended families. In the 1970s, it was not unusual to see eight, nine, and ten family members, from aged grandparents wearing their *Trachten* (folk garb) to their adult children and grandchildren of varying ages, flying out of Bucharest and arriving in the Frankfurt airport. It is difficult to consider this process as anything less than an evacuation. Where the exodus involved large numbers, Romanians have felt a sense of abandonment, even as other Romanians and Gypsies, too, moved into the former Saxon homesteads. The emptying out of Saxons from communities and regions was most often understood by people remaining behind as a loss of the best and the most able.

Ironically, the state has provided quite the contrary picture of the Saxons and their place within the Romanian state. Revisionist history has provided numerous volumes on the history of Saxons in Romania, about their folklore and their common struggle with Romanians to build a unified nation-state (i.e., one that includes Transylvania). The continuity portrayed in this relative flood of publications about the Saxons, much of it in German, provides an illusion of ethnic vitality, harping on the historic contributions made by Saxons in the development of the Romanian state.

Since the *Verschleppung* experienced by Saxons in the postwar period, no policies have been implemented by the Romanian state to subject any other ethnic group to such a unique mistreatment. A common Stalinist policy was to punish an entire ethnic group. In the 1950s, the realization of a policy error brought about a corrective measure that released Saxons from labor camps and ensured their return home. When possible, confiscated properties especially houses were returned. However, the sentiments developed by each ethnic group about the other could not be so easily transformed.

Hungarians in Romania

Hungarians have lived for a long time in such concentration over a wide enough region to limit the impact of new ethnic group intrusions. In the postwar period Hungarians have left predominantly Hungarian villages for culturally heterogeneous cities. Hungarian culture is sustained because substantial Hungarian populations reside in urban settings. Friendship, kinship, and neighborliness can be managed as primarily Hungarian affairs. Moreover, until recently, Hungarians in Romania were not attracted to the Hungarian state in sufficient numbers to create the mass exodus experienced by Saxons and Jews. We can only speculate about what will happen when such an exodus occurs. 2

The place of Hungarians in Romania is easier to discuss than that of other ethnic communities because their concentration in a rather extensive region consolidated their ability to withstand Romanian cultural encroachment. An indicator of this vigor is the common observation offered by Romanians visiting Hungarian-dominated areas. "We went to buy bread in the bread store and the clerks spoke no Romanian. They spoke only Hungarian." For Romanians, bread is a central symbol of social life among kin and within community and laden with meaning. That no one would or could speak Romanian was interpreted under these symbolically potent conditions in two ways. It was taken as a slight "They really could speak Romanian but did not want to" i.e., they were asserting their superiority. Alternatively, the Romanians were amazed that people lived in their country who were uneducated in the national language; in some ways this was a frightening prospect. Not speaking Romanian also was interpreted as a highly suspect demonstration of potential disloyalty to the country. Given the troubled past of Romanian Hungarian relations and the shifting border and territorial claims, this is not surprising. Among the most highly charged research

topics, then, has been Hungarian-Romanian ethnic relations (see Kurti 1989).

The effort of the Romanian state to nationalize the country's social and cultural system has been understood by Hungarians as nothing less than an effort to deculturize, deterritorialize, and disenfranchise them as a group. Romanian policies that have an impact on Hungarians or the territories where they are settled are always understood as efforts at ethnocide, whether or not ethnic Romanians, too, are experiencing displacement of this sort. For Hungarians, resettlement means a loss of cultural cohesion and a threat to historical continuity. The recent outbreak of hostilities concerning the displacement of 8,000 or so settlements, including Hungarian villages, resulted from the understanding that Hungarians' position represents resistance to the state and a display of national chauvinism, backed by the Hungarian state and anti-Romanian and anticommunist efforts of Hungarian associations throughout the world.

Gypsies in Romania

In the 1970s, the state enforced policies concerning the settlement of nomadic Gypsies. They were forced to live in housing in which some preferred not to live. The result of sedentarization has been that they became more visible as a minority that could not (or did not want to) maintain housing that others would have liked, as good housing in Romania is limited. The pressures on Gypsies to find gainful employment meant working at the lowest level of agricultural and industrial production and the service sector. While pronatalist policies in general were encouraged by the state, the rate of procreation among Gypsies alarmed the government. Locally, Gypsies were perceived as heavy users of social services, schools, medical services, and law enforcement and, as a result, a drain on the economy and a social problem.

In some communities, it seemed as if Gypsies were filling the vacuum left by Saxons. This atmosphere supported the fear among Romanian officials that Gypsies were taking over the country, a sentiment that was accepted among Romanians in settlements where increases in the Gypsy population were dramatic. Efforts to assimilate and absorb Gypsies from the bottom up, as Romanians, were being carried out. At the same time, the state promoted beliefs that Gypsy behavior was unacceptable in the sociocultural configuration of the nationalized socialism that Romania was constructing. Gypsies were not allowed to publicly demonstrate a cultural or linguistic heritage to

legitimate themselves as an ethnic group. The stereotypical view of Gypsies as nomadic, dirty, thieving, and without loyalty prevented Gypsies who were integrated within other parts of Romanian society from identifying themselves. Physicians, musicians, politicians, educators, and many others denied their heritage. Those who identified themselves as Gypsies were seen as associated with poverty, irresponsibility, dishonesty, and anti-Romanian sentiments.

As Romanians were fond of saying, "Tiganii nu sint civilisati!" (Gypsies are not civilized!). This contradiction, furthermore, made it difficult for Romanians to escape the bigoted epithet commonly hurled at them in the Balkans: "Oh, Romanians, they're all Gypsies anyway." The point here is that the Romanian state could not have it both ways. Gypsies could not be simultaneously perceived as lowerclass Romanians (i.e., not an ethnic group), and as an uncultured and distinct "natie" ("nation" meaning race, kinship group, or blood group), an ethnic group.

Ethnicity and Romanian Nationalism

My experience as persona non grata compelled me to focus on my work with Gypsy Romanian, Saxon, Hungarian, and Jewish ethnic development. I found that the Romanian state and those who supported it had been successful in consolidating control over a diverse citizenry, while the elite of the country had successfully centralized what remained an unmanageable economy, despite the nationalization of the means of production and efforts to construct cooperatives. Nationalism, not socialism, became the principal social unifier. This is where the socialist transformation in Romania dissolved. The threat of a Russian invasion, rather than capitalist domination, became the driving force of statism, transformed into a hegemonic force by the ethnic Romanian victors of the Paris Peace Treaty.

The socialist transformation in Romania faltered because the government, the leaders, and the bureaucracy failed to democratize social relations and, in the process, failed to provide the most elementary services and resources for the people. In the context of a pervasive nationalism and a fragile economy, these failures contributed to the collapse of the national agenda for development. Simultaneously, a new "actually existing socialist" class structure was generated in which agriculture continued to support an economy dependent on the export of agropastoral production.

This was not solely an internal dynamic. Quite to the contrary, the internal dynamic was situated within a global system that remains, at least since the sixteenth century, dominated by a capitalist mode of production in which an international division of labor and market system operates in functional relationship with shifting capital. The socialist transformation in Romania was part of this world system, sometimes less so and sometimes more. During the 1970s, Romania developed a dependency relationship with the West. Its economic strategy, like Poland's, was based on the acquisition of modern technology that would permit the country's industrial production to become competitive in the international market. This helped bring about the disastrous 1980 debt crisis and the decision taken by Ceausescu to repay the debt by depriving Romanians of a standard of living that they had been promised if they worked hard to construct socialism.

Most Favored Nation status has been a mechanism for U.S. foreign policy to influence Romanian domestic policies. The United States has effectively tied economic relationships to improvements in human rights among socialist countries. From this point of view, the policy successfully pressed Romania to allow large numbers of Jews to emigrate to Israel, Saxon Germans to Germany, and Romanians to the United States. Romania's economic policies were well served, while simultaneously being perceived as supporting human rights. Moreover, Romanian nationalism benefited as a result of such an agreement. The departure of nonethnic Romanians merely demonstrated that members of such groups really were not committed to the Romanian state.

For a moment in the 1970s Romania could have been perceived as struggling toward a system of redistribution that could lead analysts to support its struggle for separate, not dependent, economic development. Within this context, it could lead people (myself included) to conclude that nationalism primarily directed against the Russian threat was the most effective means of the government to maintain control over a culturally diverse population that could unite on this one issue: Ceausescu's regime was better than anything the Russians would install.

Romania was able to justify nationalities policies based on Marxist-Leninist principles that have fundamentally ignored the political aspirations of non-Romanian ethnic groups. Sadly, the Romanian leadership ignored the political aspirations of these other members of the citizenry. Romania has demonstrated that a class struggle

that evades or denies cultural differences will fail to unify the interests of people around class interests. Moreover, a class struggle that becomes a battle among ethnic groups over power and resources will quickly generate into ethnic and racial hatred. In such instances, a tool for unifying people becomes a mechanism for separating people from their sense of cultural continuity (tradition), ejecting them from what they have claimed as their homelands, or destroying their lives.

Since the seventeenth century, a struggle over the history of Romanian ethnogenesis has taken place. The struggle has entailed efforts to unify while simultaneously generating segmentation. I have distinguished two principles of unification: the development of national identity by discovering and focusing on the "Romanian" and the rejection of the foreign (xenophobia). These are forces of Romanian nation-state formation that shaped Romanian cultural hegemony. The development of a Romanian national consciousness has meant the inclusion of non-Romanian ethnic groups only through their Romanianization or subordination to the Romanian state. Romanian nationalist consciousness has necessitated the expulsion of those who could not or would not conform.

The principle of rejection functions in a framework that is more or less severe, even punitive, in relationship to the state and the leadership's ability to maintain control over power. This is a matter related as much to domestic issues, agricultural collectivization policies, or worker self-management, for example, as to international relations the marketability of Romanian goods or treaties with other states. Rejection takes place in the arena of preferences established by the leadership of the state as these are tied to systems of reward and punishment.

However crude this may appear, the conformity imposed on Romanian citizens under conditions of presently existing socialism forced people to accept the system at one level, but allowed them to assert other modes of behavior in areas not easily reached by the state. Of course, they also sought escape or rebellion, as through the second economy of production slowdowns. The forces of rejection have generated prejudice and discrimination, including racism, ethnocentrism, and, of course, classism, as access to even the necessities of everyday life have become more and more difficult to obtain. Before the ouster of Ceausescu, a Romanian visitor told me that people spent much of their time in search of necessities, standing in long lines, a response to my query about why Romanians had not revolted more frequently. "They are just too busy!" he said. A curious form of

governing through diversion emerged as a central policy through which the Ceausescu regime remained in power.

The planned systematization of settlements, which included the destruction of 8,000 communities including urban centers and hamlets was part of this rule through diversion. Another diversion was the development of protochronism, the representation of Romania as the successful descendant of a tradition that is in its present form secularly messianic, with a focus on "Eastern" and "native" values. The victory of protochronism at this time is understandable when viewed as an expression of nationalist cultural hegemony, itself embedded in a wider struggle between Western and Eastern civilization. This movement was successful because it also supported the regime's legitimacy within the trajectory of history.

Protochronism is more comprehensible in a comparative frame. During the Ceausescu period, while Romania preferred a form of social and cultural involution, its primary regional competitor and protagonist in the region, Hungary, was turning outward. Hungarians have perceived themselves with Asiatic roots in a sea of Slavs. Since the mid-1950s, Hungarians have been turning toward the West in their struggle for national liberation, reforging some historical bonds that are expressed in the notion of *Mitteleuropa*. This idea has resurfaced to provide Central and Eastern Europe with a regional identity alternative to Yalta and Soviet military invasion and occupation. The Romanians, in their struggle for national liberation since the seventeenth century, have carefully constructed a past tied to Rome and Western traditions. Under Stalinism, these ties were denied in favor of defining Romanian development as a result of Slavic influences. Since 1963, the trend has been an increasing focus on the indigenous forces of national identity, a focus encouraged by Leninist validation of national rights in the context of cultural amalgamation to form new social identities. This identity is at present related to indigenous cultural development and persistence, with origins in Romania's Dacian ancestry.

The stages that brought Romanian historiography to support the contention that invalidates both the influences of western Europe and of Russia is clearly presented by Dennis Deletant (1988:8889). He holds that:

1. The Transylvanian School (*Scoala ardeleana*) movement was led by Uniate priests (a unique blending of Greek Christian Orthodox rite and Roman Catholic

allegiance). Their linguistic research demonstrated Romanians to be the inheritors of Western, imperial civilization. Daco-Romans sought refuge in the mountainous regions of Transylvania during the period of the great population movements, preserving their Latin language and culture and establishing settlements in Transylvania before the Hungarian conquest. This confirms a claim to the territory and demonstrates a "noble lineage." Thus, the subordination of Romanians through feudal laws that disqualified them as a nation could be refuted. Latin and Daco-Roman ethnogenesis was a hegemonic notion until the seizure of state power by the Romanian Communist Party.

2. Stalinist Romanians turned toward establishing the country's relationship with Russia and Slavic influences. Slavophilia brought on the search for linguistic connections among Slavic and Romanian languages.

3. In the 1960s, Daco-Roman ethnogenesis and continuity was reasserted. In 1963, Gheorghiu-Dej rejected Khrushchev's Comecon plan that would have placed Romania in an agrarian periphery to Moscow and rejected Romanian historiography based on Slavization and Russification. The Romanian Communist Party was able to disguise the reemergence of its nationalism through reference to the notion of "national [i.e., state] interest." Paradoxically, the other ethnic groups gladly supported Romanian nationalism as the lesser of two evils.

4. From the 1970s to the present, increasing primacy has been given to the Dacians as the ethnogenetic substance of the Romanian people (the *ethnos*, as Yulian Bromlei would put it) a genealogy of masculine warriors, from defenders of Romanian national identity and unity. Such a line of descent permits Romanians to claim primordial ties to Transylvania, the rich soil in which the Romanian *ethnos* germinated. It thwarts Hungarian assertions that they occupied Transylvania before the Romanians, who claim to be indigenous to the region and only later conquered by the Hungarians.

The rejection of the study of the Other (Gypsies in my case) reveals the fundamentally repressive social forces that structure the domains of power around Romanian nationalism, supporting the notion that Romania is under siege. The result of protecting Romania from the foreign is that, in order for the ruling elite to remain in power, they embarked on a path that led to implosion and self-destruction. Among other tragedies, the imposition of self-exile, the destruction of historic Bucuresti, and the planned destruction of 8,000 villages are results of the political pathology that the Ceausescu regime came to represent.

The cliché that the Balkans are the crossroads of East and West has a particular ring of truth for Romania. However, it appears that at this time victory belongs neither to East nor West, but to Romania. The irony of this situation is that in victory, those who had control over the state benefited and those who supported it declared a kind of war on their own people, creating conditions of deprivation and dislocation.

"It stood here." The old man pointed with his finger toward the empty land. "This is where the village of Vladiceasca once stood. One day they came with large trucks and dredgers. We saw it with our own eyes as they tore down the houses. It only took a few days, then the entire village simply disappeared" (Owe 1989:3 [my translation]).

Notes

1. At least five other researchers besides myself had requested and were granted permission to study non-Romanian ethnic groups: Annemie Schenk and Ingeborg Weber-Kellerman, Marilyn McArthur, Laurence Salzmann, Zdenek Salzmann, and Katherine Verdery (1983). Others have worked on issues concerning local or regional Romanian identity (Margaret Heebert, Claude Karnoouh, Gail Kligman [1981], Joel Marrant, and Verdery).

2. Recent reports indicate that Hungarians have been leaving in rather substantial numbers. Estimates are that 13,000 have crossed the border (Berenyi 1989). I have heard 18,000 from knowledgeable sources in Hungary. Certainly their impact has been felt within Hungary; many who wish to support ethnic Hungarian minorities outside Hungary seem ambivalent about the preferential treatment in housing and subsidies accorded the refugees. Since Hungarian Romanians for the most part have been living in homogeneous settlements, we should expect the impact of a mass

departure to be quite different than in communities where ethnic groups are outnumbered by Romanians.

References

Beck, Sam

1989

The Origins of Gypsy Slavery in Romania. *Dialectical Anthropology* 14(1):5361.

Bell, Peter D.

1984

Peasants in Socialist Transition: Life in a Collectivized Hungarian Village. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Berenyi, Georg

1989

Ungarn suchen nun Hilfe in Konflikt mit Rumanien: Interview. *Kurier*. March 23:5. Vienna.

Deletant, Dennis

1988

The Past in Contemporary Romania: Some Reflections on Current Romanian Historiography. *Slovo* 1(2):7791.

Kligman, Gail

1981

Caslus: Symbolic Transformation in Romanian Ritual. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Kurti, Laszlo

1989

Transylvania, Land Beyond Reason: Toward an Anthropological Analysis of a Contested Terrain. *Dialectical Anthropology* 14(1):2152.

McArthur, Marilyn

1976

The Saxon Germans: Political Fate of an Ethnic Identity. *Dialectical Anthropology* 1(4):34964.

Myerhoff, Barbara, and Jay Ruby

1982

Introduction. *In A Crack in the Mirror: Reflexive Perspectives in Anthropology*, ed. Jay Ruby. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press.

Owe, Barbara von

1989

Rumanien: Die sinnlose Zerstörung der Dorfer in Siebenburgen läuft nach Plan. *Suddeutsche Zeitung* 48:3. Munich.

Sampson, Steven L.

1984

National Integration Through Socialist Planning. New York: Columbia University Press.

Salzmann, Zdenek

1981

Nicknaming in Bigar: A Contribution to the Anthroponymy of a Czech-speaking Village in the Southern Romanian Banat. *Journal of the American Name Society* 29:12137.

Salzmann, Laurence

1978

The Last Jews of Radauti: Photographs of a Romanian Jewish Community. Philadelphia: Consolidated Press.

Schafir, Michael

1985

Romania: Politics, Economics, and Society. Boulder, Colo: L. Rienner Publishers.

Stewart, Michael

n.d.

Brothers in Song: The Persistence of (Vlach) Gypsy Identity and Community in Socialist Hungary. Ph.D. diss. in Social Anthropology, Cambridge University.

Verdery, Katherine

1983

Transylvanian Villagers: Three Centuries of Political, Economic, and Ethnic Change. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Wisse, Ruth

1987

Poland's Jewish Ghosts. Commentary 83(1):2533.

6

Class Struggle in the Squared Circle: Professional Wrestling as a Working-Class Sport

Donald M. Nonini

Arlene Akiko Teraoka

What upper class has ever known members of its lower class? Knowing them would break up the game. It is their functions, not their persons that count; after all, the function of a lower class is to create an upper class. Upper and lower are linked, throughout civilized history, in a hellish minuet, but only the lower knows the meaning of the steps. What master knows a slave; what colonial administrator, a native; what domineering husband, a wife? That is why the lower race, the inferior sex, the lower class cheat so well and, in their very physical movements, satirize so skillfully, even when the penalties are dreadful.

Stanley Diamond, "The Great Black Hope"

Stanley Diamond reminds us of the necessary ignorance with which exploiting classes and dominating groups thrive in civilized society, and of the farcical performances by members of lower classes and subordinate groups that reflect back, in action and words, the narcissistic definitions of social reality held by those in power, even as these performances subvert the meanings they ostensibly reinforce. In "The Great Black Hope," Diamond opens the domain of sport to the exploration of the complex relationships between knowledge and power inscribed in the battlethe "hellish minuet" between upper and lower classes, between white and black, in contemporary American society.

The second Clay-Liston heavyweight championship match, held in Lewiston, Maine, is the performance he elucidates, keenly revealing

the implicit insights of the black boxers Cassius Clay (now Muhammed Ali) and Sonny Liston into the nature of the "minuet" that the white audience of fans calls on them to dance and into the callous and self-deceiving presumption of that audience. Liston goes down from an unseen punch in the first round, and the fight is stopped. Clay remains champion, and the match, as commentators say, "is history." It is not only that appearances deceive. As Diamond observes, the truth lies in the farce itself, played out in its own logic:

In retrospect, it appears as a near-perfect burlesque of a heavyweight championship fight. There was no visible punch, no bruises, no count. The actors know their audience. They have known it for generations. The audience will fill in what it pleases. As usual, we will ascribe to the Negro behavior which fits our assumptions. We will insist that the affair was either a fix or a mysteriously authentic fight (one veteran white sportswriter described the perfect punch in detail; a well-known sporting journal tried to photograph it as such). What we will resist seeing is that two physically tremendous men put on an entertainment for a society in which they do not believe. With due consideration for themselves, they refused to batter each other into the ground for the pleasure of a predominantly white audience, according to white rules of the game, for prizes which they had already achieved by other means. (1970:178)

In this essay, we attempt to illuminate in another example from sportprofessional wrestling the nature of the "hellish minuet" between classes in American society. What middle-class critics resist seeing here, we argue, is that physically tremendous men 1 put on an entertainment for a working-class audience that displays the performers' and audience's intimate understanding of, and resistance against, the rules of society laid down by the upper class.

On "Fakery":

A Critique of Middle-Class Judgment

We might begin by taking the class bull by the horns, the pervasive assessment of professional wrestling among the American middle class and its intelligentsia that professional wrestling is simply fake. This attitude is most caustically and articulately expressed by mem-

bers of the bourgeois academy and by journalists of the high-brow and middle-brow print media. To these observers, professional wrestling is "all fakery,," "not real," "choreography," "sham-sport," "spectacle," "entertainment," "circus," "carnival, not sport." "It's not to be taken seriously." At the least suggestion that it ought to be taken seriously as a sport at least as seriously as any other American sport, considering the ideological matrix of capitalist competition within which professional sports operate in this society the typical reaction is a melancholy sigh and shake of the head, as if those who make such a suggestion have obviously lost touch with reality.

Of course, there is an element of truth in such judgments, but only in a trivial way. It takes little, if any, insight to denigrate the wrestling profession if one reduces it to its current often ridiculous trappings. This is the strategy of the *Sports Illustrated* writer Bruce Newman, who states at the outset that wrestling is "the original sham-sport" and then as evidence launches into a satirical tirade against the promotional tactics of the World Wrestling Federation. "How about David Lee Roth versus the Missing Link in a one-fall California Lobotomy match?" Newman asks (1985:30,32). If we are talking about the audiences of MTV or "Saturday Night Live," this might be a big hit. But no real wrestling fan would pay money to watch something so stupid. When critics like Newman imply that this is the stuff of wrestling, they simply avoid the effort of having to deal with it at all.

When the accusation of fakery and sham is extended to what actually takes place in the wrestling ring between two wrestlers, we can begin to get at what is really at stake. According to academic and journalistic observers, wrestling matches are predetermined, winners and losers arranged in advance in accordance with the promoter's sense of what outcome and the maneuvers leading to it will draw the largest audience. Moves in a match are planned beforehand. Punches are pulled, falls are broken. The most common moveship tosses, arm drags, body slams, slaps to the chest, and so forth are supposedly done with maximum noise and flamboyant effect but with minimum injury to the opponent. Blood that appears to flow from a wrestler's forehead is said to be either artificial, being secreted in balloons or other containers on the wrestlers' bodies beforehand, or else drawn at a prearranged time by the opponent by means of small razors or other sharp instruments carried in their trunks. Rules exist solely to be broken, and referees are purposefully negligent when wrestlers engage in rule-breaking and unfair moves. Interviews with wrestlers before matches, in which they threaten

their opponents with mayhem and destruction, and the acting out of certain stereotyped characters (the Russian, the masked avenger, the Marine Corps veteran, the rock-and-roller), reinforce the air of the carnivalesque. Nobody really gets hurt, and fan-favorites and villains alike appear the next day or week, no more the worse for wear, in yet another match in the ongoing spectacle.

The more cynical of such observers add a particular twist to their evaluation of professional wrestling: even though it is "fake" in all the ways just mentioned, professional wrestlers at times do sustain serious injuries. These are, however, like the proverbial exceptions that only prove the rule, all an element of the "fun," a part of the "carnival" and "spectacle" produced for fan and viewer consumption. Typical is N. Brooks Clark, who points out in "What You See Is Not Always What They Get" that the brutality is just another version of the fakery:

Yes, bodies do fly, and bones are indeed broken, and blood sometimes flows. Nobody says it's easy. But that doesn't mean it's real, either. . . . Nothing enhances the illusion of real mayhem more than a little genuine blood, or "juice," as it's called in the business. (1985:60)

To all of this, we offer two critical comments. First, if we call those who make such claims about professional wrestling "observers," this is a matter of courtesy only, for we would guess that most of them have never seen a live professional wrestling match in an arena or viewed more than a few programs on television.

Assessments of professional wrestling made by its intellectual critics may derive for the most part not from their own experience, but from the commonly received opinions of others like themselves. An important corollary is that they are not members of a professional wrestling audience, much less fans of professional wrestling; in fact, they adamantly dissociate themselves from those who are. "Who could be taken in by it all?"

Second, critics who denigrate professional wrestling as a sport or make light of it as mass entertainment promote the schism between mental and manual work in this society by reinforcing the negative value associated with physical labor. Authenticity is reserved for two domains. First there is the cultural (read "mental") product—the great novel, the original mathematical solution, the innovative social theory—created by individual genius. Second, there are certain

sports such as tennis, squash, golf, and running, for instance, to which they would concede the existence of real skills, real maneuvers, and real strategies, which they admire. Not surprisingly, these sports are those they indulge in themselves and are a sign of cultural refinement, rather than set apart from it in the realm of the physical.

For this latter point, we can offer support from Pierre Bourdieu, who writes regarding the repulsion felt by the dominant class toward popular sports:

All the features which appeal to the dominant taste are combined in sports such as golf, tennis, sailing, riding (or show-jumping), skiing . . . or fencing. Practised in exclusive places (private clubs), at the time one chooses, alone or with chosen partners (features which contrast with the collective discipline, obligatory rhythms and imposed efforts of team sports), demanding a relatively low physical exertion that is in any case freely determined, but a relatively high investment and the earlier it is put in, the more profitable it is of time and learning (so that they are relatively independent of variations in bodily capital and its decline through age), they only give rise to highly ritualized competitions, governed, beyond the rules, by the unwritten laws of fair play. The sporting exchange takes on the air of a highly controlled social exchange, excluding all physical or verbal violence, all anomic use of the body (shouting, wild gestures, etc.) and all forms of direct contact between the opponents (who are often separated by the spatial organization and various opening and closing rites). (1984:215-17)

Except for the fact that professional wrestling involves individual and not team competition, it shares nothing with the physical sports preferred by the socially privileged. If Bourdieu is correct in postulating a connection between class background and the relation to the body, and if, as Bourdieu claims, the bourgeois is "ever concerned to impose the indisputable image of his own authority, his dignity or his distinction" (1984:218), then the idea of a sport in which one's body is grabbed, struck, or even thrown by an opponent must be appalling. No wonder middle-class critics see professional wrestling as "fake" and "brutal" through these epithets, they are able to reject such actions as evidence that these men and women are not fully real,

not completely human. We believe that it is a profound sense of fear on the part of middle-class intellectual critics of professional wrestling, fear that there might be something beyond the "fakery," real bones broken, real internal injuries, that accounts for the peculiar combination of queasiness and contempt that they display.

There are moments in any narrative of institutional practices that, when exposed and set in relief, offer pivotal revelations about the character of the institution itself. For professional wrestling, one such moment was certainly the encounter in the corridor of the Madison Square Garden dressing room in December 1984, in which "Dr. D" David Shultz, a professional wrestler, struck John Stossel, an interviewer for the investigative television program "20/20." Shultz's reconstruction of the event appeared in an interview he gave the editors of *Wrestling USA*:

SHULTZ: This guy sticks a mike in my face, cameras going, and you know he was real cocky, and he asked about the business, you know, "Why is it a good business?" and I run it down to him. And then he says, "Well, okay, that's good. I'm going to ask you the standard question." And I say, "The standard question?" He said, "Yeah." At that point, he didn't ask me a question. He made a statement: "I think it's fake." When he did, I showed him that I wasn't a fake. I mean, he didn't ask me nothing; he told me. . . .

WRESTLING 85: So you hit Stossel.

SHULTZ: Yeah! I slapped him. Now he said I hit him on his ear. I didn't hit him on his ear. The first hit, you couldn't tell by the camera, but I know where I hit the guy: I hit him up side the head. The second hitI stopped the action frame by frameand I caught him on the jaw. So the guy said he got permanent ear damage. I asked him, "Is that fake?" I mean I slap somebody just about every match. . . . When I hit him, it was because he made a direct insult to me about my business, I mean defamation of character. After 11 years I spent in the business, he is going to show it all over the world and tell them that I'm a fake. I am anything but a fake. A lot of people get off watching me beat up people. If they call that entertainment, that's

good, but it's got to a point where nobody takes nothing serious no more, except me. (Interview 85:2324)

The confrontation between Shultz and Stossel illustrates in miniature the struggle between classes that pervades American society here in the form of a battle that sets being "fake" against being "anything but a fake," verbal rhetorical assault against physical retaliation, and middle-class representations of working-class practice against working-class expressions of that practice. First, the encounter carries within it the gist of an exquisite *reductio ad absurdum* argument on this issue of "fakery." Either Shultz's nonverbal physical assault "up side the head," then "on the jaw," and the purportedly serious physiological consequences for Stossel's hearing capacity can be taken as evidence that professional wrestling is not "fake" (as Shultz correctly observes, "I slap somebody just about every match") or Stossel's claim regarding permanent ear damage was one of feigned pain and injury, as much as Shultz in his actions pretended to administer it, with the ensuing paradox that the authenticity of the investigative reporter's profession is equally subject to question.

Furthermore, we can see here how college graduate Stossel, a prominent investigative reporter, attempts to define the interview with Shultz according to the terms of the academic and middle-class critic: "I'm going to ask you the standard question."

Significantly, Shultz refuses to play the game: "And I say, 'The standard question?'" Later in the same interview, Shultz again rejects the imposition of middle-class discourse: "I mean fake is something I don't know how you would define it but I'm anything but a fake" (Interview 85:62). High-school graduate, Army veteran, and wrestler with eleven years' professional experience, Schultz shows that he knows the score about and is aware of the scorn of the intellectual critics who denigrate his labor. "A lot of people get off watching me beat up people. If they call that entertainment, that's good, but it's got to a point where nobody takes nothing serious no more, except me." "They" are not the "lot of people" who enjoy watching Shultz beat up his opponents; "they" are the "nobody" middle-class critics, like Stossel, who use words and language against his metier. As Diamond writes, "Upper and lower are linked, throughout civilized history, in a hellish minuet, but only the lower knows the meaning of the steps."

Perhaps the most striking aspect of the encounter between Shultz and Stossel is that Shultz's response to Stossel's verbal statement

"It's fake" came in the form of physical force and not as an extended oral denial. This enactment was then capped by Shultz's simple question, "Is that fake?" the superfluity of which only emphasizes the primacy of the physical act. If we remain mindful of the class difference between Shultz and Stossel, the conflict of words and actions takes on broad social and political significance: Shultz's physical attack can be seen to represent a characteristically working-class reaction to the hostile use of language typical of managers, supervisors, and technicians in authority. Resistance to the tyranny of bourgeois language becomes resistance to the extended use of language itself to the overt manifestation of the privileges of mental labor. The ethnography by Paul Willis of working-class adolescents in England and their conflict with the English school system, *Learning to Labor*, suggests the depths of this resistance:

Part of the reaction to the school institution is anyway a rejection of words and considered language as the expression of mental life. The way in which these creative insights are expressed, therefore, is one of expressive antagonism to the dominant bourgeois mode of signification language. In a real sense for the working class the cultural is a battle with language. This is not to reduce the cultural to anti-abstract behaviour. It is to posit it, in part, as an antagonistic way of expressing abstract and mental life centered . . . not on the provided language but on lived demonstration, direct involvement and practical mastery. (1977:12425)

We can thus begin to understand the appeal of wrestling to the working class as a realm in which, by definition, "practical mastery" means everything and "language as the expression of mental life," close to nothing. Language as the realm of bourgeois definition is answered unequivocally by a slap up side the head.

Wrestling as Work

Through our use of Willis's study, we have already made a fundamental, if tentative, connection between the wrestling world and the everyday experience of the working class. In this section, we return to the point of view of the middle-class intellectual critics to reinterpret and to incorporate the substance of their accusations within an anal-

ysis of the labor process of wrestling. As is true of any ideological discourse, the claims of academic and journalistic critics of professional wrestling are not assertions that are false in their truth value so much as misreadings, partial and distorted, that when reinterpreted and contextualized can be quite revealing of an underlying social reality.

It would be ingenuous to claim that professional wrestling as an institution does not contain within it conspicuous elements of entertainment and carnival. The various stereotypical personae adopted by the wrestlers, the agonistic displays and exaggerated affect during locker-room interviews, the parade into the squared circle accompanied by manager or valet to the beat of thematic rock musicall these reflect a side of wrestling as spectacle.

When intellectual critics disparage professional wrestling as entertainment or carnival, they manifest their dislike for the "shallowness" or "artificiality" of these aspects of the institution. What they perceive (at least the more insightful among them) is that these displays are tied to the sales effort of the wrestling promoter. However, the critics ignore, or are not conscious of, another and more important side to the entertainmentthe allegorical and narrative dimensions of the *agon* between two wrestlers. These dimensions are elaborated into an unspoken but nonetheless profound critique of American bourgeois society, one we seek to elicit in the last section of this essay. This transforms the meaning of popular entertainment and spectacle, whether the critics like it or not.

More pertinent here, aspects of entertainment, insofar as they enter into the core of the professional wrestling match itself—for instance, the loud slap on the chest which resounds throughout the arena but does minimal damage—are not otiose or nontactical flourishes but are rather subsumed within the strategy of the combat itself.

Professional wrestling, as Barthes observed, is in one sense a "spectacle of excess" (1972:15), but it is also more than that, and (something ignored by academic critics) personal physical violence does have its strategic dimension.

Slamming one's opponent to the mat or flinging him into the turnbuckle, ostentatious as they are, are moves ultimately subject to the improvised logic of efficient wrestling strategy and act to punctuate the temporary dominance of one wrestler over his opponent during the match. There are also spectacular defensive tactics—backing into the corner while begging one's opponent for mercy, or retreating halfway back to the locker room with gestures indicating that one has

had enough that add to the impression that the wrestling match is all a put-on. But these displays are not just for show. They enable a wrestler to recuperate, to disrupt the momentum of his opponent's attack, or to change the pace of a match to his advantage. Tactics of intimidation, too, such as striking a body-builder's pose, strutting, glaring, shoving the referee, or bellowing at the audience, are not just gratuitous spectacle, but also genuine strategy.

In fact, wrestlers who focus on the entertainment quality of such actions while ignoring their combative function do so at their peril. A wrestler who becomes too intent on entertaining the arena crowd by playing up to it as he wrestles (for instance, by soliciting the crowd's approval at length before taking advantage of a momentarily stunned opponent) is also one who loses too many matches and suffers too many injuries because he is distracted from the moves of his opponent. The crowd pleasers, Dusty Rhodes or Ricky "The Dragon" Steamboat, are easily made "chumps" of. In contrast, the most successful wrestler of all, Ric Flair, who has reigned as world champion of the National Wrestling Alliance since 1981, uses the tactics of entertainment not to interact with the crowd or the television camera, but solely as ploys against his opponent. The "fakery" of which wrestlers are accused, in short, is strategy.

It is also difficult to deny that, as the critics claim, professional wrestling is brutal. The generalization from an article in one wrestling magazine merely describes what our repeated observation of matches, the recurrent sight of wrestlers carried out on stretchers, and physicians' reports confirm:

The price wrestlers pay for creating and partaking in this violence is high. Unlike participants in other full-contact sports such as hockey and football, professional wrestlers engage in their activity without benefit of padding. A forehead laden with scar tissue, cauliflower ears, and aches and pains from previous broken bones, torn ligaments and knee surgery are constant reminders of their grueling profession and hard-earned pay. (Kush 1986:23)

Two examples will illustrate the generalization. The twenty-year veteran Dusty Rhodes has sustained what is probably an all-time record number of injuries:

203 broken bones, 86 alone in the limbs. 158 concussions, 36 of them medically "severe." An estimated *twenty thousand* stitches over the years no one is ghoulish enough to keep track anymore. In fact, fans may notice Dusty is bleeding *less* than ever now, because the scar tissue has built to such an extent that the skin about his eyes and forehead has a putty-like consistency, thicker than average skin. (Molloy 1986:34)

Or consider "Classy" Freddie Blassie, a veteran wrestler long since retired, and now manager of other wrestlers:

When still wrestling, had every rib on right side of body broken, five on left side one of which just missed piercing heart. Lost right kidney, has only 30 percent vision in right eye, and seventh through eleventh thoracic vertebrae are permanently fused. Has had last rites administered twice and has been stabbed at least 20 times by fans. (Newman 1985:3435)

How are such injuries sustained and inflicted? The laws of physics of flying and falling bodies and the physiological vulnerability of the human body to severe trauma inflicted by another wrestler become apparent when one views a sufficiently large number of matches. In one match between Randy "Macho Man" Savage, then Intercontinental Champion of the World Wrestling Federation, and his opponent Ricky Steamboat, Savage throws Steamboat out of the ring onto the concrete floor and then rams Steamboat's head into the steel railing separating ringside from the first row of audience seats. With Steamboat's throat across the railing, Savage leaps some dozen feet from the top turnbuckle of the near ring corner, driving his fists down on the back of Steamboat's head. The effect is to throw Steamboat back toward the ring, clutching his throat and gasping for air. Savage then pulls Steamboat back into the ring and from the top turnbuckle again leaps with the timekeeper's bell, bringing it down against Steamboat's throat. While the referee pushes Savage away, Steamboat thrashes from side to side on the mat, his face turning red, then blue. Paramedics rush in, pull Steamboat onto a stretcher and carry him away. Steamboat suffers a crushed larynx and requires an emergency tracheotomy; his physician states that he has received a "life-threatening" injury and that he will probably have to retire.

The existence of two extremes of professional wrestling moves for instance, the intimidating but relatively innocuous slap against the opponent's chest, at one end, and traumatic blows such as those inflicted by Savage on Steamboat, at the other point to a central feature of professional wrestling: the graduated character of its violence. All professional wrestlers who remain in the sport for any length of time are capable of delivering either extreme, and a variety of intermediary blows and holds with measured effect, against opponents. The more experienced, the better trained, the stronger, the faster, and the more clever the professional wrestler, the greater the repertoire of blows and holds that can be executed successfully.

This is equally true of countering moves, which block the opponent's blows and holds, or of guarding moves, which ward off injury if a wrestler is on the receiving end. Ironically, even these guarding moves have served as fodder for the claim of critics that professional wrestling is fake. Clark writes the following:

One of the first things every wrestler learns is the correct way to fall. . . . "You have to land flat and distribute the shock over your whole body," says Wladek (Killer) Kowalski, who has been teaching would-be pro wrestlers out of the Boston YMC Union since soon after his retirement from the ring in 1977. . . . Kowalski's course includes tips on how to make less-than-lethal stomps and withstand blows from folding chairs. Instruction is hands-on. . . . And then there's the infamous piledriver, in which a wrestler holds his foe upside down and slams him headfirst into the mat. Because his inverted position causes his hair to hang down and provide camouflage, the victim's head appears to smash into the mat before it actually does. *There's some other trickery involved.* "What's the first thing to hit the mat?" asks Kowalski. "My arms and hands!" (1985:60; emphasis added)

"Trickery" thus appears to be any action by which a wrestler avoids delivering maximal injury to or receiving maximal injury from another. The perverse character of this kind of comment reveals more about the class culture of the critic than it does about professional wrestling.

The goal of a wrestling match for the wrestler is quite straightfor-

ward: it is to hold the opponent's shoulders to the mat for the three-count. This can be done most efficiently by delivering a blow that forces the air from the opponent's lungs or stuns momentarily, allowing for the pin, or by executing a painful submission hold from which the wrestler can be loosed only by forfeiting the match. The graduated variety of blows and holds leading up to this climax provides diversion to the crowd, but it also wears down an opponent. This encounter, in toto, win or lose, is repeated by active professional wrestlers six or seven times a week, in different arenas, in different cities and towns on the wrestling circuit, in an extremely active yearlong schedule. It is within this regimen that measured violence makes sense. Professional wrestling, after all, is a profession, which means that men (and a few women) make their living in careers that can last thirty years or more. Nick Bockwinkel was world champion of the American Wrestling Alliance in his early fifties, and the legendary Lou Thesz wrestled for an astounding fifty years. Given this long view of things, a wrestler would be foolish to make an all-out effort on a daily basis: wrestlers literally cannot afford to inflict serious injury upon every opponent in every match and expect at the same time to earn a living.

It seems to us that the first rule of the professional wrestler as for any worker in the capitalist labor process in general is to do what has to be done, but no more, to maintain a given position in the process of production and to preserve a given sphere of personal autonomy. (That this rule is at times honored in the breach, judging by the gravity of injuries sustained by professional wrestlers, is tribute to the unrestrained logic of escalation and retribution inherent in the morality of violence in the "squared circle," a matter which we discuss below.) If in their measured use of violence professional wrestlers reserve and control the expenditure of their labor power, they thereby signify in an occulted way their autonomy and integrity within the sphere of production. This they share with other members of the working class. Again we turn to Diamond's discussion of the Clay-Liston fight:

What we will resist seeing is that two physically tremendous men put on an entertainment for a society in which they do not believe. With due consideration for themselves, they refused to batter each other into the ground for the pleasure of a predominantly white audience,

according to white rules of the game, for prizes which they had already achieved by other means. (1970:178)

In this respect, the actions of professional wrestlers, and of Clay and Liston, arise out of specifically working-class experience, much as does the behavior of English working-class "lads" studied by Willis:

"The lads," from the resources of their culture, saw their own labour power as a barrier against unreasonable demands from the world of work rather than as a special and privileged connection with it. This feeds directly into oppositional shopfloor culture whose object is at least partly to limit production and the potentially voracious demands of capitalist production on individuals. (1977:132)

At this point, we can interpret the position of intellectual critics of professional wrestling who are outraged by the "fake" actions of a wrestler who does not succeed in achieving the death of the opponent through violence, even as these critics are queasy about the "brutality" that arises from the very actions they demand. Such responses are ideological manifestations of the more generalized tendency that Diamond refers to as the culturally conditioned "rage to exploit" exhibited by a dominant class. 2 The factory owner or manager and professional wrestling's critics alike demand, but do not receive, a total commitment of energy to the point of exhaustion even death by those whose labor power they seek to command.

We can also understand the ostentatious rule breaking that is a basic feature of professional wrestling. For the so-called rules of fair play make sense to the professional wrestler only when they support the real first rule: that is, rules are followed by fan-favorite or villain only when, in context, they allow the wrestler's measured violence to achieve its effects. The referee, the representative of authority, is called on by a wrestler only when suffering from, or alleging to suffer from, the abuse of these rules by the foe: hair pulling, hitting with a closed fist, use of a foreign object, and so forth. Whether a wrestler is a baby face (good guy) or a heel, on the offensive or defensive, rules are there not to be followed but to be used as part of wrestling strategy. The most successful wrestlers do not obey the rules as much as they take advantage of them. Such an attitude, which middle-class critics cannot appreciate, is in principle profoundly subversive.

This is best illustrated by the remarks of one such critic, offered in, of all places, a wrestling magazine, who pleads for the virtues of "sportsmanship":

It is the "unique" wrestler who abstains from the barbaric style of those who remain undisciplined and lost within their own world of hatred and destruction. Wrestlers such as Ricky Steamboat, Dynamite Kid, Davey-Boy Smith and Bob Backlund can hold their heads up high above the rest. They have long contributed to the meaning of the word sport and have held the moral principles found within the rules of competition to be their holy grail. But the spotlight doesn't shine bright enough on these upholders of sanity in a sport gone mad. For if it did, then surely we would not have such an outbreak of violence both in and around the wrestling arenas. (O'Hara 1987:4748)

In O'Hara's view, wrestling represents a moral threat to the basic principles of society: "The children who watch wrestling are getting the message that if you obey the rules you'll most likely lose. Is this what we want our children to learn from wrestling?" (1987:48). Finally, he provides us with his own vision of what wrestling should be: "entertainment which allows the human spirit to compete to its fullest, devoid of all hate and conceit" (49).

All this strikes us as typical bourgeois hogwash. The middle-class critic upholds "morality" and "sanity" as virtues connected with discipline and respect for the rules, while those who behave otherwise belong to a "barbaric" world of "hatred and destruction." Such categories seek to replace a clear vision of class struggle between those who make the rules and those who are expected to obey them with an ideology of fair play supposedly valid for all. But in capitalist enterprise in general, the rules of fair play (e.g., meritocratic norms) are designed by those in authority as a means of rationalizing, disguising, and protecting their "rage to exploit." Workers in a sense realize this. Part of the rare enjoyment that the specific case of professional wrestling provides is that what the rules really represent is transparent to both the wrestlers in the ring and the crowd in the stands. (The match in which both wrestlers "play fair," in contrast, is thus rightly deemed uninteresting; the crowd chants in unison, "BORING!" because it fails to illuminate the rules of fair play for what they are.) If the lower class obeys the rules laid down for it by

those in power, it will indeed lose. As far as we are concerned, *yes*, this is what we want our children to learn. The vision of contemporary American society as one in which the human spirit competes free from hatred is capitalist ideology.

The Morality of the Wrestling World

We have argued thus far that professional wrestling as an institution epitomizes in allegory and narrative the struggle between classes in this society, and that the culture of measured violence by wrestlers "in the business" reflects a strategy of survival and subversion within a situation of exploitation. In this final section, we offer our understanding of the powerful subversive moral appeal of professional wrestling for those who experience it bestits working-class audience.

The idea is a frightening one that human beings would willingly earn their living by battering the bodies of other human beings and by having their own bodies battered in turn. It is this fear that leads people (in our experience, white, middle-class intellectuals) to reject the brutality of wrestling as "fake"; the sight of this brutality, if real, is simply too offensive (i.e., threatening) to "morals" and "good taste." True wrestling fans, on the other hand, would never waste a second wondering if what they are seeing is real or fake, and the idea that the wrestler's job is to batter or be battered seems to them perfectly natural.

In fact, there is nothing *more* real than selling the labor power of one's body for money. The working class does this every day. Wrestling is a form of physical labor, in principle no different from work in factories, mines, and steel mills; it is even, in some ways, a purer form, since a wrestler has no tools or machinery, but only his body to work with. The man Virgil Runnels, who leaves his job of digging ditches to become the wrestler Dusty Rhodes (even the name is reminiscent of the life of work), and who identifies himself proudly both as the "son of a plumber" and "The American Dream," personifies the intimate connection between wrestling and the life and aspirations of the working class.

For in spite of the rock music and the Hollywood hoopla of Mr. T and Cyndi Lauper, professional wrestling is a working-class sport. Nowhere has this become clearer to us than in the inner-city audience drawn to the National Wrestling Alliance cards at the Civic Center in

Philadelphia. According to one survey, 14 percent of the people who watch wrestling attended college, 11 percent are professionals, and 13 percent earn more than \$40,000 per annum (Kush 1986:21). If we accept these statistics, we are faced with an audience drawn overwhelmingly (8590 percent) from the skilled, semi-skilled, or unskilled working class. Why does professional wrestling appeal to the working class, and appeal to it so strongly and uniquely that college-educated professionals constitute only the margins of its audience?

Wrestling, as a spectacle of physical labor, offers an exuberant display of labor power. Once the rock music stops, sequined robes are shed, and valets and managers leave the ring, we are left with the bodies of the wrestlers and it is here that wrestling really begins. Standing in the ring, fully illuminated in a semi-darkened arena, the wrestler presents the image of labor power itself; his body, in full view of the audience, displays its scars and its muscle, the visible, tangible result of work in the gym and in the wrestling ring. Not only does the wrestler work with his body, but his body is his work, and it is displayed always with pride.

Furthermore, wrestling, even if it is labor, is labor of a special kind. Unlike work in factories, mines, or mills, the wrestler's labor does not result in a product that can be sold for profit. (Of course, promoters make money with wrestling dolls, wrestling videos, and even wrestling albums, but such products are parasitic on the real work of wrestling.) The work of the wrestler, one could argue, has no direct product, but is undertaken for the entertainment of the audience and it sometimes seems for the sheer pleasure of the wrestler. The work on display in the wrestling ring, in other words, is self-display; it is the proud and brutal exhibition of work that produces only itself, work that is its own meaning and reason.

For the wrestling fan, this proud, brutal, exuberant display is immensely fulfilling. It is frightening to witness such devastating wrestling holds as the figure-four leg lock, which can tear the ligaments of the knee, or the piledriver, where a man is lifted upside-down and driven head-first into the mat. One often witnesses a wrestler slamming another's head into the steel corner posts of the ring. But it is amazing to see how much punishment of this kind a wrestler can absorb, and how much power and energy a body holds in reserve. It is indeed frightening to watch the execution of certain wrestling moves, but even more awe-inspiring to witness survival. One watches the limits of the human body being tested experiences rare, breathtaking moments when no limits seem to exist and one learns

to marvel at the resilience and cunning of the individual engaged in battle.

The nature of the battle, too, is deeply satisfying. Matches are best when the two opponents are enmeshed in a personal feud. They have been partners in the past, and one has betrayed the other. Or one has used brass knuckles or some other foreign object, causing the opponent injury or the loss of a championship belt. Or one has joined in a gang-attack upon the other. Such scenarios are common and are a characteristic part of wrestling (and, we would add, of life in contemporary capitalist society). What they all share is the deep sense, on the part of both audience and wrestlers, that one person has been done a grave injustice by the other, and that the wronged party must get even. The best, most exciting wrestling matches are those that arise out of a history of injustice, betrayal, and injury, and that promise retribution. As wrestlers are fond of saying, and as their fans learn to expect, "What goes around comes around" a phrase taken from black working-class dialect.

In this morality of wrestling as a working-class sport, retribution is always physical. Male wrestlers, especially, give prematch interviews in which they describe in vivid terms their anger, hatred, or disgust toward their opponent, and promise to break his leg, tear his throat out, or send him to the hospital. Such verbal intimidation is something everyone experiences or engages in in one way or another, but battling with words is inherently unsatisfying. One may win in an academic grievance proceeding, but what one really feels like doing is punching out the people responsible.

As the wrestler Shultz demonstrated in his encounter with the reporter Stossel, professional wrestling is founded on the difference between words and actions. Contemporary capitalist society places a higher value on the work done with the mind. Dirty hands and clothes are dishonorable, while the immaculately groomed Yuppie enjoys social prestige. But in the world of wrestling, these values are reversed. "Talk is cheap," Bruiser Brody says. "The weak talk. Those who are frightened always got something to say. I fight, man. I annihilate people" ("Bruiser Brody" 1985:38). There are those who talk and those who fight. Only those who are weak fight with words, and they are people who command no respect.

It is a matter of course that wrestlers who can't deliver a television interview with sufficient gusto and charisma to draw an audience need someone to talk for them. But interestingly enough, their managers are not distinguished solely by their verbal skill. The "Mid-

night Express" tag team of Bobby Eaton and Dennis Condrey, former world champions, have Jim Cornett, who carries a tennis racket symbol of his class and who is financed by his rich mother. Harley Race has Bobby "The Brain" Heenan. The "Ugandan Giant" Kamala has "The Wizard." Managers are clearly associated with money, brains, and power. And they cheat: standing ringside during matches, they hand foreign objects to their man in the ring, or they attack the opponent themselves with tennis racket, megaphone, or cane.

The wrestlers, in contrast, do the actual and legitimate physical work in the ring. They are expected to deliver on the promises of their managers, which means that they are the ones who are expected to take the lumps; not surprisingly, they refer to themselves as "workers." ³ In this parallel world of workers and managers, there is therefore nothing more gleeful than the occasional sight of a manager being confronted by a wrestler on the wrestler's terms: in the working world of wrestling, the workers occasionally beat up the managers, as retribution for a history of blatant injustice and illegal interference. We wonder what working man or woman would not pay to watch this. The working-class audience sees with utmost clarity, under spotlights and before television cameras, that managers lie and cheat, that they can be made to pay, and, further, that they are no match for the wrestler—this is not "fakery" but superlative reality, and the audience cheers wildly, with a deep sense of enjoyment.

The participation of the audience is also part of what creates the sport of wrestling. Wrestling fans attending live matches will leap to their feet, shake their fists, yell as loudly as they can. There are no cheerleaders to channel the expression of support or outrage, but rather individuals scream whatever they please. Sometimes a single fan can begin a mass chant of a wrestler's name or of insults such as "bald-headed geek" and "beach bum." We have never heard racist cheers, but chants of "Russia sucks" or "faggot" are common, and one evening a group of women behind us yelled for one wrestler, who was being harassed by a woman valet, to "smack her."

Whatever fans yell, their goal is the same: to express their unqualified support for one wrestler and their unqualified dislike for the opponent. Fans are passionately partisan, and no rules of audience etiquette apply. The upper-class audience of a professional tennis match may applaud only at certain moments in the match, and tennis players may request that a particular audience member sit down or not move. The bourgeois nature of certain sportsgolf,

tennis, fencing which Bourdieu points to, extends to the behavior of their audiences as well. The audience of professional wrestling matches, in contrast, is boisterous, vulgar, and by necessity disrespectful. Their energy and uncontrolled spontaneity, we think, must be another source of fear to middle-class professionals and intellectuals, who complain that wrestlers get away with breaking the rules, or that fans are always jumping up and "unfairly" blocking the view of the people behind them. As we have argued, "fairness" in wrestling does not mean following rules set down by other people "fairness" means getting even with someone, and cheering is the way fans get in on the action.

Professional wrestling, in our view, is the ultimate working-class sport. In its exuberant display of the skill, versatility, power, and resilience of the human body, it is a celebration of the individual and his labor. In contrast to the "real" world, where men and women are caught in huge, complex, confusing systems of exploitation and control, in the world of wrestling one meets one's enemy face-to-face. Battle lines are clearly drawn, and battles are fought publicly. One is expected to be loyal to one's friends, and any betrayal of trust is met with punishment in the ring. One is held accountable for the things one says and does. Individual skill is recognizable and honored; no one can get far by simply talking a good game. Ass-kissing and bull-shitting get one nowhere. Right and wrong are absolutely clear. And there is always payback.

For those many of us in a "lower order," as Diamond calls it, restricted in situations in which we enjoy little or no freedom to confront those who treat us in less than human terms, there is nothing more satisfying than watching one body battering another. This is the genuine, subversive appeal of wrestling for the working class. It is a profession in which it doesn't matter what someone says about you, or even what he does to you behind your back or when no one else is looking. It is absolutely certain that one day you'll have your chance, in front of thousands of people who understand why, to get even. Barthes recognized this when he wrote of wrestling as "the great spectacle of Suffering, Defeat, and Justice":

What wrestling is above all meant to portray is a purely moral concept: that of justice. The idea of "paying" is essential to wrestling, and the crowd's "Give it to him" means above all else "Make him pay." (1972:19,21) 4

One enjoys in a wrestling match what one rarely experiences so vividly and immediately, if at all, in one's own working life.

No wonder this world of wrestling is cause for anxiety among those who serve the power structure in our society. The wrestling world places faith in the individual's ability to see injustice clearly and in his power to gain retribution. For those middle-class intellectuals and managers who observe this world from the outside, it appears either too brutal or entirely phony. Those on the inside cheer it for its moral clarity and justice. For the wrestling fan, it is the real world on the outside, with its lines of power covered over by layers upon layers of bureaucracy, hypocrisy, and bad faith, that is the fraud.

Notes

1. This article does not discuss "physically tremendous" women, or women professional wrestlers, except in passing.
2. As Diamond states, "To put it another way, the more the person is removed from direct and comprehensive work in the world, from creative molding of the environment, the more the human capacities remain untapped, the greater the sense of impotence, and the greater the necessity to exploit the other" (1985:2).
3. Other terms reinforce the connection between wrestling and the world of the working class: the pace of a match is the "work rate"; preliminary wrestlers who lose as often as they wrestle are "jobbers." See Jerome Matthews (1987:2629).

4. We differ radically from Barthes, however, in that in his view wrestling offers only "images" and not the thing itself real suffering, real defeat, real justice. As Barthes puts it, "Only the image is involved in the game, and the spectator does not wish for the actual suffering of the contestant; he only enjoys the perfection of an iconography" (1972:20).

References

Barthes, Roland

1972

The World of Wrestling. *In* Mythologies, trans. Annette Lavers, 1525. New York: Hill and Wang.

Bourdieu, Pierre

1984

Distinction: A Social Critique of the Judgment of Taste.
Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

Bruiser Brody: Mercenary of Mayhem.

1985

Wrestling USA (Winter):3839, 5859.

Clark, N. Brooks

1985

What You See Is Not Always What They Get. *Sports Illustrated* (April 29):60.

Diamond, Stanley

1970

The Great Black Hope. *In Black America*. ed. John F. Szwed, 17178. New York: Basic Books.

1985

Questions. *Dialectical Anthropology* 9(14):16.

Interview 85: David Shultz

1985

Wrestling USA (Winter):2225, 62.

Kush, Tony

1986

Blood, Sweat and Tears in the Squared Circle. *Wrestling Eye* (June):2023.

Matthews, Jerome

1987

Rasslin' Jargon: The Secret Language Wrestlers Speak. *Wrestling Eye* (February):2629.

Molloy, Digger

1986

The American Dream Looks at a Honky Tonk Vacation. Wrestling's Main Event (October):3034.

Newman, Bruce

1985

Who's Kidding Whom? Sports Illustrated (April 29):2842, 5970.

O'Hara, Mike

1987

Is Wrestling Too Violent for Children to Watch? Wrestling Today 1(1):4649.

Willis, Paul

1977

Learning to Labor: How Working Class Kids Get Working Class Jobs. New York: Columbia University Press.

7

Voodoo, Ethnography, and the American Occupation of Haiti:

William B. Seabrook's *The Magic Island*

Steven Gregory

William B. Seabrook was not an anthropologist. But his book about Haiti, *The Magic Island*, was popularly received by at least a half million readers in the United States and critically engaged by a host of ethnographers studying Haitian culture. Published the same year as the 1929 Haitian uprisings against the U.S. occupation, 1 *The Magic Island* is tenuously situated between the genre of the travel narrative, canonized during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries by such writers as Mungo Park, Richard Burton, and Paul DuChailly, and descriptive ethnography, which emerged in Haiti most notably through the work of Jean Price-Mars (1928) and Melville Herskovits (1937). Seabrook's text exhibits a tension between an imperial, Africanist narrative genre, elaborated within the political context of the American occupation, and a scientific, cultural relativist discourse stimulated by Boasian anthropology and by a volatile Haitian nationalist movement. This double tension between scientific and narrative discourses on the one hand, and cultural relativist and supremacist paradigms on the other, produces ruptures and fissures in the text that Seabrook struggles to mediate, if not elide.²

These constitutive tensions enable us to steal a glimpse of an extraordinary moment in the representation of the Other through the discourse of Western civilization: a moment when ethnography, as yet undisciplined by the conventions of ethnographic realism, erupts within the discursive configuration of colonialism. Indeed, it is Seabrook's very lack of anthropological discipline that allows us to view, through his text, the ethnographic process in its most subversive and critical aspects.

If Seabrook is to be situated within any genre, it would be that of

the travel account. Among his published works are *Adventures in Arabia* (1927) and *Jungle Ways* (1931), which can be said to complete the Orientalist-Africanist travel cycle. In his preface to *Adventures in Arabia*, Seabrook examined his reasons for "wandering into outlandish places." His reflective efforts, like those of Joseph Conrad's character Marlow, led him to a childhood memory:

One of my first memories is a picture-book my grandmother gave me in early nursery days. Its frontspiece showed three majestic figures from another world, cloaked mysteriously, riding upon the backs of strange, towering beasts, following a star. (1927:11)

Intervening among these childhood mysteries, however, was Seabrook's firsthand ethnographic experience with the people of Haiti. Seabrook's ethnographic work can be read as a struggle to overcome this mystification to overcome a projective constitution of the Other bequeathed by his childhood and by centuries of narrative tradition.

But this ethnographic experience was itself circumscribed by a military occupation by a political topography whose survival depended on the negation of experience and the vivification of categories of otherness. Robert Lansing, U.S. Secretary of State at the time of the intervention, observed:

The experience of Liberia and Haiti show that the African race are devoid of any capacity for political organization and lack genius for government. Unquestionably there is in them an inherent tendency to revert to savagery and to cast aside the shackles of civilization which are irksome to their physical nature. . . . It is that which makes the negro problem practically unsolvable. (Schmidt 1971:6263)

Few statements would better illustrate the premises underlying Africanist discourse, as well as the political appropriation of this discourse by an imperial power. Thus, Seabrook's text in its ethnographic and political dimensions is an attempt to wrest ethnographic reality from the grip of a discursive tradition being defended perforce by the U.S. Marines.

Seabrook's precarious position as ethnographer was by no means unique; anthropologists have traditionally worked among the colonized and by the leave of colonial authorities. What makes Sea-

Seabrook's text particularly interesting is that he does not conceal this fact he does not obscure his own situatedness within this political topography. Consequently, his search for the primitive, for the subjectivity of the Other, takes us "with eyes open," as he put it, across the barriers of otherness which in traditional ethnographies were often obscured (Marcus and Cushman 1982).

The dialectical tension generated by these barriers is perhaps the most interesting aspect of his book: Seabrook's narration oscillates between an ethnographic constitution of reality and a projective one, between firsthand experience and ideological hearsay, and between narrative presence and its dissolution. Recognizing these tears in Seabrook's narration and the textual sites where they occur helps us to critically examine the narrative devices that came to the aid of ethnographic realism as it emerged from the imaginative ground of the travel account.

But before turning to the text itself, let us first examine how it was received by a critic working with *The New York Times*. Such a step will enable us to sample the discursive climate prevailing in the United States at this critical time. R. L. Duffus wrote in 1929:

It can be said of many travelers that they have traveled widely. Of Mr. Seabrook a much finer thing may be said he has traveled deeply. It is apparent that he has penetrated as few white men have done, perhaps as no white man has done in so short a time, to the soul of Haiti. (6)

The metaphor of deep penetration "to the soul of Haiti" expresses a familiar theme in Africanist discourse, evoking Marlow's journey upriver: "The reaches opened before us and closed behind, as if the forest had stepped leisurely across the water to bar the way for our return. We penetrated deeper and deeper into the heart of darkness" (Conrad 1980:52). This paradoxical notion of traveling "deeply," not merely to the place called Haiti but to the "soul" of Haiti, alerts us to the conflation of space and time that occurs in the text and that Duffus perceives Seabrook's journey through space is simultaneously a journey back in time an attempt to project, as Christopher Miller observed, "the primitive world as an anteriority that can be reached geographically" (1985:172). But this deep penetration, this confounding of spatio-temporal integrity and directionality, is not without risk. Duffus, sensing this danger, adds, "At the same time

[Seabrook] has not lost contact with, nor apparently respect for, that very practical point of view represented by the United States Marine Corps" (1929:6).

Indeed, to recall Lansing's speculation, it is the "inherent tendency" of the African race "to revert to savagery and to cast aside the shackles of civilization . . . that . . . makes the negro problem practically unsolvable" (Schmidt 1971:6263). It is this mystified barrier between primitive and civilized that Seabrook attempts to cross ethnologically and both Duffus and Lansing reify Duffus as a "soul" to be penetrated and Lansing as a "physical nature" to be "shackled" by civilization.

What is really at stake, however, are projective, imaginary notions of the primitive and civilization, both of which ultimately rest on a theory of racial superiority. Seabrook threatens to demystify not only the primitive, but civilization as well. Here is the real danger. For to constitute the Haitian peasant ethnologically, Seabrook must confront civilization as an ethnographer. He must regard the American occupation as a civilizing mission and not merely as an exercise in Machiavellian politics.

Unlike Joseph Conrad's character Kurtz (1980), Seabrook does not irreparably lose contact with the colonial reality. He cannot. Consequently, as Duffus observes, there are two distinct "phases" of Seabrook's book. The first "consists of objective observations, excellently made and recorded, but not beyond the scope of any accomplished teller of traveler's tales" (1929:6). This phase of the book (parts 2, 3, and 4) consists of observations on the American occupation, Haitian society, geography, and history, as well as a recapitulation of "Voodoo legends."

The second phase of the book (part 1) is an account of Voodoo and, writes Duffus, "a sympathetic contribution of vast importance to a little-understood subject" (ibid.). This second phase not only is distinguished from the first by its subject matter, it also constitutes a radical discursive shift.

It is not quite a scientific contribution, for Mr. Seabrook is admittedly a mystic. Perhaps it is better than scientific, for it tells the story of voodoo from the inside as well as from the outside. . . . Mr. Seabrook, lending himself to the influence of the powerful emotions generated by the weird ceremonies which he witnessed, penetrated deeply into the Haitian psychology, thrilled with

the same nameless fears which beset his black friends. (Ibid.)

Whereas Seabrook's treatment of the American occupation is elevated by Duffus to the level of "objective observations," his account of Voodoo from the point of view of participant-observer is said to be not quite scientific, given Seabrook's "mysticism." At the core of Duffus's distinction is Seabrook's "inside" view and deep penetration "into the Haitian psychology." Again the conflating metaphor. It is here, at this liminal site exposed by metaphor, that Seabrook places himself in jeopardy, "lending himself to the influence of powerful emotions" and "dark fears." It is Seabrook's "lending" of himself to his subject, the Other, that is perceived to be both unscientific and potentially subversive.

Seabrook's narration is in fact radically split along the lines perceived and reinforced by Duffus. Seabrook's experiences as a participant-observer led him to engage critically the ideological dogma of U.S. occupation, not only by subverting the narrative devices of the Africanist travel genre but also by calling into question basic tenets of racial supremacist thought. However, when Seabrook turned to treat subjects that he has experienced as a detached observer, his narration reverted to the conventions of the travel account and to the dogma of occupation.

I shall examine the manner in which these two discursive tendencies are constituted and confront each other within the text. I focus on Seabrook's account of Voodoo where the ethnographic necessity of engaging the subjectivity of the Other ruptures the narrative conventions of the travel account. Of particular interest are the textual maneuvers by Seabrook to mediate or elide these ruptures: to delimit the terrain upon which the subjectivity of the Haitian can be constituted, given the "practical point of view" of the Marines.

The Extraordinary Other

The Magic Island actually begins with Seabrook's account of Voodoo, referred to by Duffus as the book's second phase. In the opening chapter, Seabrook introduces the first of two Haitian characters who will be instrumental in facilitating his study of Voodoo.

Louis, son of Catherine Ozias of Orblanche, paternity unknown and thus without a surname was he inscribed in the civil register reminded me always of

that proverb out of hell in which Blake said, "He whose face gives no light shall never become a star." (7) 3

Louis, the Seabrooks's yard boy, appears in the first paragraph of the text as an absence of paternity, of a complete civil identity, and curiously, of the ability to "give light." Christopher Miller has noted the important role that the related themes of blackness and reflectivity play in African discourse.

Consider in passing the definition of black in French as that which 'does not reflect' (*ne réfléchit pas*), as the potential for a horrendous pun. '*Le noir ne réfléchit pas*' means both 'black does not reflect' and 'The black man does not think.' . . . That play on words is the very foundation of an entire world view, the starting point for an elaborate 'description' of humanity, of which the 'nullified civilization' . . . of the blacks is the zero point. (1985:31)

Seabrook, through William Blake, musters this radical ambiguity that is lost in English and enters into the Africanist convention of portraying blackness/blacks as a void as an absence of reflectivity. In the very next paragraph, however, Seabrook appears to contradict himself.

It was not because Louis's black face, frequently perspiring, shone like patent leather; it glowed also with a mystic light that was not always heavenly. For Louis belonged to the chimeric company of saints, monsters, poets, and divine idiots. (Seabrook 1929:7)

Seabrook is faced with the Africanist's dilemma, noted by Miller, of "how to write about a nullity." Put another way, how does one write about a subject who has been denied subjectivity and an earthly reflectivity?

Earlier travel writers could, with some degree of success, preserve the manichaeian dichotomies of darkness/light and Other/self by focusing on landscape descriptions embellished with reductive accounts of typical native customs (Pratt 1985). Seabrook, however, is forced at the outset to recognize Louis as a subject in order to realize his project. Louis is an informant without a methodological or textual framework to mediate his subjectivity. His subjectivity is therefore mystified within a discourse that cannot yet accommodate it.

Louis's face does not reflect the light of reason, but it glows with the mystical light of unreason, shared by "monsters, poets, and divine idiots." His subjectivity is circumscribed by this domain of unreason or, better still, oscillates between a worldly absence and a mystical, "not always heavenly" presence. This oscillation is evident when Seabrook compares Louis, who he reports served "with a passionate and all-consuming zeal," with three other servants in the Seabrook household:

The last three were reasonably efficient, as servants, doing generally what they were told; but Louis, who never did what he was told, was nevertheless in actual fact, putting quite aside his fantastic power of holding our affection, the most efficient servant of them all.
(Seabrook 1929:10)

Louis straddles the precarious divide between master and slave: he never does what he is told and yet he is *most* efficient. His subjectivity is "fantastic" and is capable of subverting the colonial relations of domination.

We had not chosen Louis for our yard boy. He had chosen us. He had also chosen the house we lived in. These two things . . . had seemed to us slightly miraculous, though the grapevine telegraph of servants in Port-au-Prince might adequately have explained both. (Seabrook 1929:7)

Louis's fantastic powers of subjectivity set him apart from other Haitians. His appearance in the opening paragraph underscores the critical role that he will play as guide, leading Seabrook to the "dark mysteries of Voodoo." Louis's textual role is comparable to that of Rudyard Kipling's character Kim, who, Abdul Jan Mohamed writes, "has no origins and therefore no familial, social political, or teleological constraints either. Endowed by the narrator with special talents, he can do anything and become anybody" (1985:78). Although the narrator asserts that Kim is an Irish orphan, the latter repeatedly insists that he is Indian. This counter-dialogue produces ambiguity as to Kim's cultural allegiance and prepares him for a role as spy for the British. The decentering of Kim's textual identity enables Kipling to bypass (but not to resolve) the problem of racial and cultural difference and, as a result, to accommodate the culture of an

Other within a discourse that remains determined by the "categories of manichaeic allegory" (ibid.).

Seabrook, however, cannot create a character who will obscure the boundary of differentiating self from Other. He needs an informant a spy who will lead him across this boundary that bars him from the culture of an Other. Thus the boundary itself must be mystified inscribed into a ritual space. Within this mystical domain, Seabrook as constituting subject is in jeopardy. But this vulnerability is carefully mediated within the text. The problems of racial and cultural difference are transformed into a metaphysical geography superimposed upon the political terrain of occupied Haiti. Indeed, Seabrook's narrative vulnerability is no more than a reflexive expression of the vulnerability of colonial domination itself.

Jean-Paul Sartre has noted that the vulnerability of the numerically weaker colonists, in the face of the potential unity of the "absolute Other," is often expressed by attributing a "magical power" to the colonized.

They are oppressed and, in a way, still impotent otherwise the colonists would no longer be there; but, at the same time, 'they know everything, they see everything, they spy on us, they communicate among themselves instantly,' etc. (1982:302)

If Voodoo in the imagination of the American interventionists symbolizes the mystical power of the Haitian to resist and the vulnerability of the occupation, then Louis as Seabrook's informant is the mediator of this perilous terrain. He is a trickster figure, what Stanley Diamond (1972) has termed a "personification of ambivalence," occupying a textual site where meanings are uprooted, inverted, and reconstituted under the pressure of discursive collapse. Louis, like the Voodoo deity Legba, "stands at the crossroads, he has access to the worlds on either side, as if he were on both sides of the mirror surface which separates them" (Deren 1972:98). Seabrook tries to fix an image on the surface of this mirror to fill in the blank darkness of Louis's absent subjectivity, mystified in the book's opening pages.

And in the household Louis gradually centered his allegiance and chief concern on me. . . . Louis put me first. He began gradually to give me confidences. He felt, as time passed, that I understood him. (Seabrook 1929:11)

Seabrook does not recognize Louis's subjectivity; he cannot, for it is mystified and unintelligible. Instead, he is confounded by the mirrorlike doubling of his own voice. Thus Seabrook does not understand Louis. Rather, Louis feels that he is understood. His subjectivity is constituted as a passive reflection of Seabrook's narrative presence or, to use Jan Mohamed's phrase, "as a mirror that reflects the colonist's self-image" (1985:65). Miller writes of this narrative device:

The 'dual voice' of free indirect discourse thus helps increase the irony of the 'proceedings,' particularly when one considers that this coming-into-consciousness of an African is performed in a technique that, by 'doubling' the voice, confounds the notion of the voice itself. African consciousness is born as the inability to be autonomously conscious. (1985:179n)

This doubling of Louis's voice marks his precarious emergence as informant-as a subject whose subjectivity exists solely for an other. It is a naive (perhaps as yet unconscious) device for establishing ethnographic authority for speaking of intersubjectivity under conditions of political domination. Here is the irony.

I . . . learned from Louis, or at least began to glimpse through him, something which I think has never been fully understood: that Voodoo in Haiti is a profound and vitally alive religion. (Seabrook 1929:12)

Louis's mystified subjectivity subverts Seabrook's objectifying gaze; it is reflected back through Louis from a point below the surface of the text. Turned back upon itself, Seabrook's gaze erupts into a metaphor as a "mystic light" glowing on the surface of a face that "gives no light." This dislocation of the gaze and confoundment of light and darkness creates the possibility for Seabrook's illumination for his ritual emergence as an ethnographer.

One afternoon, quite of his own volition, [Louis] began telling me of the ritual ceremonies in which these gods were worshipped, and soon I realized he was [an] eyewitness recounting things quite unknown to the outside world and extraordinarily at variance not only with fiction and stage versions of Voodoo ritual, but with the few records extant of persons who have claimed a direct knowledge. (14)

Seabrook succumbs to the doubling of his own voice. Through Louis's nascent volition as an informant, Seabrook "realized" his position as an "eye-witness," as a speaking eye/I. This is a critical moment a liminal moment of intense ambiguity that in primitive rituals is symbolized by both grave and womb. At the close of the first chapter, Seabrook tells Louis of his desire to study Voodoo:

I said to him presently, 'Louis, it was for this, and for this only, I think, that I came to Haiti. I would give anything in the world to see it. I would risk my life, do you understand?except that isn't the way I want to see it.' 'Ah monsieur,' said Louis sorrowfully, 'if you were only black!' " (15)

Seabrook would risk his life to *see* Voodoo. But to see Voodoo as a darkness, as an absence, as Death would constitute a failure to peer through the mirror and result in a mere projection onto its surface. In short, the narration would be foreclosedtrapped in the shadow of Africanist discourse and the U.S. occupation. At this critical site of narrative rupture, it is Louis who provides the impossible solution "if only you were black!" the radical inversion that subverts the discourse and its underlying categories. And it is Louis who, as guardian of the crossroads, will open the way for a ritual solution.

Seabrook's Rite de Passage

Seabrook's journey into the subjectivity of the Other is very much a geographical one, replete with the symbolism of the age of colonial exploration.

It was humble Louis and none other who set my feet in the path which led finally through river, desert, and jungle, across hideous ravines and gorges, over the mountains and beyond the clouds, and at last to the Voodoo Holy of Holies. These are not metaphors. The topography of Haiti is a tropical-upheaved, tumbled-towering madland of paradises and infernos. (11)

Seabrook denies metaphor as it erupts within the text, tearing his narration asunder with hyphens and unmediated oppositions. This mystification of topography prepares the ground for Louis's emerging subjectivity. "I fear it is going to be difficult to make you under-

stand Louis," Seabrook warns the reader, "unless you have read sympathetically the lives of the less reputable saints and have also lived in a tropical country like Haiti" (9). The boundary of intelligibility is at once geographical and emotive: it is a problem of sympathetically reading the subjectivity of the Other as inscribed in a ritual-like space.

Seabrook is led to Voodoo "by that trail that began at my own back doorstep and led only across the garden to my yard boy Louis's bare, humble quarters where a tiny light was burning" (11). This mystical ground is juxtaposed to the Haiti occupied by the U.S. Marine Corps.

Everywhere throughout our neighborhood, in the many straw-thatched huts of the ravine, likewise in the detached servant quarters of the plaster palaces of American majors and colonels, hundreds of similar little sacred flames were burning. (1112)

This spatial opposition achieves ironic proportions when Seabrook learns from Louis "that while the [American] High Commissioner, his lady, and the colonel had called and taken tea in our parlor, the high gods had been entering by the back door and abiding in our servants' lodge" (12). The boundaries between sacred and profane, slave and master, and Other and self are conflatedcondensed to a spatial barrier to be crossed or, like a door, opened.

In the second chapter, "The Way is Opened and Closed," Seabrook sets out with Louis on a journey to visit the latter's mother in Orblanche, in the countryside. Seabrook is "flattered" that Louis invites him. "So with our joint egos agreeably inflated we ambled along the narrow donkey path, I on a little saddled pony borrowed from Divesco, he topping me on a bareback mule obtained by his own mysterious devices, and as we rode single file we sang" (17).

Louis remains mystified, but his mysticism now encompasses Seabrook as the latter shifts to the first person plural: "We squabbled and bargained until we had filled a large sack with gifts for Louis's mother. . . . (Fools that we were) a lot of banana figs . . . were crushed as we jogged" (ibid.).

Seabrook's ethnographic rite de passage is further evidenced when he returns to and further undermines the black/white barrier that alienates him from Voodoo. After arriving in Orblanche, Louis takes Seabrook to visit his uncle, a Voodoo *papaloi*, or priest: "Dort Dessiles, naturally was not wholly trustful. After all my face was white. I often regretted it in Haiti. . . . He wanted to do what Louis

asked, but he was afraid. Louis insisted. He kept saying that I was not like a white man, whatever that meant" (2021).

Louis is finally able to arrange for Seabrook to attend a Voodoo ceremony. Seabrook writes that his "part in the preparations became as intimate as that of a city cousin engaged with country kinfolk in trimming the family Christmas tree" (21). However, at the last moment, a Haitian official refuses to give his tacit approvalhe does not want to risk having a white man attend an illegal Voodoo ceremony. Again, the solution is geographical: "Louis' influence did not extend beyond his natal village in the plain, and my path eventually led up into the mountains" (27).

Finally, Seabrook goes to live with Maman Célie, a *mamaloï*, or Voodoo priestess, and the person to whom the book is dedicated. Seabrook writes that her house was "lost in the high mountains" and "isolated . . . from the organized world down yonder. . . . So far as the world of urban Port-au-Prince and Americanized Haiti was concerned, I might have been on another planet" (2830).

Seabrook's ascent of the mountain signals his most radical encounter with the subjectivity of the Other. Whereas his connection with Louis had been expressed as one of joining "egos," his relationship with Maman Célie transcends such a distinction. Again discourse fails Seabrook:

Between Maman Célie and me there was a bond which I cannot analyze or hope to make others understand because in my innermost self its roots went deep beyond analysis or conscious reasoning. We had both felt it almost from our first contact. It was as if we had known each other always, had been at some past time united by the mystical equivalent of an umbilical cord; as if I had suckled in infancy her dark breasts, had wandered far, and was now returning home. (28)

The "we" of Seabrook's narration is now held together by a bond that eludes reason and description. He no longer speaks for an Other, but speaks as an Other. Or perhaps better, as a self "returning" to the Other to the "dark breasts" of his "innermost self." As Seabrook's writing shifts into the discourse of the Other, "beyond analysis or conscious reasoning," the complicity between writer and reader is jarred, if not severed:

Such mysterious returnings to a place where one has never been; such strange familiarness of a face that one

has never seen; I think these things are within the secret experience of almost every human being, but if one has not at some time felt them, they cannot be explained. (28)

This failure of narration to explain expresses the conflict that has erupted in the text between the conventions of Africanist discourse à la Caribbean and Seabrook's emerging ethnological standpoint. Like Herman Melville's *Moby Dick*, *The Magic Island* can be read as a radical encounter of a "projective primitivism" with the "ethnological primitive." William Heath writes of the resultant tension: "The primitive is associated, on the one hand, with frightful origins, savage slaughter, and demonic possession, and, on the other, with spiritual destiny, saving actions, and redeeming rituals" (Heath 1981:31516).

Seabrook's shift to an ethnological constitution of the primitive is profoundly ritualized through his conflation of space and time. This transition is also marked by the unconventional substitutions that occur in Seabrook's metaphoric use of "darkness" and "black." Impressed by his warm reception in Orblanche, Seabrook writes, "it might have been in the friendly heart of Africa." Africa is no longer an "indeterminate! negative, `darkness' . . . condensed into a lifelike unity, with reality and presence," i.e., given a heart (Miller 1985:176). Rather, its heart has been made humangiven the human attribute of friendship. Darkness as an abstract and indeterminate negative is withdrawn from Conrad's metaphor, as Africa becomes ethnologically real, as opposed to projective blank space.

Seabrook describes Maman Célie as having "a sweet black face, like that of an old prophetess" and remarks that the children of her village "were still a little afraid of me because of my white face" (Seabrook 1929:2930). His metaphoric inversions extend to his description of geography.

The unearthly quality of the great, pale, moon-flooded mountain slopes that towered to the stars, the ghostly ravines and gorges that dropped down to blackness; the red flickering torches close at hand all this I remember now as a sort of dream, still more vivid, after a year has passed, than most waking memories. (37)

It is now the mountains that are flooded in light and the plains that drop "down to blackness." The reflectivity that was denied to

Louis ("he whose face gives no light shall never become a star") is attributed to the entire mountain, whose slopes "towered to the stars." The mountain is sacred ground, dreamlike, and bathed in lunar light. Seabrook describes ritual possession as an "ultimate and self-destroying illumination" (42). It is this illumination, this recognition of the self in the Other, that signals the ritual death of Seabrook's hegemonic "author-function" and his radical emergence as participant-observer.

At a Voodoo ceremony, Seabrook is shaken by the voice of the sacrificial animals:

It was the sound of the terrorized, shrill bleating of the white he-goats, tethered out there in the shadows, as it pierced through yet was always dominated, sometimes drowned, by the symphonic female howling choral[e] of the women. It caused something that was elemental male in me, something deeper than anything that the word sex usually defines, to shiver in the grip of an answering, icy terror. Nor had this any remote connection with the fact that I, a white man, knelt there among these swaying blacks who would presently become blood-frenzied. They were my friends. It was a terror of something blacker and more implacable than the terror of the dark, all engulfing womb." (37)

Through Seabrook's ethnological encounter, the Other is revealed as the selfa hidden self "blackier and more implacable than they." The white "he-goats" about to be sacrificed stand in for his shaken subjectivity and express the horror of his emerging reflexivitya horror whose speaking Kurtz does not survive and Marlow cannot bear repeating. Seabrook libidinizes his encounter as a castration-inducing return to the womb, the white he-goats symbolizing both his subjectivity and the repressive weight of civilization barring his return to the pre-Oedipal object of his desirethe "all engulfing womb."

Later, Seabrook describes the sacrifice of a white turkey as if it were a sexual acta mystical rape:

As the [black priestess] sought finally to tear off its head, sought to clutch its body between her knees, it attacked her savagely, beating her face and breasts, beating at her so that she was at moments enfolded by

the great white wings, so that the bird and woman seemed to mingle struggling in a monstrous, mythical embrace. But her fatal hands were still upon its throat, and in that swanlike simulacrum of the deed which for the male is always like a little death, it died. (60)

The white sacrificial animal in Seabrook's text occupies a position comparable to that of Ahab's ivory leg in *Moby Dick*: both are precipitates of repressed meanings, catalyzed by the encounter with the Other. Ahab's maniacal pursuit of the white whale results in the loss of his leg and its replacement with an artificial one fashioned from the "jaw-ivory" of a sperm whale. The fitting of the substitute leg is a vicarious attempt to incorporate the Other (the white whale) and to synthesize the repressed meanings that this latter symbolizes. It is a cannibalistic attempt at mastery of the Other, which by refusing to recognize the Other as a projection of the self, leads inevitably to self-destruction, or more accurately, to self-cannibalism. Ahab is thus described as a vulture feeding on his own heart. For this reason, the ivory leg remains in conflict with Ahab's body and at odds with his will. On one occasion,

by some unknown, and seemingly inexplicable, unimaginable casualty, his ivory limb having been so violently displaced, that it had stake-wise smitten, and all but pierced his groin; nor was it without extreme difficulty that the agonizing wound was entirely cured. (Melville 1977:495)

As a symbol of his dismemberment resulting from an earlier encounter with the white whale, the substitute leg (like the "precious trickle of ivory" that indicates Kurtz's integrity upstream) represses the meaning of his sacrifice, of his giving himself to the Other in short, of the dialecticity of the encounter. Indeed, Ahab asks the ship's carpenter, whom he refers to as "manmaker," to "drive away" the sensation of his lost leg, "the flesh and blood one" (503).

The narrator tells us that it had not "failed to enter [Ahab's] monomaniac mind, that all the anguish of that then present suffering was but the direct issue of a former woe" (495). Ahab seems to play with the idea to consider the possibility of reflexivity. While talking with the ship's carpenter, Ahab notices the blacksmith nearby. He asks the carpenter to "tell him to forge a pair of steel shoulder-blades; there is a pedlar about with a crushing pack" (502). This

pedlar, or perhaps trifier (peddle being sometimes confused with piddle), is no doubt Ahab himself, who then directs the carpenter,

Hold; while Prometheus is about it, I'll order a complete man after a desirable pattern. Imprimis, fifty feet high in his socks; then, chest modelled after the Thames Tunnel; then, legs with roots to `em, to stay in one place; then, arms three feet through the wrist; no heart at all, brass forehead, and about a quarter of an acre of fine brains; and let me seeshall I order eyes to see outwards? No, but put a sky-light on top of his head to illuminate inwards. There, take the order, and away. (Ibid.)

Ahab's image of a reforged man/self brings him to the brink of reflexivity, but he turns inward instead. The carpenter is confused and asks (aside): "Now what's he speaking about, and who's he speaking to, I should like to know? Shall I keep standing here?" (ibid.).

To whom is Ahab speaking? To the blacksmith as (cosmic) forger of humanity, or to the carpenter as mere rebuilders? That is, is Ahab speaking about transcendence or about displacement and repression? Ahab seems to incline in the direction of the former towards the possibility of real as opposed to imaginary illumination. "'Tis but indifferent architecture to make a blind dome; here's one. No, no, no; I must have a lantern" (ibid.).

The carpenter is again confused/tricked by Ahab. He exclaims: "Ho, ho! That's it, hey? Here are two, sir; one will serve my turn." But Ahab's illumination remains beyond his reach; he defers to the impossible to the metaphysical. He declines the lantern offered him by the carpenter and, implicitly, denies the latter one to "serve [his] turn," which would imply intersubjectivity. "What art thou thrusting that thief-catcher into my face for, man? Thrusted light is worse than presented pistols," Ahab observes. The carpenter responds, "I thought, sir that you spoke to carpenter [*sic*]." Ahab did not. "Carpenter? Why that's but no; a very tidy, and, I may say, and extremely gentlemanlike sort of business thou art in here, carpenter; or would'st thou rather work in clay" (*ibid.*).

Again the carpenter appears to miss Ahab's meaning: Ahab speaks now of the clay from which humanity was mythically formed; another metonymic slide toward the impossible. The car-

penter naively responds, "Sir? Clay? clay, sir? That's mud; we leave clay to ditchers, sir." If "ditchers" here means more than those who dig ditches and, leaning toward the slang usage of the term, refers to those who get rid of or away from something, then the carpenter is not so naive. If this is so, then the carpenter is resisting Ahab's imaginary confrontation with the Other his metaphysical solution. Ahab, however, forecloses the dialogue, exclaiming quite correctly, "This fellow's impious!" (503).

The ivory leg can be seen to be the reification of Ahab's inability to comprehend the symbolic meaning of sacrifice a profound attempt to commune with the Other. It is thus the site of his compulsive drive toward self-destruction. Seabrook, on the other hand, recognizes the hegoat: "This goat had become inevitably personal to me. I had conceived an affectionate interest in him" (Seabrook 1929:61). He experiences the terror of self-destruction through a ritual transubstantiation a true sacrifice. The bleating of the white hegoat, "acidetched so deeply that it will leave some lines . . . when my brain lies rotting" (57), achieves for Seabrook what Ahab's vicarious ritual-like acts fail to: recognition of the Other as a projection of the self "something blacker and more implacable than they." Seabrook does not elide the meaning of the sacrifice.

Not for anything, no matter what would happen, could I have seriously wished to stop that ceremony. . . . I believe that in some form or another they answer a deep need of the universal human soul. . . . Codes of rational ethics and human brotherly love are useful, but they do not touch this thing underneath. (6162)

Ahab's maniacal hunt is an extreme form of projective primitivism sustained by obsessive-compulsive ritual. As such, as Heath observes, it "generates its own punishment" (1981:329). Seabrook's radical encounter with the Other through participation in a symbolically elaborate ritual sacrifice enables him to transcend this projective primitivism and to critically reflect on the self, which for Ahab "remains unhinted." Seabrook asks:

What, after all, were they doing here in this final scene, when formal ritual had ended, that was so different from that which occurs in our own fashionable and expensive nightclubs, except that they were doing it more successfully? (Seabrook 1929:4243)

Seabrook's transcendence following the sacrifice is profoundly indicated by the critical and now intentional act of doubling his voice. Whereas this device had earlier served to mediate the emergence of Louis as informant a speaking eye/ I it now functions as midwife to Seabrook's rebirth as participant-observer, capable of critically reflecting upon his own culture and discourse. In a curious splitting apart of his narrative presence, Seabrook recounts the night's ceremonial events from the first of two positions:

And now the literary-traditional white stranger who spied from hiding in the forest, had such a one lurked near by, would have seen all the wildest tales of voodoo fiction justified: in the red light of torches which made the moon turn pale, leaping, screaming, writhing black bodies, blood-maddened, sex-maddened, god-maddened, drunken, whirled and danced their dark saturnalia, heads thrown weirdly back as if their necks were broken, white teeth and eyeballs gleaming. (42)

He who is speaking through this orgy of Africanist discourse is no longer Seabrook as narrator but a "literary-traditional white stranger," a spy "hiding in the forest." Seabrook has recognized this voyeur as himself and surrendered visual mastery. As a result of this positional shift, the voyeur has himself become an object to be seen and scrutinized. Robert Con Davis writes of this visual reversal:

With this elaboration of subject and object relations, wherein the direction of sight has been reversed, and wherein the complete expression of seeing has become necessarily twofold seeing and being seen the whole process of "seeing" has gone, additionally, through a middle range, neither active nor passive, in which the looker in the stage of becoming an object is a partial object, one looking at itself, part subject and part object. This is "mirror stage" development in which subject and object are held, as if on the brink of dissolution, in an imaginary and ideal equivalence as if perfect doubles of each other. (Con Davis 1983:986)

This is an extremely critical point in the text, and one whose significance has often been missed by Seabrook's readers. Alfred Métraux, discussing the exoticism that has often characterized early accounts of Voodoo, paraphrases Seabrook in the opening para-

graph to his preface to *Voodoo in Haiti*. "Voodoo," writes Métraux, "usually conjures up visions of mysterious deaths, secret rites or dark saturnalia celebrated by 'blood-maddened, sex-maddened, god-maddened' negroes" (1971:15). What Métraux missed is Seabrook's critical objectification of this narrative position the perspective of the detached observer.

Moreover, this same phrase, similarly taken out of context, appears as the caption to one of the illustrations found in the 1929 edition of *The Magic Island*. The illustration depicts a group of contorted naked black figures, exhibiting every imaginable feature of racist caricature. The caption reads, "blood-maddened, sex-maddened, god-maddened . . . danced their dark saturnalia" (Seabrook 1929:43). Thus the illustration and its caption undermine the meaning that Seabrook is struggling to convey. They appear to be afterthoughts editorial steps, mitigating the subversive potential of the narration. 4

It is this "mirror stage," when one simultaneously sees and is seen, that constitutes the critical terrain of ethnology and Seabrook's magic mountain. In contrast to the position of the voyeur, Seabrook elaborates a second position:

Thus also my unspying eyes beheld this scene in actuality, but I did not experience the revulsion which literary tradition prescribes. . . . Something inside myself awoke and responded to it. These of course, were individual emotional reactions, perhaps deplorable in a supposedly civilized person. (42)

Seabrook does not write "inside me," using the pronoun correctly in its objective case. Rather, he uses an intensive/reflexive pronoun, thus emphasizing and opening up the reflexive dialogue that has erupted within his narration: this "something" is capable of "responding" to that which his "unspying eyes beheld." Seabrook's visual experience has been wrenched apart into its component parts: "a staging for the intersection of the line of sight and the trajectory of unconscious desire expressed in the Gaze" (Con Davis 1983:987). The site of this intersection is the loss of grammar and positionalitythe uprooted "myself."

Seabrook is not unaware of the implications of his use of language:

I notice that I have been continually writing 'they,' using the time-honored pronoun employed by so many

otherwise veracious and candid traveler-authors when describing wild happenings which they feel may be regarded dubiously by sisters and aunts back home. Very well the truth. I drank like the rest, when the bottles were passed my way. I did willingly all else that Maman Célie told me, and now with good appetite stuffed myself with goat flesh and washed down the meats with more white rum, and dozed, replete and vastly contented, in the bright sunshine. It was for this I had come to Haiti. It concerned me personally. It justified something in my soul. (4344)

Thus the site of Seabrook's mysticism is revealed by his shift from the "they" of the traveler-author to the "we" of the participant-observer. Seabrook must confess to the reader (and critic) he must accept *personal* responsibility for this ethnological rupture of convention which, as was true of confession in medieval law, "renders the thing notorious and manifest" (Foucault 1979:38).

This confession of reflexivity, of engaging an Other as a means of penetrating the self (and one's civilized fictions), commits Seabrook to the judgment that is passed on him by Duffus: "Mr. Seabrook is admittedly a mystic" (Duffus 1942:4). Moreover, Seabrook's admission that his reasons for coming to Haiti "justified something in my soul" is inverted by Duffus, who applauds Seabrook for penetrating "as few white men have done . . . the soul of Haiti" (4).

This tension between reader/editor/critic, as representative of the conventional discourse, and Seabrook as ethnologist is not lost on him. At the close of chapter 4, where Seabrook recounts his receiving a talisman packet from Maman Célie, he prays to the Voodoo deities for "protection."

Maman Célie handed me a copper coin and instructed me to place it on the packet. And now, before it was tied up, she told me to make a prayer (wish). I hesitated, then stood with both arms stretched straight out before me, palms downward, as I had seen them do and said in English: 'May Papa Legba, Maitresse Ezilée and the Serpent protect me from misrepresenting these people, and give me power to write honestly of their mysterious religion, for all living faiths are sacred. (Seabrook 1929:53)

Part 1 of *The Magic Island* ends with Seabrook's departure from the mountain and his separation from Maman Célie: "Farewell, old priestess of dark mysteries . . . farewell, old mother whom I love . . . I feel your arms around me and your wrinkled cheek wet with tears" (77). The ellipses are Seabrook's. Here, as before, narration fails Seabrook as the meaning of his encounter with Maman Célie transcends the limits imposed by Africanist as well as scientific discourse. Seabrook resists both.

Thus despite the crucial metaphysical role played by Maman Célie in the text, she remains unmystified and unsexualized. The conflation of female sexuality with the exoticism of the Other/Freud's "dark continent" of psychology does not occur in Seabrook's text. Maman Célie is a maternal figure in a concrete sense. When Seabrook resorts to metaphor to express his relation with her, it is to emphasize rather than repress this maternal, kinship connection (a "mystical equivalent of an umbilical cord; as if I had suckled in infancy at her dark breasts"). 5

In short, Seabrook's maternal metaphors are rooted in his personal experience of alienation from the Other (and his effort to return "home"), rather than in a projection/repression of desire through primitivist discourse. Compare Marlow's description of the "wild and gorgeous apparition of a woman" who threatens to reclaim Kurtz in the final chapter of *Heart of Darkness*.

She was savage and superb, wild-eyed and magnificent; there was something ominous and stately in her deliberate progress. And in the hush that had fallen suddenly upon the whole sorrowful land, the immense wilderness, the colossal body of the fecund and mysterious life seemed to look at the image of its own tenebrous and passionate soul. (Conrad 1980:9192)

The "man of patches," Kurtz's tricksterlike companion, tells Marlow: "I have been risking my life every day for the last fortnight to keep her out of [Kurtz's] house." When the woman succeeds in getting into the house, she speaks to Kurtz in a "dialect" that the man of patches cannot understand (the discourse of the Other?). Marlow's conversation with the man of patches is interrupted by Kurtz, who has been talking with the manager of the Company on the other side of a curtain.

Save me!save the ivory, you mean. Don't tell me. Save me! Why, I've had to save you. You are interrupting my plans now. Sick! Sick! Not so sick as you would like to believe. Never mind. I'll carry my ideas out yetI will return. (93)

Kurtz's "return" is, of course, preempted by his own deathan option that Seabrook metaphorically rejects when discussing his research plans with Louis. Whereas the man of patches (with the help of Marlow) attempts to bar Kurtz from "the memory of gratified and monstrous passions" by physically disconnecting the latter from the object of his desire, Louis makes the connection that ultimately leads Seabrook to Maman Célie. Seabrook succeeds in returning to the "terror of the dark, all engulfing womb" through Maman Célieit is she as subject who gives this perilous journey cultural meaning.

Return to Civilization

The remaining three parts of the text constitute a radical break in Seabrook's narrationwhat Duffus described as Seabrook's "objective observations . . . not beyond the scope of any accomplished teller of traveler's tales." Part 2, in fact, can be read as a transitional section, consisting of three chapters treating necromancy, zombies and human sacrifices, respectively. 6 Of particular interest in this section is Seabrook's abrupt introduction of the conventional devices of Africanist travel narrativenotably, the use of hearsay as a means of constituting reality.

In the first chapter of part 2, Seabrook approaches a Haitian doctor and folklorist who he hopes will put him in contact with practitioners of a "witchcraft" cult. Seabrook recounts the Haitian doctor's comments:

"These people," he said, "are necromancers (users of corpses for magical purposes), though the word necromancy does not exist in our creole vocabulary. What you ask is difficult, and your voodoo friends will not be able to help you. The practice is not widespread; most orthodox members of the Petro and Legba voodoo cults hate and will have no dealings with them." (Seabrook 1929:82)

That Seabrook should accept the doctor's assertions is curious indeed since he had earlier (in the text) "discovered Maman Célie to be a sorceress, as well as a priestess of voodoo" and had himself received a *ouanga*, or talisman, during a ritual presided over by *bocors*, or sorcerers (45). Through his doctor friend, Seabrook has the opportunity to attend a ceremony for the deity Ghede, which he asserts "was not voodoo, nor was it religious" (84). As Maya Deren noted, Ghede is in fact very much a member of the Voodoo pantheon:

Ghede is the Legba who has crossed the cosmic threshold to the underworld, for Ghede is now everything that Legba once was in the promise and the prime of his life. . . . If Legba was once Lord of Life, Ghede is now Lord of Resurrection; and the difference between them is Death, which is Ghede. (1972:102)

Seabrook's inability to fathom this profound cosmological relation has less to do with a lack of ethnological data than with his failure to establish relations of intersubjectivity with his new informants. In contrast to the reflexive and decentered narrative position he occupies when writing of Maman Célie's village of the mountain, he now assumes the standpoint of the voyeur "the literary-traditional white stranger who spied from hiding in the forest." Seabrook's line of vision is no longer refracted by the subjectivity of an Other no longer vulnerable to reversal. It is now directed and circumscribed by the political terrain of occupied Haiti. He writes of *them*, his new informants:

These people gave me no personal confidence, nor were they particularly friendly. They had permitted me to see what I had just seen only because they had been instructed to do so, and had been assured that I was 'safe' not connected in any way with the gendarmerie or 'government.' (Seabrook 1929:86)

Although Seabrook appears to comprehend the ethnological significance of this negatively constituted relation, it still undermines his account of the ceremony.

Here was ample scope for the charlatanry and profitable fraud which I had been told the superstitious peasants

universally suffered at the hands of rapacious sorcerers . . . Classinia with her family and other death-cult women obviously reaped profit from their ceremonies. (8687)

Seabrook succumbs to the authoritarian discourse of the travel writer/voyeur as his relationships with his informants degenerate: He confirms what he "has been told" and speaks of "fraud" and "reaped profits." The void created by their censured subjectivity, by a lack of "confidence," is immediately filled by the discourse of capitalismrelations between people are debased and reduced to predatory market relations that are both obvious and universal.

As his ethnological experience is superceded by a projective constitution of reality, Seabrook retreats into narration that has no identifiable authorhe denies personal responsibility and allows the weight of the discourse to assert its own authority. He qualifies his account of necromancy as follows:

Certainly no white man, certainly not I, and I imagine few Haitians, has ever seen the conjurations which take place between midnight and dawn in some lonely, isolated little country graveyard. The account I am going to give is not even the 'first-hand' report of another eyewitness. The man who supplied me the details had never seen it. He had got it directly, however, from a woman he believes did see it. I am inclined also to believe that it is accurate, but I cannot vouch for it. (87)

Seabrook slides from an ethnologically constituted realityone based on the firsthand experience of an "eye-witness"to one that, as Miller notes, is derived from "pure received tradition": "The leap into the voidthe blankness of `Africa'is marked by a movement from fact to hearsay, history to legend, positive to conditional mood, direct narration to a book within a book" (1985:59).

Duffus was correct in observing that Seabrook "has not lost contact with . . . that very practical point of view represented by the United States Marine Corps." This connection, suspended on Maman Célie's mysterious mountain, appears most clearly when Seabrook treats aspects of Voodoo or Haitian folklore that became associated with Haitian resistance. Seabrook continues:

The necromantic uses which they make of various parts of the corpse are thoroughly authenticated in many ver-

ifiable cases. The facts have appeared even in American military reports of the Caco guerilla uprising. They rub grease made from the brains upon the edges of machetes and tools, so that they will be intelligent and cut more accurately . . . upon the sights of a gun so that the bullet will reach its mark. (88)

Thus we can perceive the locus of Seabrook's peculiar fascination for "necromancy" and of his reduction of the Ghede ceremony to this *idée fixe*. The sorcery of Maman Célie "was principally benevolent": The *ouanga* packet she prepared for Seabrook was "bright-colored, friendly," and expressed the "will-to-protect of a community," the "friendly" heart of Africa (87). The sorcery used by the Caco guerillas, on the other hand, was directed against the occupation forces; it was "black" sorcery.

Seabrook's debased relations with the members of the "cult of the dead" are both consequence and expression of the very relations of colonial domination that the Cacos resisted. Seabrook identifies the resistance offered by cult members to his investigation with the armed resistance of the Cacos: both are dehistoricized and reduced to the imaginary locus that is necromancy and for which, as Seabrook's doctor friend notes, a word "does not exist" in creole. Necromancy, like cannibalism in the imagination of nineteenth-century European travel writers, occupies a narrative site where the violence of the colonial system is projected onto the victim as an immanent bestiality. As Patrick Brantlinger observes, "The more that Europeans dominated Africans, the more 'savage' Africans came to seem; cannibalism represented the nadir of savagery" (1985:184).

At the close of the chapter treating necromancy, Seabrook attempts to resolve his now double and contradictory image of the Haitian peasant:

If, for example, the little scene I have just described seems out of key with things which have preceded it and things which are to follow, I beg readers not to tax me with the inconsistency. The Haitian peasants are thus double natured in reality sometimes moved by savage, atavistic forces whose dark depths no white psychology can ever plumb but often, even in their weirdest customs, naive, simple, harmless children. (1929:91)

Seabrook has thus come full circle, returning to the mystical paradox represented by his yard boy, Louis, "who never does what he is

told" but is nevertheless "the most efficient servant of them all."

Seabrook's reflexivity has collapsed into a projective self. The critical doubling of his voice as participant-observer has been substituted with a familiar manichaeian opposition (savage, atavistic forces / simple, harmless children) inscribed into the "nature" of the Haitian peasant. In short, Seabrook's gaze has once again become fixed upon the surface of the mirror Jacques Lacan's (1977) imaginary axis of the alter ego (*moi*) and *imago*.

The "double nature" of the Haitian peasant is no more than Seabrook's projection of this imaginary axis: as alter ego, the Haitian peasant is the objectification of Seabrook's alienated self, politicized as a paranoid expression of the "magical power" of the colonized; as *imago*, the Haitian peasant is a "naive, simple, harmless" child, thus rendered incapable of refusing to "respond" to this objectification (that is, incapable of emerging as a speaking subject, or "third man"). As Anthony Wilden observes:

The relationship is a purely dual one for the subject; he is in fact maintaining a sort of short circuit between his narcissistic image of himself and the image of the other, in order to resist any attempts to change that image. (1981:168)

What distinguishes this projective doubling from Seabrook's earlier reflexive position as participant-observer is an absence of recognition: that is, his failure to recognize that the *moi* ("the literary-traditional white stranger who spied from hiding in the forest") is an alter ego, an imaginary construal of the self barring his recognition of the Other and, as a consequence, his relationship to others.

This alter ego is itself constituted through identification through the alienation of the self in what Sartre (1982) has termed "relations of alterity." The milieu of these relations of alterity, of the constitution of the alter ego as an alienated/imaginary self is, for Seabrook, the political terrain of occupied Haiti. Not surprisingly, Seabrook's return to the domain of manichaeian allegory is described by him in geographical terms. At the beginning of part 3 he writes:

In the opening chapter of this book, I mentioned a High Commissioner and his lady. I seem to have left them seated with Katie [Seabrook's wife] and the colonel on a front veranda while I climbed over the back fence with Louis and ran away to the mountains. I propose now to

return by way of the front gate, to the dichromatic social world of Haiti's urban capital, under our own benevolent American protectorate. (Seabrook 1929:127)

The intervening "he" (the colonial milieu of alterity), willingly sacrificed on the mountain, awaits Seabrook as he returns "by way of the front gate" to the political reality of occupied Haiti. Like a repentant son, who in submitting to patriarchal power participates in its recreation, Seabrook reconstitutes the colonial universe, as he put it, "with its resident Marine Corpsits colonels, majors, wives, and machine guns" (127). Indeed, Seabrook pursues this narrative task as if driven by overwhelming guilt.

Seabrook describes the social scene in Port-au-Prince, where "there are Haitians who draw a reverse color line and dare to despise white people," as a "topsy-turvy reversal of natural phenomena" (128). The mystical meanings that Seabrook attributes to the terrain leading to the mountains ("a tropical-upheaved, tumbled-towering madland of paradises and infernos") also pervade the social world of Port-au-Prince. However, Seabrook's ability to transgress the boundaries of this social worldthe paternalistic (Oedipal) terrain of the occupationis limited. Here there is a *natural order*. Thus Seabrook's response to charges of brutality leveled against the Marine Corps must be read through the grammar of ideology.

Reports of that sort, in my sincere belief, after living in Haiti with my eyes open, are propagandist rot. We had to kill a few times at first, for various reasons. But that is all fortunately ended. Our attitude now in Haiti is superior, but kindly. (133)

We should not be surprised. Sartre writes of the discourse of the colonists:

These phrases were never the translation of a real, concrete thought; they were not even the object of thought. Furthermore, they have not by themselves any meaning, at least in so far as they claim to express knowledge about the colonised. They arose with the establishment of the colonial system and have never been anything more than this system itself producing itself as a determination of the language of the colonists in the milieu of alterity. . . .

The strength of this particular colonist lies in the fact

that the Idea (as a common bond) comes to him as the thought of the Other, of totalized alterity, and that he is entirely the Other as infinite flight, frozen at the moment he repeats it, while this absolute certainty becomes work, unification and translucidity in Others in the young, etc. He affirms himself as the Other who really thinks it elsewhere by making himself the Other who repeats it here without thinking. (1982:301, 302)

It is Seabrook's capture by the thought of the Other (or, as Duffus puts it, "that very practical point of view represented by the United States Marine Corps") that provides the key to the narrative rupture that occurs when Seabrook returns to Port-au-Prince. Perhaps we can now feel the full weight of Seabrook's curious prayer to the Voodoo deities, asking for their protection from "misrepresenting these people" and for "the power to write honestly." Indeed, Seabrook was asking for protection against himself or, more correctly, against his alter ego the Other who thinks elsewhere and repeats without thinking. However, in this social milieu of alterity there is no recourse to ethnographic experience as such: there is no means of isolating experience no geographical solution. Seabrook is in the thick of the occupation. Here, as Sartre observes,

He has neither the means nor the intention of renewing his experience for himself, of testing the Idea, in order to guarantee it anew: the Idea as a living praxis emerges in action and as a moment of action as an ever contestable key to the world. But there is no need to contest it since the common object is based on the practical avoidance of all testing. (1982:302)

We thus discover the key to the Africanist convention of constituting reality through hearsay for escaping from experience into the thought of the other. Seabrook believes what he is told by his doctor friend, he believes what he has been told about rapacious sorcerers, and he believes the report of the man who believed the report of the woman concerning necromancy. In short, he is now thinking "elsewhere." In fact, he relies on an American official to orient him to the "dichromatic social world" of the occupation.

I felt like a blind man walking on eggs for the first day or two in Haiti. Then I dropped in to see Christian Gross, the American Charge d'Affaires. . . . To Mr.

Gross I am indebted for the beginning of my first real orientation. The tangled social scene under the American occupation, I learned from him, was in some respects more simple than I could possibly have guessed. It seems to have certain fixed, definite rules. What made it difficult was that there were many irregularities, exceptions to these rules. In this respect it was like Latin grammar. (1929:128)

Seabrook, it would seem, learned this lesson well.

The most interesting and pervasive of the American innovations is the belated lesson in race-consciousness which we have been at pains to teach the Haitian upper classes. These urban Haitians, free, vain, independent, and masters in their own land for a long hundred years or more, had accumulated money, education, a literature, and aristocratic tradition, and had somehow forgotten that God in His infinite wisdom had intended the negroes to remain always an inferior race. Indeed, as many Americans in Haiti will testify, there were members, whole families and social groups among the upper class, who were proud of being Haitians, proud of actually being negroes. (127)

It would be difficult to overstate the disruptive effect produced by this paragraph within Seabrook's text. It could easily be mistaken for satire, but one whose irony could only be gleaned synchronically from the text taken as a whole: that is, from the narrative fissures that it opens up. 7

Seabrook appears to be obsessed with the race/civilization "reversals" which he observes in Haiti, represented by the social juxtaposition of the cultured (in the "civilized" sense of the word) Haitian elite on the one hand, and the less educated and less cosmopolitan Marine Corps on the other. Race becomes a biological (as opposed to a geographical) terrain within which Seabrook resumes his struggle with the manichaeian oppositions of darkness/light and black/white. His descriptions of members of the Haitian elite inevitably focus on racial phenotype.

Seabrook observes Mlle Thérèse, the "slightly darker than mulatto" daughter of one of his Haitian acquaintances, while attending a party given at an elite club:

Big sultry brown eyes flashed, wide-set beneath a low forehead; there was a touch of cruelty, sauvagerie, I thought, in the wide, short chin, the cobra-like cheek bones, the mouth like a slashed red fruit; a touch of negroid too in the chin and slightly retrousse nose, a touch also which suggested the face of Faustina on old roman golden coins, Pola Negri as the wife of Pharaoh. Her hair, bobbed in an almost Egyptian style, was crinkly. She was Africa, yet not quite Africa, Africa of the poets rather than of the ethnologists and explorers. (140)

After dancing with Mlle Thérèse, Seabrook imagines that "shut behind the fashionable convent culture, the Paris-gowned sophistication, the facile small talk, something was asleep, yet not asleep, like a caged panther dreaming" (140). He reflects on "the strange biological-hereditary processes that had culminated in [Mlle Thérèse]." Confounded and fascinated by this biocultural enigma, he proposes a fanciful explanation that must be thought out "elsewhere:"

I wondered whether even now, an unprejudiced, detached ethnologist visiting the earth from another planet would not deem Mlle Thérèse superior in physical beauty and strength, in richness and potentiality, perhaps also in pigmentation, to any purely white or purely negro type. (141)

His geography is still at work but his "unprejudiced, detached ethnologist" is extraterrestrial as is the "Africa" of which he now writes. But he is not unaware of the irony that surrounds his discussion of race under U.S. occupation. One might say that he submits to it and allows it to saturate and disrupt his text.

I quite realize that in writing about this social-racial tangle, which I seem to be doing on every other page, just as one encounters it at every other step in Port-au-Prince, I am piling up paradoxes, illogicalities, and non sequiturs. But I refuse to be blamed for the illogicality. The thing itself is essentially tangled, illogical, and insane. It would be the easiest thing in the world to choose selective facts on one side alone and present a

consistent picture. But it wouldn't be a true picture. (157)

Seabrook declines to accept responsibility for "the thing itself." He does not reflect on his situatedness within the colonial milieu of alterity sustained by the domination/repression of others.

Positioned within the "Latin grammar" of race relations, he must decline a constitutive role in narrative irony one might say that, as narrative subject, he becomes ironic in spite of himself. It is an Other who will disclose the irony of the discourse.

While Seabrook and his wife are visiting the home of Mlle Thérèse, the latter's mother collects a bunch of multicolored roses and begins to remove thorns from their stems. Seabrook's wife exclaims, "Oh but that's too much!" to which Mlle Thérèse's mother responds, "No, only these white ones have thorns; all the other varieties are *sans épines*." The metaphorical potential of this response interests Seabrook: "Was she being amiably matter-of-fact, or was this the quintessence of a subtlety, cynical and barbed, yet elusive as the musk of the plucked roses?" (137). 8

Even the (seemingly) most insignificant of incidents attract Seabrook's attention as occasions for the narration of paranoia. After receiving the card of a Haitian visitor from a servant on a silver tray, he remarks,

I mention the tray because this same wench had deemed her own dark and not too clean paw inadequate for the cards of previous white callers. These amusing little variations do not occur by accident in Haiti. They frequently fill Americans with impotent or explosive rage. Pretense that the servants are dumb affords a fictitious safety valve. (134)

Seabrook seems to anticipate Sartre's discussion concerning the colonists' discourse on the colonized "as the temporalisation of a multiplicity in the fleeting unity of a violence of impotence" (Sartre 1982:304). He discloses the process itself through his narration of the incident. The silver tray in the "dark and not too clean paw" of the servant ruptures the series of all other previous white callers. However, in fulfilling his role as a member of the series narrating the (paranoid) meaning of this rupture, Seabrook exposes the series itself to critical scrutiny by revealing the social basis of its negatively constituted unity.

This negative unity, expressed in occupied Haiti through the discourse of racism, remains problematic for Seabrook; he is led to self-deception by its rules, by its grammar. While waiting in a salon of the presidential palace for an audience with Haiti's president, Louis Borno, he succumbs to an illusion: a "black shadow" passing at regular intervals beyond a half-closed door.

It was the head of an American soldier, sharp, foreshortened on the sunlit marble floor, the silhouette of a shouldered rifle and fixed bayonet, a wide-brimmed U.S. army hat, a Frederick Remington detail in chiaroscuro. The silhouette was as utterly American as a brass band blaring the 'Star-Spangled Banner.' I tiptoed to the door and peeped at the man. And it seemed amazing that his face was black. It was illogical, of course, that it seemed so amazing. There had been our own black troops in precisely these accoutrements at San Juan Hill. And I had already seen a thousand black gendarmes similarly uniformed here in Haiti. It was because I had first seen this man as a shadow. Now he seemed to me something which had been masqueraded and projected on a screen. As a barefooted Haitian peasant in overalls, he had been himself. Just what was he now? (Seabrook 1929:151)

Seabrook's mistake amazes him and provokes him to question the logical ground of this amazement. What really amazes him is not that he mistook a black Haitian for a white American; he dwells on this ambiguity of phenotype at a number of places in the text. Rather, the root of his amazement lies in the recognition that his observational error was the result of having "first seen this man as a shadow" and, secondarily, as "something which had been masqueraded and projected on a screen." That is, he recognizes for the second time himself as voyeur, constituting a projective reality on a blank darkness. That this projected image is "utterly American" (rather than the "Africa of the poets") adds force to this critical recognition and political resonance to the question, "Just what was he now?"

As I wondered about him, I began wondering in the same way about President Borno, whom I was presently to meet. Was he too a shadow silhouette projected on a screen? Was he Russell's magic-lantern toy?.

(151) 9

Not surprisingly, Seabrook does not venture to answer this question in his own voice. Again, it is an Other who speaks. "The Americans have taught us a lot of things," the Haitian publisher of an opposition newspaper tells Seabrook. "Among other things they have taught us that we are niggers. You see we really didn't know that before" (145). Moreover, the question cannot even be addressed in English. When the publisher continues in French, Seabrook writes, "There was more than a difference of tongue, however. It was as if a different man were speaking." Thus "othered" and circumscribed within the text, the voice of the Other speaks again:

When the Americans landed in Haiti twelve years ago, there existed in our cities a free, proud aristocracy. We regarded ourselves as human beings like any other. We were masters in our own land. And no whites who came to our country could prosper or be happy here without accepting us as such. (14546)

A few pages later, the publisher reverts to English. As if to drive the message home, Seabrook assures the reader that he is "quoting his literal words . . . unclouded by translation." The publisher says to him,

By the way, Monsieur the writer, you said something about being in Haiti for human-interest stuff. Maybe this is human interest. But maybe it is too human. You couldn't publish it. Too much under the skin. Lily-white skin, black skin. (147)

Who is speaking and to whom? We are again reminded of Seabrook's prayer to the Voodoo deities. In any case, when he does speak his words are sanitized spoken under the influence of alcohol: "'Chauvet,' said I, 'we're getting drunk, but the truth is a beautiful thing. The truth is a beautiful thing even when it's tangled and in doubtful taste'" (147).

Conclusion

The Magic Island is an extraordinary book. I would say, it is a radical ethnographic text not because it provides a novel or experimental description or interpretation of an Other culture, but because it exposes the soft underbelly of our own civilization, which, more often than not, remains nestled in silence.

As Diamond has pointed out, "modern anthropology itself germinated in a search for the historical contrast to our own intolerable condition, in a search, that is, for the primitive" (1974:120). This is the point of departure for all anthropologists, whose very discourse presupposes a profound sense of alienation. And it is the recognition of this alienation, prerequisite to critically analyzing its social, economic, and political conditions, that constitutes the radical task of anthropology its reason for being. Diamond writes:

Unless the anthropologist confronts his own alienation, which is only a special instance of a general condition, seeks to understand its roots and subsequently matures as a relentless critic of his own civilization, the very civilization which converts man into an object, he cannot understand or even recognize himself in the man of another culture or that other man in himself. (1974:94)

Seabrook held no illusions about his reasons for studying Voodoo: "It concerned me personally. It justified something in my soul." This recognition this answer to the question that so often renders anthropologists speechless makes his book more than what we generally understand to be ethnography: it is a narration of fieldwork experience, unrestrained by what George Marcus and Richard Cushman (1982) have termed the "literary institution" of ethnographic realism. It is an ethnography of the ethnological process itself.

Seabrook's narration of his confrontation with the Other is dialectical. For this reason his text subverts conventions, whether those of the travel narrative or those associated with ethnographic realism: he musters textual authority only to lose it to an Other; he advances ideology and subverts it with ambiguity and ambivalence; as narrative subject, he is formed, deformed, and reformed through his encounter with Othersan encounter mediated by the social and political topography of a nation under U.S. domination.

Seabrook was indeed aware of the limits of the anthropologist's role as a detached observerof the relativism of a conquerer "who has become secure enough to become a tourist" (Diamond 1974:110). Seabrook recognized, if only intuitively, the nature of these limitations and, more important, the political and social conditions out of which they arise. When the opportunity arose to draw a conclusion concerning the U.S. occupation, Seabrook declinednot for ideological reasons, but because he sensed the absurdity of mak-

ing a disengaged judgment, one lacking "the strength of a profound conviction."

What conclusion emerges from these tangled part-truths? How weigh them? By some evaluations of life, perhaps, the scales tip in one direction, but by a different evaluation of life they are upset in a reverse direction. I am not sure of ultimate evaluations where problems of this sort are involved. With Louis and Maman Célie, it was different. Concerning them I have the strength of a profound conviction. But here I think that I, if I am anything, am the onlooker, the reporternot the solver, surely not the judge. (Seabrook 1929:167)

The Magic Island can be read as Seabrook's search for the source of profound convictionfor the meaning of his own life as it returns to him from the Other. An incident that occurred in Maman Célie's village succinctly illustrates this point. Seabrook is speaking of the *ouanga* packet presented to him.

Had I not accepted it seriously I should have been wrong, for into its making went something more than aromatic leaves and powders; into it went also the imponderable will-to-protect of a community, so that whatever it was or was not magically, it not only deserved respect but had an actual potency value as the sacred symbol and earnest of their protection. (49)

This is a profound insight, and not merely because it defetishizes the view of the fetish that has dominated the discourse of Western civilization. More important, Seabrook recognizes that what he is after, so to speak, is not the fetish, the cultural datum, but the "will-to-protect of a community," symbolized by the *ouanga*, but realized through cultural activity itselfhis own.

Seabrook's personal quest for culture for an organic community, kith and kin, resolved rituals, the sacred in everyday life, and so on provides the key to the ritual-like organization of the text. Seabrook's search for the primitive is an initiation ritual an odyssey of a civilized man. For this reason, anthropologists can see themselves more clearly and more critically in *The Magic Island* than perhaps in any traditional ethnography. For in Seabrook's text we witness the birth of ethnology itself. We labor through the pangs of reflexivity

only to recognize the severing of the umbilical cord. We are left on our own "front doorstep."

It is to his own front doorstep, the "tangled part-truths" of the U.S. occupation, that Seabrook returns. This is a threshold that cannot be overcome geographically, however isolated or mystified the terrain may appear.

Reviewing Seabrook's autobiography, *No Hiding Place*, in 1942, Duffus wrote:

His whole life, as pictured here, is a series of escapes, but he escaped as many times into prosperity and respectability as he did away from them. . . . [He] escaped to Arabia, escaped to Haiti . . . escaped to the Ivory Coast; escaped into drink; escaped from drink into an asylum but it wasn't what that name suggests. (Duffus 1942:8)

In Seabrook's work we glimpse in microcosm the compulsive, repetitive character of Western civilization's search for the primitivean unresolved ritual of civilization linking explorers, travel writers, and anthropologists in a search for an Other who cannot be recognized as the self. It is *this* Other that Seabrook struggled to overcome, carrying us across geographical and biological barriers only to drop us at our own front doorstep. And it is this political threshold that marks Seabrook's point of escape, provoking Duffus to later ask, "But from what?"

This question is the question of anthropology the critical question that brings anthropology into being so as to free us from its grip. And it is to this question that Stanley Diamond has relentlessly returned us this revolutionary question whose answer is not to be found in the discourse of the Other, but instead in a political practice rooted in an historical understanding of culture.

Notes

1. The U.S. Marines occupied Haiti from July 1915 to August 1934. Haitian resistance during this period varied in character and intensity, including armed rebellion during the early years. In 1929 a number of political, economic, and social factors converged to incite strikes, mass demonstrations, and riots throughout the country, which were met by severe military repression. The 1929 uprisings attracted worldwide attention and led to the Hoover administration's decision to withdraw from Haiti. Hans

Schmidt (1971:189206) has an account of the occupation and, particularly, the 1929 uprisings.

2. Seabrook's critics have often pointed to his "subjectivism." Sidney Mintz, assessing *The Magic Island*, noted, "An overwrought account of presumably personal experiences. When the author is not intent upon being dramatic, he is an acute observer" (quoted in Leyburn [1966:334]). Melville Herskovits referred to Seabrook's account of one ceremony: "Seabrook . . . reads so much into what he purports to have witnessed that the entire account is rendered useless" (1937:334). The opposition is established between a subjective or personal account and one that is "objective," benefiting an "acute observer." I argue that it is precisely Seabrook's "subjectivism" that renders his text most valuable as an ethnography about fieldwork and ethnographic writing under conditions of colonial domination.

3. This and all subsequent citations to Seabrook's work refer to *The Magic Island* (1929).

4. All of the illustrations in the 1929 edition share the same ethnocentric and imaginary quality. However, in a section at the back of the book titled "From the Author's Notebook" are a number of photographs (including one of Maman Célie) that pertain directly to the text. That the illustrations are included at all and the photographs confined to a section toward the back, rather than interspersed throughout the text, seems puzzling. These apparently editorial decisions can best be understood, I believe, as an attempt to create a counter-dialogue against the narrative itself.

5. In Voodoo, as in other West African-derived religions, the relationship between priest and novice is conceived of, and practiced as, a relationship between parent and child. Seabrook's reference to Célié as *Maman* (mother) and his use of maternal metaphors is therefore consistent with his social relation to her as a religious apprentice.

6. Necromancy, zombies, and, to a lesser extent, cannibalism are leit motifs of the media representation of Voodoo to this day; there is a long history of such representation in Africanist discourse.

7. Part 1 of the book, comprising the various ethnological chapters on Voodoo, narrates events that occurred after those recounted in the remainder of the book. This is perhaps why Duffus refers to part I as the book's "second phase." Whether intention or not, the reverse order of the text has the effect of undermining the meaning of Seabrook's ethnological experience.

8. Compare the following assessment of the Haitian elite made by a Marine brigade commander in 1917: "The Negroes of mixed type, who constitute the majority of educated people and politicians, have the general characteristics of such people the world over [that is, mulattoes] vain, loving praise, excitable, changeable, beyond belief illogical, and double-faced.

Many of them are highly educated and polished, but their sincerity must always be doubted" (quoted in Schmidt 1971:146).

9. Col. John A. Russell was brigade commander of the Marines from 1918 to 1922, and later the U.S. high commissioner of Haiti.

References

Brantlinger, Patrick

1985

Victorians and Africans: The Genealogy of the Myth of the Dark Continent. *Critical Inquiry* 12(2):166-203.

Con Davis, Robert

1983

Lacan, Poe, and Narrative Repression. *In* Lacan and Narration, ed. Robert Con Davis, 983-1005. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.

Conrad, Joseph

1980

Heart of Darkness. Norwalk, Conn.: Easton Press.

Deren, Maya

1972

The Divine Horsemen: The Living Gods of Haiti. New York: Delta.

Diamond, Stanley

1972

Introductory Essay: Job and the Trickster. *In* The Trickster, by Paul Radin, xixxi. New York: Shocken.

1974

In Search of the Primitive: A Critique of Civilization. New Brunswick, N.J.: E. P. Dutton/Transaction Books.

Duffus, R. L.

1929

A Book on Haiti that Dips Below the Surface Controversies. New York Times Book Review, January 1:6.

1942

Mr. Seabrook Looks Back on Traces He Has Kicked. New York Times Book Review, November 1:4.

Foucault, Michel

1979

Discipline and Punish. New York: Vintage Books.

Heath, William

1981

Melville's Search for the Primitive. *Dialectical Anthropology* 3(4):31530.

Herskovits, Melville J.

1937

Life in a Haitian Valley. New York: Alfred A. Knopf.

Jan Mohamed, Abdul R.

1985

The Economy of Manichean Allegory: The Function of Racial Difference in Colonialist Literature. *Critical Inquiry* 12(2): 5987.

Lacan, Jacques

1977

Ecrits: A Selection. New York: W. W. Norton and Co., Inc.

Leyburn, James G.

1966

The Haitian People. New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press.

Marcus, George E., and Richard Cushman

1982

Ethographies as Texts. *Annual Review of Anthropology* 11:2569.

Melville, Herman

1977

Moby Dick. Norwalk, Conn.: Easton Press.

Métraux, Alfred

1972

Voodoo in Haiti. New York: Schocken Books.

Miller, Christopher L.

1985

Blank Darkness: Africanist Discourse in French. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Pratt, Mary Louise

1985

Scratches on the Face of the Country; or, What Mr. Barrow Saw in the Land of the Bushmen. *Critical Inquiry* 12(2):11943.

Price-Mars, Jean

1928

Ainsi parla l'oncle. Paris: Imprimeur de Compiègne.

Sartre, Jean-Paul

1982

Critique of Dialectical Reason. London: Verso.

Schmidt, Hans

1971

The United States Occupation of Haiti, 1915-1934. New Brunswick, N. J.: Rutgers University Press.

Seabrook, William B.

1927

Adventures in Arabia. New York: Harcourt, Brace and Co.

1929

The Magic Island. New York: Literary Guild of America.

1931

Jungle Ways. New York: Harcourt, Brace and Co.

1942

No Hiding Place. New York: J. B. Lippincott & Co.

Wilden, Anthony

1981

System and Structure: Essays in Communication and Exchange. London: Tavistock Publications.

8

What I Learned from the Parrott's Egg and the Bull
Who Crashes in the Kraal:
The Senses of Time Binding and Turn Taking in
Being with the Other

James Fernandez

Part of Stanley Diamond's project, as I understand it, has been to force us to reexamine those categories that lead us to hierarchize and distance our relation to the "other," particularly that Other that we term, in that selfsame mood of hierarchy and distance, primitive. I seek to give an account of the decentering experience of being there in the field over an extended time with two vatic personalities: the leaders of two African religious movements. The first personality is the Parrott's Egg of the Bwiti religion of Equatorial West Africa (see Fernandez 1982). The second is the Bull Who Crashes in the Kraal, the *nom du culte* of the leader of the Church of God in Christ Zionist, Durban, South Africa (see Fernandez 1966:5364).

In this encounter with otherness, the colloquial situation, the situation of mutually instructive turn-taking, was shaped by a determined attempt to bind my progressive sense of time and my comings and goings to the saving circularities of a revitalizing past.

On Getting to Know Significant Others

Let's begin with this phrase *significant other*, of such frequent use in present colloquial speech in the United States to describe a person, usually of the opposite sex, of great emotional importance to one, whom one is getting to know but who doesn't quite satisfy the juralegal requirements for being a spouse. One may be living with this person and even anticipating building a life together. One has a relationship. But the person doesn't really qualify as a husband or a

wife. He or she is a significant other. Since the jural-legal rules of the relationship are not confirmed by institutional sanction, the role responsibilities are unclear, often unstable, and likely to be in constant negotiation. Not that marriage clears up all the ambiguities in a relationship, but it does provide some religious and legal guidelines for discharging one's connubial and domestic responsibilities. *Significant other* is a term we have invented to refer to highly charged but socially undefined relationships that we are nevertheless managing to negotiate day by day.

Of course anthropology, and particularly anthropological fieldwork, is full of the experience of significant others whom we are getting to know and who are of emotional importance to our well-being insofar as our professional well-being depends upon obtaining from them the materials by which we can fulfill the expectations of our profession and even build a future career. While all the connubial responsibilities contained in the American colloquialism may not be present, to be sure, in the significant other of anthropology in the end, in both cases the hope is that we will learn from each other, that we will be fruitful and multiply. In the case of anthropology, we will have fruitful dialogue and multiply human awareness of the possibilities of being human. And, of course, if our relationships with our informants fail, so fails our social and cultural anthropology. For thereby hangs our tale.

Now I want to take up the problem of the significant other in anthropology, which is the problem of the undefined other, where role responsibilities are unclear and where the relationship is ambiguous. These others and these relationships tell us something important about all others and all other relationships. That is, we do not know them in any final way. We negotiate these relationships, we adjudicate them, and finally, we learn from them, which is to say we understand them.

I am going to argue, therefore, that the significant other in anthropology is essentially a teacher and that our experience with him or her is learning and that the question to be asked is not how we can know other minds but how we can learn from other minds. Of course, this learning happens all the time if we but think about it. But I also want to ask what the nature of that learning is.

In one sense, this is all very obvious. If the learner's role seems too obvious and constructed a relation in Carlos Castaneda's *The Teachings of Don Juan*, then we may wish to recall older texts, such as those Winnebago studies of Paul Radin in which over many years the an-

thropologist sought to make himself as teachable by his chosen people as possible. In fact, anthropologists have long argued that anthropology is a learning, often of the most elementary kind, and that we do anthropology not to teach but to be taught. But perhaps in our profound struggles with these postmodern, deconstructing epistemological questions of knowing selves and knowing others we might tend to forget such basics about what kind of negotiated understandings our discipline always negotiated with othersour discipline tries for and sometimes achieves. In any event, I am going to try to address this issue of the significant other by recounting what I learned from several vatic personalities in my field experience in Africa (examples of what has happened recurrently in my field experience elsewhere): in particular, the Parrott's Egg and the Bull Who Crashes in the Kraal.

Some Negotiated Understandings:
An Insistence On Time Binding

The two personalities I report on here were remarkable by any standard and made great impressions on me. But I must report straight away that there was difficulty in working with these two religious leaders, at least for anyone with a Western sense of time. Both of them early on established the principle that I was to meet with them at their convenience, on their time rather than on my time. That is, they sought to bind me to their time. The Parrott's Egg, Ekang Engono, the leader of the branch of the Bwiti religion called Asumege Ening (Begin the New Life), when not a religious leader was a hunter in the deep forest, following the game. His time was dictated, he said, by the game themselves, and hence many of our appointments were frustrated because the game had taken him elsewhere in the forest. He was making a point, no doubt, about game time as being much different than the colonial time I was operating on.

The Bull Who Crashes in the Kraal, Hlabazihlangena, the leader of the Church of God in Christ Zionist of Durban, South Africa, offered another quite different exigency that frustrated our appointments. As a man with a large congregation, he was obliged to intercede for his people,, time and again, with the South African bureaucracy. A failed appointment was almost always explained by reference to some bureaucratic entanglement or mixup in town. The Bull Who Crashes in the Kraal, I believe, was hoisting me by my own

petard, as he saw it, since I was a representative of a European bureaucratized world that had been imposed on the native one with a great deal of attendant frustration to locals. In his view, no doubt, my experiencing the same frustration was retributive justice. For myself, caught between game time in the one case and bureaucratic time in the other, neither of which was my time as I understood it, I felt bound in a very trying way, caught up in the frustration of negotiating with them an understanding about what was crucial to me: appointment or interview time.

But though this was a kind of time-binding characteristic of my field research as to one degree or another it is a characteristic of any field research it is not just the sense of time binding I have in mind. I have in mind, more particularly, the usage of the term in Alfred Korzybski's general semantics movement of the forties and fifties that has to do with the way that human cultures work to create and negotiate a sense of integration, of coherence between past and present the way that they time bind. Both of these personalities insisted on teaching me that as well. They were not only insistent on binding me to their time and their difficulties with time difficulties with unpredictable game or unpredictable bureaucrats but also insistent that I should see how what they were doing in their independent religious movements related to what had previously been done in their societies.

The Bull Who Crashes in the Kraal was one among a number of Zulu pastors of Zionist churches who had recreated open air churches in the peripheral zones of urban Durban, Natalin abandoned places where the Group Areas Act did not prevail. These simple circles in the grass, bare-trodden choirs, were the sacred spaces within which and without which the Sunday afternoon worship took place. The "Bull" was anxious not only that I should participate and observe this healing worship of a Sunday afternoon but that I should accompany his group for their bimonthly return to the rural Zulu homeland, where Saturday night services were held in the kraals themselves. I came to understand that this was a kind of time binding of urban present to rural past and that, in fact, these circles in the grass were in some way representative of the circular village patterns of the Zulu homesteads. I learned that from Hlabazihlangena, not in so many words, but through his insistence that I accompany his congregation back to the Zulu homeland and to the kraal whose barest schematic representation was being reiterated in these urban circles in the grass.

The Parrott's Egg worked in a different way, on a similar theme. In his religion, he made a conscious attempt to syncretize contemporary Christian and older, more traditional Fang practices. He often introduced old rituals, say the slightly obscene dances of the women's cult among Fang, which would have scandalized other, more proper Christian leaders. And he was emphatic that I should be present whenever these elements were introduced, so that I should see how he was working them into the religion. The whole purpose of Bwiti was to restore effective communion with the ancestors, whose cult had been abandoned in the colonial period under missionary pressure. So the entire religious movement, not just the Parrott's Egg, was engaged in time binding. I learned a lesson in reflecting upon these syncretisms of past and present a lesson in time binding that I, as a present- and future-oriented American, had not previously well understood. These two vatic personalities taught me, at the very least, to ground what had previously been an abstract concept in the lived experience of religious world construction.

Of course it is one of the main purposes of religious movements to time bind, for they occur among peoples whose time has fallen out of joint. Often enough, this disjointedness is particularly strongly felt on the expanding firefront of the time-full, very time-conscious Western imperium as it has intruded into the apparently timeless traditional societies of the Third World. For the impact of colonialism it is a lesson we understand well now was often to deprecate and deny the local past, which is to say local time in the cases reported here, this was to deny the centrality of the kraal and its circular rhythms the relevance of ancestral commitment and the saving circularities of ancestor worship. But while we anthropologists come from very timefull societies, we do not, I think, well understand time binding. That was a lesson that for me, at least, had to wait for my encounter with the other in the persons of these two seers who felt called to teach me about time in their different, though related, ways.

Thereby also hangs a tale of the construction of ethnographic texts, incidentally. I came to see, thanks to these lessons, that the best way to write up these Others this is particularly the case with the Bwiti religion was to write in such a way that I could demonstrate time binding and describe the past with enough thickness to show its manifold resonances in present rites and texts. I came to regard the ethnography of religious movements as an exercise in time binding.

I would like to argue further that had I not spent a great deal of

time hunting time and bureaucratic time and ethnographic (interview) time and religious time with these two vatic personalities, I might not have learned the lesson of time binding. Being there made a difference. Being there enabled me both to share time and not to share time, in a particularly instructive way to share and not to share the other's struggle with time in a way instructive to our own (my own) struggle with time. Being there enabled me to negotiate understanding in this instructive way.

In the end, perhaps, to be human, to have the kinds of memory we do and the self-awareness that brings, is to have to one degree or another the problem of time binding. Each culture and each individual also struggles with time in its or his or her own way. Cultures that have been colonized and cut off from their pasts are faced with a particular struggle over their time posture. There is hardly any other way for colonizers to understand that struggle than by being there and finding themselves caught between hunting time and bureaucratic time and, above all, between past time and present time.

Of course, we in the West have a great deal to say about these questions of time. There is a vast philosophic literature on the subject. There was very little or no body of wisdom that we might recognize on the subject among Fang or among Zuluno great conversation ongoing on the great issues of time and space. And this fact might make us impatient about being among them, doubtful that we could learn anything we didn't already know. But in fact wisdom with philosophic implications is spelled out in many different registers and many different genres a point made several generations ago by Paul Radin (1957). And if we will agree to be with others for an extended time and to enter into that particularly grounded kind of negotiated understanding called colloquy with them (see Fernandez 1985:1526), that is, to take turns with them in addressing the great problems of human existence for colloquy is essentially turn taking why then we are sure to learn something that we didn't know before or, at least, didn't know in such a convincing way or from such a different perspective.

If the colonial world has created a problem of time binding for the colonized, it has created a problem for us, the colonizers or the descendants of colonizers, in turn taking. For in a world of hierarchical power relations and that is certainly the characteristic of a colonial world and, to a large degree, of the present world colloquial exchange is often severely restricted. There are those few who speak

and others who are expected to listen. Communication is unilateral and top-down. But, of course, the whole purpose of being there is to escape the unilateral and to take turns. For in that turn taking the granting to the other his or her half of the colloquy is found learning, the learning of the other's perspective.

No discussion of the other can be conducted without confronting the problem of turn taking and the colloquial engagement with the other. No discussion of the possibility of knowing other minds can be conducted without confronting the nature of turn taking and the resultant learning, or "negotiated understanding,"¹ that has characterized that knowing.

Now, in fact, though time binding and turn taking may seem to be quite different notions, I think we can see how they are related. They are both ways that we create coherence in human affairs by binding together in mutuality the past and present, in the first case, and the self and the other, in the second case. But more than that, they can be seen in temporal terms, I think, as instances of the same case. For in time binding the other of the past is made into the self of the present, and in turn taking, the present of the self is made into the past of the other and the past of the other is made into the present of the self. Turn taking takes place in time and time binding takes place between persons. But we needn't end on such complexities of the human condition. We can leave them for another day.

Let me make some simple final observations. Let us give up as a lost cause the possibility of knowing other minds. It is an essentially philosophical and not an anthropological objective. In any event, I think that hope of placing ourselves in other minds has been essentially deconstructed for what it is an imperial desire to take possession of, or better, to dispossess or appropriate, the other in the most intimate way and often for purposes probably not in his or her best interest. We cannot know other minds.

What we cannot give up hope of, however, is the possibility of learning from other minds and of other minds learning from us. It happens every day. And it is surely not the same thing as "knowing other minds." It is not an isomorphic transfer of the content of one mind to another. It is rather a kind of adjudicating and problem-solving process, a "negotiated understanding" that emerges out of social interaction between minds that are essentially separate from one another. And it is my argument here that it emerges in a particularly instructive way out of being there with the other, out of turn

taking with him or her, and out of time binding. And it is my view that this learning and this mutual adjudication happens in a particularly instructive way in anthropology. 2 Through an emphasis on being here, on time binding and turn taking, anthropology facilitates in the most estimable way the possibilities of learning from significantly but implacably other minds.

Notes

1. The reference here is to a key phrase of the pragmatic approach to human experience and human understanding and "truth values." See K. J. Gergen and K. Davis (1985) and R. Rorty (1979).

2. The observations in this paper are intended as a slight corrective to Johannes Fabian (1983).

References

Fabian, Johannes

1983

Time and the Other: How Anthropology Makes Its Object. New York: Columbia University Press.

Fernandez, James W.

1966

Revitalized Words from the Parrott's Egg and the Bull That Crashes in the Kraal. *In* Verbal and Visual Art: Proceedings of the American Ethnological Society, 5264. Seattle: University of Washington Press.

1982

Bwiti: An Ethnography of the Religious Imagination in Africa.
Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press.

1985

Exploded Worlds: Text as Metaphor for Ethnography (and Vice
Versa). *Dialectical Anthropology* 10(12):1526.

Gergen, K. J., and K. Davis

1985

The Social Construction of the Person. New York: Springer Verlag.

Radin, Paul

1957

Primitive Man as Philosopher. New York: Dover.

Rorty, R.

1979

Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature. Princeton, N. J.: Princeton
University Press.

9

With Respect to the Primitive: An Intellectual, a Student, and Fieldwork

Barbara W. Lex

The history of Western civilization is, after all, littered with dead scientific concepts.

Stanley Diamond, "*Anthropology in Question*"

One afternoon in late August 1963, I sat in the office of Gordon T. Bowles, then acting chairman of the newly independent Department of Anthropology. Summer session had ended at Syracuse University and the campus was almost deserted. In the musty quiet of the venerable building that housed anthropology we reviewed my academic progress and set about selecting courses for the fall semester. Dr. Bowles spoke of new anthropologists who were to join the faculty, and among them was Stanley Diamond.

Ironically, during that advising session, Professor Diamond telephoned. Bowles, always a true gentleman and scholar, welcomed Diamond to the city and the campus, informed him of the date and time of the first faculty meeting of the academic year, and reflecting a pragmatic aspect of life for any Syracusan explained how tickets for the football season might be obtained. I was not privy to the reply, but it seemed that Diamond declined the offer.

After the conversation ended, Bowles urged me to enroll for Diamond's graduate level seminar in the history of anthropological theory as preparation for embarking upon formal graduate study. This was heady stuff for an undergraduate, but other faculty also had pressed me to plan graduate work in anthropology. Diamond's seminar would give a stringent test to my intellectual mettle and an opportunity to consolidate an academic record sufficiently satisfactory to overcome bias against women's applications to graduate programs.

As I write this essay, two decades have elapsed. Now a majority of

those who earn the Ph.D. in cultural anthropology are women, and the nature and practice of anthropology have changed in innumerable ways. Today, anthropologists still study natives, but to paraphrase a cartoon character, more often than not, they are us.

In my attic I found the notes for that long-ago-completed course and pondered the academic odyssey that has taken me far from upstate New York. I have taught or studied in North American universities on both coasts and in the Midwest and no longer work in mainstream anthropology. Yet, when I reflect on the intellectual forces that shaped my journey, it becomes apparent how much direction derived from my years as a more traditional anthropology student and how much of a debt I owe my teachers.

In 1963, Stanley Diamond's seminar met in the evening. Only a few bold undergraduates enrolled for that course the rest of the participants were graduate students in anthropology or other fields in the social sciences. Surprisingly, the course also was popular among physicians from the nearby Upstate Medical Center and Syracuse Psychiatric Hospital some evenings the seminar was crowded to standing room only. Long before the labels "medical anthropology" and "cultural psychiatry" became specialties in anthropology, this mix of participants animated the notion that practicing clinicians and academic anthropologists have something to say to each other. Clinicians had appeared to us as remote figures, so that the significance of a meeting on common ground could not escape the notice of local anthropology faculty and graduate students, and Diamond served as the catalyst (see Diamond 1963c).

All of the foregoing is best rephrased as "we stood in awe of him." At a time when other academics adopted Nehru jackets, dashikis, and sandals and hung fetishes around their necks, Diamond was a man of dignified carriage who typically dressed in a dark three-piece suit. Perhaps these garments were emblematic of the Prince Albert style worn by Hasidic Jews and all the scholarly tradition that that image evokes. Like Paul Radin, Diamond also evinced *style* (best defined as a certain charisma) and acted as anthropologist-cum-intellectual (see Diamond 1971, 1982).

Albeit a passionate scholar, as a teacher Diamond was modest about his own accomplishments. Materials mentioned or used in that course in 1963 ranged from Penniman's *Hundred Years of Anthropology* (1965) to trace our lineage, to Plato's *Republic* as a rational antithesis to primitive society, to utopia as represented in *We*

(Zamiatin 1952), to current issues hotly debated in the *New York Review of Books*. In an odyssey that ranged through centuries and across continents, we learned of the impact of Rousseau and, in the next breath, of Claude Lévi-Strauss. Indeed, the major thrust of any student encounter with Stanley Diamond was simultaneously to cultivate a breadth of knowledge, objectivity, and relativism of anthropologists *qua* anthropology and also as informed critics of our own society. Unused to this posture, I rarely ventured an opinion. I wrote my obligatory term paper about Julian Steward's theory of multilinear evolution. When research for it indicated that Steward owed a greater intellectual debt to E. B. Tylor than to Lewis Henry Morgan, however, I dared to say so. Perhaps sensing my temerity, Diamond challenged me to express my ideas, and somehow the content and the attitudes that I acquired during that semester have remained with me.

What was not apparent then was that this seminar served as a major forum in which the expression of the ideas that preoccupied Diamond's writing was permitted to surface. These manuscripts never appeared on a required reading list, nor were they explicitly mentioned. But 1963 can be seen as a year of florescence in which Diamond published, wrote, or conceived a number of trenchant articles (among these, Diamond 1963a, 1963b, 1963c, 1964), including a treatise on his fieldwork among the Anaguta that was to appear in a volume edited by Steward (Diamond 1967). Students unwittingly benefited from exposure to an overheard dialogue between author and ideas. The net result is best and humbly expressed by Diamond himself: "My original intent was to write a book, in one concentrated burst of energy, on the theme explored here, and to that end, I carefully kept notes and references for a dozen years. As that file grew, remaining more or less unused, I wrote these . . . essays and then realized that I had, in fact, written a book" (1974:xv).

Preparation for Fieldwork

Having become a graduate student in anthropology, it was time to become professionalized and focused upon my future fieldwork. Like that of many other students in our department at that time, my thinking was shaped by a strong emphasis on African studies. It seemed likely that I would select some group in which I could study

the impact of culture contact upon tradition. The people whom I would study would be *primitive* (Diamond 1963c, 1971, 1974). Perhaps I would encounter a people like the Anaguta (Diamond 1963b, 1967). The contrary instance in the casebook of acculturation studies, the Anaguta turned their backs upon civilization and consciously chose to let their culture die. To accomplish my goal I believed it necessary to prepare for research in a remote field setting one where goats and chickens invaded one's house and delicate negotiations with informants gave substance to the anthropological enterprise (Diamond 1964, 1967). Instead, the Fates intervened and sent me to a field setting eleven miles from the campus.

Out of expediency, I worked as a public assistance caseworker while pursuing my graduate studies. Some coworkers believed that a background in anthropology would be useful in working with clients from distinctive ethnic backgrounds. The most distinctive of these groups appeared to be the Onondaga Iroquois, but caseloads were allocated by geographical units. One person had responsibility for the Onondaga reservation. He had held that responsibility for some time and seemed unlikely to give it up. It also was a common belief among anthropologists and nonanthropologists that the Onondagas have become assimilated and resembled most other rural farm populations in the United States. Accordingly, I turned my attention elsewhere and soon became involved with clients who had severe medical or psychological problems. Again, the Fates intervened, and one of the medical cases was an Iroquois man residing in a rest home in Syracuse.

Like many other urban Indians, Ralph drank too much and had diabetes mellitus. The ulceration on his legs required frequent dressing changes, and he had been placed in a rest home after hospitalization. One of the staff tended the dressings and supervised medications. Ralph spoke little English, and his medical condition remained unchanged for many months. When I made my mandatory visits to certify continuing need for public assistance, there was little to say and less to recommend. Ralph usually sat in a rocking chair on the dilapidated front porch, chewing tobacco and rocking slowly, perhaps awaiting his time to die. In many ways Ralph resembled non-Indian rest home residents, but knowledge of his heritage deepened my understanding of the reasons that some societies rejected the encroachment of civilization.

On several occasions at my office a polite voice on the telephone

asked me if Ralph had to remain in the rest home. Ralph was clearly less than happy there and could not communicate well with staff or fellow inhabitants. I repeatedly refused to request his release, but Ralph's friend persisted. Finally, I inquired whether the rest home placement actually was a medical necessity. Ralph's friend, Fred, proposed that Ralph reside with him in an apartment building where the landlady was a licensed practical nurse. Necessary nursing tasks would be performed, and Ralph would be in a more congenial setting. The social circumstances were more beneficial and the cost of care less: the move was approved. I visited Ralph to obtain information necessary to transfer the case, and I also met Fred.

Fred was a Mohawk, but the son of an Onondaga father and a Mohawk mother. Were the reverse true, Fred claimed, he would have dual tribal membership, but technically he was caught between the matrilineal descent system of the Onondagas and the patrilineal descent system of the Mohawks. Fred visited the Onondaga reservation often, and he said that he had been an ironworkerhe might have leaped, full-blown, from an essay by Edmund Wilson (1959). He must have sensed my mixture of skepticism and interest in matters Iroquoian, for he told me that I could accompany him to some "doings" at the reservation. I thanked him and was pleased that access to fieldwork had come so easily.

On the other hand, I was apprehensive. Fred clearly drank too much, too. I asked faculty their opinions about the proposed expedition to Onondaga and was met with discouraging comments about the "deculturation" process that had drained the Iroquois of any ethnographic interest and warnings about my personal safety. Downcast, I nonetheless polled my fellow students until I found someone willing to accompany me.

On the appointed evening, my friend and I drove with Fred to the Onondaga reservation. It was not my first visit there, for another anthropologist had insisted that students drive through the reservation as a course requirement. Then I had noted the central location of the ceremonial structure, or Longhouse, and had a vague idea that it housed some sort of communitywide meetings. Fred led us inside and instructed us to take seats among members of a particular matriline. I felt more at ease when I saw that the interior of the Longhouse was warmed by two wood-burning stoves and brightly lit, and that women and children attended.

What I was not prepared for was the abrupt entrance of masked

members of the False Face Medicine Society. Wearing tattered clothing and *gagohsa* (carved wooden masks), the *hondo'i* (hunchbacks) erupted through the western door and dashed about the room. The *hondo'i* scrubbed their huge tortoise shell rattles against the door jambs and wooden floors; they crawled on all fours and emitted inarticulate cries that resonated within their wooden masks. Spirits struggled with men in front of the two stoves while live coals flew in all directions; the stoves almost toppled before the attackers could be bribed with gifts of tobacco. The net effect amused elders but frightened small children. To the newcomer, the impact upon the senses of these sights and sounds was sufficiently profound to be ineffable.

Studying Humankind: Legacy of the Primitive

In retrospect, the ritual performance was designed to startle onlookers into a liminal state (Lex 1975, 1977; Isaacs and Lex 1980). At the moment it occurred, however, I was astonished which may simply be another way of expressing verbal interpretation of cortical arousal and accelerated heart rate. Juxtaposition of an elaborate, powerful ritual against the background of earlier warnings about disappointment among the deculturated added a strong cognitive element of paradox. I was struck by the immutable fact that I was only eleven miles from home but seemingly three hundred years in the past.

Onondaga preserve many calendric and curing rituals (Lex 1977). My initial contact with Fred led to introductions to persons who became informants. Through these informants grew my knowledge of Onondaga society and culture. I approached these contacts with as much caution, tact, and respect as I could muster.

It was unusual for a graduate student to have developed relationships with informants prior to completing coursework. Ergo, I felt incompletely formed as an anthropologist. Uncertain about my level of competence in fieldwork, I sought direction from various faculty members. To my surprise, Diamond, whom I had viewed as an Africanist, referred me to his article, "Indians: Red, White, and Blue" (1963b). This sensitive portrayal of Seneca Iroquois life as a three-tiered "theater of the absurd" effectively captured fundamental contradictions of reservation life for the contemporary Iroquois. Wilson's essays in *The New Yorker* (1959) may have promoted the popu-

lar notion that reservation life was but a diminished shade of prior tribal life, and that not only was Iroquoian blood diluted with that of whites, but also the Iroquoian grasp of modern civilization and haphazard adoption of its trappings were amusing in their naïveté. In that essay Diamond established his credentials as one well-versed in contemporary theater, and then extended his analysis of Seneca social organization and cultural dilemmas generically to include oppressed, displaced, or migrant peoples whether in Boston, New York, or Lagos (1963b:258). Historical struggles over sovereign Iroquois lands, syncretism, and emergence of the messianic Good Message of Handsome Lakethe Seneca prophet could be viewed as worldwide patterns reenacted in microcosm. "Indians: Red, White, and Blue" helped me to place my experience in perspective. Diamond had found the Seneca to be sagacious critics of civilization. Furthermore, it was not necessary to leave this continent or this country to find classic classroom examples to which one could apply anthropological insights.

Yet Diamond and observers of the Iroquois (see, e.g., Fenton 1972) saw inevitable erosion of traditional beliefs and behaviors leading to cultural, if not genealogical, demise. Especially with regard to preservation of traditional ceremonies, it appeared as though the last generation of traditionalists had learned to make ritual artifacts and to perform the dances, chants, and songs. Diamond's words impelled me to observe and record Onondaga traditions before much more could be lost, but I also could not keep from wondering how the inroads of three hundred years of white contact had been withstood.

Some anthropologists encouraged me to approach the issue by studying Onondaga women's roles and patterns of child-rearing as a thesis topic. This was the era of culture of poverty debates, and no doubt the apparently matrifocal structure of a traditionally matrilineal and matrilocal society prompted the suggestion. Yet Diamond and others had suggested that matrifocality might simply be a necessary adaptation to the economic realities of male responses to seasonal or low-skill wage work. Further, the notion of studying women simply because I am a female seemed yet another instance of perpetuated stereotypes and accordingly dampened my enthusiasm. Work with Onondaga women had revealed that they played integral roles in the ritual life of the reservation as Faithkeepers, Clan Mothers, members of medicine societies, and seers. In this instance, being female would give me access to the male aspect of Iroquois tradition by aligning myself with a matriclan.

The result was enduringly gratifying. I sometimes saw Onondaga culture from the vantage point of the kitchen. There is a great deal to be learned on a trip to the grocery store or in the cookhouse among women preparing feast foods. I made myself useful, running errands, minding children, peeling potatoes, or following cooking instructions, all the while listening to discussions (what others might call gossip) that revealed cultural prescriptions and proscriptions. I cheerfully helped to wash mountains of dishes and was delighted to have a niche. To my enlightenment, and certainly to the joy of Onondagas, on more than one occasion in the cookhouse I could see youngsters spontaneously imitating the songs and dances performed by their parents in the Longhouse. One woman summoned me to observe surreptitiously when a young boy sang, syllable for syllable, a song that adults had feared would die out with the demise of an elderly singer. It did not truly concern her that this youth might have difficulty adapting to the staid requirements of grade-school education. Instead, she whispered, "See, he *knows* it." Our general discussion about cultural loss led to words of optimism and faith: "Somebody always is studying what they [singers or Handsome Lake Code preachers] do. They sit quiet and listen and don't tell what they are doing. Then, when we think that it will die out [with the infirmity or death of a ritualist], they come and stand in their place" (see Lex 1970a, 1970b).

I sat for comprehensive examinations for the doctorate in anthropology a year early because of the impending departure of Diamond. One of the questions, set by him, gently inquired whether I might have noticed any messianic movements among the Iroquois, and, if so, what had I observed? I ingenuously wrote page upon page about the formation of the League, and also about the Code of Handsome Lake. Within two years, activities of the American Indian Movement were on the front pages of national newspapers, and an Iroquoian newspaper, *Akwesasne Notes*, had become a major force among Native Americans. Onondaga were suggesting that on both continents Native American peoples should form a political compact under the extant structure of the sovereign League of the Iroquois and extend membership via its traditional mode of adoption. Opposition to adoption of Indian children by whites turned on the same technical point.

Syncretistic, yes, but within the realm of the spirit that Diamond had sensed. The Iroquois, and especially the Onondaga, came forth (much like the young singers) to attempt to fill a void by offering a

political structure for an assortment of descendants of New World tribal peoples. Of course there was factionalism, like that found on any reservation. Experience and behaviors of Iroquoian peoples predicted or recapitulated much of Native American life in the historical period, so that what can be said of them often explicates experiences of other groups.

Similarly Diamond's other essays can be endlessly unpacked for nuances of meaning and further generalized to demystify the unfolding of contemporary events. In that process, one can come to see that the scholar can be considered a modern vatic, or seer. In 1963, Diamond reported the apocalyptic remarks of an elderly Seneca man who contemplated the symbol of nuclear holocaust vis-à-vis the ascending smoke from ritual tobacco: within five years Diamond spoke and wrote about "War and the Dissociated Personality" (1968). Similarly, the choices, nonchoices, and fate of the Anaguta, Nigeria, and Africa presaged events that occurred on a worldwide scale (Diamond 1963b, 1967).

The depth of knowledge and adherence to intellectual honesty in Stanley Diamond's work endures. It urged me to debate the realities of harsh issues with privileged students and to challenge them to attempt to grasp in absentia what I had apprehended firsthand. Rather than curios from a bygone era, Diamond's works written twenty years ago remain fresh and worth rereading. Another aspect of that legacy resides in my continuing work toward explicating the experience of minority groups within a dominant society, however defined, while remembering that one important gift from Stanley Diamond was a definition of anthropology as the *humane* science.

References

Diamond, Stanley

1963a

Indians: Red, White, and Blue. *Dissent* 10:25562.

1963b

Modern Africa: The Pains of Birth. *Dissent* 10:16979.

1963c

The Search for the Primitive. *In* *Man's Image in Medicine and Anthropology*, ed. Iago Galdston, 62115. New York: John Wiley.

1964

Nigerian Discovery. *In* *Reflections on Community Studies*, ed. A. Vidich, M. Stein, and J. Bensmen, 11954. New York: John Wiley.

1967

The Anaguta of Nigeria: Suburban Primitives. *In* *Contemporary Change in Traditional Societies*, Vol. 1: Introduction and African Tribes, ed. Julian Seward, 361505. Urbana: University of Illinois Press.

1968

War and the Dissociated Personality. *In War: The Anthropology of Armed Conflict*, ed. Morton Fried, Marvin Harris, and Robert Murphy, 18388. Garden City, N.Y.: Natural History Press.

1969

Anthropology in Question. *In Reinventing Anthropology*, ed. Dell Hymes, 40129. New York: Pantheon Books.

1971

Paul Radin: An Appreciation. *In Paul Radin, The World of Primitive Man*, xiiixxxvii. New York: E. P. Dutton.

1974

In Search of the Primitive: A Critique of Civilization. New Brunswick, N. J.: E. P. Dutton /Transaction Books.

1982

Totems. Barrytown, N.Y.: Station Hill Press.

Fenton, William N.

1972

Return to the Longhouse. *In Crossing Cultural Boundaries: The Anthropological Experience*, ed. Solon T. Kimball and James B. Watson, 10218. San Francisco: Chandler Publishing Company.

Isaacs, Hope L., and Barbara W. Lex

1980

Handling Fire: Treatment of Illness by the Iroquois False-Face Medicine Society. *Occasional Publications in Northeastern Anthropology* 6:513.

Lex, Barbara W.

1970a

The Anthropologist and His Informants: What Kind of Involvement? Maxwell Review 7:3546.

1970b

The Iroquois Wampum Issue: Errors of Fact and Questions of Ethics. Paper presented at the Plenary Session of the Central States Anthropological Society, Bloomington, Ind.

1975

Physiological Aspects of Ritual Trance. Journal of Altered States of Consciousness 2:10927.

1977

Altered States of Consciousness in Northern Iroquoian Rituals. *In* The Realm of the Extra-Human: Agents and Audiences, ed. A. Bharati, 277300. The Hague: Mouton.

Penniman, T. K.

1965

A Hundred Years of Anthropology. London: Gerald Duckworth.

Wilson, Edmund

1959

Apologies to the Iroquois. New York: Vantage Press.

Zamiatin, Eugene

1952

We. Translated by Marc Slonim. New York: E. P. Dutton.

PART II

ETHNOPOETICS AND ETHNOMUSIC

10

The Search for a Primal Poetics

Jerome Rothenberg

It was in 1967 or 1968 that I was led by Gary Snyder to an extraordinary poetics in the anthropological writings of Stanley Diamond. I had no idea as yet that Diamond himself was writing poetry, but coming on him then was the culmination for me of a number of years of exploring the anthropological literature as a source of insights into poetic process. Works like Radin's *Primitive Man as Philosopher* and Malinowski's *Coral Gardens and Their Magic* were already touchstones, along with numerous ethnographies and those volumes of myths and texts that an earlier operation had brought to light. I was later to find common cause with others like Victor Turner, Dennis Tedlock, David McAllester, and Dell Hymes, to name a few, but it was Diamond who spoke most directly for those who for two centuries or more had engaged in a search for the primitive at the center of their lives. "The demonic power of the mind," William Carlos Williams called it and placed it both in the individual and in the deeper histories of the species. Or again: "A primitive profundity of the personality that must be touched if what we do is to have it" (Williams 1969).

I will refer in what follows to Diamond's search for the primitive as part of our ongoing search for primal poetics. By so doing, I hope it will be clear that he has been one of the key figures in bringing that sometimes amorphous energy into a finally sharp focus.

A few preliminaries, then, to get us going.

When Charles Olson wrote "Projective Verse" in 1950, he was describing, like other artists before and since, both a method of composition and a stance toward reality (Olson 1967). For Olson, the shift in the verse freed up mind and body and allowed the emergence of a work of projective size, larger than the single poet or on a par with the single poet pushed to his or her own limits, to the making of a newly maximal poem: an epic as a poem including history (Ezra Pound). Or, as Clayton Eshleman put it much more recently: "I am

speaking of poetry that attempts to be responsible for all an individual writer knows about himself and about his world It is that simple and that awesome."

In referring to all that, I only mean to say that I hope that anything I have ever said about the making of poetry has tried to show or to discover how that making might both reflect and influence the way we live in this world or this world lives in us. This is the modernist though possibly not the postmodernist hope: that transformations in art and life are inextricably connected. (I mean here "modernist" in its avant-garde sense, not its academic one. The forerunners I cherish don't lead back to Lowell or Tate or Auden, but more significantly I think to Stein and Pound, Zukofsky and Williams, Tzara and Breton and Artaud, Khlebnikov and Mayakovsky, Huidobro and Vallejo. All of the above and more.)

The history of twentieth-century poetry is as rich and varied as that of the century's painting and sculpture, its music and theater, but the academic strategy has been to cover up that richness.

Imagine now a history of modern art that left out abstract painting or collage or Cubism or Surrealism and Dada, and you have a sense of what the literary curricula (or the creative writing ones) look like to those of us who know that similar things exist in poetry as well, and that many of the earlier moves and movements but Futurism, Dada, and Surrealism in particular were essentially the work of poets.

A characteristic of modern art (and poetry) so defined but this carries into the postmodern as well has been the questioning of art itself as a discrete and bounded category. ("Deconstruction," I used to think, was a decent enough word for this, but after a decade or two of abuse, like David Antin, "When I hear the word 'deconstruction,' I reach for my pillow.") In an essay on Robert Wilson's earlier "theater of images," Robert Stearns writes: "The avant garde might be characterized as those creators who do not take their environment and its traditions at face value. They separate and view its elements and realign them according to their own needs" (Stearns 1980).

The description (while devoid as yet of social purpose) is general enough to include the great range of strategies and stances in experimental art and poetry. Since nothing around us is (ideally) taken for granted and the conclusion or intention of the work (again ideally) arises or emerges from the work itself, the work by definition is experimental: its outcome unknown, its process crucial. Such experiments/redefinitions/reconstructions may work with structures, with

ideologies (contexts and contents), with materials and technologies, or (in any instance) with combinations of all of the above. I will point here to examples in poetry and related language arts, rather than in those arts with which most of us are more likely to be familiar.

From my own point of view at least, I see the coming together of these possibilities as (still) the great opportunity for art and poetry in our time. On their structural/compositional side, the experimental moves have included developments in visual, typographic, and concrete poetry; notably in English language experiments with projective verse and composition by field; in systematic chance operations (Jackson Mac Low and John Cage the chief practitioners); in variations of collage and montage from throughout the century. Ideological/ideational experiments permeated Dada and Surrealism during and after World War I, Beat and Beat-related poetry in the 1950s and 1960s, and aspects of feminism and other consciousness movements over the last two decades. Equally extreme but often less recognized experiments involved the materials and media of poetry from the obvious return to poetry as an art of live performance to the creation of a new electronic poetry (soundtext, *poésie sonore*, etc.), the rudiments of computer poetry, and the beginnings (toward the other end of the technological spectrum) of a poetry without sound in the culture of the deaf.

This is a larger field for experiment and change than has been brought forward in recent controversies about the Language Poets and so on, and it is characterized there and elsewhere by a sense of the old rules or what seemed to be the old rules the basic definitions within each art or between the arts being increasingly and deliberately set aside or reversed. The terms as we may think of them now, at this latter end of the century are thick, still thick, with paradox:

- Imageless art and wordless poetry (or *soundless* poetry in the language of the deaf already mentioned)
- *Musique concrete* in all its present versions going back to Russolo's noise machines and art of noises
- Free verse (a paradox, too, as William Carlos Williams taught us) and the *parole in liberta* (free words) of Marinetti
- Nonsyntactic or antisyntactic poetry from Stein to (again) the Language Poets (or "totally syntactic," in the words of

one of them, Barrett Watten) and a questioning, for them or me or most of us, of the nature and limits of meaning

- A poetry of elementary forms letters and numbers that works with reduced alphabets (Otto Nebel) or extended ones (Isidore Isou) or that reads numbers as words (Kurt Schwitters) or words as numbers (neogrammatism and beyond)

None of these become dominant for long, though some may initially make a claim for dominance.

Similarly, the boundaries between (and within) the arts dissolve into an age of blended media (intermedia) and hybrid forms of art. The distinction between poetry and prose, between word and picture breaks down. Definitions of high and low art fall away: the primitive chant, the pop song become part of the poet's arsenal new instruments are at our disposal. The language of everyday speech collides with or expels the exalted language of an older poetry like the art that seeks to break the boundaries between itself and everyday life, to reenter the mundane world or to elevate the mundane into art. At the same time that some poets reclaim prophetic and visionary functions, they or their contemporaries are altering the physical nature and location of the poem: new shapes of books; new materials to print on (metal, acetate, and film; Karl Young's wood blocks; Emmett Williams's cuckoo clocks and fishes; poems on pens, on shirts, on bodies); poetry as sculpture in the works of Ian Hamilton Finlay or of Mathias Goeritz; the poetry reading and performance, moving off the page and into the lecture hall, the theater, the gallery, the coffee shop, the loft, the prison, and the street. Writes Michael Davidson of a postmodernism that extends one thrust of modernism: "The boundary to what is possible in writing is a fiction created by and within writing. Only when the boundary is recognized as movable can it become a regenerative element in art, rather than an obstacle to its growth" (Davidson 1989).

The old boundaries are now in question. Poetry is not the only language art (an art of words measured and arranged in time), but musicians like Cage and Berio and Stockhausen have also been composing with words. Artists have collaged words, painted words on canvases and walls. Dancers have danced to language, to words. Confronting the boundaries of language has been around a long

time now, and it has made the ground of poetry a different thing from what it was before.

This century may be known by its push against the boundaries. Where once the definitions were apparent and the frame known, we have now come into the open, have taken up a stance outside the walls. The most interesting works of art and poetry are those that question their own shapes and forms, and by implication the shapes and forms of whatever preceded them.

Again some immediate and fairly obvious examples.

- The prose poem (including, most interestingly, its recent extensions by Language and other experimental poets) questions the boundary between poetry and prose.
- The visual poem questions the boundary between poetry and painting.
- The concrete three-dimensional poems in Ian Finlay's garden question the boundary between poetry and sculpture.
- The *poésie sonore* of Henri Chopin questions the boundary between poetry and music.

But it is possible for one to become a master of poetry (or even a doctor of poetry) and still be ignorant of all this. (It may even not be possible to do so without that kind of ignorance.)

As the work is now one of reinterpretation/revisioning, the view of poetry reaches from the present into the past, from the (post) industrial first world to the remote corners of third and fourth worlds everywhere. Given that kind of thrust, a poetics becomes (or includes) an *ethnopoetics*, as the work of the poet becomes in each instance *the search* ("in the excitedness of pure being," stein wrote) *for a primal poetry or art or theater or music*. The accompaniment to that search has been a century of countless inventions and reinventions in the art we make. In an art in which "the only failure," says Hugh Kenner, "is the failure to invent" (1987), each work becomes the model for some new possibility not only each new work created but each work newly sighted in the worlds outside our own that open up to us.

The art created as a primal model may be minimal or maximal in nature, but the idea of the minimal (in both a traditional and modern context) is necessarily deceptive. What was called minimal art a few years ago is only a part of what I mean by it, for what I'm thinking of are all those experiments that explore the key reductive question of

what it is that is absolutely essential to the art in question like Jerzy Grotowski's "poor (but not impoverished/empty) theater," in which actor (and audience) provide sufficient means for the theatrical act (1968), or Philip Corner's "Poor Man Music," restricting sound to the percussive possibilities of the human body. Allan Kaprow's "privacy pieces" (or the more poignant and political works of Milan Knížák in Czechoslovakia) imagine a performance without an audience (see, e.g., Kaprow 1983). And something of the same sort enters the solitary autoperformances of the performance artist, and so on. It is a little like Emily Dickinson's poem on the minimal definition of a prairie: "It takes a clover and a bee / and reverie // The reverie alone will do / if bees are few."

But clover and bees proliferate; and alongside, or even within the minimal works, maximal works emerge that explore the fullest and most extended range of human possibilities, all within the single work. The poor theater is coexistent with the epic theater or the utterly baroque theater of images (of Robert Wilson); intermedia (however renamed) remains a presence in the visual arts, where many works also seek maximal scale, whether for presentation of a simple form (Christo's running fence, say) or of a great *mélange* of forms and images. And what Olson called "projective size" brings poets into the area of the long poem, the multiphasic epic leading from Pound and Williams and Zukofsky into the immediate present (Olson [1950] 1967).

Behind such visions also lies the sense of a search for the primal that brings the present and the remote past together. (It is this kind of search that has engaged me for more than twenty-five years now.) A word often heard in discussions of intermedia and performance is Richard Wagner's *Gesamtkunstwerk* (total artwork) with its sense of *opera* (plural) superseding *opus* (singular) as a reintegration of a unified primal art that had undergone *sparagmos* (division). For those like Wagner the primal source was most often Greek; for us it goes back to the more remote past or the (apparently) remote present, with its surviving cultures and subcultures in which ritual, building on what Stanley Diamond has called "existential situations" of "struggle and identity," creates a theater of multiple means and extremes, where "art and life converge" (see Diamond 1974). Thus any given source work, if viewed as a whole, is complex in much the way that Turner described ritual, not as "an obsessional concern with repetitive acts [but] an immense orchestration of genres in all available sensory codes: speech, music, singing; the presentation of elab-

orately worked objects, such as masks, wall-paintings, body-paintings, sculptured forms; complex, many-tiered shrines; costumes; dance forms with complex grammars and vocabularies of bodily movements, gestures, and facial expressions" (Turner 1969).

Primitive is complex, I said at the beginning of the preface to *Technicians of the Sacred* (Rothenberg 1985), and something of this sort is what I had in mind.

But all of this is still too much from the side of art, too much as if the changes contemplated had only form in mind. Such redefinitions, limited to art-making or to poetry, are of course possible, and where modern art and postmodern art have been most easily accepted, it has probably been in this limited sense. (The easiest acceptance of a *new* poetry has, conversely, been largely on the side of content.) The bigger picture, among our contemporaries and those who came before us, includes as well a redefinition of what it is to be human "the attempt," as Diamond calls it, "to define a primary human potential" by experiments on ourselves (our own works and thoughts) and observations of our interchange with others. The older paradigm of humanity evolving hierarchically (vertically) from the "primitive" to the "civilized," from the non-Western to the Western, with European/rational *man* standing at the apex developed with European imperialism and was its anthropological expression, while the new paradigm of a common and diverse/multibranched humanity arose first from within that same imperialism but started coming into sharper focus with its gradual disintegration.

The work now visible is enormous. As such, it lets us see, as if for the first time, the many faces of poetry, whose range and variety make the idea of a single definition (in-our-own-image) seem obsolete, reductive. At the same time it shows the power of those singular traditions that have developed under particular historical conditions. Not surface only, but something like Williams's "primitive profundity" (Diamond's also) is at play here: the opening toward mind or spirit and the recognition that in either instance our experiments are both elemental and the culmination of all those cultural and psychological events that have come before us. The upshot of it all is this that we now know, really know, that the source of poetry is in a truly human center: in ritual and work, in acts of speculation and imagination, in a shamanism whose proudest tool is language.

If we can say that now and more! we are not made shamans thereby, or priests or magicians, but our resemblances to and our differences from those others are the hidden theme of most of what

we do. From my own perspective, it is a work in common: a great collective work of synthesis. It is changing, always changing, because the ambition that propels it makes it volatile. At one point it seems to center on prophecy and vision, at another on the experimental moment that precedes the poem or, again, on the process of writing or composing or on the language of the poem become a focus in itself. In that last instance, I have found the idea of a *language-centered* poetry not only among us but in the work of shamans and poets like the Mazatec María Sabina, who do not so much make poems describing an experience, or even a vision but seek a language whose source is in the world beyond the merely experiential more precisely for her: in language itself! It would be wonderful to touch all those bases on our own and sometimes we do but it is good, too, that there are others, as volatile as we are, doing what we fail to do.

The restlessness of our poetry is a reflection of a deeper restlessness be it Diamond's "search" or, not that distant from it, what Robert Duncan called: "this dark and doubtful presentiment [in which] . . . all things have been called into their comparisons . . . not in our identification as a hierarchy of higher forms but in our identification with the universe" (Duncan 1985).

It is at the least a comparison of all our possible humanities (and the works that arise therefrom) taken to its greatest (post)modern extreme. And yet the new paradigm, the model that this suggests, is still only partial, as the disintegration of the old imperialism/ethnocentrism is (we now know) also only partial.

References

Davidson, Michael

1989

The San Francisco Renaissance: Poetics and Community at Mid-Century. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Duncan, Robert

1985

Fictive Certainties: Essays. New York: New Directions.

Diamond, Stanley

1974

In Search of the Primitive: A Critique of Civilization. New Brunswick, N. J.: E. P. Dutton/Transaction Books.

Grotowski, Jerzy

1968

Towards a Poor Theatre. New York: Simon and Schuster.

Kaprow, Allan

1983

The Real Experiment. Artforum 22:3742.

Kenner, Hugh

1987

Modernism and What Happened to It: Essays in Criticism
37:97109

Olson, Charles

1967

Projective Verse. *In* Human Universe and Other Essays. New York: Grove Press.

Malinowski, Bronislaw

1965

Coral Gardens and Their Magic. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.

Radin, Paul

1927

Primitive Man as Philosopher. New York: Appleton and Co.

Rothenberg, Jerome

1985

Technicians of the Sacred. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Stearns, Robert

1980

Robert Wilson: From a Theatre of Images. Cincinnati, Ohio: Contemporary Arts Center.

Turner, Victor

1969

The Ritual Process. Chicago: Aldine.

Williams, William Carlos

1969

Selected Essays. New York: New Directions.

11

Diamond's Quest for Earliness in Seven Early Poems

Harold Bloom

I prefer Stanley Diamond's poetry to that of other anthropologists not only because he was a distinguished poet but because his poetry knew what his anthropology could not know, which is that earliness is impossible. But first, *primitive*, as a word, goes back to an Indo-European root that may have meant *forward*, or *through*. When Kierkegaard invoked the primitive, he probably was being playfully anti-Hegelian, opposing to the dialectic of mediation his own sense of an originary repetition. Diamond followed Kierkegaard rather less playfully, when he made *primitive* the critical term in a dialectical anthropology. The danger in questing for an earliness as a "historical contrast to our own intolerable condition" is that you tend to study the nostalgias as, say, the young Melville did. What is earliest and oldest in us either is no part of the creation, as the older Melville followed the Gnostics and Emerson in believing, or may belong to a harsh magic, as Vico and Freud believed in their different but related ways. Diamond, however, quite deliberately developed a positive definition of the primitive: for him it is concrete, existential, nominalist, above all personalist. Indeed, the term means in and for him something close to what the *authentic* meant to Sartre.

Diamond discovered Hart Crane early and may have sought from anthropology what poetry, after Crane, could no longer provide. Crane, like Shelley, was an extraordinary combination of a skeptical mind and a transcendentalizing heart. In each, skepticism forbade any focus on the primitive, and not the least likely epigraph for Diamond's work would be Crane's despair in "The Dance" sequence of *The Bridge*:

Dance, Manquoeketa! snake that lives before,
That casts his pelt, and lives beyond! Sprout, horn!

Spark, tooth! Medicine-man, relent, restore
Lie to us, dance us back the tribal morn!

Not that Diamond's *Totems* attempts to dance us back to the tribal morn but, unlike Crane, Diamond has declined to learn the Nietzschean lesson that poetry has to lie to us, consciously and deliberately, that it must give us what Nietzsche called "the pathos of truth." The Nietzsche of *The Genealogy of Morals* would conceive of *Totems* not so much as familial masks but rather as "numinous shadows." Diamond was fundamentally Jewish and too much a loyalist to dismiss his ancestral heritage. His anthropology quests for the primitive, but his poems quest for a kind of Jewishness that knows it cannot be early. Whatever a Jew might wish, he is necessarily in no position to forge the uncreated conscience of his own tradition, the tradition of superego from Yahweh to Freud. That is part of the knowing and rueful charm of Diamond's title poem:

On each familiar stoop
strangers sit
totems of my unsung infancy
faces abstract, stark
as the Kwakiutl killer shark
exploded over poplar bark
in those sub-Arctic huts
where berries blaze
and Indians live
to give away
the love they reap in ritual play
on each identical, receding stair
on each remote, and mourning street
nameless as a winding sheet
my unfamiliar family stares
faces cut in sculptured glass
and strangely sit
as salmon die
leaping

"Totems" is haunted by echoes and allusions, primarily to Blake's "London" and Crane's "Stark Major." What makes it so moving is Diamond's mode of pathos, akin to that of the Yiddish poets of New York, Mani Leib and Moshe Leib Halpern in particular. Not that

Diamond necessarily knows their work, but that he achieves something of their urban poignance here. The more ambitious poem, "In My Grandfather's House," which opens the volume, seems to me much more equivocal a success, in precisely the same way, partly because its emotional investment is too intensely involved with accommodation of the same problematical element that disturbs me in other family elegies in *Totems*. But I move now to Diamond at his best, in his true voice and mode, the lovely "Whale Song":

They hit the beach before the running tide
One antic Sunday afternoon in May
And settled down as if they'd come to stay.

The trees were dying on the inner slopes of hills
The blossoms in the dunes had blown away.

They sang of exile
Bones descending to the bottom of the sea
Stains of salt

Phosphorescent eyes
of gulls that fell upon the earth
Keening the blind return

Four blue whales
breathing in the dark
songs that only cross hung gulls can hear
and children
chanting on the bluffs
above the bay.

Diamond said that the composition of this song of innocence took several years, and one sees why, since despite the rhetorical economy, all of him is in it. The beached blue whales, prematurely dying, and scattered vegetation, fallen gulls, chanting children together form a single trope, the strongest in Diamond's poetry, which we can call a trope of unseasonable death, the death-in-life of exile from the primitive. Everything in the poem is *contra naturam* except the chant of the children, and this blind return to nature, against nature, is a purely poetic protest against every reductionism, every alienation, every secular separation between life and death. Diamond has composed (perhaps with more than conscious intention) his most persuasive polemic against structuralist anthropology. His dialectical parable

seeks to present the life and death of whales, gulls, foliage as reconcilable aspects of a primitive reality, in a return to undivided consciousness. But the charm of "Whale Song" is in a subtler dialectic, dependent upon a Sunday afternoon in May so "antic" indeed that no bipolarities, for a brief time, could exist anyway. "Antic" is restored to its Hamletian sense of madness, as the whales beach themselves purposively, and the trees and dune blossoms, out of phase, go into what ought to be an autumnal exile. The whales, like Jews in Babylon, sing as they remember a phosphorescent Zion. The gulls, crucified and keening, are the reverse of Hart Crane's and Walt Whitman's gulls as images of freedom. I judge the final strength of this, Diamond's best lyric, to be its uncanny tone. Is it that the children, like the doomed gulls, can hear the whale songs? Or do the children, in their elevation, sing quite another song, beyond the opposition of life and death?

No other single lyric or meditation by Diamond seems to me so wholly adequate to the prophetic force of this anthropological vision, but I want to explore other aspects of his vision in five very different poems: "Baptism," "Curse God and Die," "Musings," "Shaman's Song," and "Visitation." The five together expand his prophetic argument, principally by yielding to a kind of countersong that darkens any hope of a return to the primitive. Here is his most Blakean meditation, "Baptism":

You are an eagle
Said the mole
Naming him

No, replied the eagle
I am the wings of God
The incarnation of his grace
The essence of flight
For whom the world was made
And the peaks of mountains
And the bright little birds
I glide above
And, observing, name.

I caress them
Their cries in my throat
Nothing I have named dies proudly.

Then the mole said:
Eagle
Blind, I dream your being
Awake, you disappear
Invisible among roots
I begin to see your body.

Why should this parable be called "Baptism"? Whatever the poet's conscious intention, his eagle and mole necessarily recall the "Motto" to Blake's *The Book of Thel*:

Does the Eagle know what is in the pit?
Or wilt thou go ask the Mole:
Can Wisdom be put in a silver rod?
Or love in a golden bowl?

Thel (whose name is from the Greek for "desire") must accept the baptism of descent from innocence to experience, descent into the mole's pit of sexuality. At her poem's conclusion, she refuses such baptism, evidently doubting that wisdom and love are to be found in the male and female emblems that Blake derives from Ecclesiastes. Diamond's eagle is as deluded as poor Thel; Diamond's mole is presumably the primitive, but the poem's dialectical strength surpasses even the dialectics of Diamond's prophetic anthropology. The eagle and the mole are both namers; in the Blakean sense they are not true contraries, but negations. Diamond's poem prefers the mole because the mole achieves a transcendence not dependent upon appropriation for himself. But can the eagle, now named by the mole, live proudly?

I do not hear Blake as much as D. H. Lawrence in the apparently Jobean "Curse God and Die," a less subtle poem than "Baptism" but still a remarkable development of the laconic and grand single self-revelation of Job's wife. In an intricate way, the poem continues Diamond's polemic against the reductionism of a structuralist anthropology:

Imagine him sitting there
constant as a crucifix
in his Savior's hell

his senses in ashes
his face burned down

to the embers of his eyes
blind as misery
and deaf
he hears her cry

come and live with me
Then the rustle of a serpent
descending

seized between the I and the I
a cinder of a man
cipher in the sacred plan
branded in Satan's mind
he is useless to her now

Curse God!

He turns his face away
as hell evolves
in heaven's place
and mutely waits
his Lord's reprieve

second Adam
to her second Eve

Job as "second Adam" is no Pauline Christ, precisely because Job's wife is "second Eve." Diamond, in his essay on "Job and the Trickster" (1972), asserts that she "represents a totally different, a more primitive perception of reality." What Diamond reads as an admonition to be faithful to self-knowledge is, I believe, the nadir of nihilism, a despair beyond dialectics. Something different from his visionary argument has gotten into Diamond's poem, something that makes it a fable of a second Fall, out of and beyond the covenant and Platonism alike. The poem is one of Diamond's most impressive, but it mistakes itself as another quest for the primitive.

Now turning to this poet's splendid exploitation of Heine at his most pungent, indeed of a prose passage in Heine that Sigmund Freud particularly admired, here is Diamond's amiably entitled "Musings":

I am a modest man
Said Heinrich Heine
Fixing an emerald in his ear

and juggling a crystal ball
On the high wire
My needs are few
(For a poet, a pagan, a German and a Jew)
all I require (to keep my balance)
is a quiet house
In the Berliner wood
Sweet William in front
A crisp roll and fresh butter
On the table each morning
My study looking down on four elm trees
One enemy hanging from each
In a formal garden
of cultured roses
And carved hedges.

This is not only elegant, but certainly concrete, existential, nominalist, and personalistic, all to the highest degree. Free of the general and the abstract, awakened from the dream of reason, Heine (and Diamond) win the relief of what I would consider primitive revelation. One could wish that Diamond worked this mode more often. More characteristic of this poet's self-identification is his "Shaman's Song":

I talk to flowers
My fingertips withstand
The glance of roses

What do you know of the Bear
His body, my spirit
Rises everywhere
Seeing what the leaf sees
And the cloud
Ambiguous as a woman
Drifting through stones

I have lain with the otter
Under white water
On beds softer than birds

What do you know of the Fox
Bearing the message of death?

In spirit, this may be regarded as addressed to Claude Lévi-Strauss, who turns man into an object, and who cannot bear what Diamond called the "extraordinary ordinariness" of poetry. But Lévi-Strauss, to Diamond, is only a surrogate for the true accuser, the Plato of *The Republic*. The last poem in *Totems* can be regarded as Diamond's strongest protest against Platonic thought, a "Visitation" indeed of the true primitive, as the exiled poem returns with the full force of the human polemic against the Ideas:

It appeared
Enormous
Filling the small room
Roaring like one of Michelangelo's angels
Wings beating against the direction of its own will
Trying to fly backward
Halted in front of the mirror
Dissembling images of birds hidden in stones
Or sketched in old iron
Debating swallows for a second of sky
Deeper than her cobalt eye
Observing
Recalling every gesture
In the chattering square
And slowly
As the speed of light
Returns.

What is definitive in this visitation is beyond the dialectical, being caught in all the self-contradictions that cohere in the poetic. As a poet, Diamond knew what he had to refuse to know as an anthropologist, which is that every sacred space always has turned out to be an interstice, that visitations are the only communion and cannot be converted into culture. The quest for the primitive is another last romanticism, whether in Whitman, Yeats, or Lawrence. But it is the poignance of Diamond's poetry, its Jobean intensity, that it seeks to cohere with the vision of his anthropology, while knowing perhaps that such coherence is always a little beyond.

References

Blake, William

1965

The Book of Thel. Clairvaux, France: Trianon Press.

Crane, Hart

1970

The Bridge. New York: Liveright.

Diamond, Stanley

1972

Introductory Essay: Job and the Trickster. *In* The Trickster, by Paul Radin, xixxii. New York: Schocken Books.

1982

Totems. Barrytown, N.Y.: Station Hill Press.

Halpern, Moshe Leib

1982

In New York, translated by Katherine Hellerstein. Philadelphia: Jewish Publication Society of America.

Nietzsche, Friedrich

1967

On the Genealogy of Morals. Translated by W. Kaufman and R. J. Hollingdale. New York: Vintage Books.

Sartre, Jean-Paul

1948

Anti-Semite and Jew. Translated by George Becker. New York: Schocken Books.

12

Going West: Poetry, Poetics, and Anthropology

Linda LeValley Cervantes

In this essay devoted to Stanley Diamond, I will show how his poetry is best considered *as* a form of anthropology; at the same time,, it is also poetry of a high order. Literary ability should be among the criteria by which anthropologists in general are judged. Feeling, sentiment, values, and points of view should not always be in the substrates of anthropological writings. The ability of more poetic literary forms to convey the subject matter of traditional anthropology is at stake here. My look at Diamond's poetry in *Going West* demonstrates that poetic consciousness can be crucial to anthropological understanding, both within and outside the academy.

Stanley Diamond ultimately addresses a meta-issue of all anthropological inquiry that is of intense interest to me. If anthropology does not include poetic language as one of its primary modes of intellectual inquiry, while the subjects that anthropology intends to study (primitives, in this case) do use such language extensively to understand the world, how well can we anthropologists fulfill our mission? Poetic language provides a magical, totemic link to the world. It is part of primitive understanding, as evidenced by any number of ethnopoetic studies. Diamond's position lies beyond and outside even these ethnopoetic works, however. His assertion is that primitive people use this language, or some approximation of it, not only on special occasions but in everyday life, to apprehend and organize their understanding of the world. The typical Westerner, unable to partake in this poetic worldview, misses a central underpinning of primitive life. Further, this refusal to think in a nonlinear, primarily poetic manner is at the root of Western alienation, meaningless death, our Western lack of self-understanding, and our disbelief in perceptual realities, hence, in the sacred.

The view prevalent in anthropology today is that such a view of primitive thought and language is romantic, not subject to proof. It

cannot be talked about without mastering a nonanthropological language (poetics). Diamond furthermore implies that the primitive state of consciousness is not only superior in its richness and penetration into the reality of things, but that it is potentially present for all of us. It is perhaps the underlying truth of human consciousness, and not simply an artifact of a particular material infrastructure.

The poet and the shaman are not exactly the same thing in Diamond's poetry, but they are close cousins. The mastery of this other language, the plunging into unfamiliar forms of consciousness, and the return to the real world with new modes of understanding expressed in a particular kind of language are common to both. The "albatross poet" ("Return to the River")¹ is a kind of anomalous Western version of the shaman. We will explore Diamond's anthropology of primitive consciousness through his invocation of shamanic themes, as he dons shamanic consciousness as part of his poetic stance. A critical point is that Diamond is not going native in attempting to capture the essence of primitive thought. He is instead doing what anthropologists do: providing a translation, a vehicle for Westerners to understand the primitive. His translation brings us closer to the original text of primitive consciousness than other translations do.

Some of the themes I explore in this paper include where Diamond gets his authority to speak in a poetic voice about native peoples, the value judgments allowed and encouraged by poetic language, and the conflicts between primitive and modern ways of thinking. Through the exploration of these themes, we shall see that Diamond acts as anthropologist *while* he is writing poetry. He does not separate and bind off these two parts of himself. Diamond wrote and published poetry before he became an anthropologist; the two modes of discourse suffuse his writing (including his nonpoetic works). One of the assumptions of poetry appears to be that personal essence not only may be included in the text, but should be included. Diamond is an anthropologist (although he was first a poet), and it is his being, filtered through other beings, that characterizes his poetry. Any argument that says his poetry should not be considered a rich anthropological resource breaks the underlying rule about poetic essence. It also breaks a major rule of anthropology, that of relativism. Whatever form Diamond's anthropology takes (including poetry) should be considered on its internal merits, not prejudged according to the canons of scientific or, better, positivistic anthropology. The

paradox of being suspended between two disciplines, then, is a major subtext. The following exegesis sheds some light on it.

Talking Animals

Totems gives a view of the cosmology and worldview that underlie Diamond's own construction of consciousness. *Going West* is the text that comes closest to illustrating my thesis: Diamond's work is, among other things, an anthropological instruction in the differences between Western civilized consciousness and Amerindian primitive consciousness. *Totems* reads, in one sense, like the field notes for *Going West*. The text is rich with color, tone, impression, and sensitivity. *Going West* contains more structure, theory, history, and plot. Together, these two volumes of poems key the reader to the inner workings of primitive consciousness as it makes its way outward. In many Native American cosmologies, the west was the place of the soul's greatest insights, the place of the setting sun, and the beginning of looking inward into the darkening realms of inner consciousness. When I speak of primitive consciousness, I mean this inner sense of being. The language by which it emerges into the world is poetic, heightened metaphoric language. What the eyes cannot see and words cannot describe in the frank light of rationality, the inner self can bring forth in its own language.

Talking animals are a problem for anthropologists. Myths and visions in which animals speak, experienced by members of many cultures, call for some kind of critical exegesis before they can fit neatly into our Western understanding. Many have followed Durkheim into a kind of swift dismissal: primitives believe that animals talk because their religious consciousness is underdeveloped. This is called "animism": the belief that stones, rivers, and animals are all alive and speaking. Diamond has an answer as to why this position should be so comfortable for the Westerner: what the animals have to say is uncomfortable to hear; to hear animals talking risks an onslaught of unrationalizable poetic images (possibly psychosis). There is no scientific explanation for talking animals.

Diamond's poetry is filled with inanimate and inarticulate beings acting and speaking with purpose, just as are the myths and musings of primitive peoples. *Going West* opens with speeches by Otter, Bear, and Turtle. Indian is grouped with these animals as a speaker in a

quartet of speech-poems, while White Man speaks fifth in shocking, unpunctuated prose. This section of *Going West*, entitled "Return to the River," speaks of the necessity of keeping the link between proper, formal Western consciousness and the ongoing flow of animal language, primitive language, and prophetic consciousness.

Otter speaks first, not his usual playful self. "Dying in my own river / My estranged river / Not even cleanly wounded / By the arrow of a friend / My other half / Not even really wounded / But poisoned." The ugliness of contemporary Western ecological damage is framed by the old way of death, which was a proper death. A clean death is impossible in this polluted river. The last poem of the book, "How to Die in America," continues on this theme of the clean death, and explores whether Westerners have lost the capacity for a proper death (much less a proper life).

Indians knew how to participate cleanly, as the "other half" in the dance of death and consciousness. They ("the Mohicans, the Algonquins") "knew That they must depend on us for their souls." Diamond shows us why this is not just superstition or animism. If one animal is left, "She can remember the whole past / Because one of us / Is all of us / That is our strength / That you can never understand / We are born knowing / But we cannot think." One needs to know this about animal wisdom to participate lovingly in killing animals. The lack of individual consciousness on the part of Otter is her strength; she reaches back into the past and up into the future, because she does not change in the ways that humans change.

Otter's speech equates an old Indian myth of misshapen evil ("The head of a wolf / Its arms were the arms of a spider / But it walked upright") with the future, and the future is the world of the white man, of Western civilization. It is a deformed, mutated world, "searching for its other half," for completion, which it cannot find. Otter knows before Indian that the coming of the white man is the beginning of the end.

This kind of otter knowing, which Diamond attributes to the Otter itself, and not necessarily to our perception of the Otter, is critical for prophecy and thus for survival. In its prophetic capacity, Otter is spirit, is god. Its prophetic ability is not a supernatural power, it is an intense attunement to the state of the river, to the level of unhealthy poisons in the environment.

When Bear speaks next, we learn that the river is not only the physical womb of life, but its spiritual womb as well the stream of

consciousness. Bear speaks less of shifts in its environment and more of shifts in its relationship with Indians, because Indians used Bear to reach into the spirit world. "They hunted us / Like the eagle hunts the sun . . . / Our skulls their shrines." Bear knows that "silence is only what cannot be heard." Animal hearing, of course, is of a different magnitude than human hearing, thus the special relationship of animal to all that is. Animal can simply hear more. Bear has a responsibility to Indian, and vice versa. Indian honors Bear in ritual and in hunt, and Bear teaches Indian's sons "respect for the hunted." Respect for the hunted, as a spiritual value, forms a frame for an ensuing discussion of the Indian practice of ritual torture of captured enemies.

Since Bear hears in the silences, Bear is a natural interpreter of events, "he who observes man," in other words, a natural anthropologist, and a better anthropologist than the woman, Emma, who appears later in the text. Bear observes that the hunt, lusty and bloody though it is, bestows single-pointed consciousness, bringing the Indian consciousness to deeper levels. Torture teaches what pain is about and teaches the intimate relationship between birth, pain, and rebirth. The women conduct the torture because they know this relationship more intimately than the men, and the "victim" of the torture thanks the torturers for the lesson.

Hence, in a few swift stanzas, Diamond circles and reveals most of what anthropologists attempt to theorize about Native American matricentrism: that women chose chiefs but refused to rule, that ruling as we understand it today is a kind of submission. Women, eternally focused on the process of pain, birth, rebirth, naming, and generation, teach men about the nature of the power of the earth. "The earth does not rule, it supports / It creates / It is various." Yet what greater vision of power can exist than that of the earth itself, especially for Bear?

Bear is pointed in his assessment of White Man, ruiner of the indigenous Bear/Otter/Indian world. White Man imprisons animals and mistakes their lack of human speech for stupidity. This other order of speech, which is so important, is simply not known to White Man. Not only can he not hear the animals, he "cannot speak to the forest / To the river / In the way of the Munsee Shaman." This inability to speak is rooted in a failure of love; "they love nothing / *In the particular.*" Love, for White Man, is an abstraction, not a thing felt/spoken/acted in real time.

Turtle speaks last, of the animals. Turtle owes his mythic existence to the naming power of Indian. Had not Indian watched and listened, Turtle's mythic presence would never have been he would have been comical and odd, instead. This naming power, the power to change, to save, or to destroy, is at the root of this poetic, shamanic language, and it is the thing least understood by White Man and by anthropology at large. If it were better understood, it would be talked about endlessly before the kind of analytical naming that anthropologists practice was ever indulged in. Indeed, of all the white men, it seems to me that social scientists are most guilty (or capable) of this kind of unconscious changing through naming. Turtle says it best:

Who am I
Did not exist
Until they named me
Nothing at all
Even in fantasy
But after all
Something was there
They had to name it
To bring me in

Turtle is a storm of contradictions, introducing themes that wind themselves through all of Diamond's work: dualism, paradox, and mediation/transcendence. Turtle's power over the Indian imagination (they saw him as the one who carried the world on his back, a fundamental moving force) rests in his ability to mediate/transcend contradiction: water-earth; inside-outside; rattler-otter; safe-dangerous. Indians named him "trickster" and "one became what one is named." The correspondence between this belief in the power of Word and John's mystical Christianity is not lost on Diamond. Turtle also says, "In the beginning is the word / And at the end / That's all there is." Turtle's sense of time, because his form of life is so ancient and unchanging, is that everything is simultaneous. Turtle speaks from a point of view approaching eternity. The valley of consciousness, the "rainbow in the wind" that is Indian life, will disappear, but not as the result of evil. Evil dissolves in this timeless view. Otter's, demons are not evil, only "senseless the way we were . . . Before being named."

Thus naming (the poetic act) is understood fully by the animals and is the key to transforming evil. The shimmering, perfect mo-

ment, the thing to strive for, is a result of this poetic engagement with the world. It represents that state of being both at one with and understanding the world. The world seems difficult and apart from oneself until it is named or known. It must be called by its true name, according to both the nature of the namer and the named. Those who unname, or forget names, will lose their minds or die. This vision of the path to immortality is powerful, coming from Turtle. But, as we shall see, it is all lost on the white oppressor.

Indian speaks. Indian blames himself for the betrayal of the land, because he believed White Man's lies. Indian should have seen what Turtle saw: that White Man is senseless, his life is divided into compartments, his goal is to build machines that "devour the world." The Indian, with the wisdom of hindsight, feels he should have known better than to trust men who came without women, without wise elders to guide them. Indian mistook White Man for his "other half."

Naturally enough, given Diamond's underlying subtext that anthropologists are not always as good at their work as bears and otters and those whom they purport to study, Diamond's Indian voice is posing a critical anthropological question. If primitive consciousness possesses such power and prophetic ability, why didn't the Indians sense more about what to do about the white man? Diamond's Indian does not answer this question, except to say that the Indian made a mistake and trusted his white brothers too much. The answer comes, I believe, in the penultimate segment of "Return to the River"the First White Man's speech.

The mistake of the Indian was in trusting White Man's concepts of "nothing" and "something." White Man sees that the Indian is doing nothing with the land, and he is therefore justified in paying nothing in order to own it, which is to do something with it "knowing the pagans were God's first mistake." White Man introduces the concepts of progress and of stages, in which the Indian is properly left behind. Riane Eisler (1987) calls these "dominator" concepts. These are concepts that by their nature subsume and erode more egalitarian or spiritual codes of being. The two cannot coexist without the second code of concepts overpowering the first. The timelessness in which the older concepts existed without interference is the precept of "Return to the River." The river went on endlessly, timelessly (as Turtle says), until White Man came west, and the end began.

The second white man, albatross poet, would return things to their proper, earlier names. He would bring back the precepts as they stood before the dominator concepts turned the tables. It is this

insight that is often considered irrelevant or romantic within mainstream anthropology. Going native, or returning to the primitive, are not the stuff of proper anthropological speech. Like the anthropologist, Emma, introduced in a later poem in *Going West*, the job of the academic observer is to partake in the primitive in a limited way, to "preserve" it and thus to "immortalize" it. Her role is not to unite with the primitive. To speak with the voice of the primitive myth, which is to write poetry, falls outside anthropology.

Yet, as I have just tried to show, Diamond's anthropology is as vivid as if he had written a monograph, and the parts usually left out of the academic treatise are the things that move both Diamond and me. Diamond qualifies himself to move/affect/teach us in this manner, not through the recitation of fact and method, but through the gathering of spirit and nuance. I believe that the animals are speaking through Diamond because he has immersed himself in the river, as many of the poems in *Totems* show. Indeed, the intense, lyrical ("sublime," according to Dan Rose [1983]), non-narrative poetics of *Totems* shows us the natural world; Diamond draws on that world to speak for others.

For example, in "The Green Years" (*Totems*) a great train halts, pausing in a "landscape / vertical with flowers / taut with trees / evergreen / spruce, cypress, pine and fir / that shed the terraced hours / grass like damp fur in an upward climb / cornering time under red tile roofs." We already see the landscape behind the still machine, the natural world holding out its poignancy once the bang of the engine has stopped. Annis Pratt notes this as a theme in the poetry of the anima, in the poetry of those abandoning concepts that strive to dominate and embracing the world of timelessness and poetic energy (1981). Diamond's engagement with this world is typical of that experience, familiar to anthropologists who travel to places where machines stop and who are offered the opportunity to listen to the various landscapes of the planet. The juxtaposition of man-made against the natural continues throughout *Totems* and *Going West*. It is hard to do anything but share Diamond's vision that the sky and winds are proper destinies (not metaphors) for the soul, while business suits and misery occupy their own domain. In "The Laying Out" (*Totems*), he writes again of the two different deaths (much as Otter hinted):

Jews bury their dead in business suits
Anglicans in unction and misery

Vestments of the elect
Catholics where they fall
As shadows intersect
The Crow, Apache, Arikara
Raise the corpse to cauterizing winds
And escort the spirit with buffalo gongs
While hawks congregate
In a corner of sky

This natural sphere of sky, wind, and blown grass becomes "the garden of essences" in "Sacred Grove" (*Totems*), in which Eden images serve the same purpose but do not flow from the same intention as the Indian burial grounds: to root the poetic consciousness in something eternal that is sensed primarily in nature. Yet, Diamond's primary sense of reality asserts itself in the final lines: "This place seems permanent / the garden of essences / original, sublime / the stopped axis of the world / longing for an enemy of God / to give it back to time."

Thus, I wish to avoid any suggestion that Diamond's vision of nature is euphoric or sentimental. In poems like "Pure Ecology," "The Sun Sees Everything," "Rumor," and "Microcosm," the teeming underworld of earth, light, mantis, roach, and caterpillar reveals the "hysteria of ecology" ("Pure Ecology") that underlies and encircles the potential for natural epiphany. A whole series of poems in *Totems* engages the animal kingdom (foxes, dinosaurs, whales, gulls, cobras, swans, hummingbirds, ravens, tigers, eagles, tortoises, wild dogs, hares, hyenas, rhinoceros, lions, shetland ponies, monkeys, dancing bears, circus cheetahs, leopards, moles) in much the way a shaman engages the animal kingdom, in order to observe and learn the central human lessons. *Totems* is Diamond's shamanic preparation for the more anthropological learning of *Going West*. The eagle learns and teaches this central lesson in "Baptism" (*Totems*).

The essential contribution of each element, of each being to the totality of nature is addressed here, which is why the Indians listen to animals, after all. Without a serious attempt on the anthropologist's part to listen to animals, to the totality, the language of the Indian becomes quaint, rhetorical, and dead. Anthropologists, of course, make clichés of and trivialize language/meanings in this context because they do not take seriously the native worldview regarding animals. But to take it seriously is to engage the natural world oneself,

which is usually left to naturalists and zoologists, or to religious practitioners and poets.

The signs and symbols of *Totems* provide the base for Diamond to move into history in *Going West*. The attention to omens and new language given by animals ("crow-winged sky" ["Obelisks"], "a driftwood cross piloted by sharks" ["Homecoming"], "clocks tick / the color of peacocks" ["En Route"]) eventually gives way to the actual, convincing, shocking speech of animals in *Going West*.

Diamond worked for this consciousness of the animal sense, of the totemic sense of inanimate and nonhuman forms. He allowed the visions to speak through him, rather than parsing them in traditional anthropological fashion. *Going West* is thus able to start with a bedrock of mythic tradition, and to frame and reframe the story of the westward movement against that other, more primitive consciousness. Diamond does not start here because his subject matter tells him to; he starts here, with the speaking animals, because the animals spoke to him in that way.

Dualisms and Resolutions

Anthropologists are enamored of structure, of coded ways of speaking that allow some kind of rationalistic, quasi-mathematical reduction of what goes on around them. At the same time, it is perfectly true that the use of dualistic structures, opposites and pairs, is not confined to anthropologists. Anthropologists did not invent the notion of logical or dialectical opposites, or of moieties, or of primitive and civilized. Diamond's poetry especially convinces us of the latter, while the former have been demonstrated amply by a host of Western scholars.

Diamond shows intrinsic dualisms again and again. A thing is either named or unnamed. A death is proper or it is not. Without boundaries, there could be no concept of *Going West* at all; the idea of a continent divided out in parcels to be captured by White Man depends on structure, divisions, dualisms.

The moiety system is a natural duplicity. One side of the village is bear, the other fish. One side is female, the other male. One side is sun, the other moon, "and at the winter ceremony in the canyon / moon married sun / each year the halves were joined / and all division ceased."

To live in a divided world is an "ordeal" ("Paper Cities") and a

central cause of alienation and madness. The divided mind reflects the divided world, and the word "divided" means all forms of boundary making. The dualisms of the primitive consciousness were natural and still had to be mediated/transcended through spiritual work, by the persons who looked on. But the dualisms of the civilized world are like cancer; they run on and on without limit, choking out any possibility of transcendence and making no attempt to mediate. The title piece of *Going West* makes clear Diamond's belief that the hard work of mediation/transcendence over the natural dualisms is far beyond the ability of civilizers who work their way west into Indian lands, beyond the Shenandoah gap. The westward-moving pioneers possess an "immensity" but "[s]till, we built / hedges, windrows / thick houses with small windows / against the empty terror of the plain."

Into this mapped territory comes the Reverend, a Boston minister, who provides an ideology of righteousness to fit this breaking up of the plains. "A community of purpose, he said." It is difficult, at first, to tame the land *and* give purpose to the work. Purpose implies a moral, nonopportunistic connection to the work at hand. He tells the settlers they are "natural aristocrats," drawing on the European tradition of nobility to give them a sense of self equal to the possession of all this broken-up immensity. The idea that aristocracy is somehow superior in itself bestows, he implies, moral purpose on the endeavor. The wildness, the resistance of the land, is reflected in the wildness of the horses who go "slightly crazy" in their stalls at the sight of the moon, some of them escaping, others, crying, condemned to the plow. As the work horses resign themselves, the plains gradually become fertile. The taming of the land, with nobility and wealth both as goals, is accomplished under the classist banner. The land, the horses, the Indians are all conquered because of the inability of a dominator, classist model to coexist with an egalitarian, communal one (cf. Eisler 1987).

Diamond's imagery in this poem draws a series of triangles and arrows pointing in various directions: the geese point south, the sunflowers move from east to west, the triangles of hedgerows and of the Indian arrowheads point to safety and danger. As the plain is domesticated and all these boundaries mapped and noted, the "first American" sensual, footloose, a desperado appears in the plains settlement. Diamond briefly introduces a series of characters and themes that populate the public imagination of the westward movement: mountain boy, murder, the wanderer, cavalry, merchant,

hunter-farmer. The entire story of the westward movement is compressed into sixteen pages, with not a lot missing.

The judgmental language of this poem is one of the boundary-crossing elements that Diamond uses to set his poetry apart from traditional anthropology. The hunter-farmers are after the "bounty of the buffalo and the red man's head / This is a free country, they said / The Cavaliers took what they could / and we will take whatever we can." The hunter-farmers are on the move westward, "leaving the niggers behind." Their ticket to righteousness, in their own minds, is that they are attempting a noble community (they love their children and they aspire to the "superior" lifestyle of aristocrats), and they are bringing with them ministers of God. God, through his ministers, not only places a stamp of approval on the settlers' activities but helps to direct them. In this short sequence, Diamond juxtaposes the oppositions of supposed godliness and greed, religion and racism. It is perfectly clear that Diamond does not find much to admire in White Man's trek across the land, but he finds a lot to ponder over. The entire book becomes not only an indictment of racism, bigotry, classism, false divisions, and antinaturalism but an historical revelation of genocide/ethnocide and their consequences.

The priests teach the white men to take their center with them, to believe the illusion that wherever they are is home, is theirs. It is theirs by virtue of standing on the land and looking up to God, creating a movable *axis mundi*. This captures, I think, the essential feeling of ownership (a God-given right, by damn!). Never mind that it is necessary to invent the cavalry, the automatic weapon, and the massacre to truly possess the land and drive the Indians away. To the second generation settlers, it appears they must kill Indians. "We have no choice / nowhere to turn."

As the westward vision falters, a new voice, mercantilism, rises up to sustain it. The aristocratic, personal vision that the Reverend urges upon his farmer flock is not quite up to condoning full-scale genocide. Another purpose, another set of moral reasons is needed. Once the land is possessed by farmers, the Indian problem must be dealt with, and mere farming-possession of the land is not a sufficient rationale for wholesale slaughter. An entire envisioned mercantile system is pressed into service as a progressive necessity, trains and roads and markets beyond imagining. Those settlers who might not share in this vision, preferring to think of themselves merely as new neighbors in this vast land, have no real voice, because once the

Indians are slaughtered, the land is simply there, open, waiting for new uses.

Having crossed the boundary into genocide, the settlers have changed the landscape. The Reverend, up until now the speaker for natural dominion over the land, is struck by guilt and powerful visions of carnage and loss and flees back east. His bastard son, who has no place in either east or west, stays on. This liminal character, Ishmael, neither of the past nor of the future, is a direct descendant of the Reverend. The Reverend stood on one side of a clear-cut moral dividing line; the Reverend believed in himself and in the God who directed the westward movement. Ishmael, however, is so torn by a sudden sense of ultimate duality ("one thing could never be another") that he goes mad. He is himself a dual person, and the world he lives in is unnaturally divided.

he found no ritual of union
in his bisected mind
twisting in a seizure
right side in ice
left side on fire
his spirit split apart
into the inner and the outer

The westward movement, captured so well in all its major historical symbolism, contains this great paradox, which is much more complex. The unresolved dualism, the paradox, is a large subject, and I can only draw its simpler outlines here.

The liminal character, Ishmael, has no place to turn. He can't go back to the civilization that existed before the Indians were killed, but there is no civilization or order in the new post-massacre world. It is instead a mausoleum. To live inside a mausoleum is an ultimate contradiction. He sees nature and culture completely divided. The civilized world of the past rested on entirely different principles than the bloodied world of the present. The present world appears to be natural but has been unnaturally brutalized. It cannot appear as a garden or a paradise or in any other form that would motivate one to wish to possess it and transform it. The inner reality that the settlers wanted a home in the vast plains that would ultimately allow them the kind of landowner lifestyle of their aristocratic betters in the old order is nowhere to be found. There is no one to look up to them or to give them the template for the old order. The lack of congruence

between inner and outer is the age-old source of madness, and so Ishmael appears to go mad, staring up at the sun, dying of blindness. He at least is able to blot out the outer reality in this act, and in so doing to attract the souls of Indians who take him on to the spirit world.

This fantasy of atonement, in which the second-generation settler, wracked with pain over the impossibility of noble living in the midst of massacre, is absolved by Indians, provides mediation, if not transcendence; the latter must take place in death, since the Indians and their ways are dead, but it is still a ritual of union. Ishmael elects to cross over, in a sense, into the dead world of the Indians, wherein moral absolution truly lies.

The resolutions here are too rich to delve into fully, but they include the mediation of life and death through the upward, spiral dance of the spirit into the afterlife. Blindness nullifies the impossibility of joining inner and outer vision, thus obviating madness. Ishmael's arms lengthen to touch the Indians, heretofore untouchable. The man with no place on earth (a bastard in a bloodied land where even his father has fled their original purpose) finds a place in the spirit world.

I think Diamond is contrasting the Indian spiritual view with our futility. The resolution occurs not through the Reverend's useless injunctions: he is unable to conduct any Christian ritual that would save Ishmael. Ishmael moves into the world of Indian ritual and ceremony and is thereby saved. The Indians are gone, but as Vine DeLoria has said, the soul of the land, its spiritual essence, its proper religious ritual, still belongs to the Indian.

Anthropologists, of course, are not supposed to support the theory and practice of native religious systems, nor are they supposed to advocate conversion to their own. Yet, it seems impossible to treat Indian subject matter properly without an immense regard for the power, resolution, and transcendence of ritual and ceremony. If Diamond is right and the bisected mind is the source of madness and ill health (dis-ease), then the Navajo sand painters and all the other native Shamans of wholeness and restitution have got the proper idea. I believe that this is what Diamond says in *Going West* and that this is something nonpoetic anthropology cannot and does not say.

The Domain of Feeling and Judgment

Diamond moves from the massacres on the plains to the dynamics involved in the urbanization of the Indian. "Paper Cities" also tells

the story of an anthropologist attempting to penetrate one of the mesas. The protagonists of both stories are women, Hummingbird and Emma. In the first section of the poem, Hummingbird leaves the mesa, where all things are interrelated, and gets on a bus to the city.

Hummingbird is an acute observer, able to predict the actions of an amorous white man on the bus. Once she leaves the mesa, she is subject to an entirely different definition of love than the one among her own people. The instant passion of the white man on the bus, with whom she casually sleeps, is contrasted with the love that takes a "grandfather's lifetime" to learn. "Love is experience, not illusion." The white man is insistent about his instant, eternal love. She names him a "cannibal" who wants to hide himself inside her body.

The rather stark contrast between the two perceptions, one native and one modern, is again value laden in exactly the sense that anthropology attempts to avoid. Much of classical ethnography avoids any comparison, any pretense at understanding the emotional universe of other human beings well enough to contrast it with our own.

Yet white men, including anthropologists, are, of course, immersed in their own web of feelings, as is the white man on the bus. In the case of the man on the bus, his feelings, which are very real for him, obscure the true nature of his beloved, his subject, who consequently becomes a mere object. This runs parallel to the love of Emma for the Indian people. Emma insists that her anthropological purpose is good and will immortalize the Indian people about whom she cares so much. The Indians see it otherwise, feel it otherwise. Diamond is referring not merely to ideological differences here, but to radical differences in emotional style, transference, and projection. In fact, he clearly questions whether the obscuring forces we call transference and projection exist in the Indian consciousness, in the consciousness of the Other, of people living in a less modern world.

In a memorable section of "Paper Cities" entitled "Hummingbird Arrives," Diamond draws out this essential contrast in the ways that Indians and white men see themselves. The very process of looking at oneself is different in the two worlds. The whites place mirrors everywhere, and nothing is what it seems. The Indian seeks self-reflection in the river in the center of the canyon, in one place, centered in the natural world and in the flow of the river. This section sets up extra irony for the next section, "Hummingbird Learns About Her People," since now the anthropologist, Emma, attempts to teach Hummingbird about her own people in the context of these two kinds of self-reflection and feeling.

Emma's incredible arrogance is of course invisible to Emma, despite all the mirrors available to her. Emma's attempts to enter the Indian village to start her fieldwork have already revealed that she is attempting to be humble, to learn, to do what young anthropologists are taught to do: make themselves useful in some way to the people they study. The Indians find nothing useful about her. Emma promises that her study of them will help keep them alive. This is the essence of her arrogance. Years later, when Hummingbird visits Emma in her museum, she finds no liveliness in Emma's preservation of the Indian.

The Indians are astute about the purpose of Emma's anthropology. They ask whether her advisers in the university are as clear about her purpose as she is. Have these advisers sent her merely to help keep the Indians alive? The nonanthropologist might miss the double meaning here. Emma, of course, has a research agenda, probably very narrow, and intends to study some specific element of social structure or cultural life. The words she speaks to gain entry are not related to that purpose. Like most anthropologists, Emma sees no contradiction. Emma, apparently, has no inkling that the Indians see straight through her. Emma eventually becomes "a jackal," "not writing what she said she was." The anthropological process of interpreting what Indians say and do within another framework falsifies the Indian reality. "Why do you ask / if you think it is false / said Uncle Acoma." Emma does not answer but merely writes the question down. Her lack of engagement on the terms asked by Uncle Acoma (in this case merely to answer a question) dooms her anthropology to a distant, and distancing, bisected view.

The Indians attempt to teach Emma the difference between true and false by showing her the Kachina dance, the trickster dancing with the holy man, "belief and disbelief." She is shown "the uncertainty / of everything but our earth bound will / within the sunken chamber / of ourselves." Emma literally flees from the ritual, ashamed to look into this inner chamber as the source of ultimate reality. Later, she refers to the ritual and says it made her an Indian. But the Indians note that she could never truly stand their presence.

What is this kind of anthropology about? Emma grasps, as I have mentioned, that Indian consciousness is a kind of metaphor, a kind of poetry, that she refers to as dreaming. But here Diamond has the Indians refute this understanding. Indian language is not simply poetry, it exists in another dimension of life altogether. I hope that I

have captured this sense of another dimension by referring to their language, in Diamond's (and not only his) vision, as poetic. It is clear that there is no reduction to be made, no translation.

Indian/primitive consciousness is not simply the other half of our own, our lost dreaming. Uncle Acoma says, enigmatically, "We are not human beings."

No anthropology, and no poetics, can begin to understand or translate this totality of difference. The stance of anthropology has and must be that there are no such total differences, that we are all human. But Emma and Uncle Acoma cannot exist side by side in the same dimension of understanding, even when Emma grasps at applying the rules of metaphor. Her very presence is threatening to the Indian reality/being. "You . . . are only a fuse burning toward us / to ruin us / the way the mine ruined the valley." When Uncle Acoma offers to give her one brief moment of seeing from his perspective, which it is in his power to give (he offers to let her see a leaf "a thing and not a thing / a word"), Emma, in panic, loses her soul and ceases to exist as a spiritual being, a real human being.

Diamond is indicting Emma's hermeneutics here, rather than the idea of a poetic/primitive consciousness. *Going West* as a whole attests to Diamond's belief that poetic consciousness allows one to merge with an otherwise alien consciousness, as in his poetry animals speak, and the Indian from another dimension speaks. It is not the idea of poetic consciousness within the primitive that he is refuting here in the voice of Uncle Acoma. It is the wasted anthropological attempt to reduce such poetry to interpretation, to replace poetic vision with hermeneutics. It is because Emma is unable to enter into the poetic vision but instead attempts to interpret and write it down that Uncle Acoma refutes her viewpoint and attempts to send her into the next dimension. This other dimension is the lived poetic consciousness, not the studied one.

By the time Hummingbird catches up with Emma in the university museum, Emma is a respected expert "on the people of the Pueblo." Emma assumes Hummingbird is in need of aid, and also that she has the capability of helping further Emma's career. So she promises Hummingbird immortality for her people and money for herself if she will become an informant on her people's ways. Standing in the museum, Hummingbird focuses on an expropriated Kachina and refuses. Emma threatens Hummingbird with death for her people and their culture if she will not cooperate, and Hummingbird's inner

wisdom tells her to pretend to be dead to escape. Emma is another kind of Reverend: she preaches a religion of immortality versus hellfire and damnation, all within control of her church.

All of this posits intricate strategies in which anthropology is supposed to gain a foothold and reveal truth. Within this vision, in which entire cultures play dead in order to escape the encapsulating gaze of the science, anthropology is impossible. Threatening other cultures with extinction by ignoring them, anthropology plays God. Indeed, the gaze of anthropology often makes cultures appear dead. The artifacts in the museum appear dead, Hummingbird's people appear almost dead to Emma, and Hummingbird effectively pretends death to Emma, confirming Emma's beliefs. In Diamond's view, urban Indians are not dead Indians. Primitive or Indian consciousness didn't just die or go away. Anthropologists may, however, refuse to see it or name it.

This deadness is caused by missing the other dimension in which Indians exist, by appropriating bits of culture and viewing them out of context, by writing things down instead of living them. Instrumental rationality, hermeneutics, reductionism, field method, museum method, and inhumanity are all indicted here. These are the elements of impending doom. The poem cycle ends with Hummingbird's return to her mesa and her prophetic vision of complete shutdown for the city:

the trains will refuse to run
the police will drop their clubs
and stumble through the city
the letters will stop in their chutes
the firemen will disobey the alarm bells
suddenly the dynamos will die
and in the elevators
stuck in their shafts
people fearing each other
will at first be silent
then moan
like those groping their way
through an infernal sleep

The demise of Western culture, seen in the vision of an Indian who has stood on both sides of the dividing line between Indian and white, comes from the inability to enter into the proper realm of consciousness, which the Western tradition calls primitive. The In-

dians await the day when, magically, the force of Western consciousness curls in upon itself and brings the entire structure down.

The Language of Judgment

Diamond speaks with the voice of the tribal people, using English-language equivalents. The events recounted paint a dismal picture of white Western civilization. In "Return to the River," and again in "Encounters," White Man is the polluter, the poisoner, the power-mad mass murderer of animals and people. In "Encounters," African tribesmen reveal that white men (by polluting the environment) are poisoning the breasts of their women and denying them room to plant crops. They are being starved out of existence, literally. The hunter-farmers in "Going West" refer to blacks as "niggers" and claim a natural right to both Indian lands and superiority over darker races. The ironically named "first" American, the Wanderer of "Going West," is furtive, impassive, rootless, always moving, predatory, and untrustworthy but competent, while the Reverend sees clearly all the deaths he has helped to cause: of buffalo, badger, wolf, fox, and Indian. Emma is soulless and deals in death. She is fearful and unable to speak truth about the very subject she claims as her source of importance. The grim irony of her situation goes beyond her incompetence: she actually believes she can deal in life. This belief, that one is dealing out life while one is dealing out death, underlies all moral purpose in genocide. Genocidal movements do not view themselves as evil and dead; they view themselves as necessary, moral, and righteous. The tribesmen of "Encounter" call the white man "white ape / invader," people who lead nowhere. Hummingbird's vision shows the white way leading nowhere, into oblivion and extinction. Only the white man appears afraid of death. He has no communal/everyday spirituality, no contact with his ancestors. He has created an unloving death, as Otter mourns.

White Man confuses spirit with material object, is obsessed with ownership and possession, invents genocide. His voice is dead and dry, "fading to [a] little point in time and space" ("Encounters"), not immortal, threatening others with death. The problem, again and again, is his type of consciousness. Though everything conspires to teach him Indian, Land, Animal, Spirit, Ritual lessons cannot penetrate his acquisitive society. He is unable to hold knowledge when it is given to him. This is the barrier that Uncle Acoma speaks

of and is the lack of a "basket" that the Uja tells in "Encounter." The entire wisdom of the ages could be poured into White Man, but he could not contain it, for he has no inner basket, no holding place for knowledge. The baskets he covets are physical baskets, while the basket that the Uja points out to him is a "basket of water," able to contain the river of consciousness, able to contain magic, able to contain what non-Western consciousness would give him.

Diamond's greatest departure, and perhaps the primary reason for this book, is to convey these ultimate judgments beneath ethnographic and historic fact. There is little sympathy for White Man in *Going West*, and the facts seem to say that he deserves little. But anthropology steers clear of condemnation, except in oblique and obscure phraseology. Nothing in anthropology comes close to naming the ignorance of White Man as the Uja does in "Encounters," or as the animals do in "Return to the River."

Diamond denies anthropology any basis for obtaining such a position: as long as the anthropologist remains devoted to analysis, recording, and preservation (as Emma is), White Man cannot enter into the ongoing flow of natural consciousness. White Man does not even possess the rudimentary tool, a basket, for doing so.

Poetics and Politics

Going West depends for its structure on an interior time line that begins with the ancient voices of animals and ends with the urban white man dying disaffected and alienated. The movement, from natural to material, rural to urban, resolved/transcended to unresolvable, named to unnamed, reflects a central concern with irrevocable change. Diamond's concern with the resolution contradiction, which is present in both his poetics and in the subject matter about which he writes (moieties, for example), provides a central politics for the poems even as it provides structure. All the split-off opposites of modern life cry out for resolution, transformation.

The poetry itself is powerful, and exquisitely provocative. I have already spoken of the ways in which such an attempt is foreign to conventional anthropology. Now I shall discuss the ways in which the essential language and structure of Diamond's poetry compares and contrasts with that of more ordinary, prosaic anthropology. Frequently, the two are concerned with the same set of historical facts. Indeed, Diamond's time frame feels anthropological. We do not sus-

pect that he is making any of this time frame up. Urbanization did occur, the Indians were shoved off their lands, the conquest and its terrible consequences were real.

Within the shamanic context, the leap into the shamanic state consists in the audience's belief that the shaman speaks truth. Even when speaking of the bizarre, or the tragically unbelievable, or the supernatural, the shaman is believed. He is believed not because he documents his reality or provides extensive field notes, but because of his presentation of his material and his presentation of self. He is believed for reasons inherent in the shamanic paradigm. Diamond is believed for reasons inherent in the poetic paradigm, but the foundation for believability is the same as in anthropology or shamanism: the audience has, ultimately, an instinctive or deeply held feeling for the truth.

Diamond's truth is not empirically proved but is believed for reasons having to do with the basics of human experience. In shortly to be published poems about the Holocaust, Diamond touches on the kind of truth that Holocaust survivors and participants both know in their hearts. One believes the poems about the Holocaust because they are filled with the nuance, feeling, and detail that most of us associate only with the actually experienced. The incidents detailed in the Holocaust series of poems and in *Going West* are terribly true for me; no one could make these things up. The poems convince with their language, their depth of observation, and their tone. We do not need facts, figures, or photos. This ritualized, narrative poem creates a truth of its own that has to reflect reality.

If one does not hear Diamond's voice in *Going West* or in the Holocaust poems as truthful, I believe the narrative fails, but not the poetry, of course. If, for example, one believes (even after reading the poems) that the Holocaust never happened or that the Indian just naturally died out (like the dinosaur), then the narrative has not worked. It is the task of Diamond's language to convey through specific cues that it is truthful (not necessarily realistic). These cues, of course, vary from culture to culture and from subculture to subculture. The term *truthful* must be rendered to connote something like "a point of view deeply affecting to us and upon which we will base action and feeling." The "us" is critical. The reader needs to feel part of Diamond's broader worldview, but the reader also needs to feel that the poems will convince within the broader culture/subculture within which the reader exists. For example, the reader needs to come away from the Holocaust poems with the idea that genocide

really occurred, that the evidence that it occurred is overwhelming and will be believed by sensible persons, and that the feelings Diamond evokes in relation to the Holocaust are shared by oneself and others. The difficulty of some traditional anthropologists to accept poetic visions of reality lies partly in their subcultural view that traditional anthropology is "scientific" and therefore "truthful" and convincing, while poetic anthropology is not. This misses the point of greatest interest, which is whether or not the text at hand holds out truths that positivism/scientism cannot touch or even duplicate.

In *Going West*, this sense of truth or conviction inheres in the form/content of Diamond's poetics. Each one of us notices in our own customary (presumably unique) way. We do not look through other people's eyes. To do so would be magical, and yet we can be convinced we are seeing through Hummingbird's eyes or Turtle's senses. Hummingbird notices the "whitest man" she's ever seen and it seems she is at least as fully aware as her audience of the symbolic nuances of her encounter with this man. The use of symbol is within the character's voice, not an omniscient poet's. And the use of language breaks a rule of anthropological speech. Anthropologists speak about, not for, others. The merging of the reader's point of view with the speaker's, if it occurs as it did for me, is again magical. It is also an act of transformation, proving that certain kinds of barriers we take for granted in modern life can be broken.

In "Paper Cities" Hummingbird's point of view moves into places that are beyond the grasp of the whitest man, and we can attempt to move with her and hope we understand her, or we can remain mystified as the whitest man does. Increased mystification here seems to be a function of increased whiteness, that is, of Westernization. This naturally urges the reader to attempt to make a leap out of whiteness and into Hummingbird's domain. She is the hero and the whitest man is not someone with whom we wish to identify (although, of course, we do, uncomfortably). Hummingbird teaches the whitest man about love among her people:

I do not know you
and you do not love me
you cannot love me
it takes a grandfather's lifetime
to learn to love among my people
we must live and work together

for many years, through many lives
and we learn to give ourselves
first to the spirits of the earth
and then to the children
and then to the gifts that we have been given
by our ancestors
all the things we make
and to the rituals through which we die
and learn to live again
many times in a lifetime
then and only then can a woman love a man
and a man a woman
love is experience,
not illusion
it is life's way
not a trick of nature
the end
not the beginning
but I love you he repeated

If we grasp the world that Hummingbird describes, we see a spiritual/cultural worldview beyond the whitest man's grasp. Still, we understand why he persists in his own feelings. We see two worldviews side by side. This intimate juxtaposition of viewpoints, on a bus, engaged through the lust of the whitest man and the quest of the Indian woman, rings true. Because she speaks in conversational discourse, adequately contextualized, we believe her. She is not a disembodied voice speaking on love among the Indians. She is earnestly attempting to explain her ways to a man she is about to sleep with. There is a thick web of meaning between Hummingbird and the whitest man. Hummingbird, speaking with keen motivation and intensity to her would-be lover, is heard as speaking truth. It is in such encounters, in real life, that most of us expect to hear a particular kind of truth. We have suspended critical judgments of the type we use in reading analytical treatises, and we are open to the kind of truth Hummingbird brings to consciousness.

Diamond erects such contexts throughout *Going West* and in his Holocaust poems he intensifies this use of thick webs of context. In some passages of *Going West*, Diamond goes for intensely evocative language, rather than contextualized point-of-view and facticity. This

language aims at perfect descriptions ("moribund river, leaden sky"). *Going West* is not primarily a descriptive work. It relies less on the search for perfect language and more on context, use of historical fact, use of a historylike time frame, narrative, detail, voice, and point of view. *Totems*, on the other hand, displays a use of language that achieves gemlike phrasing, lyrics that are sufficient unto themselves, the kind of language most of us equate with poetic vision, as in "Homecoming."

The white buildings settle like gulls
On the bony hills that rim the beach
A driftwood cross
Piloted by sharks
Sceptres in the scarlet foam
Bears the sole survivor home.

Here the message is brought to us with rhyme, rhythm, and alliteration. *Totems* makes greater use of autonomous symbols (speaking of social context, here). This works all alone on the pages to say something about dimensionality, about language itself, about meaning and the ways we choose to construct it from sounds and words.

Contrast the above poem to the narrative flow of "Going West":

Once and only once
did we ever see the Reverend afraid
the day that Liza killed Ezra
when she found him
meddling with their daughter
and began a feud between the brothers
first one and then the other
The Reverend, trapped,
preached first against incest
then against murder

This poem unfolds in time and space, with characters and events. Narrative poetry is Diamond's proper vehicle here, because "Going West" is meant to feel real, to convey a sense of things that really happened, to create, in short, a myth out of compressed history. It is this specificity and historicity that brings it up against the traditional literary domains of anthropology. Like ethnography, the series of poems have a discernible chronology, a cast of characters, complete statements, and unrhymed, unalliterated but strongly rhythmic lines.

The attention to detail in "Going West" frequently has the informational feel of history:

We heard them long before we saw them
Dragging five small cannon
On carriage wheels
and double axles
A chariot
the wheelwright said
A machine
the blacksmith said
of ten small barrels
circling the mouth
of the cannon
Six hundred. rounds a minute
and a crank.
like the handle
of a butter churn

The "ten small barrels" appear to tell us about how the apparatus looks, its potential lethality, but the "ten" appears to have no further symbolic valence (as compared to the "sceptres" above). I draw out this point because Diamond is clearly directing our attention to the machines of war, not metaphors of war. The entirety of "Going West," then, is about actual process, the truth of that process; and Diamond's language approaches various notions about truth from several different directions: intimate contexts that ring true, historical contexts we know to be true from textbooks, mechanical details that make us see machines that really were. I belabor this point partly to show the versatility of Diamond's craft and language (his poems on the Holocaust use concrete and symbolic language simultaneously to great advantage). But I also bring up these points to show how poetic language can work much as history does to condense large expanses of time, to highlight salient aspects and dynamics of various periods, and to influence the direction of a reader's thoughts about what really happened. Indeed, conventional history collapses entire decades and years of history into convenient periods, which is an act of poetic consciousness in itself. Anthropologists and historians already use poetic devices; Diamond makes these explicit and uses them more or less exclusively in his poems. In doing so, he reveals the essentially metaphoric, poetic nature of all that is usually called history or ethnography.

He accomplishes this revelation without ever losing sight of the fact that history really happened. He is not a revisionist. The settlers in his poems are people who really did battle Indians. They are not symbols for battlers. The Holocaust really happened. It is not a symbol for a tragic occurrence. Diamond frames these events in a way that retains a sense of their actuality and prevents their becoming mere figures for exploitation and murder. The kind of detail used in the last passage I quoted is one way to do this. Ultimately, truth in these poems lies in the kind of personal, idiosyncratic event that plausibly turns up in oral histories: the day a stranger made a pass at me on the bus (my first day away from the mesa!), the day Liza killed Ezra (remember what the Reverend said about that!). Violence, novelty, lust, material interests, love, sexuality, unusual events: these are what people actually remember and talk about from the past, these are what give narrative the ring of truth.

From all this, readers draw their own conclusions, led by Diamond's openly political point of view. The difficult balance between drawing one's own conclusions (sometimes out of the air) and accepting the necessity of history (some things really did happen to get us where we are) is the essence, I believe, of a certain kind of contemporary politics. Diamond's dialectical perspective is well known, and we see here its practice in the maintenance of the tension between readers figuring things out for themselves and simply accepting someone else's view of what happened. Traditional anthropology is not written so that readers have to do much figuring out. To swerve too far to either pole diverts one's political framework into the outright construction of history for one's own purposes or into the equally dangerous belief that we remember and preserve in history all that happened and was important. Diamond encourages a dialectical position that is ultimately somewhat mysterious because it depends on the paradoxes of poetic consciousness. We as readers feel we *know* what happened, even as we continually are reminded and absolutely realize that we cannot know such things.

Another dialectic is presented in the tension between metaphor and reality. As I have mentioned, Otter really does speak in *Going West*. It is not *as if* Otter were speaking, it is not a case of "if Otter spoke, this is what Otter would say." Otter speaks. He speaks as clearly and as surely as the human speakers who follow later on. The lack of distinction between animal speech and human speech in the way Diamond frames these poems is critical. The division between metaphor and reality is gone. The soul's destiny *is* the wind and the

sky, not to be *like* the wind and the sky. The poetic consciousness is not limited to the realm of the imagination. This is what ties Diamond's work into the shamanic process, where words are used in much the same way.

Diamond also posits and envisions a world in which existential, not hegemonic, contradictions are resolvable, and where nonexploitative reciprocal relations between humans and nature and among humans themselves define society, continuously create culture, and thus create the true freedom of persons. The poetics of nature underlie this vision. Bears are naturally good observers, man did not simply envision them so. It is in the nature of bears to be aware of man. It is not necessarily in the nature of man to be aware of either man or bears (take Emma as an example). When the natural world asserts its order, the contradictions cease, and beings fall into their properly named realms. The parsing of whole things into nontotal parts is thus condemned. This appears to me to be a condemnation of the entire Western way of going about apprehending the world, not just of anthropology's way.

Still, to read *Going West* is not primarily to be aware of dialectics. These are poems; their language is down to the bone, and their themes are accessible to ordinary Americans. The familiar figures of the settler-icons loom against their stylized western landscape. The vision of the cannons is as though from a western movie. The incident where the white bus driver almost zooms past the waiting Indian woman is equally cinematic. We listen intently to what Otter, Turtle, and Bear have to say because deep within us, we have been waiting to hear them speak in a way more meaningful than they do in cartoons or in animated musicals. This is to say that, except in the context of the strictly academic, Diamond's themes and constructions are familiar. The dramas of *Going West* are the dramas of everyday life. The overall view (that white men destroyed the Indian life) is by now a popular perception. The depth and incisiveness of the indictment of this genocide/ethnocide is, perhaps, something outside the popular view, but I think not inconsistent with it. And it is particularly interesting to me that these poems are accessible to my beginning students and seem to concur with their basic beliefs about what anthropology is and should be.

To do all of this at once to form a consistent historical picture, to use ordinary themes, to resolve contradiction and to hint at a world without obliterating contradiction, and to balance several orders of dialectics is indeed an extraordinary accomplishment. Based on this

description, many anthropologists would admit to attempting to produce similar works. In the end, it is the poetic language that poses the greatest difficulty for anthropologists in their evaluation of poetic-ethnography. The ability to write such language remains mysterious: Evans-Pritchard drew attention to the fact that only poetry could truly convey what unfolded in the Nuer concept of *kwoth* (Grindal 1989). Perhaps it is this mystery of talent or gift that excludes poetic discourse from the conventional academy.

How to Die in America

The original plaint of Otter in the opening stanzas of *Going West* is that the loving way to die has been lost. Given White Man's intense fear of death and his mad death-dealing, instructions on how to die are useful. Such instructions may even open up and begin to create the kind of basket we need to hold the poetic/primitive consciousness. The Reverend flees east, away from new creation and insight, in light of the deaths he caused; he is haunted by death and is hardly able to face his own. Emma's spirit dies young, but she scarcely notices. She cannot expect a proper death later on. Emma's understanding of death is egotistical. She believes she holds the keys to immortality through her anthropology! Ishmael finds a good death through union with the Indians and forces blindness upon himself in a dying attempt to open up the inner light and close out the outer reality. None of these Anglo characters appear to know how to die on their own, to keep their spirits alive until physical death, or to release their spirits to their proper destinies.

Hummingbird and her mother, also named Hummingbird, together braid their hair and wait in the center of their world for the death of White Man's culture. This image of union and centeredness contrasts with the instructions given for death in America, where there is no center.

As this country hardens into concrete
Los Angeles, New York
and New Orleans
grow together at the center
Center of what?
This state, without a nation.
Without memory.

Only Capital went west
Until there was no place else to go
(from "Paper Cities")

The blind pathways of capital, urging outward into whatever space is available, is a metaphor for the kind of consciousness that is antithetical to the consciousness that listens for the words of animals. The Reverend's instructions on how to move the center around have backfired. To die in America, one must first understand this meaningless conquest of space, in order to create a different space.

First, one must go alone and unknown, slipping away from one's prior forms and formulations. One must keep moving across the country, exhausting one's personal capital, money, and credit. This seems a likely instruction for so many North Americans; it has become their nature to exhaust resources in a quest with no meaning. The instructions continue, urging the dying person to wider and wider realms of travel, outside the boundaries of the United States. The dying person is urged to throw away the artifacts of his personal and cultural life, to wander through the Third World reinventing a new humanity for the self.

Anthropologists visit the Third World in a different context: to retrieve the Third World and study it, not to reconstitute the Western self.

Diamond's final instructions on "How To Die in America" reflect the processes already contained in all of *Going West*. The end of Western culture is near, White Man's soul has already fled over the horizon. These instructions speak for themselves, of course. They provide a way for stripping down, returning to some kind of natural state before death, although there is no way for White Man to achieve the honorable death of tortured Huron or hunted Bear:

So walk like a white man
Dissimulate importance
and on the edge of the city
put the last mask behind you
slouch quietly
on dirt roads
becoming trails
destroy the last paper
stop eating
stare carelessly into the sun
remove your shirt

fling the cash into the bush
collapse slowly for another hundred yards
then crawl as far as you can go
into the tall grass
and with your hair on fire
and your soul somewhere else
close your eyes
for the sake of those who will find you
neither hating nor loving
but beyond their grasp

The shucking off of the outward trappings of Western culture and the descent into death are equated here and are, perhaps, the proper purpose of trips to native cultures, both literally and figuratively. The death of the Western consciousness is a trailing off, not the painful rebirth experience of the Huron or the painful, elevating death of the tormented Ishmael with his feet in two worlds. The Westerner crawls off into the bush to die, his soul long departed.

The Antianthropologist

Stanley Diamond's poetry signals the end of anthropology as most of us know it, for *Going West* presents the primitive Other in full light, while anthropology is reductive. *Going West* enters into the realm of the Other and speaks for her/him/them as only poetic consciousness can. Hence, the anthropological critique of Diamond can be as bitter as the one he deals to the establishment; but his supporters are legion, not only among anthropologists, but among Indians, Africans, and, more generally, critics of our civilization.

Where does Diamond derive his ability to speak for Indians, or in the voices of animals? I have argued briefly in this paper that Diamond's poetry itself, as in *Totems*, served as an apprenticeship in the kind of consciousness that he is voicing. The strength of the poetry is not only in sheer poetics (the poems in *Going West*, remember, are *narrative*) but in the way we judge our ability to share in the assumption of primitive/poetic consciousness. I believe that this ability is a human ability, not particular to one social or ethnic group, and that Indians in general also saw this kind of consciousness as a human capability (not one belonging merely to Indians).

What of Diamond's evaluations of salient aspects of our society and culture? These are not mere criticisms but moral indictments

that posit soullessness, even ultimate and inevitable demise of an entire system. However Hummingbird's prophecy works itself out, Diamond's poetry, I believe, stands in the place of anthropology in providing the truer glimpse into primitive consciousness. In teaching anthropology at the undergraduate level, I have found that it is precisely this level of judgment that arises from hundreds of students, who in turn wonder how anthropologists can write about the extinction of the Apache or the Arapaho without feeling, without intense critique. Students ask me how anthropologists manage to turn such fascinating human experiences as marathon runs to the sea for salt or vision quests on mountain tops into the dulllest kind of reading with, all too often, the most shallow of interpretations. The equation I have made between poetic consciousness and primitive consciousness reflects their relationship in Diamond's work, in contrast to the merely detailed, opaque thought attributed to primitives by Durkheim and many others. Even the best, most empathic anthropology often struggles to evoke the life-ways it attempts to describe; I remember well Evans-Pritchard's sense of struggle in presenting a true picture of *kwoth*. The idea of spirit in Diamond's poetry is accessible and leads us to believe that tribal spirituality exists within all of us.

I should note, finally, that political and cultural change of the magnitude implied in *Going West* would have revolutionary consequences for anthropology as a discipline and, of course, for society at large.

But poetry must go with its own purpose and flow. In not denying that he is an anthropologist, with an anthropologist's language, history, knowledge, concerns, and themes, Stanley Diamond enters this flow as a full person, intellectual and poetic, and his poetry makes statements in a multitude of directions. Like the many embedded arrows that Diamond inserts into *Going West*, and the many references to directions, we are guided through and over and not just to a certain point. The linear bonds of academic anthropology are pointedly shed, and to great advantage.

Stanley Diamond took a breathtaking risk in *Going West*, the way, I suppose, that all true poets must, and more anthropologists should.

Notes

1. All poetic references are to poems in Diamond's *Going West* (1986), except where noted otherwise.

References

Diamond, Stanley

1982

Totems. Barrytown, NY: Station Hill Press.

1986

Going West. Northampton, Mass.: Hermes House Press.

Eisler, Riane

1987

The Chalice and the Blade. New York: Harper and Row.

Grindal, Bruce

1989

Is There Room in Anthropology for Poets? Anthropology and Humanism Quarterly 13(2):66.

Pratt, Annis

1981

Archetypal Patterns in Women's Fiction. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.

Rose, Dan

1983

In Search of Experience: The Anthropological Poetics of Stanley Diamond. American Anthropologist 85(2):34555.

13

Our People after the Whites Came

Dell Hymes

Stanley Diamond devoted himself to understanding the primitive as a pole opposite our own civilization, to the political dimension of anthropology, and to poetry. I would like to offer a short American Indian text that embodies all three.

Context:

Scholars

The text is from the Kalapuya. They lived in the green, rain-nourished western part of what we now know as the state of Oregon. East to west, their territory stretched from the valley of the Willamette River to the foothills of the low Coast Range of mountains; north to south, from somewhat below the present city of Portland to Corvallis and somewhat beyond. They hunted, fished, and gathered along the Willamette and inland up many of its tributaries. Like other peoples of the region, early in the nineteenth century they were devastated by epidemics of alien disease. Sporadic affrays apart, they could offer little resistance to the whites who began to enter the state as settlers in the 1840s in substantial numbers. In the 1850s, the survivors of the Kalapuya were removed to a reservation, as were other Indians of what soon declared itself a state.

Very little is known of the culture and language of the Kalapuya. Of what is known, very little is due to the efforts of residents of Oregon. In 1877, the Swiss linguist Albert Gatschet recorded something of the northernmost dialect, Tualatin. The rest of all that can ever be had as primary data is due to the leadership of Franz Boas and his dedication to documenting people's own words, in accord with the German and Jewish valuing of language that he and several of his students and colleagues transmitted to American ethnology. In 1914, Leo Frachtenberg recorded a great deal, particularly in the Mary's River dialect of the Santiam group. From 1928 through 1936, Melville Jacobs worked extensively with John B. Hudson, a Santiam speaker, collecting new information and checking old as part of an

almost single-handed devotion to three decades of knowledge, which if not for him would be forever unknown. Jacobs (1945) brought together the greater part of the work of all three in a single monograph, superciliously reviewed by linguists at the time and now out of print (see Hymes 1977).

There has never been published a description of any of the three major dialects (Tualatin, Santiam, Yonkalla). That lack has severely hampered tracing the historical affiliations of the language and inhibited recognition of its literature. Edward Sapir considered it part of a broad Penutian family, and Swadesh linked it most closely with Takelma, another extinct language of Oregon. My own probings indicate that both are right, but proof awaits the elementary resources of grammar and dictionary. (I tried to interest one philologist in the task, to no avail.) A decade or so ago, thanks to the encouragement of ethnologist and linguist Wayne Suttles, a Portlander earning a living driving a bus, Henry Zenk (1976), examined all the source materials for evidence of ethnobotany and ethnozoology, preparing a uniquely valuable study as a master's thesis at Portland State University.

A few years ago, a scholar working in Assyriology, Howard Berman, gave up a position at the Oriental Museum in Chicago to settle in a small apartment near the University of Washington archives in Seattle, where Jacobs's materials are deposited. There, without grant or salary, Berman has freshly assessed the entire body of evidence and is preparing the first adequate analysis of the workings of the grammar, more than a hundred years after Gatschet (Berman 1988). He has indeed found more linguistically valuable material than realized. Jacobs recorded extensive texts from the one other living speaker of Kalapuya, Eustace Howard, husband of his remarkable Clackamas Chinook collaborator, Victoria Howard, but did not publish it. He disliked Eustace Howard there is a telling unpublished vignette in his notebooks portraying the man as a casualty of a broken culture. And, according to Berman (1988), Howard's texts, though linguistically rich, are narratively diffuse. Both factors probably influenced Jacobs's decision not to publish, as well as what he reports in the preface (dated January 1937) to part 1 of his monograph:

In 1928 and later years I recorded lengthy texts from this man. . . . His dictations were wretched and he was unable to translate his own dictations. Mr. Hudson, who is as enthusiastic and skillful a translator as an anthropologist can hope to find, was also unable to

make sense of Mr. Howard's dictations. Hence I cannot include the Howard texts. . . . Possibly some fragments of the Howard materials can be salvaged from the manuscript notebooks in later years, after intensive analysis of the language. (1945:8)

A half century later, that intensive analysis is being provided and the lengthy texts are being used. Some of the frontiers of anthropology, and its debts to indigenous peoples, remain in archives and philology.

Such are the accidents of knowledge without a constituency. Of descendants of the Kalapuya there are only a few, scattered and not organized as such. Of chairs, institutes, and series devoted to the Indian languages and literatures of Oregon, there have been none. There is indeed now emerging at the University of Oregon a Department of Linguistics with a commitment to the Indian languages of the state, and something is to be hoped from that, if funds can sustain the effort. A first-rate descriptive linguist is at work but, as of the moment of writing, funded one year at a time (cf. Rude n. d.).

Context:

Anthologies

Obscure as it may be, Kalapuya has been noticed by anthologists. Lopez (1977) has rewritten two Kalapuya stories, and one of them has been included in an anthology intended to be authoritative (Erdoes and Ortiz 1984). The trouble is that the rewriting changes the form of both stories (Hymes 1981), a circumstance that bears on the form of the text to follow, "Our People after the White People Came."

In Kalapuya, as in other cultures of the region, there is a pattern number to which a series in a ritual or a story will conform. In Kalapuya, as in Chinookan, Sahaptin, and Columbia River Salish (Cowlitz, Chehalis), the pattern number is five. In the first story revised by Lopez, "Coyote Goes to Gamble," Coyote leaves his wife to gamble, and comes to four places before reaching his destination in the fifth. Indian tellers and audiences appreciate such a sequence as a mode of what Kenneth Burke (1925) has called "arousal and satisfying of expectation." Lopez omits it (see Hymes 1979).

Where five is the salient pattern number, it is accompanied by use of three as well. Where four is the salient pattern number, as in Takeima, Zuni, and many other North American languages, it is accompanied by use of two. These numbers are less conscious to narrators, yet basic to rhetorical rhythm. In a culture with three and

five, a three-part sequence will have a sense of frame, or initiation of action, then initiation or continuation of action, then outcome. Commonly the outcome will be an arrival, an object of perception, or a quoted speech or thought. A five-part sequence will commonly turn out to be an integration of two three-part sequences, with the middle element as a pivot, serving as outcome to one sequence of three and as onset to another. The arousal and satisfaction of expectation, the rhetoric of action, takes a form that can be glossed as "this, then this, then that." (A two- and four-part pattern typically has a pattern of "this, then that, this, then that.")

Such patterning is not mechanical: at any point the next sequence can be of either three or five units. Moreover, the action of a story can be intensified by changing from the usual, unmarked principle to one that is unusual, marked. Instead of "this, then this, then that," one may have pairing: "this, then that." Typically such pairing occurs in a series that overall has the usual kind of grouping: one finds three or five pairs of turns at talk, say, in an interaction, or a culmination set forth in three pairs of acts. Such is the case with the second anthologized Kalapuya story, "Coyote Takes Water from the Frog People." It is a short, subtly shaped account of Coyote acting with foresight to undermine a private for-profit monopoly, selling what should be a freely available public good. The story is organized in sequences of three and five parts. The culminating action, when Coyote digs out the dam by which Frogs hold back the water that they sell, is cast in terms of pairs or actsthree pairs, to be sure, but against the usual background of threes and fives, pairing marks intensity. Lopez loses this entirely, partly by inserting additional dialogue into what John B. Hudson told tersely (Hymes 1985, 1987).

I mention Mr. Hudson because my wife and I met him in 1954, and because I was offended, both that his words were altered and that his name did not appear in either book just "Kalapuya." As is the case with many Indian people who have been sources of knowledge, he has descendants who take pride in his standing as such. (They were glad that a review in *The Nation* brought that out, Zenk informed me [see Zenk 1976].)

William Hartless was the source of "Coyote Goes Gambling," of the text that follows, and of a version of the story about Coyote, Frogs, and Water. The anthologies deserve credit for motivating close attention to both originals and for a consequent appreciation of their artistry they might otherwise not have received. Hartless was the man with whom Frachtenberg worked. He spoke the Mary's River dialect

found west of present-day Corvallis, a dialect mutually intelligible with the Santiam of Jacobs's great source, John B. Hudson. Hudson spoke highly of the intelligence of Hartless, but his name is not noted in even the small world of scholarship of the northwest coast. Attention to his stories shows a remarkable narrator. His account of the release of water from Frogs explores the nature of Coyote as trickster. This "temporizing of essence," as Burke might call it, is carried out through the integration of five stories into a single sequence. In brief, when Coyote's wants coincide with the natural order and the benefit of others, as they do at the outset, he succeeds; when they do not, he fails. Parallelism of detail in the first and last adventures points the moral, framing a sequence in which Coyote succeeds, fails, fails, then turns failure into success (see Hymes 1987).

These vicissitudes of Kalapuya material have a common moral. The stories have structures shaped by Hudson and Hartless (and others), using Kalapuya resources of rhetorical patterning to various ends. The texts are not shards one can paste into whatever pattern one pleases. Their narrators were skilled, economical users of language. Much of the point and import of their stories is to be grasped through recognition of shape and proportion, of recurrent ending points and emergent contrasts. The stories draw upon ways of marking such things. Put most broadly, any way of putting such a story on the page implies a claim that the relations on the page represent the relations of the telling.

To put American Indian narratives on the page as paragraphs of prose is to misrepresent them. We have come to realize that such narratives are a kind of poetry. They consist of lines, not of sentences, and of relations among groups of lines, not of paragraphs. One can recognize units and relations that answer to notions of verse, stanza, scene, and act. Patterns of expectation obtain at each level of relationship: verse to verse, stanza to stanza, scene to scene, act to act. The narratives prove to have an architecture. Possibly this architecture, which was pervasive in accounts of daily life and in myth in a way of life where oral discourse was central, provided a sense that experience has implicit order. Even in a text that is cursory and probably told under compulsion, its dialectical norm shaky and shifting, such order shines through (Hymes 1984).

Anthologists, then, are not free to improve upon the originals, not, at least, until the originals are truly known. Robert Lowell can imitate poems of other languages, and, in doing so, enrich the literature of the world, because the original in the other language, and the new

text in English, are both known. That is not the case with American Indian texts. Few are truly known. It is a sad irony that even the Boasians, who sought not to impose alien categories on native minds, did so in publishing Indian narratives as paragraphs of prose. The paragraphs are devised by the anthropologist. The assumption of prose is the anthropologist's assumption. We now realize that any way of putting a text on the page implies a hypothesis as to the structure of that text, a theory as to how texts of that language and narrator are organized. And we are beginning to discover, in case after case, that the texts of Native American languages (and perhaps of oral narrative generally) are organizations of lines and groups of lines, answering to a rhythm of their own.

The Text

Hartless's account has a title probably supplied by Jacobs, but an appropriate title. It has five topical sections, concluded in the fifth by an epilogue. In my profile of the organization, sections, or scenes, are identified by lower case Roman numerals (ivi), stanzas within sections by Arabic capital letters, verses within stanzas by Arabic lowercase letters and lines by number.

[i] [Food and wood]

ABCDE 13, 48, 911, 1216, 1721.

[ii] [Nudity, sex, children]

Aabcde 2223, 24, 25, 26, 2728.

Babcde 29, 3031, 32, 3335, 36.

Cabcde 37, 3841, 4243, 44, 45.

[iii] [Clothing]

ABC 4650, 5155, 5660.

[iv] [Food]

ABCDE 6162, 6364, 6567, 6869, 7074.

[v] [Doctoring]

Aabcde 7579, 8082, 8385.

Babc 8687, 8892, 9394.

Cabc 9596, 9799, 1002.

Dabcde 1034, 105, 106, 1078, 10910.

Eabc 11112, 11314, 11516, 11718, 11923.

Notice that the stanzas within a section, and verses within stanzas, come in terms of the pattern numbers three and five. Indeed, the lines within stanzas are often so organized as well. The stanzas of section [i], for example, consist of 3, 5, 3, 5, and 5 lines; those of [iii] each have five lines. In [iv], the pairs of lines of verses a and b, accompanied by lexical repetition (now, now; vanished, vanished), seem deliberate emphasis. So also in the first and last verses (a, e) of [v](D) that is how; that is how. In the last stanza of [v](E), the first and second verses are paired just like the Americans; just like the Americans and the third and fourth verses are paired want, dies; want, dies. The stanza and the account are concluded by a five-line epilogue.

On the following pages are the translation and the Kalapuya original (Jacobs 1945).

[i]

cí:pgam * sdó: candu:'me:'nmai* du:káudi:gwa,
 wá:' gda:du:háibincáu'*,
 cint'é*: láu' wi:.

cí:pgam yéla: a'mé:nmai gdi:nidá:tsi't hás-anúwa.

5 wá:' gdanit'ákfu*
 cáu'wi*: gdi:nidá:sne dinik'wáinafu*.
 q'ó:nfan* gum'úihidn't du:'lí:yu:,
 du:mé:fu:'.

10 gús* gindu:wú:ne' du:kwáina:fin.*
 wá:' wé: gdadu:pláqna amplú* '
 pá' láu' sdó:' sdu:du:fé'.

gumsú cí:pgam du:t'asdu:'wa*.
 dí:bai du:'wádak gandu:túqna*,
 wá:' gdadu:t'ábala't*,
 15 t'é*: láu' wi:.
 qúnfan* gindiyé:han du:túqyamá*:

du:pyáu's* ancúnu'q* dedi:wú'k,
 damlúi' du:'wádak.
 gwáu'k u:gé:'tsido: du:'wádak,
 20 gús-gandu:túqni*.
 q'ó:nfan gindu:yé:han du:'wádak.

[ii]

mádfan níke: gumsú cí:pgam,

dí:bai gdawá:' du:fó:'ya sdó: candu:'mé:nmai*.

asúwai' mádfan ginilákwidai.

25 ginitsánqtse:fǐ't* a'yí:'watsa't, nau ambí:natsa't.

mádfan ta:fo: ginit'sánqtse:fǐ't;

dí:bai gé:mediné:fya dinimí:c'wa*,

ambí:natsa't nau andé:wadn't ginit'sánqtse:fǐ't

mádfan.

wá:' níke: dinihú:bna.

30 wá:' gdani'nák,

"pás cindu:hó:'yu:*!"

goni'lá:tgwinai dinihú:bna.

[*Our People after the Whites Came*]

[i]

Long ago we who are tribes of Indians,
they did not make us poor,
not as we are now.

Long ago only Indians lived in this country.

5 They did not labor,
to find their food.
It just grew on the prairies,
on the hills.

That is where we got our food.
10 We never split apart the earth.
That is how we ourselves do now.

Our way of dwelling long ago was good.
Even the wood we burned,
we did not chop up,
15 not like now.
We just gathered our firewood.

In the winter time when the cold east wind came,
we had quantities of wood.
He made our wood for us,
20 that is what we burned.
We just gathered our wood.

[ii]

Everything was good long ago,
even though there were no coverings for
we who are Indians,

The children all played with each other.

25 They swam, the boys and the girls,
All of them swam together.
Even though twenty years [old],
the girls and the young men swam (together).

There was nothing in their hearts.

30 They did not say,
"Let us have sex."
They took care of their own hearts.

- cú * gi:nihúli: ambí:ni,
 pá' gdani'yánda,
 35 cáu*' wi: t'é*: gdi:ni'ná:.
 wá:' t'é: q'ónfan* gdani'wáyfidai.
- pás gindu:húi cí*:pgam.
 láu' t'é: dí:diká'wu: du:básdin,
 dí:nifya du:'mí:c'wa* nau tába' ambí:ni,
 40 andé:wadn't dí:nifya nau wánfu:' du:'mí:c 'wa,
 danihúli: gi:niwáyfidai.
 pás láu' ni:húi amim' mádfan,
 gdi:diká'wu: ambásdin.
 cí:pgam wá:' pás gdadu:húi.
 45 gindi'lá:tgwinai du:hú:bná.
- [iii]
 láu' tá:fo'dn't di:'í'di't da'lámésna,
 gús* gumangábdin lípre:t gam'nágat,
 "cámya'nk* ancámbe:k* gdi:gé'ts mé:ne amím',
 "gu:wá:' dinisí:dgaq*."
 50 pás t'é: gindu:húi sdó: candu:'mé:nmai*.
- gé:me' cámyank* ancámbe:k gamgé:'ts,
 wá:' gdanit'ákfu*'.
 q'ónfan gum'úihdn't dinikwáinabfu*'.
 wá:' gdanit'ákfu',
 55 ginikáuni: *Adam* nau *Eve*.
- giniwá:' dinifá:la:cau*',
 gdi:wá:' dinisí:dgaq.
 pásfan gini'í:fí't,
 pási:st'é* sdó: candu:'mé:nmai* gindu:húi.
 wá:' gda:disímim'wanai níke du:wá:'
 60 du:sí:dgaq.

[iv]

láu' t'é: mí:fan cindiháibincáu*',
gwíní:k u:máu-amím' gdi:niwála.

mádfan níke: gu:wá:'yu:,
dí:bai du:kwáinafu*' gu:wá:'yu:.

65 cámyank ancámbe:k wá:' indahúili: di:gám'yacwo*:,

t'é: cí:pgam wi:,
gúsi*: anúwa ambásdin gdi:niwála.

Whenever they wanted a girl,
they traded over her,
35 but before they could do it.
But they would not just have sex with each other.

That is how we used to be long ago.
But now that we have been mixing with Americans,
a fourteen year [old] girl,
40 a boy fifteen years [old],
they want to have sex with each other.

That is how all the people are now,
we have mixed with the Americans.
Long ago we were not like that.
45 We took care of our hearts.

[iii]
Now once in a while when I go to church,
there I hear the priest say,
"The Headman Above made the first people,
"They had no garments."
50 But that is the way we Indians were.

The two the Headman Above had made,
they did not labor.
Their food just grew.
They did not labor,
55 those named Adam and Eve.

They were not ashamed,
When they had no garments.
That is the way they went about,
but that is the way we Indians were.
We never were abashed not
60 having garments.

[iv]

But now we are extremely poor,
now that the white people have come.

Everything has vanished,
even our foods have vanished.

65 The Headman Above has not wanted to help us,
not as long ago,
since the time the Americans came.

- láu' ambásdin gum'nágat,
 "a'mé:nmai cí:pgam * gumháibincau*'.
 70 wá:' gdadiháibincau*'.
 cámyank* ancámbe:k* gumgám'yacwo*:,
 gum'úqwo: din'á:wi.
 wá:' níke: gdadi'yándan
 pá' t'é*: láu' wi:.
- [v]
 75 wí:'na:s gindidá:pna:di du:pá:lakya
 sdó: dedi:du:hé:li:p.
 wá:' din'á:wi gda:dihé:lipfí't,
 cín* t'é: láu' wi:.
 gumsú du:'yába sdó: candu:mé:nmai*.
- 80 ampá:lakya di:'yé:kladi amím',
 di:'ála',
 pá' wá:' gidanidá:pna:t.
 láu' t'é: dí:bai di:de'ála',
 ní:fan dandidá:pna:t ambásdin ampá:lakya.
 85 Pás láu' cindu:húi*.
- cí:pgam t'é: gindi'yála'yu:
 cáu*' wi: pá:lakya di:gwín dindá:pna.
 wá:' láu' gdagwin dindá:pna,
 mé:ni dí:s* gamhó:du
 90 gam'í:'t gus* u:'yé:kladi,
 cáu' wi: gadi:'nák,
 "cumhúli*: dandá:pna".
 wí:'na:s damdá:pna: láu',
 t'é: máti: ambásdin gúsi*:..

- 95 mé:ni cinduphúli*: di:dá:pna,
 cáu' wi: pú:nuk alámetsí:n* di:dupdí:di:'t amím'.
 gam'ála' gus gi:dupyé:kla:di,
 láu'mdé mí:fan danduphúli: di:dá:pna,
 búntmu dandupdáhi:' gús* candi:pyé:kladi*.
100 pás-manhúi candi:pmáu-amím*'.
 gambála'yu: di:dá:pna
 di:dupdáhi:' amím dediyé:klifal.

 láu' t'é: pási dí:bai a'mé:nmai,
 pási: ni:há'yu:,
105 cín't'é*: máti: ambásdin.

Now the Americans say,
"The Indians long ago were poor."
70 We were not poor.
The Headman Above helped us,
he always fed us.
We bought nothing,
not as it is now.
[v]
75 Indeed we paid our doctors,
when we got sick.
We were not always ill,
not as we are now.
Our own Indian ways were good.
80 When a doctor treated a person,
[and] he died,
they did not pay him.
But now even if we die,
still we have to pay an American doctor.
85 That is the way we are now.

But long ago we became well,
before a doctor got his pay.
He did not get his pay then,
first after a while he saw,
90 the one he doctored walking about,
before he said,
"I want my pay."
Indeed he was paid then,
not like you Americans since.

95 First you want your pay,
before you give a person a little medicine.
If the one you doctored has died,
now then you want your pay all the more,
even though you kill the one you doctored.

100 That is how you white people are.
Your pay will have become bigger,
if you kill a person who is being doctored.
But that is how the Indians,
that is how they do.

105 But we are like you Americans.

- láu' mí:fan cindiháibincáu *'.
 máti: gdadupnákwit,
 "cindigám'ya:t* a'mé:nmai."
 pá' gani:húi ambásdin wi:.
- 110 pá' wí:'na:s dandidáhi:' du:mím' di:diyé:kla:t.
- láu'mdé mí:fan pá'lafan cindihúli*: du:dá:pna,
 t'é*: ambásdin wi: du:ni'nái.
 mugús* wi: t'é: gandi:pnákwit,
 "mé:nmai gamanhúi t'é: ambásdin-wi:"
- 115 pá' wí:'na:s láu' cindu:hú:li* gi:diyé:kla:t ddu:mím',
 gi:'ála'.
 mí:fan cindu:húli lúi' du:dá:pna,
 gi:'ála' candu:yé:kla:di*.
 gúsi*: láu' níke: gumbúini danhú:bna,
- 120 gi:hé:lancwa*.
 mádfan níke: cí:pgam* gumyúhu: anúwa.
 pá' múnгни dinhú:bna!
 pási: gahanhúi.

Now we are extremely poor.

You then say,

"We are helping the Indians."

That is how they have become like Americans;

that is how indeed we kill our people when we

110 doctor them.

Now then we want our own pay simply all the more,
we learn to be just like the Americans.

But that is what it really is like when you say,

"The Indians are becoming just like the Americans."

That is how indeed now we want to doctor

115 our people,

if he dies,

We want lots of pay for ourselves all the more,
if the one we doctored dies.

Such now is what my heart has made of it,

120 I tell about it.

Everything long ago is changed [in] the country.

That be its heart!

That is the way it is.

References

Berman, Howard

1986

Notes on the morphology of Santiam Kalapuya. Manuscript.

1988

Jacobs' Kalapuya Material: A Progress Report. Paper presented at the 1988 Hokan-Penutian Workshop, Eugene, Oregon (June).

Burke, Kenneth

1925

Psychology and Form. *The Dial* 79(1):3446.

Erdoes, Richard, and Alfonso Ortiz

1984

American Indian Myths and Legends. New York: Pantheon.

Hymes, Dell

1977

Bears That Save and Destroy: Faces of Feminine Power in Clackamas Myth. Manuscript. Revised version forthcoming from University of Pennsylvania Press.

1979

Review of Lopez. *The Western Humanities Review* 33(1):9194.

1981

Comments. *Journal of the Folklore Institute* 18(23):14450.

1984

The Earliest Clackamas Text. *International Journal of American Linguistics* 50:35883.

1985

Review of Erdoes and Ortiz. *The Nation* 240(3):8586.

1987

Anthologies and Narrators. *In Recovering the Word*, ed. Brian Swann and Arnold Krupat. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Jacobs, Melville

1945

Kalapuya Texts. University of Washington Publications in Anthropology 11. Seattle.

Lopez, Barry Holstun

1977

Giving Birth to Thunder, Sleeping with His Daughter: Coyote Builds North America. Kansas City: Sheed Andrews and McMeel; New York: Avon.

Rude, Noel

n.d.

Noun Stripping in Central Kalapuya. Manuscript, 1986.

Zenk, Henry

1976

Contributions to Tualatin Ethnography: Subsistence and Ethnobiology. M. A. thesis, Portland State University.

14

Ethnographies I:
Fragmentary Annotations on the Hyperborean
Peoples

Nathaniel Tarn

Willow when dances, feet motionless. Knees do most of dancing, swinging thighs, hips from side to side. Arms angular, branches. Head most frequently pensive. Even dancers round her when most violent, dance calling for it.

Willow a granddaughter. Dances with many hopes on frail shoulders. In hand, pleas of extended family, immeasurably large. Spectators respectful. She may not be finest in her group indeed so far from that, indeed just competent. Watchers sense but carriage. Old men dream student prince arriving at parental house, with muskets, blue beads, silk. hose. Hose extraunthinkable at home.

Willow's land immense, completely flat. Not possible there to walk so far from any thing you see it disappear. Fragment of blue air. Whatever there isnatural, man-made-forever in sight. That is: unless invisibility occurs so max a man not even sees himself on the ice shelf. For most of years, all is one color, uniform, with sharp, variant patches in selected background sites. Suppose, at one time, everything's white. Might suddenly stumble on cascades of blue. Or dark in line, fillet of grey above it. Mouse on whale snout. Most suddenly, you suffer gashes of violent red. Out of white, some blind red maw might breach: teeth lined with black. But red so overpowers a maw, no else clearly perceived. After long, almost interminable silences, red gashes might appear in sides of anything that moves, on land, water, or sky or disappear over the ice alone.

Land arches in huge circle round largest sea so that THE people live in all world parts, because its circle, or curve of it, is so extensive. Why, whenever you look at birds in that land, wherever are flying in circles. You stand, looking to sea, there come the birds. Like bullets out of gun: impossible to figure why they race so fast. After much thought, you understand they fly around the world while you stand:

always the selfsame birds, whether from left or right. Also, because of curve and visibility these two taken together there peaks always stand in sight, in distances. Impossible to calculate how high these are. Often, vole or hare, see rising from burrow, will be misunderstood for a large mountain. Too, mountains lying in very distant countries, visits to which forbidden, unpractical. Under these circumstances, you never need to travel. Everything conceivably desirable available right here. In line of sight.

Occurs sometimes however, outsiders wish Willow's people. Invite them down to center. Long time ago, determined by people none of Willow's that, should Willow's move out of their homeplace, it would be "down." Secret tradition, among Willow's, any such move is "out": rarely told to nonpeople for selfevident reasons. Willow, her family travel "down" in large planes. Buys lots of bubblegum from airport vending machines wherever, whenever planes stop. Willow is granddaughter: as world goes, she's young, she's timeless, frequently laughing, frequently giggling with fellow dancers. Hard to remember she has seven kids, themselves have children. Husbands cannot remember times she did not cook.

Music playing for Willow sits so close together, a wonder it can breathe. However large field, terrace, stage they receive to play, cling so tight to each other breath seems to be one breath.

Menacing animal. Experts at changing shape: now see one animal, now other animal. Different, wee, smaller animals sometimes will flash from back of larger one; impish masked figures, flattered in, out of music's knees. Instruments, also, given to transformation. It has been claimed that any art-piece from those parts will change its shape at feather drop. Why very little remains with any owner long. Any object transformed will, likely as not, need new owner requires it precisely thus depart from old one with no longer desire. People much addicted to gifts in that land, without cost count, without keeping accounts. Individual finds it unbearable not to share with neighbors, whether something caught, bought, or fallen from sky with whispered plea for possession. Generosity extends outwards into surroundings. Animals, birds, fish, love themselves up to be eaten, even calling out relatives to be devoured with them. Know spirit matters only to be feasted with ribbons, sent home to sky with many gifts. At night, loud, masterful howls can sometimes be heard. Traveling over clouds of domestic bark, cries of largest beasts calling to relatives.

At center are also people who always come "up" to it, as well as

people who come from one hand, supposedly, but in reality occupy everywhere. Add to this thin scattering of those who come from other hand: picture complete. We are attending a congress where all these people are expected to dance and describe their gods. Some act as if gods have never been described beforewhen, in reality, they have been, many times over. Others forget they've never said a word about gods in all recorded history, continue to say nothing about them. In a former case, audience bored; in a latter, puzzled, angry, perplexed. Then there are those usually from other hand who know in advance all gods are one. Sit silent most of time, merely smiling. Infuriate audience occasionally most people do not notice them at all.

Those who come "up" to center have dances also. Dancers move feet a lot, jump up, down, make considerable noise in crying, singing, rhetoric. Willow's people leave all noise to music, dancing silently or with only very few, remote syllabifications. Whereas Willow, her companion wear what is almost uniform, with minute variations in gloves or slippers. Others drape themselves in gaudy robes, each one so varied never could one dancer be confused with another.

Land of those who come "up" as different from Willow's as can be imagined. Green, abrupt. Everything in it thick, tall, hiding everything else: you really cannot see forest for trees. Kind of land fit to convince anyone very few things are on earth, all of them his. Walk a mile or two, you'll drop off into sea. Or, in another direction, into mountain cleft. Seems fair to generalize direction of most things climbs: that land is in most senses strictly vertical.

Thus, all people there filled with most forceful aspirations. No ladder in sight?they'll immediately invent one. Cling passionately to belongings. If, for sake of social well-being, they give anything away, they do so with such passions as almost to destroy recipients plus themselves. Keep strictest possible accounts. Will call on you for reciprocity years even after gods themselves have forgotten what given, what loaned. No object has ever changed shape in that land: even nonsentient things afraid of record-keeping proclivities. Gods themselves don't feel free in those forests. Chained to particular persons, lineage sacrificed into immutable forms, breaking free from this lumber would be more laborious than they can bear to contemplate. Nor has any animal, as far as it is known, ever given itself away in charity: beast, fowl, fish have to be taken with violence from lair, from covert, with club, poison, dagger. Blood turns to stone in their veins at the abruptness of these deaths, can never flow freely to irrigate land.

As may be expected, it is these men never talk about gods, continually hint, knowing full well even hints themselves are esoteric. No progress ever made with such people: most of us have given up on thinking. Visitors from one hand are those who weary mankind's residue with repetitions about gods. Since they are everywhere, it is impossible for human, wherever he lives, to miss encountering some images of such at some time or other. Mass production of images scares everyone giving thought to quality control. We cannot pretend there's no resentment among man's residue when these people come tell about gods yet one more time again. In some senses, however, rest of mankind is guilty. If they themselves were to speak more about their own gods instead of allowing them to change shapes so much, or hinting at them, or never mentioning them at all, resistance to these ubiquitous, mass-marketed gods of one hand might be more effective.

Tonight, we are at center. Willow dances. Once again, some have metamorphosed, some hinted, some told, some remained silent, smiling. After few days of intensive argument, most sit back, content in knowledge nothing has been achieved. Familiar, comfortable thought implies there will be many more such meetings until outstanding issues settled all for once. Thought of living without congress once in a while (travel, planes, bubblegum) is unforgivable.

Each participant now free to choose own method of worship.
Watch Willow. Watching her, seems an ordinary day. On that day's horizon, everything I can think of takes place. Perhaps anything anyone could think of. She's a kind of contentment. Everywhere like that happiness detected, one time, more time happiness recorded. Ear turns away from everything, even animal drumming, sinks deep inside itself to drown in some source quenched. Lap quiet, strangely: would I had imagined I could be her prince. Hands joined, completing circles no energy escapes.

At precise moment hands lock into most comfortable position, notice Willow's feet have lifted from ground. Gone, gone, beyonded. Impression of her among documents sitting at back of stage, looking something wistful at her family but she is among wings with fellows, chewing gum, smiling. Once again, godbride gone into silence. Our planes depart tomorrow.

15

The Participant Observer

David P. McAllester

"You ethnomusicologists don't have to worry about the job market, you can always go perform somewhere!" thus an anthropologist at a joint meeting of the two disciplines a few years ago. And it is true, a good many of us are jazz or art musicians, as well as ethnomusicologists. It is true, also, that some of us have been gainfully employed in performing the musics, and sometimes the dances, of the Others whom we have chosen to study, such as Africans, Native Americans, Javanese, Indians, Japanese, or Chinese. But that does not mean that we do not have to worry. For one thing, a comfortable living is seldom earned in the United States in any but the popular arts. But more importantly for this paper, our participation in exotic musics lands us in a number of dilemmas where we worry a great deal.

The musical/anthropological scholar who is captivated by the music of another culture is in the position of the field worker who is so successful in joining in as a participant observer that one day he or she is offered a spouse, or a clan membership with lifelong obligations, perhaps beginning with a painful or even disfiguring initiation. Suddenly participation is serious and the field worker is faced with the sobering fact that until then it has been a sort of privileged make-believe. Such a critical moment can lead, at worst, to an emotional breakdown in the field and, at the least, to a humiliating exposure of pretensions. Fortunately, this problem, in an extreme form, is relatively rare in anthropology. But something of the same magnitude of choice is very frequent for the ethnomusicologist who is also a performer that is, for most of us.

To be enthralled by a new music is like falling in love. It can lead to a lifelong commitment, forsaking all other musics. But the romance is eventually over, and then ensues a long, sometimes difficult, coexistence. The more the ethnomusicologist learns of the finesse of the new music, the more evident becomes its endless complexity. Even

more daunting than the technical musical sophistication is the subtlety and depth of the cultural context. Can you perform correctly a music meant for communicating with the ancestors when they are not your ancestors? What happens to your participation when you realize that your responses to the music are primarily aesthetic, inappropriate in a culture where the music is intended to function in a different dimension?

A good half of my students in ethnomusicology eventually ask me, "What can I *do* with this wonderful music? I'm not ever going to be an Indonesian (Native American, Cambodian, etc.)!" It is not only students who ask that question. We teachers are possessed by doubts as well as by zeal. In the latter mode, we would like to see every music department in the world teaching their own music in the presence of all the others, with as full a realization as possible of their varieties of scale, melody, rhythm, and intonation, and all their varieties of musical intention. We would like to see every medium in the world disseminating a musical repertory that reminds us of the wonderful similarities and differences in the whole world of music. We believe that Music is all musics, and that somewhere in the confrontation of them all is Musical Truth. ¹ We recognize the world dominance of Western popular and art musics and we dedicated ourselves to redressing the balance. Our well-meaning intention is to preserve the world heritage of music, even if nobody asks us to. We are conservationists: our archives are the repositories of many musical traditions that are otherwise extinct. We tend to value old musics over new ones; like our anthropologist cousins, we spend much of our time recording the past from the lips of old people.

On the other hand we, like our students, are disoriented by the power of the musics we study. We, too, have put away our violins or our saxophones and become conversant with the *gambang* or the *hichiriki*. We long ago stopped singing tunes from Broadway musicals and began singing fancy-dance tunes from the powwow circuit. Like our students, we ask ourselves what it can lead to because we not only teach about it, we teach *it*. We are not just producing generations of little professors who will inject ethnomusicology into music departments and anthropology departments. There is not much problem with that, but we are also producing performers. We see our students enmeshed in participant observation of a virulent kind, when they are still susceptible undergraduates.

What leads us into this position is that we are humanistic anthropologists of the deepest dye. In the humanities you cannot under-

stand theory without: experience in the practice. A real expert in French literature must speak excellent French. Because most ethnomusicology programs recognize this fact, we have, for thirty-five years, been bringing to the United States resident artists from all over the world to assist our students in beginning their practical, participant experience. An analogous practice in "straight" anthropology has been the rare importation of native speakers to assist in linguistics training and to help teach a language that is going to be necessary in the field.

In ethnomusicology, the rather large-scale presence of Other musicians has raised a number of problems. There are the problems of the musicians, themselves, as they have been uprooted from their homes by the lure of American prestige and American salaries. We have interfered with their lives in order to take advantage of their talents, and we are able to do so because of the position of power we enjoy in the world. There are questions of ethics not easily solved as we attempt to deal humanely with such problems as the following:

- Some of our resident artists become so homesick and/or disoriented that they have to be repatriated almost at once. This must be done with sensitivity to the loss of face such a hurried return might entail, and with generous financial support.
- Professional performers, often outstanding virtuosos at home, find themselves better paid than at home but obliged to teach wave after wave of beginners. This can sap morale and blunt the edge of the teacher's performing ability. I have heard a Japanese music scholar refer to the "empty years" spent by a resident artist in America.

- If the resident artists stay too long in America, they may be forgotten by their home audience, putting their professional careers at risk. Their isolation from the home music scene and the pressure on them here to be authentic may limit their perception of significant changes at home and lead to a kind of outdated classicism in the music they teach in America.
- Some resident artists, enjoying a social standing and standard of living far higher than they are used to at home, may want to stay in America, with their families, forever. This could constitute a talent drain that would endanger their music in its home locale.
- There are often problems in adapting native teaching methods to American students. The guru/disciple relationship, for example, is not really possible here.

· The resident artists, too, are participant observers in a new culture. They, and their families, must cope with a new set of mores with regard to social relations, alcohol, and drugs. And, of course, they are fascinated by their exposure to the many musics of America and of the other resident artists in their program.

These and other problems of the resident artist can be poignant and difficult to resolve. But now I turn to the worries of the teacher-ethnomusicologists, arising from their responsibility, their students.

American students of ethnomusicology usually begin their participant observation as undergraduates surrounded by the comforts, still, of their own culture. Thus they avoid, at first, most of the pain that accompanies participant observation in anthropological fieldwork. They undergo a rather carefree dose of romance, as they start to play native.

It is quite usual, for example, in public performances of the musics, and especially the dances they are learning, to wear native costume. They also follow native usages with regard to the instruments: they remove their shoes before approaching a gamelan² and, as a gesture of respect, they refrain from stepping over the instruments. It is something of a thrill to be required to handle musical instruments with the meticulous formality required by Japanese teachers. The style of movement resulting from wearing a sarong, a kimono, or ankle bells has a bearing on correct performance in dance or music. And we do not stop there we go on to native foods, the observance of native festivals, the rules of polite social interchange, the learning of the language. We are teaching, in fact, a precontact course in the culture that goes with the music. It is a proseminar in participation, something that few anthropological programs can afford, or, perhaps, would even be comfortable with. Anthropologists usually have to learn to perform the culture when they get there. The best they can hope for in advance is the hints they get from the literature and from veteran colleagues and teachers.

Graduate students in most ethnomusicology programs are expected to spend at least a year of research in the field. Here they collect, analyze, and perform the music in its full cultural context. This could range from haunting broadcasting studios in Tokyo to assisting in the ritual curing of a sick child in Zimbabwe. It is now, in the confusing situation of being in the field, that our graduate students absorb a degree of performance skill in their role as participant observers that brings them a certain acclaim. They may find themselves performing to large, enthusiastic audiences and may

dream of becoming professional performers, in native terms. But the complications that attend many a romance begin to set in. The students are at the same time becoming sophisticated enough to see how complex the music really is, technically, and also that it integrates with native culture, as suggested above, in ways beyond their ability to follow or even to understand fully. They begin to see that the Other audiences are enchanted somewhat by musical ability, but more largely by the novelty of seeing a foreigner attempt to perform at all, abandoning a position of economic and political power and seeking a native master. But this novelty will not last forever and the American does not want to be appreciated as a freak, in any case.

The ethnomusicologist performer has to face the fact of being only a moderately good musician with a limited repertory. His or her position begins to become increasingly strained as it is subjected to honest scrutiny. The various recourses or solutions to this situation that have developed in the last thirty-five years can be illustrated by the case of the many gamelan students who have developed in this country, during that time.

But before getting to the problems, it is noteworthy that of the several thousand students who have enjoyed learning to play gamelan music, most have gone on to normal pursuits of their own culture, enriched by their Indonesian experience.

There are still well over one hundred Javanese and Balinese gamelans in the United States now. Most of them have been imported from Indonesia but at least a dozen have been built here, using various ingenious substitutes for the hand-forged bronze keys of the native instruments. There is a newsletter/journal, *Ear*, 3 by which the several hundred long-term devotees of gamelan playing keep in touch with each other. This core of people with a sustained interest represents a new and significant musical movement in American cultural life. What becomes of them when they realize that they cannot become Indonesians, that their participation will always be limited?

They can become entrepreneur/advocates of Indonesian culture. Academic entrepreneurs represent one level of this solution. They can teach as much as they were able to learn and bring in scholars and performers from Indonesia to carry the instruction to more advanced levels. They can get the grants for carrying on research in Indonesia and they can win prestige, advancement, and extra income from their books, recordings, and reviews in appreciation of Indonesian culture.

A somewhat more commercial kind of entrepreneur can use training in Indonesian music and culture to arrange tours of Indonesian artists, write informed program notes and liner notes for record jackets, sell recordings and gamelan instruments. Graduate studies and a good deal of performance in gamelan are valuable training for such a career, and its educational value for the general public can be significant. Such entrepreneurs can do much for improved intercultural understanding. It is essential that interpreters of Other cultures be accurately and sensitively informed, if they are to do this important task well.

They can fill a role in journalism and criticism. This kind of career can be combined with either of the two entrepreneurial choices mentioned above, or it can be a career in itself. As worldwide performing groups increasingly appear on our concert stages and in our folk festivals and libraries of recorded music, our traditional theater and music reviewers are unable to give knowledgeable assessments to the public. The critic with a sound ethnomusicological training can be a valuable guide and watchdog.

They can make a career in multicultural music composition. A number of musicians who are composer-performers are making frank use of musical ideas from all over the world. Several of these are people with a strong background in Indonesian performance and some of this music involves the use of Indonesian, or Indonesianlike instruments. As in all things, this may be done well or badly, and a good ethnomusicological background is likely to encourage the former.

They can perform Indonesian music in America. Several groups of former students have organized gamelans made up of the devotees in their neighborhoods. There are perhaps six or seven such groups in the United States. They are people with careers outside ethnomusicology who share the wish to keep growing in gamelan music. Like amateur theatrical or music groups, they can develop artistically enough to charge admission to their performances and thus be able to rent rehearsal space and meet other expenses. They are able to progress beyond the limits of college or university groups, which have to include beginners year after year and which lose their advanced students on graduation.

Everything I have described in this paper, of course, is familiar to anthropologists as one aspect or another of acculturation. It happens whenever cultures come in contact with other cultures that do things differently. Culture is a contagious commodity, and nothing can stop

ideas and practices from spreading and finding directions of their own. Anthropologists and ethnomusicologists have a somewhat specialized role to play in the process. In the case of music, exploitative and insensitive uses may be mitigated or even prevented with enough understanding and good will.

I began with an anthropologist's observation that the ethnomusicologists have a commercially useful second string to their bow. I then went on to outline how the very nature of our study makes us more vulnerable than most students of culture to the hazards of participant observation. I end on a hopeful note by observing that, although we cannot become Comanches or Japanese, the special nature of our interests and training can make us useful in interpreting a significant part of other cultures to the world at large.

Notes

1. Jon Barlow provided this idea of Musical Truth, independent of any particular cultural manifestation of music.
2. *Gamelan*: Indonesian orchestra of bronze percussion instruments that, in larger ensembles, also includes wooden xylophones, strings, a flute, and singers.
3. *Ear Magazine: Gamelan Indonesian Arts in America*. New York: New Wilderness Foundation, Inc.

16

Weber and the Rationalization of Music

Ferenc Feher

In analyzing modernity all roads start from and lead to Max Weber. What follows here intends to show that the sociology and philosophy of culture are no exception.

Weber's Theory

Weber wrote his seminal essay *The Rational and Social Foundations of Music* in 1911. It was published a decade later. 1 Although it is a relatively unknown contribution to Weber's epoch-making theoretical edifice, I will seek to show that it exerted a strong 'underground' influence and that it has served as a catalyst for the formulation of both Adorno's and Ernst Bloch's philosophies of music. Weber's dry essay, in which his encyclopedic knowledge seems to overwhelm the bold theorist in him, can only be properly understood if we place it in its appropriate philosophical context, which is somewhere between Nietzsche and the left-radical cultural criticism of the first half of the twentieth century.

A formal reading might easily give one the misleading impression that in *The Rational and Social Foundations of Music* Weber reached the zenith of his 'action theory.' Occidental music emerged from a historical battleground on which 'purposively rational' and 'traditionally rational' actions had been contending for centuries. In terms of pure action theory, the ascendancy of Occidental music refers to nothing more than the progressive domination of the field by 'purposively rational musical actions' over musical actions of a kind that have only traditional legitimation and that gradually lose out in the conflict. Purposively rational musical actions are offspring of 'mathematical reason.' Their legitimation derives from the circumstance that the new mathematics as well as the new physics could complete the task of reducing the confused kaleidoscope of sounds to mathematically manipulable formulae. Neither Pythagorean nor Christian

efforts to mathematize music had been successful due to the overwhelming influence in the Greek and Christian worlds of *ethos*, which protected the affective character and blocked the rising hegemony of the consistently quantifiable aspect of music.

The philosophical implications of a 'strictly sociological' theory are already apparent. Indeed, it is almost impossible to miss Weber's unstated polemic against *The Birth of Tragedy*. For Nietzsche, it was precisely Socratic rationality, the spirit, and the gaze of the antimusical observer of tragedy that had undermined and ultimately destroyed the Dionysian qua the musical and had doomed to failure tragedy as a genre. In turn, both music and tragedy would resurrect through the anti-Socratic, Aryan, and thoroughly antirationalist spirit of German music, the music of Richard Wagner. Weber issued a culturally deep, conservative warning (quoted below) against the Nietzsche-inspired subversive romanticism that threatened his cherished rationalized tonality. The stricture clearly shows that for Weber (mathematical) rationalization was the guardian spirit of Occidental music and that, further, Nietzsche presented for him, at least in this respect, a potential danger.

There is yet another and even broader philosophical implication of Weber's theory of rationalized music. Throughout his life, Weber consistently denied that he had a philosophy of history of his own. However, as many analysts of his work have stated, his sociological action theory was intermittently transformed, in steps imperceptible to the author himself, into a historico-philosophical grounding for and justification of Western modernity with its penchant for separate but equally rationalized spheres, with its battling deities, with its internal tragic dialectic whose poles are the triumphal march of separate spheres of rationalizations, on the one hand, and the disenchantment of the whole rationalized universe on the other. The story of rationalized music is one of the most philosophical chapters in this sociological action theory, which is at the same time a philosophical *plaidoyer* for the Occident as the homeland of rationalization sui generis.

What are the terms and the key concepts of the rationalization of music?

The drive toward rationality, that is, the submission of an area of experience to calculable rules, is present here (in Western culture). . . . This drive to reduce artistic creativity to the form of a calculable procedure based on

comprehensible principles appears above all in music. Western tone intervals were known and calculated elsewhere. However, rational harmonic music, both counterpoint and harmony and the formation of tone materials on the basis of three triads with the harmonic third, are peculiar to the West. So too is a chromatics and enharmonics interpreted in terms of harmony. Particular also to the West is the orchestra with its nucleus in the strong quartet and organization of ensembles of wind instruments. In the West there appeared a system of notation making possible the composition of modern musical works in a manner impossible otherwise. (See Martindale and Reidel 1958: xxii)

Here the basics of the harmonic chord system are described in Weber's own words:

All rationalized music rests upon the octave (vibration ratio of 1:2) and its division into the fifth (2:3) and fourth (3:4) and the successive subdivisions in terms of the formula $n/(n+1)$ for all intervals smaller than the fifth. If one ascends or descends from atonic in circles first in the octave followed by fifths, fourths, or other successively determined relations, the powers of these divisions can ever meet on one and the same tone no matter how long the procedure be continued. . . . This unalterable state of affairs together with the further fact that the octave is successively divisible only into two unequal intervals, forms the fundamental core of facts for all musical rationalizations. . . . Fully rationalized harmonic chord music based on this tone material maintains the unity of the scalable tone sequence in terms of the principle of tonality. The unity of the scalable tone sequence is achieved through the tonic and the three primary normal triads any major scale has together with a parallel minor scale, the tonic of which is a minor third lower of the same scalable tone material. . . . By adding another third to the triad, dissonant seventh chords are formed. . . . The intervals contained in harmonic triads or their inversions are (either perfect or imperfect) consonances. All other intervals are dissonances. Dissonance is the basic dynamic element

of chordal music, motivating the progression from chord to chord. Seventh chords are the typical and simplest dissonances of pure chord music, demanding resolution into triads. In order to relax its inherent tension, the dissonant chord demands resolution into a new chord representing the harmonic base in consonant form. (Weber 1958:36)

The focal point of Weber's analysis is to call attention to the sharp contrast between modern (Western) and premodern music, that is, between rationalized and far less rationalized types of music. The latter term, Weber emphasizes, is not totally arbitrary. Several factors, such as the regulative influence of the peculiarities of spoken language, the technical requirements of instruments used for accompaniment and the like, bring recurring but mathematically unsystematic regularities into premodern music. Nonaesthetic (pragmatic and partial) rationalization via *ethos* is exemplified by the "magical" and "medicinal" use of music. Weber maintains that

whenever music is used in the service of . . . magical practices it tends to assume the form of rigidly stereotyped magical formulae. The intervals of such magically effective musical formulae are canonized: classified rigidly into right and wrong, perfect and imperfect. . . . A magical fixing of forms serves rationalization indirectly. For in music as in other areas of life magic may be a powerfully antirational force. But the fixing of intervals serves the purpose of establishing a set of forms against which others are to be tested. In this it may serve as the basis for a uniform musical culture. (Martindale and Reidel 1958: xxxvi)

Weber never makes mention of this, but it becomes perfectly clear that, although the historical process of rationalizing music has yielded a very peculiar aggregation of purposive rational actions, the net effect of rationalization is something eminently *antipragmatic*. It is music as an *aesthetic* phenomenon, which, having shed all traces of its magical-communal-pragmatic use, arises at the end of the rationalizing process. The Kantian "purposiveness without purpose" has been powerfully vindicated by Weber's philosophically based sociology of music.

"Fully rationalized harmonic chord music" is, however, a dialecti-

cal formation par excellence. There are several dialectical features of this edifice that have been created by "mathematical" reason, even though the latter seems to be radically antithetical to dialectics of any kind. The first dialectical feature is that systematic rationalization brings us to the limit, the *nec plus ultra* of musical rationality.

The harmonic chord system appears to be a rationally closed unit. However, this is only apparently true. To be representative of its key, the dominant seventh chord should, through its third and seventh of the key, form a major seventh. However, in the minor scale the minor seventh must be chromatically raised in contradiction to what is required by the triad. . . . This contradiction is not simply melodically produced. . . . The contradiction is already contained in the harmonic function of the dominant seventh chord itself when applied to the minor scales. . . . Any dominant seventh chord contains the dissonant diminished triad, starting from the third and forming the major seventh. Both of these kinds of triads are *real revolutionaries* when compared with the harmonically divided fifths. Not since J. S. Bach *could chordal harmony legitimate them* with respect to the facts of music. (Weber 1958:67; emphasis added) 2

A second dialectical feature of fully rationalized music is that, contrary to expectations, it behaves not like a rule-governed artifact but as an organic body that needs the tension caused by an inherently irrational element.

The continuity of progression in the relation of chords to each other cannot be established on purely harmonic grounds. It is melodic in character. Although harmonically conditioned and bound, melody . . . is not reducible to harmonic terms. . . . music could never have consisted entirely or alone of mere columns of thirds, harmonic dissonances, and their resolution. The numerous chords do not grow out of the complications of chainlike progressions alone. They also, and preferably, grow out of melodic needs. Melody can be understood only in terms of intervallic distance and tone proximity. Chord progressions do not rest upon an architecture of

thirds. They are not harmonic representatives of a key and not consequently or synonymously reversible. Nor do they find fulfillment through resolution into an entirely new chord but in a chord which characterizes and supplements the key. They are melodic or, seen from the standpoint of chordal harmony, accidental dissonances. . . . *Without the tensions motivated by the irrationality of melody, no modern music could exist . . . chordal rationalization lives only in continuous tension with melodicism which it can never completely devour.* (Weber 1958:810; emphasis added) 3

A third dialectical feature of fully rationalized music can be summarized as follows. While the music of Western modernity builds on the traditionalist, ethos-based loose regularities of prerational music (and, in *uno actu*, it sweeps away the whole antiquated edifice, the inherited traditional rules and their systematic-mathematical rationalization never would have sufficed for the completion of the project. In order to reach its target the system of strict mathematic formulae needed for its counterpart is its exact opposite: the eccentric individual, the virtuoso. Martindale and Reidel, who are normally very accurate interpreters of Weber's theory, misinterpret or one-sidedly present Weber's intention at this point. It is undeniably true that experimentation, rather than stereotyping, is the rule with the virtuoso. It is equally true that music addressed to aesthetic and expressive needs (i.e., the music of the virtuoso) may deliberately "savor the bizarre." It is also true that "progressive alterations of intervals in the interest of greater expressiveness," which is the feat of the virtuoso, lead at times "to experimentation with the most irrational microtones."

But it is decidedly a one-sided presentation of Weber's views, as if musical virtuosi, according to him, only constituted "one of the forces eating away the structure of tonality itself" (see Martindale and Reidel (1958:xxxviixxxviii). Virtuosi indeed act "irrationally" and subversively, but they also have an eminently rationalizing function. In his brief analysis of modern mathematically and fully rationalized instruments, Weber emphasizes that some of the best of thesee.g., the Amati violinscould not have been used to full capacity without having been played by the eccentric individual, the virtuoso. This observation can be extended to the well-known historical anecdote that Beethoven is said to have wept profuse tears of relief, despite his

general hostility to the cheap mixing of tears with music, when he heard the young Franz Liszt perform the *Hammerklavier* sonata, a work generally deemed to be unperformable. This illustrates that the virtuoso, a deviation from the rule, was necessary simply for the rationalized work of art to exist.

The theory of rationalized music ends on a decidedly conservative note. The mastery of Occidental music of "polyvocality" with its three forms "polysonority" or modern chordal harmony, contrapuntal polyphony, and harmonic homophonic music has completed the whole edifice of rationalized harmonic chord music. The unsurpassable and canonic period of Western music is seen in J. S. Bach and his age, in which the mastery of "polyvocality" was achieved.

Weber warns the musical rebels about the futility of their bold but unconsidered attempts to transcend the limits of tonality and its inherent rationality. A music that is not harmonically rationalized is much more free-moving, Weber admits. It is his firm conviction, however, that the would-be transgressors chase phantoms.

Our musical sensitivity also is dominated by the interpretation of the tones according to their harmonic provenience. We feel, even "hear," in a different fashion the tones which can be identified enharmonically on the instruments according to their chordal significance. Even the most modern developments of music, *which are practically moving toward a destruction of tonality*, show this influence. These modern movements which are at least in part the products of the characteristic, intellectualized romantic turn of our search for the effects of the "interesting," cannot get rid of some residual relations to these fundamentals, even if in the form of developing contrasts to them. (Weber 1958:102; emphasis added)

Modern music, as it is portrayed in Weber's analysis, bears an acute resemblance to all the dominant features that otherwise characterize Western modernity in his larger narrative. It is a fully rationalized system, the cumulation of purposively rationalized acts. Although it draws on the raw materials of inconsistent rationalizations of premodern worlds, it resolutely sweeps them away to erect its own proud edifice on their ruins. Western music has been completely rationalized, and yet it reaches the limits of rationality very quickly.

The residual "irrational" elements within the rationalized system

are "revolutionaries" or "rebels." On the one hand, they challenge the legitimacy of Occidental music; on the other, they generate a dialectical tension without which dynamic development within the system would be inconceivable. Despite its role of a dialectical stimulant, the romantic rebellion cannot pretend to transcend, let alone supersede, the rationality of the system. Insofar as the rebels find the courage or boldness to stray beyond the limits of rationality, they can destroy the system; but they will negate it without creating anything of lasting value and significance in its stead. The Weberian strictures concerning the impossibility of transcending modernity with its autonomous rationalized spheres are no less stern and no less beyond appeal here than at any other point in his system. Once the stage of "polyvocality" was reached, the rationalized sphere of music could still continue to unfold in depth, but it has nowhere left to go beyond that level.

An issue regarding this "musical theory of action" must be addressed: At this point, where is the actor? Or more precisely, who is the actor? In fact, Weber's theory is characterized by a mysterious and almost total anonymity as far as the actor is concerned. Admittedly, this anonymity is only "almost" total, for Weber does briefly refer to the roles of "professionals," as the manufacturers of musical instruments, the priestly castes, and the virtuosi. In the main, however, it is "music as such" that, in Weber's theory, unfolds and makes progress toward rationalization through acts of purposive rationality. It is "Western music" as such that had been locked into and has come victoriously out of a long struggle with its antagonist, "prerational" music. The anonymity created by the (almost total) absence of the actor, the *sensu stricto* career of the rationalizing process, generates a quasi-natural (in Marxist vocabulary "reified") atmosphere in Weber's theory. But why this anonymity? Why a mathematical theory of the basis for musical creation without an adequate account of the musical actor?

The likeliest answer to this dilemma is that, had Weber undertaken a sociology of the actor, he could not have escaped taking up the analysis of *interspheric relations* and their causal or noncausal nature. At the same time it is clear that, although he had learned enormously from Marx, Weber was a lifelong adversary of historical materialism, with its "cause-and-effect" conception of the interspheric relations of social life. However, to refrain from taking up the all-too-obvious problem of the stunning resemblance of autonomous spheres to one another does not provide any solution to the puzzle. If

the spheres are perfectly autonomous with regard to their genesis and functioning and yet display strikingly similar structures, *praestabilita harmonia* of a kind must be behind these parallels and similarities. While this is perfectly in keeping with the *mathematica sacra* of Kepler and his passionate inquiry into the "music of the spheres," it does not sit well with the great sociologist who pleaded "religious unmusicality" and in whose work music had emerged as the yield of "this-worldly" mathematics. Perhaps at this point, the legacy and the fate of Western rationalization affected its major theorist. Strongly insistent on fully rationalized theory, he very soon felt the limits of his own rationality.

Adorno and Bloch:

Two Representative Critics of Weber's Theory of Music

Theodor Adorno's position was linked to Weber's theory of rationalized music by closer ties, both positive and negative, than he would have been prepared to acknowledge. True to his strange habit of remaining silent about his predecessors, Adorno's anti-Weber stance in his *Philosophy of Modern Music* is only implicit, if vehement, and Weber's stimulus to Adorno's theory of music is never mentioned. Yet as a stimulus, Weber is crucial to Adorno.

Many analysts have pondered the meaning of Adorno's mysterious, although repeated and quite unequivocal, statements that music is bourgeois, in the sense of *bürgerlich*. Needless to say, taken literally, this curt verdict flies in the face not only of the fundamental facts of the history of music but also of Adorno's frequently stated admiration for Palestrina. However, if we regard Adorno as a conditional subscriber to Weber's theory of the rationalization of music, the puzzle is solved. Music is bourgeois (*bürgerlich*) insofar as it is fully rationalized because and at this point Adorno is in agreement with Weber ongoing and self-completing rationalization is the very essence of the epoch that is termed modern or bourgeois.

More important than the initial stimulus, however, is that Adorno's attack against Weber is premised on the self-consuming negative dialectic of the Enlightenment. Here is the fullest polemical statement from *Philosophy of Modern Music*:

The assumption of an historical tendency in musical material contradicts the traditional conception of the material of music. This material is traditionally

defined . . . as the sum of all sounds at the disposal of the composer. The actual compositional material, however, is as different from this sum as is language from its total supply of sounds. It is not simply a matter of increase and decrease of this supply in the course of history. All its specific characteristics are indications of the historical process. . . . Music recognizes no natural law . . . a unique ontological law is by no means to be ascribed either to the material of tones itself or to the tonal material which has been filtered through the tempered system. This, for example, is the typical argumentation of those who either from the relationships of harmonic tones or from the psychology of the ear attempt to deduce that the triad is the necessary and universally valid condition of all possible comprehension and that, therefore, all music must be dependent upon it. This argumentation . . . is nothing but a superstructure for reactionary compositional tendencies. . . . That which seems to be the mere self-locomotion of the material is of the same origin as is the social process, by whose traces it is continually permeated. (Adorno 1983:3233)

What is wrong with the theory of "mathematical self-locomotion" or the Weberian conception of the rationalization of music? The details of Adorno's argument can be briefly summarized here. In the historically conditioned ongoing process of rationalization, yesterday's achievement has gradually become today's dilemma.

All the tonal combinations employed in the past by no means stand indiscriminately at the disposal of the composer today. Even the more insensitive ear detects the shabbiness and exhaustion of the diminished seventh chord and certain chromatic modulatory tones in the salon music of the nineteenth century. For the technically trained ear, such vague discomfort is transformed into a prohibitive canon. . . . this canon today excludes even the medium of tonality that is to say, the means of all traditional music. It is not simply that these sounds are antiquated and untimely, but that they are false. They no longer fulfill their function. The most

progressive level of technical procedures designs tasks before which traditional sounds reveal themselves as impotent cliches. . . . It is precisely the triads which, in such context, are cacophonous and not the dissonances. (Adorno 1983:34)

The historical dialectic explodes the boundaries of the traditional musical world and creates a new sonorous domain of seemingly unlimited liberties.

All restricting principles of selection in tonality have been discarded. Traditional music had to content itself with a highly limited number of tonal combinations, particularly with regard to their vertical application. . . . Today, in contrast . . . no conventions prevent the composer from using the sound which he needs in a specific spot. No convention forces him to acquiesce to traditionally universal principles. With the liberation of musical material, there arose the possibility of mastering it technically. It is as if music had thrown off that last alleged force of nature which its subject matter exercises upon it, and would now be able to assume command over this subject matter freely, consciously and openly. The composer has emancipated himself along with his sounds. (Adorno 1983:5152) 4

Breaking through the barrier of traditional, quasi-natural musical conventions i.e., rationalized music in the Weberian sense, however, not merely liberating. For specific reasons, it also ushers in the period of rationalization of a *higher* type.

The various dimensions of Western tonal music—melody, harmony, counterpoint, form, and instrumentation—have for the most part developed historically apart from one another, without design, and, in that regard, according to the "laws of nature." . . . Melody circumscribed the harmonic function; harmony differentiated itself in the service of melodic valor. . . . In a later development a common denominator is sought for all musical dimensions. This is the origin of the twelve-tone technique, which finds its culmination in the will towards the suspension of that fundamental contrast

upon which all Western music is built the contrast between polyphonic fugal structure and homophonic sonata-form. (Adorno 1983:5354)

Already the traditional-conventional music, that is, the Weberian "rationalized" phase of Occidental music had known autonomous musical subjectivity, a term with the aid of which Adorno wanted to overcome the reification of the Weberian "musical self-locomotion." However, the exact meaning of the term is not entirely clear in Adorno's text. The most likely application of the term probably covers the type of artwork that has its roots in convention but which has already gained the level of the autonomous musical subject; it is best exemplified by Beethoven's sonata-form. The more the center of music is shifted from universalistic-conventional organization and rule-following toward the heroic, unique, and idiosyncratic, but still rational autonomous, musical subject, the more will Beethoven occupy the place of the Weberian paradigmatic figure, with Bach on the peak of a musical Olympus. However, the hopes tied to this new phase of musical rationalization turned out to be short-lived:

A system by which music dominates nature results . . . The conscious disposition over the material of nature is two-sided: the emancipation of the human being from the musical force of nature and the subjection of nature to human purposes. . . . At the same time, however, this technique further approaches the ideal of mastery as domination, the infinity of which resides in the fact that nothing heteronomous remains which is not absorbed into the continuum of this technique. Infinity is pure identity. . . . Music, in its surrender to historical dialectics, has played its role in this process. Twelve-tone technique is truly the fate of music. It enchains music by liberating it. The subject dominates through the rationality of the system, only in order to succumb to the rational system itself. . . . From the procedures which broke the blind domination of tonal material there evolves a second blind nature by means of this regulatory system. . . . The total rationality of music is its total organization. (Adorno 1983:6569)

The total or rather totalitarian fiasco of the second rationalization of music leaves only one of two alternative outcomes: either the aban-

donment of the twelve-tone system and the selection of some undefined musical path of a new freedom or the end of music.

Without doubt, Adorno's critique of Weber contains some serious injustices. The theory of Western rationalization, which at every point concluded in the disenchantment of the world, concealed and very often disclosed almost tragic tensions. In *History and Class Consciousness*, when Lukács used Weber's own characterization of rationality in order to leave behind the whole domain of purposive rationality, he acted in a dangerous fashion against the stricture but not necessarily against the spirit of at least one of Weber's most profound intentions.

And yet, a new theory of music has emerged from Adorno's biased polemic, in which the rationalization thesis has acquired new and deeper dimensions. Rationality here ceases to be a result of purposive actions, a result not teleological in nature. It has been plugged into the historical process whose telos, in good Hegelian fashion, is freedom. Freedom becomes the yardstick that measures rationality. Insofar as rationality becomes domination and freedom evaporates from rationalized objectifications, insofar as the first or second wave of rationalization oppresses the autonomous musical subject that could only enjoy a single historical moment of self-emancipation, rationalization becomes an oppressive trend. It turns against the intentions of the Western project. Furthermore, the dialectic of Western rationalization, a trend that Weber also detected but which he believed to have been subordinated to the general rationalizing schema,, has in Adorno been transformed into the spasmodic but grandiose cycle of an overwhelmingly negative dialectic. This transformation provides us with a deeply problematic philosophy of history. At the same time, it presents us a magnificent philosophy of Occidental music which accounts for its somber, internally split and dramatic grandeur in a way that is incomparably deeper than the Weberian thesis of "rationalizing self-locomotion."

Even less well known than Adorno's simultaneously negative and positive attachment to Weber's thesis is Ernst Bloch's covert polemic against Weber's thesis, showing that Weber's theory also served for Bloch as a powerful negative stimulus. According to his correspondence (Bloch 1983:157), Bloch was working on "Philosophy of Music" (which became part of both the first and the final second version of *The Spirit of Utopia*) during the summer of 1915. Bloch, who never belonged to the Weber circle and who felt enormous resentment against his omission from this intellectual paradise, could not possi-

bly have been acquainted with Weber's essay in manuscript. However, we do know, once again from Bloch's correspondence, that he discussed the plan of "Philosophy of Music" (which had been brewing for some years) with Weber, who proved a uniquely insensitive audience. It cannot be any accident that the single polemical motif in which Bloch captured the message of his philosophy of music, in a letter to Lukács, was an invective against the idea of musical "progress," which was of course central to Weber's rationalization thesis (Bloch 1983:160).

Neither prophets nor journalists write dissertations. Bloch was a mixture of both, and this is why his frontal attack on the theory of musical rationalization is so unsystematic, but, also, undeniably, why it offers so many deep and unexpected insights. Bloch makes his incursion into Weber's position exactly at the point where Weber himself felt a dialectical tension in the edifice of Western music at the point where, later, Adorno identified the stimulus for changing the form of rationalization—namely, in the tension between the constructive-rational and the affective, the harmonic and the melodic aspects of modern music. Yet Bloch's message is more profound than the mere reductive contrast of the harmonic to the melodic. For Bloch, the whole idea of rationalizing music is yet another version of those futile attempts that aimed at reforming human existence through the domain of the calculable (e.g., the economic), which he called (in *The Spirit of Utopia*) *die Verwaltung des Unwesentlichen*, the "management of the insignificant." Most specifically irrelevant is the term "progress" in understanding either the history or the function of music. There is indeed some sort of gradual improvement in the *atelier* aspect of handling and arranging the musical material, Bloch admits in a polemic against Lukács (and the *spiritus rector*, Weber) (Bloch 1983:177). However, he reveals his intentions when he suggests a seemingly totally paradoxical, if not outright nonsensical, historical topology of music in which Mozart is placed lower on the rungs of the ladder of rationalization than Bach and therefore appears to be prior to him.

The key to the puzzle is in Bloch's "mystical-musical egology." He contends that it is subjectivitythe Ego and its historical metamorphosesthat constitutes the heart and the center of music, and not some sort of rationalized structure within the material that either "manages the insignificant" or enchains one to one's existence. In composing and appropriating music, one builds an "Ego-like house" (*ichhaftes Haus*), the dimension and the beauty of which depend on

the creative and appropriating Ego. History is a mere receptacle in which the metamorphosis of this Ego takes place. In this neutral medium it could easily happen that the paradigmatic figure of a lower level of the egology appears at a historically later stage than the paradigm of a higher level.

The egological typology has four stages. First is the stage of the "small worldly Ego," the harmonic, the Greek, the one that dwells in perfect harmony but that is not familiar with the metaphysical tension that drives us toward our proper destiny. Mozart is representative of this stage with his fifteen-year-old's music. The "small spiritual Ego" is expressed in the second stage; it is exemplified by Bach. The house of this Ego is small; the atmosphere that reigns supreme in it is one of devotion, piety, tacit exaltation. But its windows open onto nowhere. Eyes turn toward the inwardness; the sound comes from within; and the addressee is precisely this sonorous inwardness, not any kind of external audience. It is difficult to decide whether the hero of the third stage, that of the "large worldly Ego" epitomized by Beethoven, Wagner, and Bruckner, lives in a house at all, for the "large worldly Ego" lives in the world at large. It is a public and heroic figure. It challenges the skies and what is beyond. The music of the Grail or another mysterious mana lifts up from its enlarged orchestra. Finally, the fourth stage, that of the "large spiritual Ego" has not yet come. There have been certain forerunners of the "large spiritual Ego" but Siegfried turned out to be the false Messiah. We still have to wait (Bloch 1964:21112).

Two possible readings of Bloch's philosophy of music are equally true but not of the same width, scope, and depth. In the first reading, Bloch's polemic against the rationalization thesis, with his emphasis on the affective element of music, presents the best theoretical anticipation of musical Expressionism in the era before World War I. This historical and therefore somewhat reductive interpretation has many supporting arguments, the most important of which is Bloch's attitude. In turning back to the Kierkegaardian parable of the poet who is slowly burning to death in the interior of the iron bull where he had been thrown by the wrathful tyrant, and who imperturbably chants his swan song, Bloch indignantly asks the "rationalizers": What are we looking for in listening to this song? Is it the well-arranged melismas of the song that capture our attention or the brutal message of his suffering, everyone's suffering, that makes us "richer" for listening? (ibid., 178). This untarnished advocacy of an Expressionist *Inhaltsästhetik* becomes even more explicit when Bloch turns against

"musical number-crunching" and when, significantly, he makes the criticism against Schönberg's imminent turn toward dodecaphony, which he brilliantly anticipates, that the answer to the dilemma of music cannot be found in further mathematization, only in freer, "larger" expressivity (ibid., 18990).

The second reading of Bloch's theory is mystical-eschatological. The fourth stage of the egological typology will only be realized simultaneously with parousia. It is not by chance that, when he is explicit about his intentions, Bloch reaches back to Kierkegaard. Admittedly, his reading of Kierkegaard is fairly arbitrary, because the sphere of the religious in Kierkegaard comes long after he had left the sphere of the aesthetic, whereas with Bloch, music is the antechamber of parousia. Yet once the music of the fourth stage resounds, all Egos are on the threshold of their imminent unification with that infinite transcendental subject. If we translate Bloch's position again, however, and those without faith perforce translate, we come to a surprising revelation. We shall perceive that, in fact, the music of the third stage, the music of the Ninth Symphony, implicitly contains the music of the fourth stage, that of the large spiritual Ego. Parousia can also mean "the end of prehistory" (a shade of meaning embraced later by Bloch himself). The mana whose sounds we perceive can usher us into the unification ceremony with the ultimate transcendental Ego, but it can also announce the moment of *seid umschlungen, Millionen*, the festivity of the Supreme Being, humankind's (or the world Spirit's) homecoming, an end to the vicissitudes of history. If we read Bloch's text in this second sense, we shall view music as the peak of the rationalist project of the Enlightenment even after the repeated collapse of attempts at its mathematical-technological rationalization. *For then, music alone will appear as the appropriate abode of the concept 'humankind'*, which is the precondition and the ultimate justification of rationalism in the same measure. Occidental music will thus appear as the only shelter in which rationalism can survive the periods of persecution and critical questioning to which it has no properly rational answers.

What do we do when, in the spirit of Beethoven, we hug millions? We certainly do not make love, for humankind does not emanate eroticism, hardly even affect. Caught red-handed by Heidegger at the old-fashioned sin of humanism, it was still Sartre who rightly questioned the possibility of "being fond of humanity." Nor are we engaged in political action when we listen to music and hug millions. I

agree with both Plato and Thomas Mann in regarding music as politically suspect. While under its spell, we are more indeterminate and unspecific in our hates and sympathies than politics would like us to be. There is no doubt that we communicate while we are listening to music and hugging millions. But this is a special kind of communication. Its message is meager yet redundant. It conveys to those millions in my embrace only the truism that they are like me and I am like them. It is a discourse that knows no argument; indeed it is one that draws its strength from the absence of argument. Whenever conceptual issues, such as human rights or economic world systems, are on the agenda of the discourse of humanism, the overarching or underlying term, humankind, suffers more defeats than it heralds victories. Not so in music, when we do not bring up argument against argument, but we prove by the very fact that we are absorbed and enchanted by the mana of music together with those we hug and by whom we are being hugged that we are the same species. In this sense, music is indeed communication; together with mathematics, it is the only universal language. This is perhaps the greatest vindication of the rationality of music. It is also the reason why, once attempts are made (e.g., by Adrian Leverkühn) at revoking the Ninth Symphony, the very project of Occidental music is destroyed.

Notes

1. See Weber 1958. I refer to the introduction by D. Martindale and J. Reidel extensively in describing Weber's theory.

2. It is perhaps more than accidental that the melancholy report on the impossibility of fully rationalizing music on the basis of mathematical principles is roughly on a par with the other spectacular admission of the limits to Western rationality, namely, Bertrand Russell's resignation. *Principia Mathematica*, too, had to be ended on a note of resignation: mathematics could not be fully based on logical principles.

3. It is noteworthy again that the "scale-alien tones" that generate melody and that, from the viewpoint of chord aesthetics, are resistant to alien bodies, are called "rebels" by Weber.

4. A very good and convincing description of the (negative) dialectic of "musical self-emancipation" in Adorno's theory can be found in David Roberts (1991).

A totally false conception of the "rationalization as emancipation" of music appeared on the left roughly at the same time. It hailed the "Taylorization of music," which allegedly contained the possibility for the "radicalization of evil": in undermining the traditional forms of performing

music, a new era would be ushered in, in which there would be no difference between composer and listener, performer and audience. Walter Benjamin admired Hans Eisler's aggressive statement of this idea:

In the development of music, too, both in production and in reproduction, we must learn to perceive an ever increasing process of rationalization. . . . The gramophone record, the sound film, jukeboxes can purvey top quality music. . . . canned as commodity. The consequence of this process of rationalization is that musical reproduction is consigned to ever diminishing, but also ever more highly qualified, groups of specialists. The crisis of commercial concert is the crisis of an antiquated form of production made obsolete by new technical inventions. (Quoted in Benjamin 1982:263)

References

Adorno, Theodor

1983

Philosophy of Modern Music. Translated by A. Mitchell and W. Blomster. New York: Seabury Press.

Benjamin, Walter

1982

The Author as Producer. *In* The Essential Frankfurt School Reader, ed. A. Arato and E. Gebhardt. New York: Continuum Books.

Bloch, Ernst

1983

Briefe 1903/1975. Vol. 1. Frankfurt: Suhrkamp Verlag.

1964

Der Geist der Utopie, Erste Fassung. Frankfurt: Suhrkamp Verlag.

Martindale D., and J. Reidel

1958

Introduction to Max Weber, The Rational and Social Foundations of Music, trans. D. Martindale, J. Reidel, and G. Neuwirth.

Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press.

Roberts, David

1991

Art and Enlightenment: Aesthetic Theory after Adorno. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press.

Weber, Max

1958

Rational and Social Foundations of Music. Translated by D. Martindale, J. Reidel, and G. Neuwirth. Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press.

17

Culture, Music, and Collaborative Learning

Charles Keil

What does an anthropologist or ethnomusicologist have to say to literary people? How do musical styles in cultural contexts model collaborative learning?

As I try to summarize my answers to these questions, I'd like to review two of my favorite authors on culture, Stanley Diamond and Edward Sapir, since it is the problem of culture, more specifically, cultural creation, that literary and music people surely have in common.

What brought me to a collaborative learning conference 1 was a shared concern with creating classless society and culture in at least one classroom, a common search for what Diamond called prime or primitive culture. I think we're also after a subtle variant of prime culture that Sapir defined in 1924 as "genuine culture," in opposition to the "spurious culture" that was already engulfing the United States and every other industrial society as the electricity-powered mass media tidal wave swamped us (Sapir [1924] 1949).

You want to empower people verbally as skilled readers and writers. And I want to empower them musically, to help them reclaim their gifts as singers, drummers, dancers, and instrumentalists. To do this sort of work we all require a clearer sense of primary and genuine culture.

Stanley Diamond, in *In Search of the Primitive* (1974), defines and abstracts various aspects of prismatic pieces of one holistic, primitive gathering and hunting society that took a few million years to evolve. His description and Colin Turnbull's more concrete portrait of *The Forest People* (1961) often sound like collaborative learning heavens. In primitive society economies are communal, property is unknown, and equal access to tools is taken for granted. Leadership roles are situational, rotational, consensually validated, and symbolic. No laws, lawyers, or cops; lots of customs and plenty of open conflicts facilitate the airing of grievances and differences with the aim of

restoring equilibrium. Participation is full and direct in actions that are physically, emotionally, and intellectually integrated; building or sailing a canoe or spreading a hunting net can be religious-social-economic-magical-technological-musical-aesthetic experiences. Which is another way of saying that people in primitive societies don't abstract concepts from lived experience and reify them the way post-Platonic literate people do. They don't insist that each person become a madman or a specialist. Who you are and what you know are not separable.

Let me say again that this sort of society took a few million years to evolve, according to the past decade's archaeological work in East Africa, and, once evolved, kept us well adapted to a broad variety of environments, from tropical to arctic, as *Homo ludens collaboratus*, for tens of thousands of years. We became fully sapient in this society, with brains as big or bigger than at present, but were not knowledge-driven and work-oriented; hunting and gathering peoples put one to four hours a day per person, on the average, into solving food and shelter problems. I'll say it a third time for emphasis; as leisurely, curious, playful collaborators we evolved for millions of years and then stayed adapted for tens of thousands of years.

This prime society, in its limitless cultural diversity, first came under attack from *Homo laborious hierarchicus* (who was also a patriarchal cuss) just a few millennia ago, in a few small corners of the world. Up until a few centuries ago, primitive society was the preferred mode of production (see Marxism), reproduction (see feminism), and preproduction (have fun-ism) for the vast majority of the earth's peoples, and none of these societies gave up this way of life voluntarily. My Hessian peasant grandparents still knew about the spirits in trees. My grandmother told me so, and I'm telling you. If any society and culture reveals our species being, our human nature, primitive society is it.

I hold the view, then, along with that staunch antievolutionist Kenneth Burke, that the agricultural, industrial, and electric-atom revolutions did not abolish this primary human nature of ours. They just distorted, repressed, oppressed, and depressed it. And alienated it. From this perspective, Descartes and Newton are just an interruption in the flow of human consciousness, a mere ripple in the stream, and the latest French thinkers the froth on the ripple. Collaborative learning, as I understand it, is not a new epistemology but an old ontology, a search for our natural sociability, playfulness, and ability to cooperate. Some may consider it a new support system for prime

and genuine culture building, a fresh attack on the inherently isolating and alienating processes of phonetic literacy and linear thinking, but it is also an attempt to recover the oldest forms of humanness that were stolen from our ancestors just a few generations ago.

In his early attempts to define "genuine culture," Sapir tried to fuse notions of "national character" with "high culture"the "specific manifestations of civilization that give a particular people its distinctive place in the world," mixed with "the conventional ideal of individual refinement" in the arts and letters sanctioned by a dominant class (Sapir [1924] 1949). The ideas of "national character" and "high culture" are dangerous enough taken singly, potentially deadly in combination, and often positively genocidal when backed by delusions of empire. Sapir knew this, I think, yet he desperately wanted to salvage a qualitative aspect of culture from the threat of mass media homogenization of culture, on the one hand, and the scientific values of ethnographic neutrality/relativism, on the other, both of which can blindly reinforce the truism that everyone is equally cultured. (An open-eyed awareness of this truth is, of course, a prerequisite for working effectively with people from different cultures, usually labeled with racist epithets like "deprived," "disadvantaged," "underdeveloped," as if people who don't share our supposedly universal values are naturally prefixable as de-, dis-, under-, sub-, etc.) Sapir tried to guard against these dangerous nationalist and elitist sources synthesized as "genuine" by insisting that "genuine culture is not of necessity either high or low; it is merely inherently harmonious, balanced, self-satisfactory. . . . a culture in which nothing is spiritually meaningless. . . . The genuine culture is internal, it works from the individual to ends" ([1924] 1949:30831). Sapir is especially careful to distinguish between civilization and culture: "It is easier, generally speaking, for genuine culture to subsist on a lower level of civilization. . . . Civilization, as a whole, moves on; culture comes and goes. . . . While art lives, it belongs to culture; in the degree that it takes on the frigidity of death, it becomes of interest only to the study of civilization" (30831).

As Sapir develops this theme, it becomes ever clearer that nation-states and their ruling classes can nurture poor substitutes for genuine culture at best. Only small, localized, autonomously face-to-face groups can really create it. So-called French literature has usually been the interaction of friendship networks in certain neighborhoods of Paris. Shakespeare's plays came down to us as monuments of early British civilization but were actually an accidental by-product

of the Globe Theatre's genuine culture. Socrates strolled around Athens, a small town of 30,000 citizens, discussing things with small groups without ever freezing group process by writing it down.

I hope that any length of time spent with these Diamond and Sapir essays will further convince you that "collaborative learning" is just another name for our prime species being in the process of creating genuine culture.

What about music in diverse cultures as models for collaborative learning? I found that difficult to talk about *with* taped examples *and* a generous amount of time to develop ideas during the conference. All the world's music is inspirational. And a growing shelf of books describes the ways people collaborate to make it. Perhaps a short outline of the phases of musical collaboration observable through time and across cultures will clarify somewhat the ways in which being and knowing reinforce each other in musical creation.

Music is a collaborative mode of communication in all societies. Much bourgeois art seems to be individualistically produced and consumed novels, paintings, sculpture though even here we underestimate the degrees and kinds of collaboration involved. More obviously symphonies, operas, ballets, and dramas require many people to prepare and perform together. The collaborative essence of music is not immediately obvious to all literate Westerners only because we have gotten into the habit of trying to fix or freeze music by writing it down. Say "music" to most of us, and we think of a composer or songwriter who creates it in his (never "her" in the imagination) head, writes it down, takes it to a conductor or interpreter. It is performed, and a passive audience appreciates it with applause at the end. Anywhere outside hierarchical civilizations, however, music is more obviously a collective creation: composers and performers are the same people, and active participation, usually by dancing, is the norm.

Among the Bambuti and other "pygmy" groups, each person sings his/her own melody in ways that both link and overlap all the other ongoing melodies (Turnbull 1961). Each person may contribute something unique to the mix that is meant to be audible to all other participants and to the environment. Each person is singing and dancing for self, with the group, to the forest. This kind of singing-dancing-instrument playing event before a honey-gathering, after a hunt, night after night, or for weeks at a time when someone has died seems to be about creating and maintaining social equilibrium and ecological balance. Continuous and simultaneous expression of

individual parts is a way of both being together and knowing each other, sending and receiving information and sensations at the same time, ontology and epistemology as one process (Chernoff 1979). Note that both literary and electronic media of communication are more channeled, directional, limited, and simpler than Bambuti ceremonial. Create a collaborative learning process to match it, if you can.

The layered effect, densification, the hocketing and counterpoint of many individual voices heard simultaneously are often but not always heard in the other classless societies of the world. A recent effort to compare the musics of egalitarian peoples reveals once again the marvelous diversity of musical and cultural solutions to the question of what to do with so much free time (see Feld 1984 and Roseman 1984). Unique environmental factors and culture area niches and the sounds of local birds and neighboring peoples seem to shape each people's music toward a precious distillation of local knowledge (Geertz 1983).

There are many settled farming societies around the world where obvious social classes do not exist but where social inequalities do exist between men and women as well as between senior men and junior men. These societies on the brink of class often have call and response, leader/chorus song styles that reflect constant dialogues and dialectics within the society over precisely the issues of inequality (Keil 1979). Men and women compose songs about each other; young men protest the abuses of older men; elders complain about the lack of respect and the new practices that undermine tradition. While some people compose new songs, most do not. But it is assumed that everyone can and will do so if they need to confront an issue or solve a particular problem by appealing to the wider kin community. While social inequalities exist and indeed are the generative force behind much of the song-and-dance music activity in such a society, they are not fixed but always being negotiated in a plural universe (politically polycentric, religiously pantheistic or polytheistic, musically polymetric, polyrhythmic, polyphonal).

These open processes of both collaborative and competitive learning do not really assume a "knowledge" in any way separable from life. It is probably only with the advent of feudal society that concepts like "knowledge" and "music" are invented to name the stuff that emerging specialists will try to fix, monopolize, and control for the interests of an aristocracy. Scribal literacy certainly makes this effort easier for written knowledge. Sound-patterned knowledge is harder

to control, but modes are codified, certain notes are declared off limits (e.g., the flatted fifth), cyclical structures are established, patterns preset to reflect the "natural" hierarchical (in space), repetitious (in time) order of society and nature (Becker and Becker 1981).

If feudalism invents and fixes "knowledge" and "music" in a singular or united way that is open to infinite shading but very little basic reinterpretation or change, capitalism has presented us with *two* monocultures that both compete with and reinforce each other in imposing still more "knowledge" and "music" upon us. Many of us have become so transfixed by the powerful high culture and mass culture Scylla and Charybdis that we forget the vital currents of people's music and culture that still flow between them. "Polka," "salsa," and "country," for example, in their local ethnic and class contexts, all deserve books of affirmation as styles that make possible continued collaborative learning and reinterpretation of both being and knowing.

This is a difficult point to make briefly and in conclusion, but I believe it helps to think about cultural styles in music, dance, gesture, conversation, work, courtship, clothes, etc. the whole range of expression as an accelerator of collaborative learning wherever they are present or can be borrowed to fit. People collaborate best within flexible pretested frameworks. The twelve-bar blues has been dull dishwater as a structure ever since it was invented at the turn of the century; it requires verbal and instrumental phrasings to keep it alive for each generation. Human rites and ceremonies can bring language skills into a more holistic context. Tea ceremonies. Haiku contests on set themes. Chain poems. Hyperbole bouts. Slogan chanting. Playing the dozens. Party hearty lyrics. Psychodramas. Mock weddings. Naming ceremonies. And so forth. Can you write like you talk like you sing like you drum like you dance your life?

Notes

1. The conference was on Collaborative Learning and the Reinterpretation of Knowledge, Yale University, May 1984.

References

Becker, Judith, and Alton Becker

1981

A Musical Icon: Power and Meaning in Javanese Gamelan Music. *In* Sign in Music and Literature, ed. Wendy Steiner, 203-15. Austin: University of Texas Press.

Chernoff, John

1979

African Rhythms and African Sensibility. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Diamond, Stanley

1974

In Search of the Primitive: A Critique of Civilization. New Brunswick, N. J.: E. P. Dutton /Transaction Books.

Feld, Steven

1984

Sound Structure as Social Structure. Ethnomusicology 28:383409.

Geertz, Clifford

1983

Local Knowledge. New York: Basic Books.

Keil, Charles

1979

Tiv Song. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Roseman, Marina

1984

The Social Structuring of Sound. Ethnomusicology 28:41115.

Sapir, Edward

[1924] 1949

Culture: Genuine and Spurious. *In* Selected Writings of Edward Sapir in Language, Culture, and Personality, ed. David Mandelbaum. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Turnbull, Colin

1961

The Forest People. New York: Simon and Schuster.

PART III
A CRITIQUE OF CIVILIZATION

A Beat of 1-2-3

When hearing the low howl of a horn
and seeing the tear blue of a child's eye
I look for words
descriptions
of this urban life.
When, after the rain
a black mist arises
and I know it is the purity of
dirt
I cannot help but look for words.
In a scattered maze of streets
the crazed of the world salute each other
remembering nothing
contemplating everything
until their shoes wear thin
and it does not even matter.
Skipping up a cracked hill
not in the least forlorn
is a girl or the twin of a girl
who in a beat
a beat of 123
scowls in my face
and it does not even matter.
Hung up, dry as the day it was made
is a skirt and a shirt and a hat.
It is the silk behind the glass
it is the audience-of-one
and it is not real.
But that does not even matter
when I hear the low howl of a horn
and I see the tear blue of a child's eye.

Sarah Diamond

18

The Human Condition

Agnes Heller

All those who ponder moral problems are attempting to find out why certain people are vicious and wicked, whereas others are reasonably good, or even virtuous; and further, why both the good and the wicked people are considerably outnumbered by those who are neither good nor wicked, but who sometimes do the proper thing and sometimes the improper thing. This simple and banal observation makes people wonder about "human nature," the knowledge of which might provide an explanation. Meaningful worldviews, always available, offer the basic conceptual clues of an understanding of this kind. For example, it suffices to know that "men" are born with unruly passions, that they are conceived in sin, or that the instinct of self-preservation drives them to pursue their own interests above everything else. This and similar all-encompassing explanations make us understand that even people who know what is good fall short of practicing it. Philosophies, as a rule, elevate the simplest everyday questions to a level of high sophistication. Whether morals "derive" from "nature" or whether they contradict this "nature" is a problem no moral philosophy can circumvent. If we probe behind the surface of the complicated methodological devices of modern philosophies, the same "naive" questions keep surfacing. And this stands to reason, for the question "How are good persons possible?" cannot even be addressed, let alone answered, without having first developed a theory of "human nature," whatever this compound term "human nature" means.

As far as the direct relationship between so-called human nature and ethics is concerned, all four *logical* possibilities have been exhausted several times, each time in a different orchestration. The first solution is that human nature is bad (evil) and *hinders* people from becoming good (virtuous): in other words, we are good *despite* our nature. The second solution holds that human nature is good and thus *further*s people in becoming good and virtuous, so we are then good *in accordance* with our nature. Yet here something other than

nature must be held responsible for all evils; "society," "civilization," and even norms (including moral norms) compete for the title of the malefactor. According to the third solution, human nature is *morally indifferent*, raw material able to become both good and evil. But here again something other than nature must be held responsible for a good outcome as well as an evil one. Laws, habits, knowledge, and ignorance are the respective agents of the ambivalent product in this version. In the fourth solution, there are good as well as evil propensities in human nature; some natural endowments *further* and others *hinder* our becoming good and virtuous. The catalogue of logical possibilities, despite its obvious emptiness, indicates that the purely rationalistic *explanation* of morals is clearly outnumbered. Only the advocates of the Socratic tenet, in terms of which those who know the good will do the good (wickedness being ignorance), can be termed rationalist. Still, the rationalist *project* of the improvement of morals is not outnumbered: with the exception of the first solution, all at least allow for a rationalist interpretation of the project.

The problem of "human nature" is primordially *ontological*: relating ethics to "human nature" presupposes the *knowledge* of that nature. The naive ontology of the everyday attitude has to be replaced in philosophies by reflectively construed ontology (metaphysics). In naive everyday ontology the *referent* of the compound "human nature" is as obvious as it needs to be for *everyday* explanatory purposes (for example, in employing the notion as an extenuating circumstance, as in "He could not do any better, such is human nature"). In philosophy, though, the referent should be clarified, and usually is. Yet even a beginner in philosophy is aware that the *referent* of the compound category "human nature" is *not the same* in different philosophical systems. The extension of the category differs because certain phenomena viewed as part of "human nature" by some theories are excluded by others. But there is more to it than this. The diverging interpretation of certain constituents of "human nature" is in itself tantamount to a shift of the referent, even if the extension of the category remains constant. If one mentions human nature within the framework of Aristotelian, Spinozan, Kantian, Hegelian, or Marxian philosophy, one simply *does not mean* the same thing. Does *reason* belong to "nature" or not? Does "nature" encompass every *innate* human propensity and nothing else, or only *some particular innate* propensities and nothing else, or *both certain innate and certain acquired* propensities? Do philosophers also have in mind organs such as the lungs when they describe human nature qua

"everything innate"? Or do they have in mind only those innate propensities that supposedly "motivate" human beings? What kind of *acquired* propensities belong to "human nature"? (Aristotle said, for example, that something common to *all* cities *is* human nature.) Is "human nature" common to all people, or are there different kinds of people "by nature"? Is there a particular "male nature" and a particular "female nature"? Do slaves and free people share the same "nature"? Do different races share the same "nature," and do they share it completely or only partially? Is "human nature" part of "nature," or is it to be understood as a juxtaposition to "nature"? Is "human nature" a microcosm that mirrors the macrocosm of "Nature"? Is "human nature" something internal in contrast to "external" Nature? Is culture equivalent to "human nature" or is it "the other," the opposite of "human nature"? To make matters even more complicated in relation to this issue, the referent may shift, or alter in extension, within the same philosophy.

In each and every particular philosophy the shift in referent is intrinsically interwoven with the theoretical project as a whole. For example, how would one answer questions like these: Is human nature constant, or is it open to change through time? *How and to what extent* is "human nature" open to change? *What instances, happenings, and interventions* can change "human nature"? "progressive development," "invention," "contract," "culture," "breeding," "reason"? Can all of these change "human nature"? Some of them? Or perhaps none at all? Are certain elements in "human nature" static, whereas others are open to change, and so dynamic or variable? And is it the static or the variable elements that are more crucial from the viewpoint of moral philosophy? How can questions like these be answered: Is "man" by nature gregarious or "individualist," altruist or egoist, sympathetic or aggressive? How can questions like these be answered: Is "human nature" an *indivisible whole*? Does it "consist" of *two* parts, such as "soul and body" or "mind and body"? Or does it "consist" of *three* parts, such as "mind-body-soul," "cognition-emotion-volition," or "Id, ego, and super-ego"? If "man" "consists" of two, or eventually three parts, *which* part, if any, is responsible for evil and *which* part is more open to good? Is "body" the source of evil in the world, or is it rather the inquisitiveness of mind? In a more picturesque formulation, do unconscious instincts drive us toward the forbidden, or is it the "devil" who puts evil ideas into our heads? How can questions like these be answered: Which is the crucial, the essential component of "human nature" sociability,

consciousness, reasoning, work, language, communication? What is "our" relation to "our" nature repression, self-development, selective control, acceptance, rejection, "laissez faire"? What *should* "our" relation to "our" nature be? How can questions like these be answered: What is our relationship to the "nature" of another person? Are communication and interaction with other humans communication between, or an interaction of, distinct "human natures," or am I the *only* human person to whom I relate as to "human nature," as to "internal nature" in a manner of speaking, whereas others are part and parcel of an "external nature"? How can I relate to others as to "internal natures" if *their* internal world is external to me? How does my attitude toward external human nature differ from my attitude to my own "internal nature"?


How does society fit into this picture? If one juxtaposes "society" to "nature," one should explain *how* we came to live in society rather than in the "state of nature," and, simultaneously, one should *reintegrate* "the natural part" of "man" into nature in general. But what kind of nature are we dealing with here? With a nature imbued with spirit, the object of sublime contemplation? With a nature conceived of as a well-constructed machine? Or with a nature that society must control and conquer, a nature equipped with an inexhaustible arsenal of materials for the means of production, the passive target of instrumentalization? Alternatively, one could design a model, say a model made up of three circles. One circle, the middle one, represents society, whereas a circle on the right stands for "internal nature" and a circle on the left of "external nature." The circle representing society cuts across the other two and makes it apparent that a part of both natures has been socialized, whereas the other parts have not been socialized, or not yet to the same degree. This is clearly a historicist model that is connected with the idea of "progress": the larger the circle termed "society," the further we have progressed. If, alternatively, one conceives of "human nature" as social by definition, and human individuals as mere subunits of the system termed "society," we are left with a two-circle model, one circle representing society, the other "external nature." A model like this can be combined with the idea of progression, regression, and eternal repetition alike, all circling around the notion of "homeostasis."

At this point I will stop this ironic examination of "human nature." It has become clear that the very notion "human nature" is polymorphic, vague, and overloaded with secondary connotations. "Human nature" is a metaphor that can stand in the main for *three*

theoretical proposals, each different in kind. In terms of the first proposal, human nature is a subsystem of the system "Nature"; in terms of the second proposal, human nature is a subsystem of the system "Society," and in terms of the third proposal, human nature is a combination of these two major subsystems. Since I reject completely the first two suggestions and regard the third as being inextricably tied up with a one-sided evolutionist imaginary, I prefer to eliminate the notion of "human nature" altogether and replace it with a concept I term the *human condition*. But my substitution of "human condition" for "human nature" does not result from the above-mentioned considerations alone. Although this term is no less metaphoric, it has its own traditions, of a different color. No great sophistication is needed to discover that "human condition" can be associated with the age-old notion of "human destiny." Whereas the notion of "human nature" elicits images of mere passivity ("living according to nature") or, alternatively, images of warfare (conquest, bringing under control or, as Marx put it, "pushing back nature's borderlines"), the concept of "human condition" elicits images of "being destined to something" or, alternatively, "living up to our destiny."

I began with the observation that we usually start raising questions about "human nature" when we intend to ascertain why certain people are vicious while others are reasonably good, and why both wicked and good people are considerably outnumbered by those who are neither good nor wicked but who sometimes act properly and sometimes improperly. I immediately added that philosophers have reshaped the question using a great deal of sophistication. No aspects or components of "human nature" were left unexplored by these philosophers, and "human nature" became a subject of inquiry in its own right. In the process of searching for these constituents and attempting to establish their relevance, the original focus of the inquiry was more often than not obscured to such a degree that the *explicandum* ceased to be the moral behavior of "man." Naturally, the notion "human condition" is not immune from such a fate either. Marx's ontology of "generic essence" and Heidegger's ontology of *Dasein* (both being interpretations of the "human condition" and not of "human nature") are cases in point. To make my position clear, I wish to interpret the notion "human condition" so as to make it suitable for providing an ontological background for raising and answering the question "How are good persons possible?" Hannah Arendt has already made a strong case for such an interpretation. I

am thoroughly indebted to her, even if I formulate the basic question differently and so expect that I will produce different answers. I am convinced that if we keep in mind the fundamental *explicandum* throughout our investigation, the category "human condition" will prove to be a far better and more reliable metaphor than that of "human nature."



Human Life on earth is the outcome of self-domestication. Crossing the threshold dividing the "human" from the "animal" has, according to archaeologists, taken several million years. "Several million years" is not *human time* because we cannot relate to such time. It can be measured but not *imagined*. Human time is historical time. During this period of self-domestication, *social regulation* has been substituted for *instinct regulation*. After this substitution ended, "the human condition" began, or, to put it another way, social regulation *is* the human condition in its abstract indeterminacy because it defines both the potential of and the limits to "the human condition" that is, the potential of and limits to *itself*. Since social regulation is self-created (humans are self-domesticated), all particular social regulations can be changed and replaced by others. Social regulations can undergo thorough structural transformations. Nevertheless, since "the human condition," in its abstract indeterminacy, is tantamount to social regulation, to shed all such regulation is to go beyond the limits of that condition.

We will never come to know the social life of the prehistorical *Homo sapiens*. Consequently, what follows is not based on any empirical evidence but is intended to be the *explication* of the definition of "the human condition."

Humans were never *beasts* or *savages* giving vent to their "barbarian instincts." They were humans precisely in the sense that their actions and interactions were no longer controlled by instincts. History has nothing to do with the so-called process of humanization of our "nature." We cannot be *more* humanized than by *being human*. The assumption that the supposed "borderlines of *internal* nature" have been gradually pushed back "by civilization" is but an empty analogy shaped upon the process of "pushing back the limits of *external* nature." The idea underlying the analogy is that increased *control* of "nature" is accompanied by an *increased* control over so-called human nature. When people today discover that actions for-

bidden in our society are permitted in certain others, mainly in tribal groups, they attribute this phenomenon to a lack of social control and equate it with a low level of humanization. However, this sort of observation more often than not disregards the equally significant fact that certain actions permitted in our civilization are forbidden in one or another tribal society. Hence it is retrospective assessment, and not the observation of facts, that creates the semblance of a unilinear and progressive "humanization." By this I do not intend to deny that enormous human potentials were indeed developed in the course of the histories of various civilizations. I only reject the description of this development as "pushing back the borders of internal *nature*" or as "a socialization of human nature."

The newborn infant is *not* a "piece of nature." The general genetic endowment of the infant is a product of self-domestication: we *are born* human infants because social regulation has already been substituted for instinct regulation. The human infant is *programmed* for a "life-in-society," s/he is endowed with the *readiness* to speak, to work, to act (and not only to behave), and to cope with social regulations. Not the brain alone, but the entire organism is so programmed. Nor is the newborn infant a "piece of society." It can develop into a complete human being *in* society, but it does not produce or reproduce society *by the simple fact* of being born a human infant. The infant does not "mature" into a social being unless it is brought up *in* and *by* society. Thus the newborn child is neither "nature" nor "society" but an independent system in its own right.

We are human because we are born with "human programs" and because we are brought up in the company of humans and in interaction with humans. We learn to be members of a given society primarily by coming to know and practice the norms and rules of this society. Social regulations develop, as well as pattern, our thinking, action, and behavior. Of course, we not only learn *about* social regulations, we also learn *within the framework* and *under the guidance* of these regulations. "Knowing *what*" and "knowing *how*" as embedded in language, customs, and artifacts, and as mediated by speech, action, and interaction provide the horizon of our personal experiences. Thus everything we can refer to as *a posteriori* (personal experience) is the result of "dovetailing" of *two a prioris*: that of the *genetic* a priori and that of the *social* a priori (both are "given" prior to experience). However, a complete unity of the two givens does not always occur. In terms of my hypothesis, the more complex the society, the more such a complete unity will be the exception rather

than the rule. The more the horizon of personal life experience broadens, the more potentials of the genetic given can surface, and the more multifarious the potentials become, the less the *sum total* of these potentials fits completely into any strict and concrete regulation. It is precisely the problemization of this incomplete "dovetailing" of the two a prioris that gives rise to speculation about "human nature."

Every human is an example of the *general* genetic a priori. But every human is also unique; every infant is born with an idiosyncratic, *individual*, genetic a priori; there are no two persons completely alike, not even identical twins. Equally, there are no two societies completely alike, not even among small bands of hunter-gatherers.

Each person is thrown into a particular society by the accident of birth. The *conception* of a particular personal a priori via an individual's progenitors is in itself an accident. It is also an accident that this person is thrown into this or that particular social setting. There is nothing in the genetic makeup of an embryo that would predestine its "being thrown" into any *particular* social context; it is only predestined to be thrown into a social setting. Destiny as *accident* is thus twofold. Transforming this accident into determination and self-determination is precisely what "growing up in a particular world" is all about. I term this "dovetailing" of the two a prioris "historicity."

To repeat, nothing is "written" or coded into the general genetic a priori that would predestine anyone for one particular social a priori, because every newborn child is fit for human life in *any* social setting. The general genetic a priori is constant, whereas social a prioris are different and subject to change. While nothing is "written" or coded into the personal genetic a priori that would predestine anyone for one particular social a priori, not all personal genetic a prioris fit equally, or equally well, into a particular social a priori. If a hundred infants are born into the same social setting, it is obvious that some will find it more difficult, and others will find it easier, to fit into *the same* "social a priori." Social and genetic a prioris can be dovetailed to a greater or lesser extent, and sometimes they do not fit together at all. One must conclude that there are a great number of potentials in the genetic a priori of every person that remain barren within the framework of every social a priori, but more so in one than another. One can equally surmise that potentials are developed in every particular society, and yet these potentials can be strong in one personal genetic a priori and weak, or even absent, in another. *"The human*

condition" can thus be concretized as the determination and self-determination of historicity under the condition of a historical hiatus. This hiatus is historical in two respects: (a) the general genetic a priori is a constant, but the social a priori is changing and practically infinite in its variations; and (b) the personal genetic a priori is idiosyncratic, but almost infinite variations of personal genetic a prioris can be comprised and "integrated" by the same social a priori.

Even if the two a prioris are *completely* dovetailed, a human being will never be a subsystem of society, for the simple reason that there are two parties to this dovetailing. Society can be described, albeit not defined, as the patterned relationship of humans to one another, to the sources of their subsistence and to the creations of their imagination. The patterns are the social regulations substituted for instinct regulation, the very rules-and-norms that ensure repetition, constancy, the economy of "energy intake and output," regularity; in short, the homeostasis of every human group, and therefore of the human species. A complete dovetailing of the two a prioris has three aspects: (a) the full internalization of all regulations, (b) the ability to observe these regulations "as if" they were instincts, and (c) the absence of choice between regulations or any aspects thereof.

Whether or not all three conditions have ever actually been met in respect of every adult member of a human community is of limited interest here. What is crucial is the fact that a complete dovetailing of the two a priori does not generally occur, at least not in respect of every adult member of a community in any known society. Even the slightest discrepancy results in a kind of tension, and the greater the discrepancy, the more this tension is experienced. The tension I have in mind is not the tension *between* the genetic a priori and the social a priori, as is the case before and during the bridging of the hiatus, but rather the tension *within historicity*. Although the latter is due to the incomplete dovetailing of the genetic and social a priori, the very tension within historicity is not that between the so-called natural (the genetic a priori) and the social (the social a priori). This is so for the very reason that certain elements of the genetic a priori have been completely fitted into the social a priori in the already terminated process of socialization. Moreover, this tension itself can be explained, dealt with, even mobilized, by the meaningful worldview(s) of the society (community) in question (myths both local and universal, artistic practices, philosophy, science, and the like). Thus the thematization of tension is inherent in the social a priori. A greater than average tension of historicity can result in a "subjective

deficit" as well as a "subjective surplus." The latter is the constant source of the creation of cultural surplus and can be absorbed by the meaningful worldviews just as it can contribute to the change (modification) of social life patterns, if other conditions are met.


There is no self, and there is no society, without "fitting together" the two a prioris. Yet such a complete dovetailing would be a very rare occurrence. A perfectly dovetailed self is *one-dimensional*, and a society in which all selves are perfectly dovetailed would be unable to change (and would be characterized by the absence of meaningful legitimizing worldviews). Historicity is imbued with tension. The quantity, the quality, and the character of this tension vary, yet the tension is always present. *"The human condition" can thus be further concretized as "living in tension."* We are destined to live with this tension. We can attempt, in vain, to rid ourselves of it. We can also try to make the best of it.

I have *described* "the human condition" in three consecutive steps: (1) as social regulation substituted for instinct regulation, (2) as the determination and self-determination of historicity under the condition of a historical hiatus, and (3) as historicity qua "living in tension." Of course, one could enumerate certain concrete elements of "the human condition": Humans must work to subsist; humans are language users; humans kill members of their own species; and so forth. Yet whatever humans do whether they work, talk, or kill, whether they make love or war, whether they write poems or turn to God in prayer they never do so in accordance with an innate pattern, but in accordance with or in relation to norms, rules, and regulations. Whatever they do, they must bridge the hiatus, and they must learn how to bridge it, in order to become persons. And whatever they do, they live in tension.

As mentioned, the tension of historicity (its quality, quantity, and character) constitutes both a historical and personal variable. The historical factor must be heavily emphasized, but it cannot be dealt with in any detail within the narrow framework I have set here. It is usually the case that the more complex a society becomes, the stronger this tension can become, yet due to various reasons it does not necessarily become stronger. I will list a few of these reasons: the differentiation of the system of elementary norms and rules; the differentiation of meaningful worldviews that explain and channel the existential tension and make use of it; the different ways and modes in which the internal tension can be externalized; the poten-

tial for self-awareness to be transformed into self-consciousness; and the same ideas and worldviews that increase the tension by making it conscious and that, thus, create a specific kind of tension, simultaneously decrease this tension by *verbalizing* it. I will return to these problems shortly.

The existential tension does not make its appearance in a constant state of mind or body, but rather in a *pendulum-like* movement with a smaller or larger amplitude. If I set my own self swinging on a larger amplitude, this action is accompanied by a heightened degree of emotivity, and sometimes, though not always, also by a heightened degree of cognitive awareness. Yet it is still the case that while one swing unites, another separates. Examples of this are: binding ourselves to others / separating ourselves from others; identifying ourselves with others / distinguishing ourselves from others; seeking security / reasserting personal freedom; longing for dependency / longing for independence; transcending ourselves in a trance, mystical contemplation, love, immersion in Beauty / defending ourselves against the loss of the self; dissolving into communities / seeking solitude; sharing "public opinion" / trusting only our own eyes. These and so many other feelings and cravings are but the forms of our ongoing attempts to cope with existential tension. I have chosen to illustrate this with pairs of attitudes that are in themselves value indifferent, as moral issues proper cannot yet be considered.



General theories of "human nature" chart a *map* of the self, presupposing that each and every self is correctly represented by the same map. Admittedly, one or another part of this "map" can be "larger" or "smaller," "stronger" or "weaker," in respect of different people, but all are presumed to have the same map "inside" this much is taken for granted. There were times when people knew they consisted of a body and an immortal soul. These days we throw out the old map as useless and replace it with several new maps, each claiming to be "the correct" one. Some of these "maps" gloomily contend that there is a territory within each self that remains *terra incognita* and that no traveler engaging in soul research will ever locate it. Others cheerfully assert that this particular "territory" does not exist except in our fancy, so all maps should go into the rubbish bin. Yet most of us are still busy drawing new maps. All such maps

provide us with *regulative theoretical ideas* (in the Kantian meaning of the term), by which to organize and reorganize internal experience, as well as our experiences of others. If there is only *one* theoretical idea of the self provided by the dominant meaningful worldview, every person will understand his or her self under the guidance of that idea. The internal experiences of some people will comfortably fit in with this theory, those of other people with varying degrees of difficulty. Yet if there exist *competing* theories offering different theoretical ideas for the organization and reorganization of our internal experiences and of our experiences of others, as is the case today, people can choose that which provides the best understanding of their *own* experiences. If someone asks the question of whether the self "consists" of Id-Ego-Superego or "I and Me," or if someone argues, as Wittgenstein did, that the self does not belong to the world but is rather the *limit* to the world, I would say, "Out of these take your pick. Choose that which organizes your own self-experience best." Because surely one of the theories will make you understand *your* internal world better than the rest. If you wish to explain other selves by relying on introspection and, in addition, on the observation of *certain* other selves, then you must commit yourself to *one particular* explanation. The fact that not *everybody* recognizes his or her own experiences or his or her experiences of others in one single theory of the self but that many people recognize some of their experiences in one theory and some in another and also recognize their experience of one person they know in one particular theory, and their experience of another person they know in another theory, is for me evidence enough to conclude that *the internal differentiation of the self is itself a variable*. Moreover, it is not only a historical but also a "personal" variable. At first glance, this conclusion seems unjustified. It could be said that the *facts* of the "internal world" are the same but are only interpreted in different

ways within different theories, and so become facts of those theories. Yet theories of the self are not like theories of the natural sciences, and not even like social theories, but are similar to philosophical theories: in fact, *they are* philosophical theories. Philosophies can always be verified, never falsified, though we can abandon philosophies if they provide no answer to the meaning of life, if they do not raise our historicity to the level of historical consciousness where historicity can recognize itself in the consciousness. Life experience, prestructured in everyday life and thinking, is coconstitutive of the choice of philosophies, not only as far as one's viewpoint, "regard," or evaluation is concerned but

also as far as "ipseity" is concerned. Two people with sharply diverging life experiences will not recognize their historicity in *the same* philosophy. Different self-experiences are rooted in different life experiences, and vice versa. And one could still contend that since there are ideal-typical life experiences in every particular world, so there must be an ideal-typical self-experience as well. I do not deny the existence of ideal-typical, or perhaps dominant, self-differentiations in every particular social a priori (including our own world); I only assert that not all of us carry the same map "inside." Thus my answer to the question of whether the self "consists" of the trichotomy of Ego-Superego-Id is that some selves do, others do not.

So what can in fact be stated about "the self" that has a claim to general truth? First, selves are the only bodies that are connected to all other bodies by meaning. *Body as self* feeds on meaning. The self is created by other selves, which on their part are bodies connected to all other bodies by meaning, and the same self creates other selves, which are equally destined to be connected to these other selves by meaning. The self also comprises long-term memory, both conscious and unconscious. (Total loss of memory is tantamount to total loss of self.) Memory is not simply equivalent to the coding of information. It involves encoding the *relation* of the entire body to all previous items of information to any particular subsequent item of information; in other words, memory constitutes *involvement in rendering meaning*. Memory also involves forgetting, and thus the decoding of the relation to long-term information, and so memory also constitutes *involvement in rendering meaninglessness*. *Conscious experiencing* is guided by the medium of language. Accordingly, conscious experience can only be subjective ("mine") if it is first *shared* (language being shared meaning). I can only know of *my* headache if I know that *there are headaches*, which others also have, though they do not have *my* headache. The more meaning I share with others, the richer and more complex is the meaning I render to the unshared experience.

I understand (identify, cognize, comprehend) my internal perceptions with the *same conceptual tools* I use to understand (observe, identify, comprehend) others, although the two perceptions are *different in kind*. Let us take, for example, affects such as fear, shame, disgust, gaiety, sadness, anger. These are all innate feelings, and are accompanied unless they are deliberately suppressed by equally "innate" facial expressions. Yet I do not see *my own face* only the faces of others, and I do not see that *I am blushing* I only see that

others are blushing. On the other hand, I *feel* that I am ashamed, whereas I *do not feel* that others are ashamed, or, if I do, the feeling is secondary (reflective), not primary; it is not an affect but an orientative feeling. However, I *know* that *others*, when blushing, feel like I do when I feel ashamed and I am blushing. The concept "being ashamed" is adequate in both cases, and the conceptual tool of understanding is the same. This simple example can illuminate more complex situations. I can know myself better than others know me because I have *privileged access* to my own feelings, ideas, thoughts, conscious desires, plans, and suspicions, and I can disclose these things or keep them to myself as I wish. Yet it is also true that others can know me better than I know myself, because they *see* me *relate* to them, and it is *in human relations that meaning is disclosed*.

But there is more to it than this. The attitude of all selves is ontologically particularistic. Selves are the *navels* of the world for themselves. All relations to other humans and to the world in general are as to so many umbilical cords: the self is tied to the world by all these cords. If a community is more or less homogeneous, and the distinction between I-consciousness and we-consciousness is slight, then the community is perceived as *the navel of the world*, or almost so. However, what is historically contingent and changing in the case of communities is ontologically ultimate for the self. It is not possible to conceive either of a self that steps outside itself completely, and thus ceases to be the navel of the world, or of a self that severs these umbilical cords and ceases to be the bundle of those cords. This is not even the case with the mentally ill, unless one permanently loses one's self. To see oneself *completely* with the eyes of others is humanly impossible, and so is complete solipsism. This is an additional reason for knowing ourselves better than knowing others, as well as for others being able to know us better than we know ourselves.

To repeat, the self is the only body connected to all other bodies by meaning. The bundle of umbilical cords is the bundle of meaning. Actions performed carry meaning, and this statement is but the reformulation of the basic statement concerning "the human condition" that social regulation has been substituted for instinct regulation. The nonobservance of social regulations also carries meaning. If done deliberately, it carries meaning both for the self and the other selves. If it happens unintentionally, it *may* carry meaning both for the self and the other selves, or, alternatively, either for the self or the other selves.

Social regulations, which always include the primary objectivations

of ordinary language, customs, and the patterns for using human-made objects, are not the sum total of selves. Regulations are the social system. Selves are not subsystems of the social system but are the fountainheads, as well as the products, of this system. The more heterogeneous the regulation, the greater the range of options for rendering meaning; the greater the range of options for rendering meaning, the more numerous the differentiations of shared meanings and the greater the variety within the bundle of umbilical cords binding the self to a particular world; and the greater the variety in the bundle of umbilical cords, the more *individualized* selves may become. Yet, as discussed, there can be cords in the bundle of single selves that cannot be connected or at least comfortably connected to the meaning offered by standing regulations. Selves can also seek for meaning that has not yet been "provided," thus creating a cultural surplus.


Self is always *self-awareness*. This follows from everything said hitherto. Still, self is not always *self-consciousness*. Self-consciousness is not tantamount to our long-term memory as defined above. Nor is it tantamount to privileged access to internal occurrences (the perception of the self by the self). It concerns *a specific use of the privileged access*. Self-consciousness is, moreover, not tantamount to *self-reflection in general*. Self-awareness cannot exist without some sort of self-reflection. Finding out whether I am really hungry or really angry is self-reflective, but has nothing to do with self-consciousness; it is not the kind of self-reflection we normally attribute to self-consciousness. Not even the *evaluation* of certain internal occurrences necessarily goes with self-consciousness. Whether I am "a little" thirsty or "very" thirsty is a matter of evaluation. I can *evaluate* certain impulses negatively (as bad) *because* we are forbidden to carry them out. Nonetheless, self-consciousness presupposes a specific kind of self-reflection, *the combination of empirical and transcendental self-reflection*, which I will term *double-quality* (self) reflection. The *standpoint* of a self-reflection of this kind is always an idea, an abstraction, be it a theoretical idea, an abstract norm, the idea of supreme beings, the idea of moral good and evil, or even the idea of the self. (I will elaborate upon this problem later.) The self becomes an *object of scrutiny* in the process of double-quality self-reflection. We want to discover who we are, what we are, "what is inside." It is under this scrutiny that *the self becomes individually differentiated*. The differentiated complex self is not "there" at the outset; and this double-quality self-reflection is not *a means to*

fathom the "depths of the soul": in fact it *creates* these depths. How and to what degree the self becomes differentiated and "deepened" depends on the theoretical or practical idea on which the double-quality reflection rests. If we do not stop searching, the self becomes *a bottomless* mine or a terrifying abyss (and whether it becomes mine or abyss again depends on the regulative idea). And even if we stop searching, as we always do when being guided by *practical ideas*, we return to self-scrutiny upon withdrawing from acting (or from a particular crucial act). But we should not forget the distinction between the perception of one's own self and one's own perception of other selves, or of the perception of one *by* other selves. Double-quality self-reflection can accompany double-quality reflection *upon* and *by* others. Given a proper balance between double-quality reflection and self-reflection, with both being guided by practical and theoretical ideas, and given that practical reflection gains the upper hand either way (the search stops to allow action), our inner world will not only be construed as "deep" by us, but also by others. However, if I become too reflective and continuously scrutinize my "soul," rendering it a bottomless world, the only one worthy of being scrutinized, I will perceive my self as a bottomless mine or abyss, while others will perceive it as flat and hollow. A narcissistic self is hollow; the nought is at the bottom of such a self. This can be formulated as an objective statement, that is, *irrespective of the regard*. For the hypertrophy of self-reflection leads to the loss of the double quality of that self-reflection: *it loses its transcendental dimension*. The transcendental moment of self-reflection is due to the *standpoint* of the particular reflection, which is also nonempirical (an idea, an abstract norm, and so on). But self-searching as a goal in itself loses grasp of the transcendental standpoint of reflection. The idea *of* searching the self is not an idea *for* reflecting *upon* the self. Self-searching thus ceases to be an act of *self-consciousness*.

The knowledge of rules (regulations) per se does not yield self-consciousness; nor does knowledge about "the rules of the game." Being seen by others and vice versa, and seeing others who see you, involves self-awareness, but not yet self-consciousness (at least not in the sense that I have defined it). The temporary self-alienation that occurs when the self places itself in the position of another self and views his or her character or action from the standpoint of this other self is not the beginning, or the decisive pattern, of self-consciousness. Temporary self-alienation per se does not yield double-quality reflection because the transcendental element is miss-

ing. The attempt to judge our selves from the viewpoint of a particular other, or to live up to the expectation of particular others, becomes an act of self-consciousness (self-reflection) if and only if *the attempt itself* has already been preceded by, and has resulted from, the act of double-quality reflection.

The double-quality reflection, and in particular the *transcendental* aspect of self-reflection, is traditionally expressed by a powerful image. It seemed obvious that we can reflect upon ourselves from the standpoint of a *nonempirical entity*, an abstraction, an idea, because we, too, carry an abstraction, an idea *inside*: a particular substance to do with thinking or evaluating. The self, the "real" self or the "supreme" self, dwells, so it seemed, in its vessel: the body. The body is contingent to the substance, and the immortal soul can move from one body into another without changing its substance. Or, to quote a more modern version of the story: I am because I carry *mens animus sive intellectus*. This traditional image has been strongly challenged of late, although sometimes the baby has been thrown out with the bathwater. In such instances, although *mens animus* has disappeared, so has the whole inner life of the self, and eventually also the self as the *navel* of the self's own world.



I described the self as comprising long-term memory of *experience*, conscious or unconscious. I added that conscious experiencing, as well as the encoding of that experience, is guided by language. And yet, although language (conceptualization) guides the process of experiencing, the latter is not purely or completely conceptual, and neither is experience. Experiences are so heterogeneous and all-encompassing that even their main forms elude enumeration. These main forms can be images, interpretations, ideas, voices, scents, passions, deliberations, intents, moods, streams of events, problems and their solutions, flashes of insight, puzzles, stories of natural or supernatural beings "who live on, under or above Earth," shocks, fears, joys, elations, and humiliationsone could obviously go on and on. Experience as sedimented experiencing carries the meaning that relates our body to other bodies of meaning. It orients, selects, and motivates as a kind of internal regulatory system. Experience is the *internal* regulation (orientation) for actions (in the broadest sense of the wordacting, understanding, judging, communicating, evading, evaluating, loving, and the like). To repeat, personal experience and

experiencing are engulfed in and redeemed by shared experience, but personal experience is not a subcase or an item of shared experience. It is not the "internalization" of shared experience, though it presupposes such internalization. The movement of the pendulum discussed earlier on, the alternation between *isolation* and *bindedness*, *self-reassertion* and *self-abandon* and the like, is the alternation between sustaining *my* experience, *my* meaning, *my* orientation, *my* selection, *my* self-regulation, and the *oblivion of those experiences in the shared*; the shared meaning, the shared orientation, the shared selection, the shared regulation, and eventually the total oblivion of long-term memory as sedimented and accentuated experience (Nirvana, death).

In every society there is a certain amount, a certain kind, of "alternation tolerance." Remaining within the limits of this tolerance is what is generally termed "normality." And if normality is the case, mutual recognition can also be the case. The self grants recognition to the shared meaning, recognition to the shared world, while claiming recognition for itself. The term "recognition," as used by Hegel, is a subcase, albeit a decisive one, of recognition in general. The mother already recognized the self of her child while smiling at this child, and the child recognizes the world of others in smiling back to the mother. The reciprocity of smiling is shared experience, although the experience of the mother (which is conscious) and the experience of the infant (which is preconscious) is not only different in degree but also different in kind. If others help us to bridge the hiatus, we are already recognized as members of this particular world. Mutual recognition takes different forms and shapes. It can be selective to a greater or lesser degree. It can be general (due to one's membership of a particular world) or personal (recognition by people who hold us dear) or special (personal recognition granted to specific achievements, merits, and excellence). It can also occur in the reverse manner, as recognition of my world in general, personal recognition of those I hold dear, and selective recognition of certain aspects of my particular world (which involves nonrecognition of other aspects). But whatever forms and shapes this recognition takes, both kinds of recognition presuppose "normality." Yet if the degree of alternation exceeds the limit defined as "normal," both forms of recognition can break down. On the other hand, it can also happen that the person in question will contribute to the cultural surplus and thus embody the promise of another world.

If the two aspects of recognition are in complete balance, *then life*

has meaning. If there is a "recognition deficit" on one or both sides and the deficit can be thematized and problemized, life can be *rendered meaningful*. But if such a deficit cannot be thematized and problemized, life cannot be given meaning. Meanings are present because meanings are everywhere when there is speech, action, and work. Meanings (but *not* "Meaning") are present even in a situation of total subjection and submission. Meanings without a "meaning to life" is precisely what *suffering* is all about. Animals can be "in pain." *But suffering is a human privilege*. To attribute virtue to suffering is a tribute paid to the human condition.

19

Witchcraft Trials and Stalinist Trials: Reflections on a Parallel

Emmanuel Terray

Translated by Susan Ossman and Christine Ward Gailey

The 1936-1938 Moscow Trials of the old Bolshevik cadres were compared as early as 1936 to the witchcraft trials that set fire to stakes from the Elbe to the Pyrenees during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. ¹ The press brought back this comparison on the occasion of the "affairs" that marked the histories of the People's Democracies from 1948 to 1952: the Rajk affair, the Kostov affair, and the Slansky affair. Analogies between the two types of trials are suggested by the central role played by confessions and the similarity of attitude on the part of the accused, including their compliance in owning up to the most abject crimes.

Yet this parallel was quickly judged superficial, and, thus, academic historians abandoned it to politicians and journalists seeking dramatic examples from the past. In 1972, for example, Annie Kriegel determined that the "parallel is seductive, but in the final analysis quite poor," for "it is less the techniques than the systems that are at issue" (1972:116). But is the question closed? On the basis of a precise inventory of the common traits of each type of trial, I would like to reconsider the similarities they present. Are these simply coincidental? Can they be explained by the persistence of this or that cultural heritage? Or are they instead the indication of a more profound and hidden relation between their social and political milieux?

If this debate can be reopened today, it is because one of the two parts of the comparison now appears in a totally different light than it did only twenty years ago. Recent scholarship has served to renew our understanding of the causes, forms, and effects of the great

witch-hunt of 1550-1630. 2 Taking the risk of simplifying this complex picture, let me review the major advances of this research. In the middle of the sixteenth century the repression "snowballed" as it took on the dimensions of a veritable epidemic. At this time, in a society whose stable principle revolved around male heads of households strongly linked to village or urban communities, and continuously exercising a craft or an agricultural activity, suspects were found among women—especially single women—and among vagabonds, shepherds, peddlers, or foreigners: in other words, among those who held subordinate or marginal positions in the social edifice. The allegations directed against them did not originate with the public order, from civil or religious authorities, but rather from complaints from "below," that is to say, from the heart of the very communities to which they belonged. These complaints were put forth along with witnesses and facts aimed at showing what we would call "village sorcery." The unfortunate accused were charged with spreading sterility, illness, and death among men and livestock; of provoking hail, fire, and floods in their vengeance—in short, of bringing unhappiness to persons and goods. Underpinning these complaints were beliefs rooted in peasant animism similar to those seen in other times and places.

The entire task of the judge consisted in substituting the charges and circumstances of village witchcraft with those of satanism. Norman Cohn has clearly demonstrated how the complex notion of satanism was born out of a fusion between two dissimilar ideas: that of heresy and that of witchcraft (Cohn 1975). The result of this fusion was an image of the world in which the universe was divided into two sides, that of God and that of the devil, and these two affronted one another in an inexpiable war. Witches are therefore the demon's agents; they have made a pact with him through which they have entered into his service. Their alleged activities—night meetings, sacrilegious ceremonies, incestuous orgies, cannibalism of children—display this systematic inversion of norms and values that define them as unreconcilable enemies of the human race. The insistence on their rapid movements and the theme of the Sabbath emphasized that witches did not simply form a collection of separate individuals committing crimes but an organized conspiracy that weighed on the community as a mortal menace to divine order.

Only experts trained in detecting witches were able to discover them, since, as slaves of the devil, they acted as his secret agents and

hid themselves among other people. These experts were clergymen or civil magistrates who were guided by manuals with instructions that described the means of accomplishing this formidable task. In addition, since the crimes and practices of the witches formed part of an imaginary order, a single type of proof was acceptable: the confession. The entire procedure aimed at producing this avowal and dictating its terms. Examinations conducted to search for the satanic "marks" and the use of torture or the threat of eternal damnation were only means to break the suspect's spirit and to convince him or her to take on the personality that the manuals outlined. Confessions were not accepted if they were not accompanied by denouncing one's accomplices. This combination was the only unquestionable proof of a sincere conversion and, thus, the hunt became an epidemic, as each trial produced others in its wake.

What is the historical significance of the great witch-hunt of 1550-1630? In other words, why did it occur at that time? As Robert Muchembled has stressed, it is at the political level and to the rise of absolutism that we must look.³ Until that time local communities, rural or urban, remained largely autonomous with regard to the central authority in the economic, social, and cultural areas as well as in the strictly political realm. One of the objectives of the new power holders was precisely the reduction, if not the destruction, of this autonomy. To the extent that the witchcraft trials found their point of departure in internal community quarrels, they provided an excellent means for the representatives of centralized power to insert themselves into local affairs and thus weaken local solidarities and activate conflicts in short, to break the common bond that previously posed obstacles for attempts to penetrate local relations.

From the religious point of view, the great hunt is contemporaneous with the immense confrontation between the Reformation and the Counter-Reformation. During the Middle Ages, the Catholic Church held the monopoly on religious institutions, and its leaders could thus allow themselves to be relatively indulgent in the face of persistent pagan practices. They resigned themselves without too many objections to a Christianity that was in many instances superficial. Beginning with the Reformation, however, the Europe of believers was divided into two hostile camps; each of them had to become more demanding of its partisans than in the past. Both spent considerable energy and resources to assure control or loyalty of their subjects' souls and hearts. As we have learned from Michel

Foucault, the control of souls must pass in a privileged way by the subjection of bodies. The accrued surveillance of mores, the repression of sexuality, and the domestication of festivities took on their meaning alongside the witch-hunt. The latter produced a concrete representation of the criminal "type," as well as the punishments that awaited. These messages were particularly directed to people's imaginations and sensitivity in order to evoke terror. As such, it appears as an aspect of this general tendency toward total power, which claims not only exterior obedience, but also internal compliance.

Stalinist Trials

Kriegel has presented us with a synthetic version of the details of another type of trialthe Stalinist trials in Moscow between 1936 and 1938, and the Rajk trial, the Kostov trial, and the Slansky trial from 1948 to 1952 (Kriegel 1972). Referring to this 1972 study, we can begin to recall what these trials were not. Clearly, they were not trials of a judiciary nature. The condemned had committed no crimes, at least not those of which they were accused. Lawyers and judges clearly knew of the prisoners' innocence from the legal perspective. In fact, "one" began with an elaboration of the list of crimes and then went on to find men who might appear as plausible suspects for these crimes, just as for the movies the screenplay precedes and determines the selection of actors. 4 Besides, the trials were not an episode in the struggle between power and opposition. In the Moscow trial, the indicted were certainly former dissidents, but they were brought to judgment in 1936, after they have already been vanquished and discredited.5 As for the trials in the People's Democracies, the indicted were without exception loyal servants of the regime (London 1968:214; Kriegel 1972:59). Finally, the trials did not take place at a decisive moment in the battle between the various factions that shared power. In the Slansky trial, for example, within the dominant class in Czechoslovakia in 1950 there were groups based on profession-technocrats, party members in the apparatus, police, etc or on an ethnic basisCzechs, Slovaks, etc.and on a historical basisold members of the International Brigades, former partisans, old Soviet refugees. But all groups were present among the accused.6 Better yet, some of the accused had persecuted others before being prosecuted.7 In fact, in the Stalinist political system there

were innumerable acts of vengeance between antagonistic camps we need only think of the elimination of Beria. But these cases never took the form of public trials with confessions.

What then were these trials? Above all, as Kriegel points out (1972:157), they were a pedagogical device. They aimed at transmitting a message. What was the meaning of this message and what were the methods used to communicate it? The meaning was obscured in consciousness because the trials were addressed to two distinct publics at the same time: the mass of simple believers and the elite of the "initiated." The criterion that permit us to separate the two groups is the evaluation of the truth of the accusations and confessions.

The simple believer accepted the truth of the accusations and confessions with more or less conviction, skepticism, or cautiousness, while the initiate knew and could not help but know that the accusations were entirely false. The message directed at the simple believers can be summarized thus: the world is divided into two camps, that of good and that of evil. The capitalist camp is evil, and it conducts a permanent and merciless struggle against the good, socialist camp. This combat is considered part of the nature of things. What remains a problem is that even in the good camp there are the evils of exploitation, alienation, and oppression, despite Stalin's report on the 1936 Soviet Constitution that they have disappeared with the passing of class struggle. ⁸ Grave social problems—penury, the high cost of living, waste, a top-heavy bureaucracy—are obvious. Nonetheless, the socialist system itself is not called into question; in fact, it cannot be questioned because by definition it is the good incarnate. Any difficulties or shortcomings, thus, must necessarily come from the outside, that is to say, from the camp of evil. It might be possible to attribute these problems to former groups of leaders, but they have been decimated or exiled. Thus, they cannot appear as credible suspects. Foreign spies might be offered, but their small numbers and their social position are not sufficient to explain the extent of the difficulties being experienced. The most satisfactory hypothesis is that of highly placed, hidden traitors who have sold themselves to the enemy and practice sabotage on his account. ⁹ Here we observe what might be called the "interpretive function" of the trials: to account for the presence of unhappiness, of evil, in a world that should be dominated by good. Sometimes the trial has as its objective the definition and exorcism of a specific political peril—this is the case, for example, for the Rajk trial, which is almost entirely consecrated to

the denunciation of Titoism. But more often the persistence of the general and diffused evil that has spread into various parts of the system is the enigma that the trial has as its mission to resolve. The public production of highly placed traitors, so inconspicuous and yet so powerful, allows citizens to be called on to be vigilant. The traitors are everywhere, and they can worm themselves into the very highest positions in the social pyramid. It is therefore necessary to beware of everyone. Consequently, the bonds of spontaneous social solidarities are weakened, e.g., those family ties or friendships that pose obstacles to the party's influence.

For the initiates, who know that the confessions and the charges are false, the preceding remarks are not applicable. For them, the trial holds a double lessonfirst, that no one is safe from accusations or judgment. The fact that highly placed persons have fallen shows that even those exercising the highest functions are not protected, except perhaps at the pinnacle. Indeed, the arbitrary and false nature of the accusationstheir crudenessproves that, in any case, innocence is no defense. No one can consider himself out of danger, whatever his past behavior might have been. Second, the confessions reveal that the party can do as it pleases with people that it arrests. The majority of the guilty are men known for their courage who did not give in, in other circumstancesin spite of torture, imprisonment, or deportation. If they confess this time, it must be because all resistance is futile.

This double message is transmitted by means of a double discourse. As Aristotle and Molière knew, a play depicting the punishment of bad people is much more persuasive than a lesson in morals. The message, thus, is diffused via spectacle; the Stalinist trials are, above all, educative plays. 10 First, they display what we may call the "judicial comedy." Pascal demonstrated long ago the extent to which the machinery of law is itself a spectacle (*Pensées*, 85253). Here, all of the traditional forms of law are respected. The roles of magistrates, lawyers, judges, prosecutors, and so on are represented. Decorum is maintained, and the ritual is scrupulously observed. The executive, the party, the police none intervenes at the front of the stage.

Yet the Stalinist trials distance themselves from the "legal comedy" and begin to resemble actual theater in the sense that they exclude all improvisation. Ordinary trials retain a bit of uncertainty, a space for the unpredictable or unexpected. Here, to the contrary, the

verdict is decided in advance; the accused do not defend themselves, and the lawyers speak with the same voice as the prosecutor. The witnesses' accounts and depositions are learned by heart and repeated by rote. Thus, it is really a play in which everything is arranged to avoid and prevent any unplanned incidents. 11 Finally, as in the theater, the trial is by definition directed toward an audience. The public is chosen while the debates are transmitted to a mass radio audience (Kriegel 1972:158). The Stalinist trials are therefore a play, an edifying spectacle devised to illustrate that famous double adage: "crime doesn't pay" and "the traitors are everywhere."

From this perspective, the accused are clearly only a means to an end. The organizers of the trials select them in such a way as to render plausible the demonstrations they want to conduct. In order that the suspect be retained, his personality and his past must adequately fill the role that one wants to have him play. We can list the possible roles for the accused by proceeding in this way: in socialist society, there is an image of the ideal party member or militant. Most often this is incarnated by the Great Leader. He is of working-class origin, born in the country (or linked to the national community by birth), and he has belonged to the party from his adolescence. He has always maintained his relations with the party and acted under its control. Finally, he has never distanced himself from the party line. As soon as anyone departs from this image in any way, he becomes suspect and a potential traitor. We can consider the Slansky trial as an example.¹² As Kriegel has shown (1972:44), most of the prisoners are of bourgeois or petit-bourgeois class origin, and many are part of a cultural minority, in this case the Jewish community. In the course of their careers, they have spent extended periods in the capitalist world in voluntary or forced exile, in particular during the Spanish Civil War and the antifascist resistance. During a part of their political career the resistance, for example they remained outside the party's influence for various lengths of time, thus severing their links and depending on themselves (Kriegel 1972:47). In the distant past, several of them were found to have "traces" of contamination by the enemy. Prior to joining the party, they belonged to other organizations or to splinter groups.¹³ Finally, some of them had remained in personal relationships with "enemies of class." In short, if the socialist society is, as Hannah Arendt has suggested, a world formed of concentric circles with the secretary general at its center (1972:101), then the suspect is the man who, in one way or another,

has been located outside these boundaries, on the periphery of this world. Each of these distances creates the subjective and objective possibility of treason. Subjectively, the distance opens the space in which political deviance can develop. Objectively, one who distances himself takes the risk of presenting, if only passively, an alternative to the system already in place.

In terms of the trial process and the production of avowals, the facts are known, studied, and overabundant. We will limit ourselves here to a few brief reminders. Before the arrest, the psychology of the future prisoner presents two characteristic traits. First, an absolute confidence in and loyalty to the party. "We were led," Artur London later said, "to unlearn how to think for ourselves, to wait for everything to come from the party, the supreme guide: We had forgotten the right to reflection and to contestation" (London 1968:434). In particular, the future prisoner knows of several cases of repression that took place in the past that are unjustifiable. However, he justifies them in the name of two proverbs that have always excused the murder of the innocent: "Where there's smoke, there's fire," and "you can't make an omelet without breaking eggs."¹⁴ At the same time, the future accused is haunted by an obscure feeling of guilt, the motives of which can be quite varied. Sometimes it is due to private "faults," for example, marital infidelity (London 1968:29). Or, a bad social conscience can arise from a class background seen as undesirable (Loebl 1977:7677). Finally, loyalty itself leads him to make mistakes and to admit that, at the political level, he might have been mistaken or misled. This sentiment of guilt is encouraged by the practice of self-criticism, which, as Kriegel has shown, is less the analysis of error than of sin.¹⁵ And it is ultimately lifted to a quasiontological dimension as this amazing text by London, written several years after his rehabilitation, bears witness:

This feeling of guilt that powerfully exists in each individual even in his daily life, is inherent in human conscience. Who has never reddened to his ears on the school bench without being guilty, When the teacher addressed the entire class to ask who had done some silly thing to be reprimanded? Who has never felt a feeling of anguish in crossing a border, even if he transports nothing illicit, because of the simple sight of a customs official? Who has never asked himself "What crime have I committed" when a police man ap-

proaches him even before he opens his mouth? (London 1968:15556)

The interrogators use this combination of belief and guilt as a lever to pry confessions from the accused. Following the accounts of historians and survivors, the torture, the deprivation of sleep, the maltreatment are not the primary causes of confession. They certainly weakened the capacity of the accused to be lucid and to resist, but these techniques alone cannot break people who had withstood the Gestapo.

Other procedures were necessary, procedures belonging to the order of discourse. First, the questioner strives to put the accused in a position of contradiction with the party to whom he has given everything (London 1968:173, 606; Loeb1 1977:99). In its name the accusers require a confession by calling on the victim's loyalty. 16 We turn once again to Koestler's hypothesis that offers one, but only one, of the aspects of the truth. In the second instance the questioner inculcates a feeling of isolation and impotence in the accused.¹⁷ Prosecutors do this by deploying people who are close to the accused¹⁸ or by bringing together prisoners who have strong personal antagonisms¹⁹ to pit them against one another in a game of mutual denunciation. At this level there is often such great success that animosity persists among survivors even after the trial (London 1968:543). Third, the questioners try to aggravate an already existing sense of guilt: "You have cheated on your wife," Eugen Loeb1 is told, you are "a fortiori" guilty of cheating the party (Loeb1 1977:78). In other cases accusations of sexual depravity or corruption are introduced, to be revoked only upon the complete avowal of public wrongdoing.²⁰ Here as well, the success is enormous: After the trial some of the condemned simply decide that the sentence was too heavy (London 1968:204).

All of these tactics are aimed at creating a demoralized state in the accused so that his resistance finally collapses.²¹ After a certain period, any resistance appears to him to be not only useless, but absurd. London finally declares that "None of this has any meaning. I have nothing to hold on to, I am a lost man . . . " and

The leaders of the game have calculated that it is by removing any meaning from my resistance that they will eat away at it rather than smashing it. I no longer see an escape anywhere. When you discover that your

effort is without a goal lassitude begins to overwhelm you. (London 1968:204)

The same formula appears in Eugen Loeb's writing:

My own reflections had destroyed the meaning of my mission, my belief, my hope. I no longer had any perspective . . . My entire life had lost its meaning. (1977:51)

Loeb adds that in his eyes all values lost their meaning, so that he was no longer even motivated to revolt against his fate (1977:164, 22021, 235). It is this feeling of absurdity that leads to capitulation, at the same time as this appears to the accused to be the result of a free decision on his part:

No one forced me to surrender myself. It would be false to say that. I chose it myself. When I confessed I knew exactly what I was doing. (1977:163; see also Loeb 1977:245, 24748)

This deliberate surrender, embraced and interiorized, is necessary to the final success of the play, for it is the most efficient obstacle to an eventual recantation. During a public trial, the accused must be presentable, it is thus necessary to reconstitute his physical strength but in so doing one also takes the risk of reconstituting his courage. Confessions drawn out by violence would thus be precarious. Certainly the questioners can use blackmail by threatening the lives of dear ones, but if such a threat is efficacious against premeditated recantations, it does not preclude an unreflected outburst. To avoid this, it is necessary to break the individual's motivation. This is accomplished by the demoralization process described above. In fact, London, like Loebel, dreamed about recanting their confessions before the trial, but ended up renouncing this dream, since any action appeared to be useless and devoid of meaning (see London 1968:359, 364-65; Loebel 1977:235).

Witchcraft Trials and Stalinist Trials

These examples help us to gauge the extent to which a parallel exists between the witchcraft trials and the Stalinist trials. The survivors themselves make the comparison (London 1968:155, 290), and it is strongly suggested by the terminology used in both cases. In reading

the analytical reports of the Stalinist trials, we cannot help but be struck by the frequency of expressions of a religious origin or tone; the theme of repentance has a central importance. 22 The accused are called upon to confess their crimes and to "ask for pardon." They involve themselves in redeeming their selves.²³ Like the Virgin Mary triumphing over the snake, the prosecutor of the Rajk trial invites the judge to "crush the head of the viper that wants to strike us" (*L'Affaire Rajk* 1949:402,432). We are familiar with the characteristic bestiary employed in this discourse, for example, in Vishinsky's invectives: reptiles, rats, toads, rabid dogs.²⁴ Here we can recognize many of the animals familiar to the witches of the seventeenth century. But beyond this similarity of expressions, we can identify what we call "ideological sequences" common to the two types of trials.

First, a pivotal analogy can be uncovered concerning the general conception of the world that underlies the judges' discourses in both cases. As discussed above, the Stalinist trials aim at believers and presented the antagonism between socialism and capitalism as corresponding to the opposition of the people of God to the legions of the devil. During the Rajk trial, this is how Gyorgy Palfy's lawyer attempts to excuse his client's misdeeds:

The defense takes the risk of proposing that a considerable part of this responsibility falls on the shoulders of obscure powers who have known how to find the most apt and the least resistant elements for their infamous struggle against the progressive forces of humanity . . . who steal and lie and engage in high treason, paying the rations of Judas and buying the blood of the workers, and hiding behind their bags of money, setting themselves against man's salvation and spreading their fetid breath. . . . We all know that they will be punished for their crime and that their obscure forces will be annihilated by the great and invincible camp of the forces of world progress. When, taking the side of the defense I throw the bulk of the burden on these obscure forces, I am asking you to consider the attenuating circumstances in deciding the guilt of my client, that is, the weight of these forces.²⁵

Finally, the agents of the Western information services, like those of the demon, are invisible to the naked eye. They hide among the

people; only an elite observer's clairvoyance can unmask them. Both trials serve an interpretive function, serving to account for evil and to legitimate the church or the party.

Second, both types of trials define and present the accused in similar ways. In the sorcery trials, there are predetermined kinds of suspects. Predisposition, however, does not reduce the guilt of the suspects, since the witches have deliberately themselves made a pact with the devil. Insisting on the contractual nature of the link thus created underlines the fact that this act of allegiance is freely willed. Finally, once concluded, the pact is irreversible and cannot be abrogated in this world. This is why the stake awaits even those condemned who confess, for the confession produces absolution only in the next world. In the Stalinist trials, the psychological, social, and political predispositions are also cited: weakness of character, non-proletarian class origins, or a stint in a political organization other than the C. P. "Even at the first test," the prosecutor of the Rajk trials say of the accused, "their cowardice and weakness and their rootless nature made out to be traitors." (*L'Affaire Rajk* 1949:400). In his final declaration, Palfy states, "My class situation, all of my education and my past pushed me to dissimulate my true activity as an enemy." 26 Pal Justus's lawyer sketches a synthesis of these various factors:

[This] is a petit-bourgeois who came into the workers' movement, thus his class situation rendered him indecisive. His joining the workers' movement took place by means of a splinter group. In the Social Democratic party he experienced very little party discipline . . . and from the start he was highly characterized and marked by his defective training in the Social Democratic party. (*L'Affaire Rajk* 1949:42324)

Once more we find the estrangement from the image of the ideal militant. At the same time, however, the accused considers himself to have made a free choice (Barton 1954:81). Laszlo Rajk says on this point,

What I did and committed, I had always done and committed of my own free will and with an entire liberty of judgment. The different and coercive circumstances to which I have alluded in my examination play only a

secondary role that is totally insignificant. (*L'Affaire Rajk* 1949:426)

On the occasion of arrest but without particular constraints, the prisoner accepts the role of spy for the police, as Rajk did, or for a foreign intelligence agency, like London. This arrangement takes place when the accused is very young; Rajk was twenty-two years old, Szalai eighteen at his "fall" (*L'Affaire Rajk* 1949:10, 30). Thus, at a very early point in his career in the party this contract is made and becomes irrevocable. Evoking Rajk's first term with the police, his lawyer, Horthy, declares that "Rajk signed a declaration and from that moment, like Dr. Faustus in Goethe, he could no longer liberate himself from the devil" (*L'Affaire Rajk* 1949:404).

Third, the accusers share a similar position and benefit from the same privileged status. As we have said, only a hawk-eyed elite can identify traitors, but this elite does not mix with the clergy or the party as a whole. The most powerful and feared inquisitors received their mission directly from the Pope and were responsible only to him (see also Eymerich and Pena 1973:19091). They were not under the authority of bishops or the local clergy, which was, in fact, the reason for many conflicts. Similarly, the agents of the state police who organized the trials and led the interrogations were most highly placed persons situated outside and above the party hierarchy: they were controlled only by the Secretary General and in the People's Democracies beyond him, Moscow. Thus, London was questioned about Slansky's actions in July 1951, although at the time Slansky was still second in command in the party. 27 The inquisitors or the security agents constitute what is called the "center of the center." This is not surprising, since their task, as we will see, consists in sowing insecurity among the ranks of the clergy or the party.

In addition, the same procedures of accusations are at work in both cases. In the heresy trials or witch-hunts not only the members of the social categories listed above but also those who have accorded them hospitality or protection are accused of heresy, as are those who manifest compassion for them or are indignant about their fate (Eymerich and Pena 1973:8587, 213). At the same time, guilt spreads by association or simple proximity, and it transcends time. "The trace that remains in the memory due to the frequenting of heretics is indelible," says the *Manual for Inquisitors* (Eymerich and

Pena 1973:55). By the same token, we observe a similar functioning in the Stalinist trials where the mechanism of "objective" guilt is well described by Loeb and London:

Since I had had links with Field and Field had been denounced as a spy in the Rajk trial, I had to admit my objective guilt to the party as a result of this relationship, even if subjectively I was ignorant of Field's role at that time. . . . Since my comrades from the International Brigades had signed their confessions . . . I am objectively guilty since I was their leader. (London 1968:290)

Here again we find guilt by association. What is interesting is that this guilt also transcends the passage of time. London could hear one of his interrogators say, "Once one has professed anarchist opinions, one retains them throughout his life" (London 1968:290). For example, the contacts that London established with the Yugoslavian militants in 1936 are described a collusion with Titoism, even though Titoism became a political reality only twelve years later (London 1968:94, 160, 16970). In other words, slipping into treason is similar to the choice of "intelligible character" as Kant presented it. It comes into being outside time or space, a sort of metaphysical eternity, which historical materialism would have a hard time evaluating. Finally, in the two cases the prisoner must not simply avow his guilt, he must also denounce his co-conspirators. In this way he is complicit in the repression itself and thereby loses his self-respect.

Fourth, the examination and trial follow parallel sequences. In each case the central progression moves toward confession, since the idea is to produce imaginary crimes. In the witchcraft trials the initial charges are everyday wrongdoings or disputes; the role of the judge is to bring the prisoner to recognize that he or she has formed an alliance with Satan. In the Stalinist trials the prisoner, full of goodwill, is prepared to confess errors, negligences, imprudences, or lack of vigilance (London 1968:64, 87), but it is the task of the judge to make him confess his treason. In other words, in each case a primary material real facts, but insignificant ones are transformed into a final product unreal, but capital, crimes. The methods employed to achieve this result are also largely identical: torture, of course, but also an effort to place the accused in opposition to his community. In the heresy trials, the judge wields threats: In the absence of a confession, prisoners are deprived of the sacraments; the pressure ex-

exercised on this basis was strong enough to elicit Joan of Arc's single hesitation. In the Stalinist trials, blackmail about the party's "pardon" operates in the same way. In both instances the prisoner's belief in the most efficient arm of the accuser. Even as a prisoner, the accused remains dependent on his community. Detached from it he appears suspended in a void and, thus, he is ready to do anything even confess to preserve his social existence.

In addition, the specific role of lawyers is defined in the same manner in each case. Here is what Francesco Pena said in 1578:

The role of the lawyer is to urge the accused to admit and to repent and to solicit penance for the crime he has committed. (Eymerich and Pena 1973:130)

Echoing this, Slansky's lawyer defends his client by saying,

the greatest difficulty for the defense [is] knowing that from the legal point of view it is virtually impossible to oppose the accusation, with regard to either the designation of crimes or their qualification. (London 1968:425)

The presence of a lawyer, then, is a sort of homage that vice renders to the virtues of traditional justice. But the duty of the lawyer is to legitimate the accusation by certifying its veracity and to content himself with pleading for clemency and attenuating circumstances.

The function of the trials is therefore the same. Above, we have described the Stalinist trials as morality plays; the witchcraft trials, we read in the *Manual for Inquisitors*, are no different:

We must remember that the first aim of the trial and of the death sentence is not to save the soul of the accused but to procure the public good and terrorize the people. (Eymerich and Pena 1973:130)

The same concern is affirmed concerning the custom of burning an effigy of the defaulter. It is a "very laudable practice whose effects are terrifying" (Eymerich and Pena 1973:187). In addition, in each case the spectators are themselves invited to take part in the action and are consequently included in the enterprise. In witchcraft trials, the judges openly encourage denunciation, which is presented as a pious act and recompensed as such. Besides, it is obligatory to be a witness if one is asked by the magistrate and it is prohibited to show compassion (Eymerich and Pena 1973:88, 11011, 213).

In the Stalinist trials, leaders and militants are required to give false depositions. The population is required to vote for resolutions calling for the prisoner's execution. As a result, the entire nation acts in complicity with the verdict and shares responsibility for it. We must not forget that there is a circle of profiteers surrounding the witchcraft trials. Once the court costs are paid, the judge and the informers share the confiscated goods. As for the Stalinist trials, they are linked to purges that eliminate an entire generation of leaders and allow an accelerated promotion for young administrators. Material interest is not, of course, the principle mobilizing the organization of the trials. Yet it permits the association of individuals with these operations who will no longer be able to challenge them if a time of restitution comes.

Power, Magic, and Science

Profound and far-reaching analogies exist between the two types of trials, although they spring from different historical, economic, social, political, and cultural contexts. What, then, is the basis for, and the meaning of, these analogies? Nothing allows us to suppose that Stalin and Vishinsky were deliberately inspired by models borrowed from the witchcraft trials. We are led to another hypothesis: an ideological schemaa complex set of elaborated sequences that are at once normative and interpretiveand can remain latent, hidden in the repertoire of collective culture for long periods, but can surface and become active at certain conjunctures. In order to identify this schema and to take note of the occasions when it becomes operational, we can refer to Arendt's analysis of the totalitarian universe (Arendt 1972:13, 17, 4849). Following Arendt, we can say that the staging of the trials is a point, a stage in the transformation of an absolute into a totalitarian power. The first, in the etymological sense, is a boundless power that recognizes no institutional or legal obstacles in its path. In a regime of absolute power there is no longer any separation of powers, or any institution or organism that is separate from power. But, power continues to throw itself against a collective inertia, against the grinding of the gears of the social machinery and the passive resistance of individuals, for it is stopped by what one might call the "wall of private life" or the individual's interiority. Even though citizens are obedient in their external actions, they nonetheless escape the power holders' grasp to the extent that their

spirits and hearts form a sort of reserved domain. Totalitarian power tries to enter this domain, to spread its influence into all aspects of individuals' livescontrolling visible actions and gestures but also feelings and thoughts.

How do the promoters of such a project execute it? Arendt distinguishes three stages in the construction of total power (Arendt 1972:290). First, the masters of power build an imaginary universe that is coherent and closed and opposes itself to the real world, which is of necessity open, complex, uncertain, contradictory, etc. Then they progressively herd the population into the center of this universe by seizing all means of expression and mass communication. Finally, they constrain all members of the community in accordance with its laws, under threat of physical or social liquidation. Whoever simply wants to survive must learn these laws, internalize them, and guide his behavior by them. This imaginary universe can be provided by a religious or political ideology. From the perspective that interests us here, the distinction has only a secondary importance. What counts is that power poses at once as a theory (a description and interpretation of the social world and of history), as an ethic (a hierarchy of values and morality), and as a code for behavior. With these three elements it offers individuals all they need to live and all they require to think or act, without it being necessary to look elsewhere, that is to say, beyond the boundaries of the system.

How does this imaginary universe substitute itself for the real world? How is it imposed? The procedures utilized are part of what one can call "the propaganda of fact." It is propaganda to the extent that power holders want to inculcate in their subjects a certain number of fundamental convictions. First, the real world that which we have before our eyes and which we experience is shown to be a world of appearances, a superficial and misleading veil. Behind this world is a hidden world; it is disguised, secret, and invisible, but therein resides the truth. On this point we can add a remark to Arendt's analysis: the reduction of phenomena to appearance and the insistence that an invisible world exists behind appearance, which contains the truth of these phenomena, are procedures shared by both magical and scientific spirit. Of course, magic and science do not conceive of this world in at all the same way. Magic professes a sort of anthropomorphism where the second world appears as a double of the first. To the contrary, as Bachelard has clearly shown, science constitutes itself in and by a qualitative rupture with sensory or intuitive data, with the taking in of appearances. But in both cases, there

is a refusal or naïveté, understood as the acceptance of the immediacy of the visible. There is doubt, defiance, and suspicion with regard to appearances. Like a magician, the scientist does not give in to the obviousness of sensibility. He assumes that, as a general rule, things are not what they appear to be. In other words and this is the essential point the first step of the procedure, the dismissal of appearance, can be accomplished equally well from a positivist as from a magical, superstitious mentality. Behind the woman the believer of the sixteenth century learned to see the demon; behind the comrade, the believer of the twentieth century learned to recognize the spy. From this point of view one can better understand why the sort of cultural revolution that the Enlightenment represents was unable to neutralize definitively the ideological schema that underpinned the witch-hunts and trials. Like them, it took its roots in this critique of appearances.

In the second place, this world behind the world is more real than the real world, since it is in it that the events of the real world meet and are played out. It is there that they find their influence and their significance. The essential theme is that of conjuring or conspiracy. This brings us back to an idea that the decisions that count the choices that make history are made in secret places by small circles of mysterious men, who manipulate things using common mortals to bring about their wishes. We are familiar with the success of such a fantasy in political discourses of both the Right and the Left. We note the symmetry formed by the Jesuits and the Franc-Maçonnerie, the Synarchy and the Komintern, the Trilateral Commission and the K. G. B. From one conspiracy to another, the thesis barely changes. What happens in front of our eyes is merely an illusion or a smoke screen. Our destiny is decided behind our backs, in the wings. It takes place beyond us, in a world we cannot see. Thus, the schema of conspiracy that is at play in the trials belongs to a much vaster set, whose efficiency has hardly been eclipsed during the period separating the witch-hunts and the Stalinist terror.

This other world is invisible; it is governed by laws and inflexible principles. While it is held in place by Christian belief, it has as its main regulator the will of God, at once all-powerful, immutable, and incomprehensible. When it is based on "Stalinist Marxism," it is placed under the laws of historical evolution, inventoried by dialectical materialism and historical laws of dialectics, the law of the correspondence between productive forces and relations of production, the specific laws of a specific mode of production. In each instance

the laws are unchangeable; they escape human actions; so one can do nothing but adapt to them. But it is necessary to know them. Only a small minority is able to attain such knowledge. They alone can enlighten us and lead us, for they in the church or the party have access to this other world: only they know the laws that guide it; they alone can direct us and enlighten us. We return to the famous formula of Saint Cyprian, "Outside the church there is no salvation," that established the church as God's only representative on earth. The church becomes the obligatory intermediary between the believer and God, a concept similar to the concept of the party as a leader the enlightened avant-garde, the holder of theory and Marxist science of the uncultivated and blind masses.

At the same time, only the church and the party can explain the meaning and the truth of our feelings, thoughts, and actions. We simple mortals are closed into a universe of appearance and illusion, including illusions about ourselves. We can be "objectively" and unconsciously accomplices of the class enemy. In both cases our ideas and our actions are not what we believe them to be, and it is the role of the church or the party to tell us what they are. More precisely, they have no meaning or value in themselves. They take on value only because of the church or the party.

In the church this thesis manifested itself by means of notions like the impenetrable nature of God's pathways. The idea that divine action escapes our reason and our logic can take the most disconcerting channels, such as salvation deriving from our allegiance to God via the necessary intermediary of the church and not from the intrinsic merits of our acts. In themselves our acts are nothing. It is belief or grace as free, arbitrary gifts that God gives that fixes their value. A single action can be good or bad in terms of whether or not it is accompanied by belief and grace. Similarly, in the party, it is the party line, in spite of all of its changes, that determines the meaning of individual conduct and action. Any action that appears just can be shown to be criminal if deviant. At each moment, it is the party line that dictates truth and error, and this is why it is logical that the past and history be periodically rewritten in terms of the meanderings of this party line. There is no past in and of itself. The policies of the party determine not only the merits of individuals' acts or persons, but even their very existence. Consequently, we find the retouched photographs, the disappearing of archives, or the gaps in the manuals.

The confessions required from the incriminated during the trials

appear in a new light. When a prisoner avows that such and such inconsequential conversation was, in fact, an abominable conspiracy, he recognizes at the same time that this conversation has no meaning in and of itself, but has meaning only in terms of the judgment of the party. Confession is, thus, less to admit guilt than to acknowledge the party's right to judge any action.

As interpreters of the laws of the invisible world and as judges of an action's meaning and purpose, the church and party are infallible; their sentence is without appeal. The notion of infallibility in the Catholic church is a direct consequence of the theory of divine inspiration; the church has always claimed to be inspired by divine spirit. Debate, therefore, has no influence on the principle of infallibility. It has as its object to determine the instance within the church (Pope, council, etc.) that would be accorded this privilege. In the communist movement, the same logic is at work and in a fashion that only appears to be paradoxical. It is to Leon Trotsky that we owe the clearest affirmation about the infallibility of the party. It is opposed to the individual member:

No one among us can or wants to be right against the party. In the final analysis the party is right. We cannot be right except with the party, for history has not created any other paths to bring about its reason. (Quoted in Souvarine 1935:340)

In addition, it is not only the individual, but the working class as a whole that has no right to question party decisions:

The workers' opposition has come out with dangerous slogans. It has transformed democratic principles into fetishes. It has placed workers' rights to elect their representatives above the party. . . . As if the party did not have the right to impose its dictatorship even if this direction temporarily rubs against the changing humors of workers' democracy. . . . We must encourage the consciousness of the historical right of the precedence of the party among us. The party is obligated to maintain its leadership without taking into account the spontaneous humors of the masses, even without taking into account the temporary hesitations at the heart of the working class. (Trotsky, quoted in Deutscher 1954:5089)

Under these conditions, the believer or the individual party member lives in a state of anxiety and permanent insecurity with respect to

the church or the party. According to one major tradition in the church, faith is necessarily linked with anxiety. But an objective insecurity corresponds to this subjective anxiety, in the face of the repressive powers that the church exercises, both directly and indirectly. The description of suspects in the *Manual for Inquisitors* distinguishes between several degrees of suspicion. A slight suspicion, it says, involves canonic penalties of abjuration for the person being questioned.

There is a slight suspicion when it can be lifted by a weak defense or be produced by weak conjectures. For example, those whose behavior is different than that of everyone else are suspect of heresy. They are suspect since heretics often act in this way. (Eymerich and Pena 1973:90)

The external signs of heresy are characterized in an equally weak fashion:

There is an external sign of heresy at any time when there is an action or a word that is in disaccord with the common habits of the catholic people. (Eymerich and Pena 1973:136)

With such definitions we can hardly see who might escape suspicion.

In Stalinism we find the same dialectic between the subjective and the objective. London and Loeb discussed the feeling of guilt that each militant feels with respect to the party, no matter how highly placed he might be. As for insecurity, the periodic phenomena of the purge creates it. The memories of victims reveal the insignificance of the motives that bring them to be arrested; unfortunate remarks, omissions, fortuitous contacts, and, in some instances, simple chance. Thus, the organizers of the purges determine quotas so that the purged population is in conformity with the image of the class enemy that power hopes to project at a given date (Arendt 1972:290).


Witnesses insist on the arbitrary nature of the propagation and evolution of the purge and emphasize that this nature is neither hidden nor denied by the authorities. To the contrary, it is when it is avowed publicly that the purge reaches its fulfillment and full efficiency.

To escape both anxiety and insecurity, a single path is open to the believer or the party member: to conform at each instant and on every point with the will of the church or the party. Still, we must

remember that this will be impenetrable in the case of the church, since it only transmits the plans of God, while it is fluctuating and unpredictable in the case of the party. It is less an issue of docility than of identification. The believer is invited to dissolve his personality, to merge himself with the church or the party. At least this is the conclusion to which the most important spirits of either the church or the party have come. Here we recall the *Constitutions*, where St. Ignatius Loyola calls on the soldier of God to obey his superiors " . . . as if he were a cadaver that one can transport anywhere and treat any way, as a stick for the blind man which serves everywhere and for all purposes" (quoted in de Chastonnay 1941:118). Yuri Piatakov echoes this in a 1928 declaration, although he was so far from being a convinced Stalinist that he became one of the leading figures among the prisoners of the 1938 trial:

A true Bolshevik drowns his personality in the collectivity. That is to say, in the party so that he can make the necessary effort to renounce his own convictions and honestly adopt those of the party. This is the criteria by which we can recognize a true Bolshevik. It would be impossible for him to live outside the ranks of the party and he would not hesitate to affirm that white is black and black white if the party required it. In order to be at one with this great party, he loses himself into it and abdicates his own personality to the extent that there would no longer be an atom of his identity that does not belong to the party. (Quoted in Conquest 1971:183; see also Kriegel 1972:98)

When the program traced by Piatakov is realized, when the believer has renounced all individuality and autonomy to the benefit of the church or the party, then the era of total power begins.



We have reconstructed the path that leads from absolute to total power. What, then, is the exact role of the trials? We spoke above of propaganda where the function of the trials is to produce facts. In other words, to render real, to bring into existence in a visible and tangible way the imaginary universe that power wants to impose. In a certain sense, a trial is a miracle of incarnation.

To shed light on this miracle we must briefly take up the issue of

the relations that exist between the trials and the purges once again, that is, the wave of arrests, deportations, and executions that are contemporaneous to the trials and serve as a backdrop to them. During the great witch-hunt of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, there was no separation between trial and purge. Each arrest was followed by a trial, and avowals were extracted to nourish the process. Each victim lived through the totality of this painful itinerary. Such an organization presupposes numerous personnel and considerable time. This explains in part the relatively small number of victims. With the Stalinist terror, however, we observe two distinct phenomena. On the one hand, the purge has several stages: exclusion from the party, arrest, summary judgment in secret, and deportation or death. This process involves thousands or hundreds of thousands of individuals. On the other hand, the trial is a public event, in which the judicial ceremony is respected. The trial involves only a few persons: sixteen in the Zinoviev trial, seventeen in the Piatakov trial, nineteen in the Bukharin trial, eight at the Rajk trial, ten at the Kostov trial, fourteen at the Slansky trial. Yet, there is an organic link between the trial and the purge. Annie Kriegel (1972:142ff.) and Zbigniew Brzezinski (1958:7576) have clearly stated, it is not sufficient to say that the first is the conclusion and the coronation of the second. The trial furnishes the ideological and political legitimation for the purge. By arresting, judging, and condemning high officials, the authorities demonstrate by means of example the egalitarian character of the terror. The trial of leaders gives the green light for informers and accusers at the base, while the summons furnishes themes and motifs for denunciation. In addition, the trial provides the purge with a practical guide. During the millions of seances of criticism and self-criticism that mark the purge, how many amateur prosecutors were inspired by the invectives of Vishinsky? Even during the most

secret procedures, the inquisitors never renounced their quest for confessions: The judicial comedy is never completely abandoned.

Therefore, there is a sort of division of labor between the trial and the purge. One is an elaborated operation; it is multifaceted, but it has consequences for only a small elite. The other is a summary operation, an expeditious measure applied to millions of simple party members or citizens. The trial, then, represents the moment of quality, the purge that of quantity. The trial gives the process of terror its charter, its meaning, and its model. Once it has taken place for highly placed officials, it is sufficient to class the ordinary suspects

according to the categories traced by the trial, saving personnel and time. This also allows the purge to spread much further than the witch-hunts. Each individual must take the trial seriously, since each trial lengthens into a purge for which it is at once the program and the lexicon. Through its relation to the purge, the trial addresses itself to everyone, speaks to everyone, menaces everyone. The purge gives the trial the weight of reality. Without the trial, the purge would be but a blind terror and devoid of meaning; but without the purge, the trial would remain a distant spectacle that would lose its interest for individuals and consequently would be powerless to convince them.

From this perspective the trial during the seventeenth century and the combination of trial and purge in the twentieth century are demonstrations of the omnipotence of the church and the party. Omnipotent with respect to human beings to begin with, for the church and the party can do what they please with individuals, no matter how courageous they are. There is no "wall of interiority." Judges, the accused, prosecutors, lawyers, and witnesses are puppets in the hands of the church or the party. Each has its place and each one has completely internalized the church or the party beyond their antagonism to one another.

But, above all, the trials demonstrate the omnipotence of the church and the party with regard to facts and their relation to the real world. They put into practice what we could call the "proof by consequence." The plots and crimes of the accused are imaginary, but they become real. Indeed, they are real to the extent that they produce consequencesarrests, executionswhich are certainly real, to the victims at least. The trials are born of an unreal world, that of satanic conjuration; but, at the same time, they demonstrate the reality of this world, for how could a nonexistent cause produce real effects? During the sixteenth century, the proof that agents of the devil exist is that they are burned; in the twentieth century, the proof that there are spies and traitors is that they are shot.

From this point of view the distinction sketched above between believers and initiatesbetween those who accept the official version and those who act "as if" it were soultimately becomes secondary. Whether the crimes and conspiracies denounced during the trial are real or invented has little import for us, because in either case, the trials signify the same danger, the same menace. In either case, we conform if we want to survive. In certain ways the initiate finds himself in a situation that is even more perilous than that of the simple

believer, for he can allow himself to trip over a regulation that might be used against him, or make him suspect. Kriegel has challenged the possibility of a parallel between the sorcery and Stalinist trials under the pretext that in the first case judges were sincere, while in the second they were hypocritical or cynical (Kriegel 1972:116). She bases her opinion upon Mandrou's work, according to which the belief in Satan would have been ". . . an integral part . . . of the mental universe of the judges for centuries" (Mandrou 1968:14). In fact, Cohn's research has clearly shown how the worldview of satanism was constructed little by little during the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries and only reached its apogee at the end of the fifteenth century (Cohn 1975:chaps. 2, 3, 9, 10). Even then it remained tied to the educational class. Its taking root in the spirit of the times appears to us, therefore, much less profound than Mandrou suggests. In the second place, the degree of sincerity of the judges in the sixteenth or seventeenth centuries appears quite difficult to determine. We admit that among them there were the same proportion of naifs, opportunists, connivers, or zealots among them as among twentieth century Stalinists. In any case, the uniformity of belief that Kriegel suggests is dubious. The number of skeptics was certainly not negligible, if we are to judge by the relatively large number of those among them who had the courage to speak, from Reginald Scott to Montaigne, and from Jean Wier to Friederich Spee. Finally, and above all, what is important is not the degree of support for the fiction of satanic conjuration, it is the implacable and fanatic will to bend the real world to the logic of this fiction.

In all, throughout the trials the unreal, the imaginary, shows its force as it becomes the productive organizing principle of reality. Here the notion of spectacle with which we began reappears. The trials act as educational plays, but they form a special genre of theater. At the end of a comedy or an ordinary tragedy, the curtain falls and the actors and spectators go home. The time and space of the play are clearly delimited and separated from the time and space of real life. In the spectacle of the trials, however, the drama invades real life and comes to include the entire population as its effects spread in the wake of the verdict. There is a fusion of theater and life, or better yet, spectacle is substituted for life and, often, takes life. The director of the trial, thus, can experience himself as demiurge, for he experiences his creation not simply as an aesthetic production that has an existence of its own alongside reality but also as a divine creation that becomes the work of reality itself. If, as André Malraux

said, "Each man dreams of being God," then the organizers of the trials must have had the exhilarating sensation of drawing quite close to the realization of this dream.

Conclusions

To learn from the preceding remarks we would like, first of all, to refrain from fashionable banalities about the religious nature of the communist movement. After all, we could equally easily determine the political essence of the religious, and it is precisely this ambivalence that poses a problem. In our opinion, the richness of the parallel we have attempted to draw is to be found elsewhere. It arises from the fact that, through it, we have perhaps better outlined the claim to the autonomy of the political which today serves as a motto for so many ideologues who do not define its content. The witchcraft trials and the Stalinist trials are enmeshed in different social, economic, and cultural contexts, and yet they share a common ideological pattern, common interpretative and normative sequences that simultaneously guide the comprehension and the transformation of reality. Between this schema and the diverse historical contexts where it operates, the relation is first of all that of syntax to a lexicon. The schema establishes a network of relations between a certain number of abstract elements. The terms that are used are undetermined, indirect, and open; they are variables that can be used to represent diverse figures. The schema only sets the syntax, or a law of composition between elements independent of their concrete historical identities. The role of the historical context, thus, is to give names and consistency to the schema. In the sixteenth century, we have the set of city of God/legions of Satan, agents of the demon/church and inquisition; in the twentieth century we have that of socialism/capitalism, spies and traitors/party and security. The elements of these sets are positioned according to places determined by the schema and this position regulates their relation, the terms occupying the same position being syntactically equivalent.

Does the shift from one context to another modify the pattern? First of all, the syntactical equivalence between homologous items permits and perhaps facilitates the overdetermination by the following terms the socialist camp and the party, or the city of God and the church. Besides, the historical developments of society also transform the modalities according to which the pattern is put into practice. We can cite as examples the problem of relations between the

purge and the trial. During the sixteenth-century purge and trial are mixed and indissociable, while in the twentieth century, although linked and complementary, they remain separate and distinct. Of course, the conflation corresponds to a decentralized society, made up of cells that are largely autonomous and in which information circulates slowly and poorly. In order to produce its effect, the trial of the terror must be repeated integrally at the center of each cell. Separation and distinction are adapted to a centralized society, where the diffusion of information is rapid and safe. One or two trials in the capital are sufficient to legitimate a purge on a national scale.

At the structural level, the schema remains identical. The reoccurrence of the trial comes from the fact that it accomplishes a specifically political task: the transformation of absolute into total power. Preventing the achievement of total power is linked to a particular conjecture that, in turn, is produced by the set of economic, social, and cultural determinants. But if we understand politics as the competition for power in all of its dimensions and in all of its aspects, the change from absolute power into total power is clearly a phenomenon of the political order, capable of appearing within the framework of very different regimes and putting into operation extremely varied modes of domination. More precisely, it represents a sort of going to extremities, the possibility of which is inherent in the pure logic of political conflict; in Carl von Clausewitz's thought, the destruction of the enemy is inherent in war. Thus, any political enterprise that refuses to take into consideration the weight of social inertia and the requirements of time and that sees in people's resistance or passivity the only obstacle to the realization of its aims can be tempted to engage in such extremism. Similarly, organizations—churches, parties, states—that discover themselves suddenly fragile, menaced, and faced with an enemy within and without, experience the need to reinforce their hold on the population they control. In the cases we have studied above, the two factors of voluntary intolerance and fear are involved in each, but in different proportions. Fear dominated the sixteenth century while intolerance marked the twentieth.

From this perspective, and if we do not see cruelty in and of itself as a manifestation of delirium (which is, unfortunately, barely arguable), the witch-hunt, the stakes, the purges, the trials these instruments for the extremism evoked above can no longer be held as the symptoms of some collective paranoia. That Jean Bodin, the rigorous

analyst of absolutism, also writes a treatise on the extermination of witches, is not an indication of dissociation in his personality or an incoherence in this thought. 28 For him, the construction of absolute monarchy and the extermination of witches have the same rationality. In a similar way we tend to be astonished today that so many intellectuals and scientists accept, without apparent hesitation, the goings-on within the Stalinist fantasies. When questioned on this point, as a general rule repenters considered their blindness as a temporary aberration due to sociopsychological problems. This permitted them to plead irresponsibility. In reality, at the moment that these thinkers accepted the objectives of Stalinist policies the universal triumph of communism as a type of society they had no logical motivation to reject its method and means, including the purges and the trials. It was, thus, natural that they did not see any real contradiction between their science and their political convictions. Theory and practice had different requirements. Is additional evidence needed? Then observe one of the repenters almost lightheartedly using the schema he learned among his comrades against them, without considering these models to be the products of unreason.

If the witch-hunts, the purges, and the trials cannot be analyzed in terms of social pathology, neither can the events that terminate these episodes be presented as a cure or a catharsis. Hugh Trevor-Roper, for example, and, to a lesser extent, Robert Mandrou explain the end of the witch-hunts by the advent of a new collective mentality among the leading class more critical with respect to traditional beliefs and more interested in the exact sciences and experimentation. To use simple language, the Enlightenment burned off the fog of superstition (Trevor-Roper 1972:22426; Mandrou 1968:556, 560). Without denying the partial pertinence of this interpretation, we propose another. If the witch-hunts lost their momentum, it is above all because they had fulfilled their function. At the middle of the seventeenth century, after Fronde's last jerk, absolute monarchy was solidly implanted; the split between Catholic and Reformed in Europe was largely accomplished and stabilized. The two sides now knew that they had to coexist; they no longer considered each other as mortal menaces. Each had reinforced its control over the hearts and minds of its followers. The crisis had thus been resolved. At the same time, the hunt no longer appears to us as an anachronistic and barbarous survival. If the trials and the purges stopped with Stalin's death, it is not the

result of liberal progress, but because the terror in its old form had lost its object. Having "liquidated" all its real or potential adversaries, the new dominant class had ensconced itself. To continue with repression would only have provoked instability and fear, among both (new) leaders and followers. But under such conditions, and to draw on the usual metaphors for such contexts, the abscess had not yet been drained, the wound not yet healed.

Indeed, one can ask why those fearful scenarios have not been played out more often in the history of the West. We shall answer this question as Clausewitz addressed the question of total war: Certainly the logic of politics, the struggle for power, necessarily implies the possibility of going to extremes. But it is rare to find this slide to total power happen without restraint. As a rule, it is channeled, limited, or blocked by preexisting economic, social, and political factors. Everything favoring the development and the free play of these factors inhibits the propulsion toward absolute power. The threat can manifest itself, certainly but as a temporary eruption as, for example, American McCarthyism. The danger becomes mortal only to the extent that the various gears of social machinery are dislocated, subject only to the exigencies of the unlimited growth of power. Put another way, the movement toward total power cannot continue without a parallel impetus toward absolute power. The obstacles to what we call decentralization, community autonomy, local liberties, democracy, and self-determination also act as a rampart against absolute power.

This rampart can always crumble. To exorcise, once and for all, the specter of the witch-hunt, the trials, and purges, to relegate these episodes to the museums of extinct horrors, a radical change must occur. The conditions making such atrocities possible spring from the inner logic of conceptualizing the political as the competition for power. Another politics must be invented, one that no longer operates on a basis of inequality and domination, that no longer has embedded in it a distinction between rulers and ruled, between those who command and those who obey. Utopia? Perhaps. But those who reject this effort learn to live without illusions, their eyes focused on phantoms. Despite appearances, we are a long way from having finished with the time of trials.

Notes

1. The comparison was attempted by Friedrich Adler, secretary of the Socialist International, in Adler 1936. See Broue 1964:275.

2. See, among others, Cohn 1975, Kieckhefer 1976, MacFarlane 1970, Midelfort 1972, Monter 1976, Thomas 1971, Castan 1979, Mandrou 1968, and, above all, Muchembled 1978, 1979, 1981 and Muchembled et al. 1978.
3. See Muchembled 1978; 1979; 1981; and Muchembled et al. 1978.
4. London (1968:129) and Kriegel's comments (1972:42).
5. Broué 1964:40; see also Brzezinski 1958:38 and Kriegel 1972:58, 145.
6. On the battle of clans in Czechoslovakia in the 1950s, see Barton 1954:27.
7. On Slansky's role in London's arrest, see London 1968:299300. Above all note the active role played by Karel Svab, vice minister of state security. He was involved in the pressures, chases, and questioning of Loeb and London before being arrested himself and judged alongside them (Loeb 1977:112; London 1968:48, 5859, 389; see also Kriegel 1972:90).
8. *Sur le projet de constitution de l'URSS*, report of the VIII Congress of Soviets, November 25, 1936, in Stalin 1947: 2:21420.
9. On the theme of sabotage in the Moscow trial, see Broué 1964:57, 117, 134; on this same theme in Slansky's trial, see Loeb 1977:17778, 19495, 242; and Barton 1954:17576, 294, 348.
10. Kriegel 1972:157; the parallel between the trials and theater has already been admirably developed by Barton (1954:7689).

11. On the existence of "rehearsals," see Broué 1964:241; London 1968:355; Loeb1 1977:219, 22627; and Kriegel 1972:74.

12. See the list of the inculpated reproduced by London 1968:37879, 389, and, before him, Barton 1954:9495.

13. Thus, at the Slansky trial, the accused Geminder and Sling explained their criminal behavior by their temporary membership in movements for Zionist youth at eleven years of age. See Barton 1954:883.

14. On this point see London 1968:31, 359; on the Rajk and Moscow trials, see Loeb1 1977:46, 75, 146, 218.

15. London 1968:7778. On the initial good will of the accused, see 64 and 87; on the feeling of guilt that impregnates the accused, see Kriegel 1972:9294.

16. Loeb1 1977:99, 232; see also the letters addressed by Svab and Frejka to Gottwald immediately before their execution, as cited by London 1968:43839.

17. On isolation and powerlessness, see London 1968:65, 215.

18. To the letters written by London (1968:448, 476) to overwhelm her husband, we can add that of Thomas Frejka, son of the accused Frejka, addressed to the tribunal to ask for the death penalty for his father (Barton 1954:85).

19. Slansky and Svab were judged with the very men they had had arrested:

see note 11 above; London 1968:77, 83, 16365, 19899; and Kriegel 1972:100101.

20. London 1968:211, 353: Sling was at one point accused of matricide.

21. The word *demoralisation* is London's (1968:63); see also Loeb1 1977:164.

22. On the theme of repentance, see Broué 1964:18, 19899 (Bukharin's declaration); *L'Affaire Rajk* 1949:429, 432, 435 (final declarations of the accused).

23. On the theme of buying back or reparations, see Broué 1964:17, 54; see also *L'Affaire Rajk* 1949:429, 438. On religious vocabulary, see Kriegel 1972:123.

24. Broué 1964:17, 54; see also *L'Affaire Rajk* 1949:374 (reptiles, sneaky and slithery snakes), 402 (rabid dogs).

25. *L'Affaire Rajk* 1949:4089; see also 418, where Szalai's lawyer invokes the sinister forces in his pleading.

26. Ibid., 426, on predestination by social origins. See also London 1968:382, 414, 42627; Loeb1 1977:100101; and Barton 1954:80ff.

27. London 1968:29899; see also Loeb1 1977:184ff. Just as Loeb1 (1977:179) was questioned on Dolansky and Cerny on Zapotocky (London 1968:111), although the latter persons did not leave the high spheres of the state or the party.

28. The first book, *La République*, appears in 1576 and the second, *La démonomanie des sorciers*, in 1580.

References

Adler, Friedrich

1936

Le Procès de Moscou, un procès en sorcellerie. Paris: Nouveau Prométhée.

L'Affaire Rajk

1949

Stenographic report of the complete trial, prefaced by Pierre Courtade. Paris: Les Editeurs Française Réunis.

Arendt, Hannah

1972

Le système totalitaire. French translation of the third part of The Origins of Totalitarianism. Paris: Seuil.

Barton, Paul

1954

Prague à l'heure de Moscou. Paris: Pierre Horay.

Broué, Pierre

1964

Les procès de Moscou. Paris: Julliard (Archives).

Brzezinski, Zbigniew

1958

La purge permanente. Paris: Les Iles d'Or.

Castan, Yves

1979

Magie et sorcellerie à l'époque moderne. Paris: Albin Michel.

de Chastonnay, Paul, trans.

1941

Les Constitutions de l'Ordre des Jesuites. Paris: Aubier.

Cohn, Norman

1975

Europe's Inner Demons. Sussex University Press.

Conquest, Robert

1971

The Great Terror. London: Harmondsworth/Penguin.

Deutscher, Isaac

1954

Trotsky: The Prophet Armed. Oxford, U.K.: Oxford Paperbacks.

Eymerich, Nicolau, and Francisco Pena

1973

Le manuel des inquisiteurs. Ed. and trans. by Louis Sala-Molins.
Paris: Mouton.

Kieckhefer, Richard

1976

European Witch Trials: Their Foundations in Popular and Learned
Culture. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul.

Kriegel, Annie

1972

Les grands procès dans les systèmes communistes. Paris: Gallimard
Idées.

Loebl, Eugen

1977

Le procès de l'Aveu (French translation of My Mind on Trial).
Paris: France Empire.

London, Artur

1968

L'Aveu. 2 vols. Paris: Gallimard/Folio.

MacFarlane, Allan

1970

Witchcraft in Tudor and Stuart England. London: Routledge and
Kegan Paul.

Mandrou, Robert

1968

Sorciers et magistrats en France au XVII^e siècle. Paris: Plon.

Midelfort, H. C. E.

1972

Witch Hunting in Southwestern Germany 1562-1684. Palo Alto,
Calif.: Stanford University Press.

Monter, E. W.

1976

Witchcraft in France and Switzerland: The Borderlands during the
Reformation. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press.

Muchembled, Robert

1978

Culture populaire et culture des élites dans la France moderne
(XV^e-XVIII^e siècles). Paris: Flammarion.

1979

La sorcière du village. Paris: Gallimard.

1981

Les derniers buchers. Paris: Ramsay.

Muchembled, Robert, Marie Sylvie Dupont-Bouchat, and Willem Frijhoff

1978

Prophètes et sorcières dans les Pays Bas (XVIeXVIIIe siècles).
Paris: Hachette.

Souvarine, Boris

1935

Staline, aperçu historique du bolchevisme. Paris: Plon.

Stalin, Joseph

1947

Les questions du Léninisme. 2 vols. Paris: Editions Sociales.

Trevor-Roper, Hugh R.

1956

De la Reforme aux lumières. (French translation 1972.) Paris:
Gallimard.

Thomas, Keith

1971

Religion and the Decline of Magic. Harmondsworth: Penguin.

20

Soviet *Etnografiia*: Marxist Methodology or Evolutionist Ideology?

Peter Skalník

In all ideology men and their circumstances appear upside-down as in a camera obscura.

Karl Marx, *The German Ideology*

Etnografiia, a sister discipline to British social anthropology, shares with other social sciences in the Soviet Union in a claim to follow and develop what Karl Marx left unfinished. Since the 1920s, its findings have been promoted as contributing to the theory of historical materialism (a term used by Frederick Engels and V. I. Lenin) and as employing the methodology of "historism" (*istorism*), which views history as a succession of "socioeconomic formations." 1

Among Western scholars, both Marxist and non-Marxist, a consensus of opinion has prevailed that until recently this claim has been heavily overshadowed by ideological wishful thinking. Nineteenth-century evolutionism in particular has been the major ideological guideline for Soviet "Marxist" ethnographers.

Ever since the 1960s, while a kind of pluralism within Soviet *etnografiia* emerged and Stalinist dogmas came under attack, the evolutionist ideology survived in all major streams of thought, including the most unorthodox. Behind often fierce debates, evolutionism has remained the common denominator. This prevents researchers from making use of the nonideological methods that Marx used in *Capital* and other works.² In other words, the evolutionist myth that has signified the development of Marxism since Engels has helped to disqualify the scientific methodology of Marx. Conversely, as long as evolutionism of the nineteenth-century kind is not rejected, the creative application of Marxian methodology in Soviet *etnografiia* will

remain impossible. I will point out where a methodological revolution could have begun.

My argument is based on my observations while studying at the university in Leningrad (1963-67) and, subsequently, on my close monitoring of the work of the major protagonists in Soviet *etnografiia*. The gradual and often hesitating transition from monolithic Stalinist dogmatism toward more creative approaches is marked by the admirable courage of those Soviet ethnographers who challenged the dominant ideology with their adherence to an empirical grounding, gained through intensive fieldwork.

The history of Soviet *etnografiia*, similar to that of other branches of *sovietskaia nauka* (Soviet science), has until recently been merely a history of amassing, adjusting, distorting, and forcing the "data" (*dannye*) into the ready-made, closed schemes of historical materialism. This was the period of "varnishing reality." ³ In the 1960s, a challenging discussion developed that implicitly aimed at revising the ideological Marxist "theory" by confronting it with data obtained through research.

The discussion concerned the lineage/clan and community (see Skalník 1981a) and concentrated on identifying the basic economic unit of primitive society. Another debate reemerged about the Asiatic mode of production, which involved not only ethnographers, but also Orientalists, historians, and philosophers. The debate centered on the empirical value of data on Eastern and other non-European forms of political economy and their place in the five-stage schema of history.⁴

Perhaps these discussions prompted an increased interest in Soviet *etnografiia* among Western researchers, especially in the past decade. Familiarity with the subject has been facilitated by the increasingly active participation of official delegates, such as Yulian Bromlei,⁵ in international scholarly communication. A venture like Mouton's "World Anthropology" series reflects the impact of the Soviets on the international scene, as did the Ninth International Congress of Anthropological and Ethnological Sciences held in Chicago in 1973. Tamara Dragadze has published a collection of Soviet works on kinship, marriage, and family (1978). Mouton also has published a special collection of Soviet articles translated into English, while Ethel Dunn and Stephen Dunn have published their own collection of translations.⁶ Moreover, Stephen Dunn publishes a journal of translated articles called *Soviet Anthropology and Archaeology*.

The Struggle for Methodological Principles

Following Ernest Gellner's reviews and the 1976 Burg Wartenstein discussions between a group of selected official Soviet ethnographers and selected Western anthropologists, ⁷ it became obvious that the apparent unity of Soviet *etnografiia* belonged to history.⁸ Discussions, even controversies, were under way in Moscow and Leningrad. Whatever problems one might have with Gellner's "diplomatic mission" (see Diamond 1979:89), the dialogue between Western anthropology and Soviet *etnografiia* continues, presently via the growing number of Soviet-edited translations into English and other European languages.⁹ Gellner informed Western readers that Soviet ethnographers are in "an open and vigorous debate" about " . . . the relationship of *rod* and *obshchina* (clan and community, roughly), a problem whose logic is difficult to understand, but which is carried on at a high level, by men who seem to wish to revise the old scheme" (Gellner 1975:600). He differentiated between three kinds of "exclusive groups or trends," namely, "the Ethnosists, the Primitivists, and the Ideologists" (Gellner 1977a:207). Gellner also emphasized that the groups or streams of thought in *etnografiia* were consistent rather than mutually exclusive.

There was a struggle over methodological principles going on in Soviet *etnografiia*, especially regarding primitive society and the development of the divided society and the state.¹⁰ Some questioned the quality of Bromlei's scholarship or argued that his *ethnos* "theory" smacked of opportunism (see Skalník 1986:198). While I appreciate the points made by Gellner and other commentators on Soviet *etnografiia*,¹¹ I do not accept their conclusions.

Two senior members of the Miklukho-Maclay Institute of Ethnography in the USSR Academy of Sciences in Moscow have been most vocal in these discussions. They are Yurii Semenov, a leading "Ideologist" in Gellner's terms, and Vladimir Kabo, a leading "Primitivist." Examining their work shows, however, that, while labels and procedural methods differ, the underlying ideology of evolutionist Marxism creates a rapprochement between them. Both scholars profess in different degrees, explicitly (Semenov) or implicitly (Kabo), an organicist evolutionism. I consider this stance to be alien to a Marxian attempt at the science of society and history. This is not to say that their arguments are similar.¹²

Semenov's Views

Semenov is a Marxist-Leninist philosopher by training, a Communist Party member, and an ethnic Russian. He never conducted ethnographic field research although he would have been eligible to do so. Before joining the Moscow Institute of Ethnography, he published a volume on the origin of humanity, an article on why the primitive gens had to be matrilineal, a booklet on group marriage, and articles on Morgan and the periodization of primitive history (see Semenov 1958, 1962, 1964, 1965a, 1965b). For the volume edited by L. V. Danilova, Semenov contributed a long chapter on the initial stage in gentile society, which contrasted with the next chapter, written by Kabo on Australian community (see Danilova 1968). Since Semenov joined the institute, he has published widely: on the origin of marriage and family, on Western economic anthropology, a review of Emmanuel Terray's *Marxism and 'Primitive' Societies*, on the transition from the matrilineal to patrilineal clans, on primitive socioeconomic relations, on methods for the reconstruction of the development of primitive society, on socioeconomic formations and world history, and on the typology of community (see Semenov 1974a, 1974b, 1975, 1976, 1977a, 1977b, 1978, 1979, 1980, 1982).

In his writings, Semenov undertakes an exegesis of Lewis Henry Morgan's writings, accepting his alleged discoveries and logically justifying their incorporation into the Marxist theory of primitive society. Semenov does not deny the existence of primitive community but asserts that it was actually, in accordance with Morgan, identical with the gens of clan (lineage). So he defends the whole scale of Morgan's postulates, including primitive promiscuity and the development of group marriage between dual lineages, which follows from a state of agamythe absence of marriage in the local and productive groups. Group marriage is by definition uneconomic and nonlocal, i.e., married people do not live or work together. Semenov uncritically upholds Morgan's typology (in *Ancient Society*):

Morgan's historical materialism emerges clearly upon examination of his conception of the development of primitive society. Morgan's great service to science is the discovery of the foundation of pre-class society, its principal nucleus. As Morgan persuasively demonstrated, this basis was the gens. (Semenov 1965a:4)

Clearly, then, Morgan is part of Marxism for Semenov, as for most Soviet ethnographers. 13 It would be virtually impossible to try to

decide how much overlap there really is, although some have attempted to do so. 14

What is more decisive here is that Morgan was hijacked and ideologized by Engels, Marxists of the Second International, and subsequently, by many Soviet ethnographers. Semenov constructs stagelike ('stadial') schemes of both the history of primitive society and human history in general. For example, he elegantly and logically asserts that even though all societies have not passed through all stages of history, what matters is that each stage has happened somewhere in the world. Once achieved somewhere, it did not have to be, virtually could not be, repeated elsewhere, since each "next stage" has always emerged on the outskirts of the occurrence of the previous one. Gellner aptly calls Semenov's theory a "torch relay theory of history" (Gellner 1980:64). Elsewhere he says that Semenov explains Marxism with the "theologian's effortless mastery of the elusive abstractions of Marxism the Forces, Means and Relations of Production, that trinity of intertwined spirits which guide our destiny" (Gellner 1977a:2089). Meyer Fortes was equally impressed by Semenov's exposition of Marxism (see Gellner 1977a:209). Of course, as in Hegel's *Philosophy of History*, the Prussian state is the ultimate embodiment of progress and freedom, the socialist-communist socioeconomic formation as it was allegedly being achieved in the Soviet Union would inevitably take over the relay from the capitalist West. Using Semenov's logic, one could argue that those parts of the world that have achieved neither capitalism nor socialism could jump over both these formations because they have already been achieved elsewhere. This logic, however, is unacceptable to Semenov, because the communist socioeconomic formation is an end in itself the ultimate fulfillment of history (see Semenov and Gellner in Gellner 1980).

In order to compare Semenov and Kabo, we should examine a recent article by Semenov (1982) on "stadial" types of community. Semenov is an opponent of the idea of the primacy of community; at the most he identifies gens (clan) with community. Nevertheless, he uses the concept of community to exemplify his stadial thinking. For example, he calls the period of the formation of human beings and their societies the stage of proto-society formed of "primitive human hordes" "proto-communities." Primitive society proper only emerged 30,000-35,000 years ago and produced at first the "monoclan" community in which, according to Semenov, marriage bore a dual-clan, uneconomic, and "dislocal" character (Semenov 1982:34).

The primitive community, thus, completely coincided with the clan, which was inevitably maternal.

Even if individual marriage replaced the dislocal one and clan members belonged to more than one community, Semenov maintains that "the clan and the community coincided in their basic features" (Semenov 1982:34). While others would call this community-clan a community in which some clan members form the core, he coins a new term: "homoclan" community. He explains that

at the stage of monoclan community the clan could only assume the form of a matriclan. The basis of a homoclan community could be formed by the matriclan and by the patriclan. The homoclan community could be either a matriclan or a patrician community. Historically, the patrician postdated the matriclan. Correspondingly, the patrician community postdated the matriclan community. (Semenov 1982:34)

Semenov states that the clan, originally undivided, became divided into lineages after a while. If the lineages from different clans formed a community, it was then a heterogeneous community, the "polyclan" community. He is not bothered by the possibility that all this might not be true if tested empirically (see Kuper 1982). He does not demand or expect that each community should have passed through all his stages. The same logic is applied in his theory of socioeconomic formations:

The primitive communities can be said to pass through all these stages only if considered as a whole, but not individually. The main point to bear in mind is that after the rise of the matriclan community the progressive evolution of the primitive community could not take place without the transition from an earlier to a later formation of the identified types. (Semenov 1982:35)

Again, the matriclan is presented as the first and the only obligatory state.

Finally, Semenov distinguishes stadial types of "take-communalistic" relations and "share-communalistic" relations; the latter is divided into "divide-sharing" and "give-sharing" subtypes. Distribution (sharing) heralded the "late primitive community." As lip service to the concept of peasant community (or agricultural community) of

Asiatic, feudal, and early capitalist periods a concept used by Marx, Engels, and Lenin he concluded that it would be "extremely desirable to use the term 'community' in ethnographic historical writings in only one sense; that is, for designating the primitive and peasant community exclusively" (Semenov 1982:50). The whole exercise is evidently useless because, for the sake of ideological faithfulness, what had previously been painstakingly differentiated (primitive versus peasant community) is now glossed as one.

Kabo's Views

Kabo, a specialist on Australia and Oceania, always wanted to do fieldwork there, but was never allowed to do any, except for short trips to Sakhalin Island. Kabo is not a Communist Party member and is classified a Jew according to Soviet official ethnic nomenclature. He consciously limits his field to the primitive social (or socioeconomic) formation and is especially interested in primitive communities of hunters and gatherers, the economy of hunters and gatherers, the origins of the food-producing economy, and the methodology of the reconstruction of primitive social order.

15 The author of two monographs on the origin of the Australian aborigines and the Tasmanians respectively (Kabo 1969; 1975), he wrote a comprehensive treatise on primitive, preagricultural communities worldwide (Kabo 1986; see also 1981).

Both Kabo and Semenov explicitly consider themselves fully within the Soviet Marxist tradition. So Kabo introduces one of his influential articles by stating that "the problem of the development and disintegration of the primitive community and the formation of class social order in its bosom is one of the central problems of the Marxist historical science" (Kabo 1968:223). He gives some references to the writings of Marx and Engels on the community immediately after this opening statement. Only then does he turn to detailed discussions, of why community is logically and factually different from clan or lineage as a result of exogamy. His approach is not consumed by the reconstruction of hypothetical stages in primitive society or with the whole of history but rather by analysis of the historical and local content of the concept of community.

In the 1960s, Kabo solved the clan/community controversy for himself in favor of community (*obshchina*) as the basic economic and

social unit of the primitive society (Kabo 1968). Here he appears to be a more consequent follower of Marx than Semenov, because he analyzed the economic and social structure on the basis of concrete empirical data from the Australian aborigines, San, Tasmanians, Tierra del Fuegians, and other known primitive communities. At the same time, Kabo attacked Western functionalist "presentism." As Gellner once commented, "Kabo's historism and his historical materialism are highly refined rather than crude," and his method could be called "critical reconstructionism, a determination to persist in the efforts at constructing ideal types" (Gellner 1973:538). Kabo's meticulous, highly erudite writings on community emphasize the primacy of the community and its historical role in the development of social stratification, leading finally to the formation of classes and states (Kabo 1968; 1978a; 1978b; 1982).

In another of his recent articles, Kabo reconstructs the transition from the food-appropriating hunter-gatherer economy to the food-producing economy (Kabo 1985). This transition is also the subject of the last chapter of a recent book (1986:23257). Kabo employs V. Gordon Childe's concept of the "neolithic revolution" in comparing data from various foraging societies of the world. He follows every possible technological advance reported in existing literatures. However, phrases such as "higher level of development," "the Bainings are typologically very close to the Tasmanian tribes," "the Australian Aborigines, who are a classical example of hunters and gatherers on a neolithic level of development of culture," along with his frequent use of the words 'type,' 'preceding epoch,' and 'level' reveal that Kabo is, irrespective of his innovative synthesis of ethnographic details, a prisoner of a scheme of lineal development in stages, types, and levels, that is, of teleological evolutionist thinking. Like Semenov, Kabo accords stages or levels an ultimate precedence over the analysis of structural history.

Kabo's approach, thus, interferes with his attempt to reconstruct the primitive community and its history. Nevertheless, he seems to suggest that he is seeking something other than conventional evolutionist schemes. For example, he makes a "relativist" statement: "In the strict sense of the word there was never a 'purely acquisitive' economy, because people by their very social nature, are productive beings. The main difference between human society and animal society is in production" (Kabo 1986:257). Similarly, his article on the Australian hunter-gatherer community shows that Kabo is satisfied with the internal dynamism of a society and environment in which

"two basic types of communities [local clan and heterogeneous]" coexisted (1982:84).

Kabo's work is ambiguous in that it presents two contradictory lines of thought. One line points back to the ideologized, indeed eschatological, models of an inevitable succession of types, stages, and formations. The other, based on empirical data collected mainly by Western anthropologists and archaeologists, aims at understanding the world before the advent of conscious production. By trying to reconstruct the history of primitive communities, Kabo must look for structural changes. These, however, he can only identify through comparing the "presentist," frozen structures of various pre-agricultural communities. There are almost no data about the sequence of structural changes in one particular society, so Kabo's task is to show laws of history where no history in the modern sense of the word exists. At the same time, if the history of exploitative modes (Asiatic, classical, feudal, capitalist) is not real history, as Marx suggested, but if primitive history and communist mode history are genuine human histories, then Kabo cannot use stadial method. Two questions remain: Can one reconstruct the history of the emergence of the West from the facts about foragers whose communities have not disintegrated? Alternatively, are these communities of the same kind as those archaic communities from which divided societies and civilizations emerged? Kabo methodologically errs when he divorces the study of primitive communities from the investigation of their change into stratified societies and civilizations in areas where such changes have happened.

Conclusions

Kabo and Semenov are very different scholars. Semenov believes in the existence of "scientific ideology," for which facts are merely illustrations and can be eliminated if they do not fit. Kabo respects facts and knows them very well, but because they are scanty, he is compelled to presuppose the existence of types and stages in the alleged history of the primitive community in order to compare data from different parts of the world. With Kabo, every stage is properly documented, whereas Semenov's stages are predetermined, existing by their "logic" and not through any empirical grounding.

What unites Semenov and Kabo is that neither aims at a radical grasp of Marxian methodology, which would have truly revolutionary

consequences for Soviet *etnografiia*. Kabo's intention undeniably has been to do, without fanfare, for the primitive community what Marx did for capitalism. A recent book offers a summary of his lifelong research on community (Kabo 1986). In it, Kabo conclusively argues in favor of the universality of the primitive preagricultural community and documents its transition, under favorable conditions, into agricultural communities and societies. Kabo, with his thesis about the primacy of the community, has offered a more viable theory than Semenov. The twenty years of discussion between "Ideologists" and "Primitivists" have not been fruitless.

The opposition between the dogmatic evolutionist Marxism and a more authentic Marxian methodology as played out within Soviet *etnografiia* indeed exists and represents a vital conflict between ideology and science. Gellner's "Primitivists" and "Ideologists," while working on the same or similar themes, symbolize an irreconcilable split within the field that has dominated Soviet *etnografiia* for decades. "Ideologists" like Semenov serve the preservation of the Soviet status quo, whereas "Primitivists" like Kabo seek to develop a social science. Unfortunately, in practical terms, this confrontation has often been a no-win situation. It is my contention that Kabo, unlike Semenov, has potential to become the "Marx of primitive community, " but only if he and his colleagues reject ideological evolutionism, that is, Marxism devoid of Marx.

Notes

1. This was Lenin's terminology; see N. B. Ter-Akopian 1983:5.
2. On Marxian science, see Karl Korsch 1963.

3. See D. Zil'berman 1977; cf. Skalník 1968.
4. See Skalník and T. Pokora 1966, and L. V. Danilova 1968, 1971.
5. Yulian V. Bromlei has since 1965 been the director of the Miklukho-Maclay Institute of Ethnography of the USSR Academy of Sciences. He made the study of ethnos (Russian *etnos*) the central theme for Soviet *etnografiia* and thus pushed the theme of the reconstruction of the history of primitive community into the background. The 'Ideologists' and 'Primitivists,' both working on primitive society, are today less conspicuous than during the pre-1960s period. Bromlei apparently succeeded with the Soviet party and state establishment, becoming the first Soviet ethnographer ever to become an Academician (Russian *akademik*, full member of the highly prestigious USSR Academy of Sciences). His books include *Etnos i etnografiia* (1973), *Sovremennye problemy etnografii* (1981) and *Ocherki teorii etnosa* (1983).

6. See Bromlei 1974; and Dunn and Dunn 1974.
7. See Gellner 1973, 1975, 1977a, 1977b. See also Dragadze 1978 and Gellner 1980.
8. An apparent unity was displayed vis-à-vis Western anthropologists and ethnologists, for example, during the VIIth International Congress of Anthropological and Ethnological Sciences held in Moscow in 1964.
9. See, for example, Bromlei 1976, Veselkin 1977, *Soviet Studies in Ethnography* 1978, and the "Soviet Ethnographic Studies" series.
10. In a talk given in November 1976 at the London School of Economics, at the invitation of Gellner, I tried to explain this to an audience including Meyer Fortes and Dragadze.

Gellner, Fortes, and others urged me to write about my experience with Soviet *etnografiia* ever since I escaped to the West in 1976. Stanley Diamond published the first results in *Dialectical Anthropology* (Skalník 1981a). The collections I edited with Hans Claessen (1979; 1981) include exposition of some Soviet views of state formation that stand in contrast to the dogmatic concept of *ranneklassovoe gosudarstvo* ("early class state"). I continue to work on several epistemological and historical themes in Soviet *etnografiia* (1986; 1989).
11. Most recently, Humphrey 1984.
12. For a parallel distinction between grand theory and detail, see Fortes 1978.
13. See also Averkieva 1978 and Ter-Akopian 1980.

14. See especially Krader 1972, Schott 1976, Service 1981, and Skalník 1973, 1980, 1981a, 1981b.

15. See Kabo on hunter-gatherers (1968; 1978a; 1978b; 1981; 1982; 1983), food-producing (1985), and methods of reconstruction (1972; 1979); cf. Gellner (1973:53740).

References

Averkieva, Iu. P.

1978

U istokov sovremennoi etnografii. *Sovetskaia etnografiia* 1.

Bromlei, Yulian V.

1976

Soviet Ethnography: Main Trends. Moscow: USSR Academy of Sciences.

Bromlei, Yulian V., ed.

1974

Soviet Ethnology and Anthropology Today. The Hague: Mouton.

Claessen, Hans, and Peter Skalník, eds.

1979

The Early State. The Hague: Mouton.

1981

The Study of the State. The Hague: Mouton.

Danilova, L. V.

1971

Controversial Problems of the Theory of Precapitalist Societies. *Soviet Anthropology and Archaeology* 9:269328.

Danilova, L. V., ed.

1968

Problemy istorii dokapitalisticheskikh obshchestv. Vol. I. Moscow: Nauka.

Diamond, Stanley

1979

Introduction: Critical versus Ideological Marxism. *In* *Toward a Marxist Anthropology*, ed. Stanley Diamond, 110. The Hague: Mouton.

Dragadze, Tamara

1978

A Meeting of Minds: A Soviet and Western Dialogue. *Current Anthropology* 19(1):119-28.

Dunn, Ethel, and Stephen Dunn, eds.

1974

Introduction to Soviet Ethnography. 2 vols. Berkeley, Calif.: Highgate.

Fortes, Meyer

1978

An Anthropologist's Apprenticeship. *Annual Review of Anthropology* 7:130.

Gellner, Ernest

1973

Primitive Communism. *Man* 8(4):536-42.

1975

The Soviet and the Savage. *Current Anthropology* 16(4):595-617.

1977a

Ethnicity and Anthropology in The Soviet Union. *Archives Européennes de Sociologie* 18:201-20.

1977b

Class before States: The Soviet Treatment of African Feudalism. *Archives Européennes de Sociologie* 18(2):299-322.

Gellner, Ernest, ed.

1980 *Soviet and Western Anthropology*. London: Duckworth.

Humphrey, C.

1984

Some Recent Developments in Ethnography in the USSR. *Man* 19:310-20.

Kabo, Vladimir R.

1968

Pervobytnaia obshchina okhotnikov i sobiratelei (po avstralii-skim materialam). *In Problemy istorii dokapitalisticheskikh obshchestv*, ed. L. V. Danilova, 223-65. Moscow: Nauka.

1969

Proiskhozhdenie i ranniaia istoriia aborigenov Avstralii. Moscow: Nauka.

1972

istoriia pervobytnogo obshchestva i etnografiia. (K probleme rekonstruktsii proshlogo po dannym etnografii). *In Okhotniki sobirатели i rybolovy*. Moscow: Nauka.

1975

Tasmaniitsy i tasmaniiskaia problema. Moscow: Nauka.

1978a

Die australische Lokalgruppe. Ethnographisch-Archäologische Zeitschrift 19(4).

1978b

Problems of the Economy of Hunter-Gatherer Societies. Soviet Studies in Ethnography, 10616. Moscow: USSR Academy of Sciences.

1979

Teoreticheskie problemy rekonstruktsii pervobytnosti. *In* Etnografiia kak istochnik rekonstruktsii istorii pervobytnogo obshchestva, ed. A. I. Pershits, 60107. Moscow: Nauka.

1981

Sotsial'naia struktura pervobytnogo dozemledel'cheskogo obshchestva: edinstvo i mnogoobrazie. *In* Marksistko-leninskaia filosofiia i voprosy metodologii istorii i arkheologii. Ashkhabad.

1982

The Hunter-Gatherer Community (A Case Study of Australians). Community and Its Types, 5289. Moscow: USSR Academy of Sciences.

1983

Society and Culture of Hunters and Gatherers: The Common and the Specific. *In* Studies on Ethnography and Anthropology: Papers Presented by Soviet Participants to XIth ICAES, part 2. Moscow: USSR Academy of Sciences.

[1980] 1985

The Origins of the Food-Producing Economy. Trans. Skalník and Gellner. *Current Anthropology* 26(5):60116.

1986

Pervobytnaia dozemledel'cheskaia obshchina. Moscow: Nauka.

Korsch, Karl

[1938] 1963

Karl Marx. New York: Random House.

Krader, Lawrence

1972

The Ethnological Notebooks of Karl Marx. Assen: Van Gorcum.

Kuper, Adam

1982

Lineage Theory: A Critical Retrospect. Annual Review of Anthropology 11:7195.

Marx, Karl, and Frederick Engels

[1845/1846] 1970

The German Ideology. New York: International Publishers.

Schott, R.

1976

More on Marx and Morgan. Current Anthropology 16(4):731-34.
(Replies by Krader and Panoff 17(2):333-36.

Semenov, Yurii I.

1958

K voprosu o prichine matrilineinosti pervonachal'nogo roda.
Uchenyye zapiski krasnoiarskogo gosudarstvennogo
pedagogicheskogo instituta 13(2).

1962

Vozniknovenie chelovecheskogo obshchestva. Krasnoiarsk. (2d ed.
under the title Kak chelovechestvo, Moscow, 1966).

1964

Gruppovoi brak, ego priroda i mesto v evoliutsii semein-
obrachnykh otnoshenii. Moscow: 7th ICAES.

1965a

The doctrine of Morgan, Marxism and contemporary ethnography. *Soviet Anthropology and Archaeology* 4(2):315.

1965b

O periodizatsii pervobytnoi istorii. *Sovetskaia etnografiia*.

1968

Problema nachal'nogo etapa rodovogo stroia. *In Problemy istorii dokapitalisticheskikh obshchestv*, ed. L. V. Danilova. Moscow: Nauka.

1974a

Proiskhozhdenie braka i sem'i. Moscow: Mysl'.

1974b

Theoretical problems of 'Economic Anthropology'. *Philosophy in the Social Sciences* 4:20131.

1975

Marxism and Primitive Society. *Philosophy in the Social Sciences* 5:20113.

1976

O spetsifike pervobytnykh proizvodstvennykh (sotsial'noekonomicheskikh) otnoshenii. *Sovetskaia etnografiia*.

1977a

The problems of the transition from the matrilineal to the patrilineal 'clan' (A preliminary theoretical analysis). *Soviet Anthropology and Archaeology* 15(23):328.

1977b

Theoretical Problems of Ethno-Economy. *In Ethnography and Related Sciences*, ed. E. Veselkin, 5577. Moscow: USSR Academy of Sciences.

1978

O nekotorykh teoreticheskikh problemakh ekonomiki pervobytnogo obshchestva. *Sovetskaia etnografiia* 4:5875.

1979

"O metodike rekonstruktsii razvitiia pervobytnogo obshchestva po dannym etnografii." *In Etnografiia kak istochnik rekonstruktsii istorii pervobytnogo obshchestva*, ed. A. I. Pershits, 10825.

1980

The Theory of Socio-economic Formations and World History. *In* Soviet and Western Anthropology, ed. Ernest Gellner, 2958. London: Duckworth.

1982

Stadial types of community. *In* Community and Its Types, 3251. Moscow: USSR Academy of Sciences.

Service, Elman

1981

The Mind of Lewis H. Morgan. *Current Anthropology* 22(1):2543.

Skalník, Peter

1968

Comment on Berreman, Gjessing, and Gough, "Social Responsibility Symposium." *Current Anthropology* 9(5):425.

1973

Engels über die vorkapitalistischen Gesellschaften und die Ergebnisse der modernen Ethnologie. *Philosophica* (Bratislava) 1213:40514.

1980

Authentic Marx and Anthropology: The Dialectic of Lawrence Krader. *Bi jdragen tot Land-, Taal- en Volkenkunde* (136)1:13647.

1981a

Community: Struggle for a Key Concept in Soviet Ethnography. *Dialectical Anthropology* 6(2):18391.

1981b

Comment of Service. *Current Anthropology* 22(1):3839.

1986

Toward an Understanding of Soviet *Etnos* Theory. South African Journal of Ethnology 9(4):15766.

1989

The Soviet *Etnos* Theory and Its South African Parallel. Cahiers d'Etudes Africaines. Paris.

Skalník, Peter, and T. Pokora

1966

Beginnings of the Discussion about the Asiatic Mode of Production in the USSR and the People's Republic of China. *Eirene* 5:17987.

1978

Soviet Studies in Ethnography. Moscow: USSR Academy of Sciences.

Ter-Akopian, N. B.

1980

Podkhod Marksa i Engel'sa k istorii pervobytnogo obshchestva i nekotorye voprosy teorii Morgana. *Sovetskaia etnografiia* 5.

1983

Vzgliady K. Marksa na istoriiu pervobytnogo obshchestva i poniatie obshchestvenno-ekonomicheskoi formatsii. *Sovetskaia etnografiia* 5.

Veselkin, E., ed.

1977

Ethnography and Related Sciences. Moscow: USSR Academy of Sciences.

Zil'berman, D.

1976

Ethnography in Soviet Russia. *Dialectical Anthropology* 1:13553.

21

Marx and the Question of Anthropology

Ulysses Santamaria

Alain Manville

Translated by Susan Ossman
and Christine Ward Gailey

In *Holzwege*, Heidegger remarks that Anthropology is an interpretation of mankind which, fundamentally, already knows what man is. Given the manner in which the question is posed, it should be self-evident that it is a thing of the past. But how could one expect this of Anthropology, since its only stated task is to conform to the Subject's self-definition? 1

Marx's entire problematic is contained in the irreducible distance (and difference) between "was der Mensch ist" and "wer er sei." It is a historical problematic that appeals to concrete, historical people in the name of a project that aims to transform the world a project originating in the movement of the French Revolution. In effect, Marx develops his thought within the perspective of the Hegelian problematic, the emergence and implementation of liberty. We know that for Hegel modern times provide the setting for the unfolding of the power of subjectivity to the self. Marx takes up this Hegelian vision of modernity by criticizing its fundamental presuppositions. Unlike Hegel, he refuses the positive recognition of the world as it presents itself to philosophical knowledge. Where Hegel sees the principle of freedom, Marx denounces the form of its negation. Against the Hegelian compromise, Marx opposed the revolutionary imperative and the radical transformation of the current state of affairs; he rejects Hegel's pseudo-solution, which sees in the state the site of effective implementation of liberty. To the contrary, in a radicalization of Hegel's historicism, Marx views the state as a fundamental obstacle to the emancipatory movement, one which must be overcome. For him, the Hegelian fixation on the figure of that state crys-

tallizes the failure of German idealism as the heir to the French Revolution.

In Marx's view, the state cannot be the means through which liberty can be realized (as proclaimed in Hegelian philosophy), since the state does not include a set of determinations that Marx considers as essential. There is in Marx a militant denunciation of the Hegelian reticence in the face of civil society and its system of determinations, a denunciation of this site of division and the apparent "Aufhebung" in the abstract sphere of the state. For Marx, the principle of free will does not permit itself to be blocked by Hegel's timidity but must instead realize its ultimate implications. The communist revolution is simply the resumption of this imperative, against which opposition or resistance is futile. To Hegel's realist positivism Marx responds with his radicalism, a radicalism whose effective realization of liberty cannot be resisted.² Thus, it is much more than a matter of *thought*. For Marx, if the world does not permit the full implementation of liberty, then the world as presently constituted must disappear.³

This revolutionary pathos is sustained by a conception of historical reality that is the effect of the radicalization of Hegel's philosophy of history. For Hegel, history moves in the direction of liberty. The reality of the historical future is merely the product and the expression of the various stages of this emancipatory movement toward the self. The modern period constitutes a privileged moment, when this principle attains concrete expression. But this expression, for Marx, only develops in an alienated form, a form of freedom that is its own negation: The reality is unfreedom. Capitalism appears to Marx as the age of liberty, the locus of the emergence of the free, autonomous individual, but in a form that negates itself. This is why the world must be abolished, for this world is unacceptable in its violence, alienation, and oppression of the very powers it produces and fosters in the paradoxical form of its contradictions. This contradiction is at the core of Marx's revolutionary project. The contradiction between the emergence within modernity of the historical subject, the capitalist individual,⁴ and the negation of the historical force that resides in and constitutes its essence, "the practical power of autonomy." The communist revolution aims at implementing this force, the liberation of the form of free individualism that is suppressed to the point of total negation in capitalism. The autonomy of the subject is an illusion, because it is devoid of efficacy and reduced to its opposite, the heteronomy of the alienating logic of the power or capital. Commu-

nism, the subversion of the individual's way of life under capitalism, defines precisely the return of autonomy to itself. It involves the destruction of the system and the logic that result in illusory autonomy.

Rearticulated within this problematic, which allows Marx's thought to develop, is a radical critique of all the fundamental concepts that serve as structures in anthropological thought. Nevertheless, undermining the basic concepts of anthropology takes place within the paradox of a thought that simultaneously weaves a new anthropology.

Marx's critique of anthropological concepts involves two contradictory lines of thought, which are articulated in the *1844 Manuscripts*. For the reader who ignores the principle shaping the entire movement of the text the project of communist revolution the text defines the discourse of new anthropology, which historical materialism subsequently developed. The new anthropology appears to permeate Marx's text through a coherent set of themes and concepts, which has led many commentators to see in the manuscripts Marx's return to Feuerbach's anthropology, modified by the influence of Hegel. Thus, Ernest Mandel writes that "Marx approached economic problems as a philosopher freshly imbued with Hegel and Feuerbach, accepting the material criticism of Hegel by Feuerbach, but beginning to criticize Feuerbach himself by using Hegel, given that Hegel's contribution could add a historical and social dimension to anthropology that had been absent in Feuerbach" (Mandel 1970:153).

It is this type of representation that we want to challenge by reconsidering the line of thought that runs through the text of the *1844 Manuscripts*. Far from expressing the outline of any sort of anthropology, it sets in motion the process of its deconstruction and destroys its basic concepts.

Formulations such as Mandel's can no longer be accepted once one re-centers all Marx's thought in the perspective of its aims, which imply the destruction of the concepts of nature, human nature, generic being, labor, and so on. It is only through a radical critique of the metaphysics underlying all these concepts that Marx's project becomes thinkable: a radical revolution that goes to the root of the exploitation and the production of a new subjectivity that addresses the origins of the radical alienation making up the structure of the world. In the space opened by the question, "Wer der Mensch sei," the question of humankind radically changes its meaning. It is no longer an abstract theoretical question, but the practical

question of what the French Revolution was not able or did not know how to accomplish, namely, the emergence of a revolutionary subjectivity that defines the free autonomous subject. This problem was the subject of all German idealism; Marx brought it up again in his critique of German idealist philosophy by ripping it from its ahistorical contexta priori to the emergence of morality in Kant or the development of absolute reason in Hegel.

With Marx, the issue of the free autonomous subject becomes both historical and political, its meaning dependent on a specific context, that of the reality of the capitalist world and the destiny created for concrete individuals living in it. This question is thus aimed at a historical object and not simply an abstraction, such as mankind or the human species. It is a historical object on two accounts, since Marx makes it a product of historythe history of the capitalist mode of productionand an objective of the revolutionthe creating of the free, autonomous individual by the destruction of the existing state of things, itself resulting from a given moment in historical development. Marx's aim is not to produce a positive notion of what man *is*, or of what man can be, but to produce a meaning that gives sense to the revolutionary project. We agree with Louis Althusser's view that "the Marxism of Marx has nothing to do with the anthropological question 'what is man?' or with the theory of the realization, objectification, alienation or disalienation of the human essence, as in Feuerbach and his followers" (Althusser 1966:194). The object of Marx's question is the status given to subjectivity and its destiny under the dominant social logic of capital. The problem of subjectivity as it is posed by radical historicism no longer allows us to speak of humankind, but only of people, concrete people in an environment that is always socially and historically determined. The aim of revolution, therefore, is not to liberate "man in general," but rather, concrete, historically situated persons, even if Marx saw this as coming about through the liberation of their own humanity from within themselves. The result is that, as historical beings, they no longer exist in an endless prehistory, but relinquish their status as subordinates, as slaves, and attain this principle that resides within their own particular potential and spirit.

Marx's object is therefore not man that fundamental concept of anthropology, about which Theodor Adorno aptly remarked, "*Man* is the ideology of dehumanization" (1971:152). This abstraction underlies the entire metaphysics of history and obstructs the practical

aims of Marx: the emergence of a new, free, autonomous subjectivity that can become "the cornerstone of being in its totality."

The question of "man" is thus fundamentally political. From Marx's novel historical perspective, humankind's most essential trait is this historical essence, not nature; he focuses on the practical determination of being. Consequently, "man" is defined by history, which is a product of people, not nature; the concept is produced in and by history, with the added dimension that this product of history is also a producer of history. History is the environment in which everything exists and without which one could never reconsider a space that escapes historical examination the reality of nature, or the infrahistoric site of existence of an objectivity prior to history. 5 Yet, if history gives birth to "man," this birth occurs as a natural process that hides the fact that the essence of this being is totally historical, a reality that is always produced by social practice and that precludes the very question of nature as it always appears at the bottom of anthropological thought. For Marx, the entire world is history. Nature is merely a concept grounded in a metaphysics of *origin*, of *a prioris*, of transcendence, which the entire problematic of Marx radically criticizes. For Marx, it is impossible to go beyond history. Thus, Marx's question is not asked in a naturalist framework, in which it would be necessary to provide many criteria for the distinction between human and animal, as anthropological interpretations of Marx would have it. Instead, the question must be posed in a historical and political way. The current inhumanity of human existence is contrasted to a human condition where people can practically fulfill their potentials. Humanity is no longer considered to be biological determined but rather historical, permeated by and creative of history.

With Marx, humanity is no longer defined with reference to the metaphysical idea of nature but from within the limits of a historical perspective. The opposition is between two situations given to humans: that of animal existence where the species is relegated to the status of nonbeing and that of the revolution that has as its aim the establishment of communism. Communism, Marx writes, is the state of affairs in which nothing can do violence to the humanity in humankind. With this "humanity in man" Marx replaces an anthropological concept with a politico-historical one that extends beyond Hegel to Kant, namely, that the determination of humans must unfold politically and historically (Kant 1965:46). Whatever produces

"the relegation of man to his minority for which he himself is responsible" is characterized by this state; here, the subject leaves behind immaturity to accomplish self and personality, human dignity. This recalls Kant's pragmatic view, as expressed in his *Anthropology*:

Anthropology can be considered from either a physiological perspective or a pragmatic one. Physiological knowledge of man consists of finding out what nature makes of man. Pragmatic knowledge refers to that which man, as an active and free being, makes of himself and can or must make of himself. (Kant 1980:399)

Following such a concept, we leave behind any theory of human nature. We enter the domain of concrete historical reality the modern reality of capitalism as a universal phenomenon, in which the concrete destiny of the individual is played out, as well as the subjectivity that serves as the ultimate criterion in defining the humanity of the animal we call human.

Marx's project, therefore, is to bring into being what capitalism produces in a hidden and specific possibility. The historical present is the moment when subjectivity and liberty emerge in the self. But these remain constrained, transformed into their contraries because of the dominant form that capitalism fixes for people's activities, namely, labor. This alienating force in people's lives must be abolished if people want to reappropriate their humanity and leave prehistory behind. Since the beginning of what we can call humanity's history, we have been slumbering in a prehuman stage, for we have lived with an incommensurate distance between ourselves and our essence. Private man lives as a prehuman, in an animal state. Marx's definition of man no longer relies on a Feuerbachian anthropology but on a practical historical problematic. This problematic finds its source in Kant's practical political thought and in the determination of the meaning of our humanity. All of German idealism recognizes the humanity of people as over and above their definition as sensuous beings: beings based in suprasensual dimension, that of practical autonomy of the subject, a practical reality that constitutes, according to Marx, the real basis of any real or possible existence. It is here that we see Marx's radical historicism, which, as Gyorgy Márkus reminds us, accomplishes "the complete transformation of the fundamental question of modern philosophy, that of the subjective constitution of the world."

From 1843 to *Capital*, Marx never ceases repeating that the mystification of the dialectic in Hegelian philosophy resides primarily in the fact that for Hegel, "the movement of thought is . . . the reflection of reality, which is only the phenomenal form of the Idea." This *locus communus* of the materialist, already clearly formulated by Feuerbach, takes on a radically new meaning due to the fact that Marx conceives of reality (*Wirklichkeit*) in the form of an "objective activity," that is to say, in the form of production and its results. From the naturalist critique of Hegel's absolute Idealism, the affirmation is transformed into a questioning of the fundamental tendency of classic German Idealism, that is, the reinterpretation of the notion of the subject. (Márkus 1982:74)

In the *1844 Manuscripts* the phenomenology of the world of political economy to which Marx refers requires an interpretation from the revolutionary viewpoint of human emancipation. It must be rooted in an ontology of subjectivity that is a lively critique of all possible anthropologies, since its concepts draw on a deconstruction of existing anthropological concepts.

The Critique of Political Economy

The *1844 Manuscripts* open with a critique of private property. To understand the meaning of this critique we must return to the perspective that directs its development. The merger with the discourse of political economy finds its impetus in Marx's theoretical conceptualization of the conditions requisite to revolution, producing a concept of revolution that no longer plunges into the terrible vortex of the already existent that it tries to eradicate. Through this search, Marx moves to political economy and its critique. He does this as a result of a new consciousness, through his critique of politics and the political sphere in Hegelian philosophy: the state could never constitute the means of resolving the problem of subjectivity and autonomy. Political emancipation can only define a false emancipation, a fictive political revolution that permits the persistence of precisely what should be uprooted. The violence that is rooted in the sphere of civil societythe arena where the materiality of the social tissue is

organized (and which Hegel's philosophy comes to recognize) appears in Marx as a critique of Hegel's own reluctance to face the consequences of his own argument. Reviewing the *Manuscripts* according to the logic that goes beyond political fictions, he portrays civil society and the economy, as the locus of violence, alienation, and the negation of autonomy. This viewpoint radically alters the meanings usually attributed to Marx's critique and condemnation of capitalism. If the political economy is called upon, it is not so much in the name of the economic misery it engenders, nor even the injustice and inequality that it legitimates, but because of the *otherness* it imposes on practical subjectivity (Haarscher 1980:177).

Marx constructs an abstract capitalism to criticize certain conceptions of communism that fail to address the central problem that the revolution must resolve. In fact, through the concept of abstract capitalism, Marx provides the critique of the concept of "revolutionary" transformation. The disappearance of misery, the establishment of formal equality for all, the suppression of private property, and the socialization of property do not constitute the solution in Marx's eyes. Abstract capitalism merely defines a society in which the logic of capital is maintained and where only the most pathological effects are absorbed by the system. This is simply the notion of capitalism without excess, a clean capitalism, sanitized in areas where it might do physical violence to persons. This state of affairs merely improves the material lot of the subordinates but under continuing conditions of subservience. Subordination is maintained in its most insidious form, since in these circumstances it is obscured; subjectivity loses all self-perception and finally dissolves into its own absolute negation.

Guy Haarscher demonstrates that Marx's critique of private property centers not on economic issues but rather on activity and, consequently, subjectivity under capitalism. Fundamentally, private property is denounced as a mode of being, a type of activity, and, thus, as a state where subjectivity is a simple, positivist, economic determinant. We should note whether or not the person is a means to an end in himself, where the individual subject is engaged in practical submission to a free, liberated activity corresponding to a subjectivity finding its ends within itself. Haarscher writes that Marx

links the critique of capitalism to an ontology of activity, an ontology that contrasts normal activity and goals of activity to authentic activity, that is, the mode of activity

where man manifests that he is in and of himself, his own aim. It is from this concept that revolutionary praxis defines itself. . . . [A]ction aimed at implementing authentic activity [signals] the historical movement from alienation to emancipation. . . . Communism is nothing other than the emergence of this activity with the aim of utterly eradicating normal activity. (Haarscher 1980:59, 150, 177)

The entire critique of political economy is motivated by this opposition; the question of subjectivity is considered through the question of free activity. The destiny of subjectivity has a double meaning that retains the Hegelian concept of the *Bestimmung*: its determinationthe mode of relation that it has with itselfand its destinationthe types of ends it articulates in this relation and that are imprinted upon it in its movement. In fact, Marx writes that "private property is not a simple state of things external to man. With private property man is condemned. to the dispossession of self and to the negation of self." 6 Thus, Marx can define private property as "the sensuous expression through which man becomes for himself an object, from which the expression of his life is the alienation of his life, where its realization is its unrealization" (Marx [1844] 1969a:71). Marx sees a fundamental contradiction in private property. Its essence fails to return us to the most external phenomenon of its manifestation. Above and beyond the phenomenology of the system of private property and the most obvious phenomena of capitalismwage earning, workers' misery, the alienation of work, pauperization, and so onit is the destiny of the mode of subjectivity that is in question, the form of objectification it receives.7

Marx's main interest in private property lies in what he calls "its subjective essence," the subjective aspect of the system it defines that totally escapes all political economy. The subjective essence of private property draws us back to the mode of being and activity beyond, to this person who becomes a stranger to himself, a sort of loss of self that is the internal inversion of human essence, the destiny made of subjectivity that has become equivalent to its suppression. Thomas Meyer remarks that the alienation that Marx identifies in the subjective essence of private property is the result of a poor regulation of the relation that the person entertains with his or her own activity, and not simply as the result of an arrangement of social institutions. The theory of alienation can be understood only from a point of view

that places the essence of subjectivity at the root of the analysis of private property as an institution of the relations between people and things. Meyer notes that "the entire construction of Marx is linked to a critique of private property as an attitude. The fact of alienated labor and a fortiori of the institution of private property have their roots in man himself. The conscience and attitude of man with respect to his action on things are the locus of this inversion" (1973:1023). In the inversion of the relation of person and activity is the relation of the person to the self; the structure that such a relation defines and the status assigned to subjectivity are called into question. Marx writes, "Man is condemned to the dispossession of self; to the negation of self, to the devalorization of human life" ([1844] 1969a:9091). The system of private property within oneself implies

the transformation of human activity into labor, that is, into an activity completely alien to it, to man, to nature, to the spirit, and to life. Hence, man leads an abstract existence because he is only labor, that is to say, a being who, on a daily basis, may fall from his well-appointed void into a complete vacuum, into a special non-being that in reality simply signifies nonexistence. . . . man's nonexistence becomes "human merchandise," a merchandise endowed with self-consciousness and with its own activity. (Marx [1844] 1969a:76)

Marx contrasts the inversion within subjectivity to the relation of person to self, based on the Fichtean model ([1844] 1969a:64). The opposition between "Die verkehrte Einstellung" and "Die frei bewusste Tätigkeit" consciously chosen action recalls Marx's distinction between the "sense of having" and the "sense of being" (84). The first expresses a state of alienation, while the second is that of an "aktive Lebensausserung als Selbstzweck" (85) active fulfillment of one's potential for its own sake. The latter corresponds to the purposeful activity that Marx contrasts to "average activity" in the spheres of economy and capital throughout the *1844 Manuscripts*. "Die verkehrte Einstellung" is expressed phenomenologically by the fact that, as Marx writes, "the species being of man becomes the means of his physical existence" (Marx [1844] 1972:181). On the ontological plane, this phenomenological expression of alienation refers to the relation of subjectivity to itself and to a particular structuring of subjectivity defined by this particular mode of activity slated for abolition, namely, labor.

In Marx, the fundamental critique of vulgar communism is a conception of the revolution that has not succeeded in piercing the heart of private property and remains at the superficial level of the institutional superstructure. Private property is seen as a sum of social relations, the institutional objectification of people's relationship to things. Indeed, Marx writes that the revolution that limits itself to doing away with private property in reality leaves intact what should be destroyed and then radically transformed, that is, the effect of this inversion within subjectivity. Vulgar communism, far from being able to provide for the desired solution, replicates the alienating effects of private property by generalizing its disastrous consequences for the subject. What Marx says of political economy, that it "only considers private property from its objective side" ([1844] 1972:182), applies to a model of communism that merely collectivizes the principle of private property.

Understood from its objective side, the alienation of private property cannot lead to a solution, since it misses the point, "Die Bestimmung des Arbeiters" (Marx 1968:68), that is, workers being determined as subordinates and their inhuman destiny. This kind of communism, writes Marx, is "the extension of the central alienation to all," and it "is precisely, insofar as it is a generalized and total negation of man's personality, the expression following from private property, which is the negation of this" (Marx [1844] 1972:182-183). This negation of the personality is, in fact, the negation of the liberated, autonomous subjectivity that the revolution intends to have emerge at the heart of sociohistorical reality through radical activity:

Unlike all previous revolutions that left the mode of production unchanged, it is directed against the previous mode of production, it does away with labor. . . . It transforms the basis of all of the modes of production and exchange and, for the first time, consciously treats all preexisting natural conditions as human creations and strips them of their seemingly natural character to submit them to the force of united individuals (Marx [1844] 1972:184).

Vulgar communism, Marx argues, can propose only the restoration of alienation, a reinforced alienation at that, since it can only produce a community of labor that is in fact one of "generalized capitalism."

The twin aspects of the relation are elevated to a represented generality: labor as a determination in which

each has his place, and capital as a recognized generality and force in the community. (158)

Marx's communism recognizes the subjective essence of labor defined by other categories that refer back to the concepts of subjectivity and autonomy basically categories set up in German idealism. Marx defines his communism as "the replacement of private property and human self-alienation by the real appropriation of human essence by and for man" (159).


This concept of the reappropriation of humanity through its motivating theme of alienated labor has been the object of a number of misinterpretations. It has led some commentators to turn Marx into the theoretician of an original anthropology that has as its principle vector the concept of labor and appears to reintegrate the historical point of view absent in Feuerbach's anthropology. In this analytical framework, labor defines humanity's essence, and history becomes that of different modes of production. The history of different modes of organizing labor becomes the very principle of the practical production of the objective historical world. The specificity of the praxis of human reproduction, unlike animal reproduction, is that it breaks out of the circle of organic life's functioning and opens the space of history. Through work humans can show their specific essence, the fact that they are the species that has gone beyond nature, making nature the conscious object of activity and, thus, appropriating it for human use. This activity, this productive relation to the environment, defines the human essence; this new determination would represent the "species being." This version of Marx's text can be drawn from such passages of the *1844 Manuscripts* as this one: "Through production of an objective world, the elaboration of inorganic nature, man demonstrates his capacities as a conscious species being" (Marx [1844] 1972:159). Far from emanating from a coherent anthropological theory, the diverse definitions of human essence scattered throughout the text signal a profound ambivalence in all of Marx's thought between two irreconcilable imperatives: a revolutionary project and a will to distance himself from the Young Hegelians' idealism.

It is this will, accompanied by his appropriation of the entire Feuerbachian problematic, that redirects the analysis of metaphysics, nature, and labor in Marx's text. Work as such no longer defines alienation, but a specific historical form of worklabor that in-

cludes humans' more generic activity. This includes alienated labor in the form of wage labor.

The alienation of labor no longer signifies the alienation that plays itself out in the alienation of work but the alienation of work that under the capitalist regime transforms this generic activity into a pathological occupation, a pathogenic form of objectification of human power. The alienation of labor, then, does not refer to a naturalist metaphysics that views work as the medium by which humans appropriate nature. It is merely a particular type of activity that takes on a specific form under the regimen defined by the logic of capital. Work, thus, cannot hearken to some essential "human nature," of which Marx's entire framework of analysis poses a radical critique. Beyond the contradictory recognition that posits labor as a natural determination, for Marx, labor defined only the dominant mode of practical activity at the base of bourgeois capitalist society.

To distinguish these contradictory, even antimonic, conceptions of labor we can draw out two conceptual lines implied by each. On the one hand, there is a naturalist anthropology, the legacy of Feuerbach. This views the determination of man's essence as derived from a concept of freely chosen conscious activity ("frei bewusste Tätigkeit") as concretized in thought. This concept preserves only the aspects concerning consciousness:



According to this vision of things, following the Cartesian line of thought in setting up man as master and owner of nature, humans concretely define themselves as labor power. This determination is in reality the destiny imposed on people by capitalism. This understanding of human essence as the subject of labor, as "arbeitend Wesen," refers to the theory of "Bildungsprozess" an educational process where species being is posited as subject in a "Werkstätigkeit"; it creates the notion of *Homo faber*, the distinctively laboring animal. Labor, consequently, becomes an original principle and the realization of humankind. World history resumes as the process of humanity's self-production through labor, labor being defined as

the natural form of the objectification of all the essential human forces.

It is in the context of this naturalistic perception of activity/labor that the problem of alienated labor is posed. By giving this natural, generic human activity the form of wage labor, capitalism renders this generic determination of humanity meaningless. Alienated labor in the form of wage work is work devoid of substance. It becomes an activity at whose center the natural order of its constituted elements has undergone an inversion, setting up a pathological structure, some of whose effects Marx describes in the *1844 Manuscripts*.

From this perspective, the communist/specialist revolution would come about to end this internal perversion of the natural economy of activity/labor, by defining a new organization of labor that would no longer be subject to the alienating logic of capital. With this anthropological model and its central concept of labor, we can identify two radically different things: the rationalization of domination over the social process and the revolutionization of this same process. Labor is seen to retain within itself a revolutionary force, and Marx's concept of "praktische kritisch Tätigkeit" is equivalent to a political praxis of emancipation where the central issue is "the free development of individuality."

The positivization of the category of labor made possible by this anthropological theory of alienation goes back to a theory of emancipation that Jürgen Habermas and the entire Frankfurt School clearly demonstrated to be a metaphysical and mystifying notion. In fact, labor here defines the (metaphysical) concept, in which an unsuccessful attempt is made to overcome the classical representative/contemplative subject; the latter is replaced with a concept of subjectivity that is that of a productive, active subject. But this metaphysics of history fails to see that labor remains fundamentally a contemplative activity, a type of activity that, far from being able to bring about the realization of human essence, leads to the unrealization of people, people who have practical subjectivitythe practical power of autonomyas their very basis. This determination of human essence is no longer reduced to *doing* but also concerns the sphere of action where the destiny of human liberty is played out. This is why Marx could write of alienated labor: "It degrades autoactivity, reduces man's free activity to an average activity and renders man a stranger to his own essence . . . a foreigner to his own species being" (Marx 1969b :142). In fact, if the species being can be affirmed in fashioning

the objective world, this production alone does not allow the definition of the human that corresponds to Marx's definition of a free being. A world of slavery also produces the objective world; it can even produce in it the illusion of free action, as Marx reminds us in the *Holy Family* with respect to the alienation of the bourgeoisie:

In the modern world each person is at one and the same time a member of the state of subservience and of collective being, the state of slavery of bourgeois society is in appearance the greatest freedom, for the apparent independence it accomplishes for the individual takes its notion without restraint toward its own liberty, when in fact this liberty is merely a fulfilled slavery that defines his inhumanity. (Marx 1967:198)


To reduce alienated labor to a simple superstructural effect of the institution of private property and of capitalist relations of production, therefore, is to lose sight of labor. Labor is, for Marx, the mode of activity suppressed, that is, it is a form/activity that must be abolished if practical subjectivity is to rejoin its determination of the practical power of autonomy, of liberty.

The domain of liberty begins in fact only where the activity of labor [*das Arbeiten*] ceases. By its nature it holds itself above the sphere of physical production and above the domain of necessity, as the development of human forces that find themselves . . . to be their own ends [*Selbstzweck*]. (Marx 1974:347)

This development of the productive forces of each individual, Marx notes in the *Grundrisse*, corresponds to "the production of another subject" (505), of a new subjectivity.

Besides the consideration of the "frei bewusste Tätigkeit," there is a second possible line of thought. This appears as soon as we shift the emphasis from the first term to the second. No longer is the emphasis defined with respect to an abstract opposition between humans and animals. Instead, the human relation to one's own essence forms an opposition that confronts the reality of the person who, on the one hand, is subject to an inhuman existence but who, on the other hand, realizes his or her own essence and refuses the slavish destiny that is imposed by the existing order. This conceptual chain takes us away from the metaphysical horizon of a hypothetical

nature in which humans would find their true basis. Instead, it pushes us into an entirely historical universe, where the erosion of freedom takes place.



Following such a schema, we are faced with a Kantian sense of activity, the behavior of the subject that aims to implement its ultimate end, autonomy. Marx does not posit labor as the form of activity that defines human essence or that would constitute humanity's species being in a Marxist anthropology. To the contrary, labor is recognized as simply a historic form of activity, a simple sociohistorical category no longer a natural form of human objectification. For Marx, who takes up an analysis already present in Hegel, labor is essentially an unfree activity. 8

Beyond the simple phenomenological level, the ontological structure of subjectivity that corresponds to labor can only be the downfall of autonomy in the arena of external finality, alien, the negation of that which defines it, liberty, becoming other than subjectivity (the form of its objectification that eradicates it). That Marx could speak of "free labor" is a true contradiction in terms: the subject of such labor appears as a contradictory subject that could not exist in any production process.

Consequently, it is a blind spot in Marx's absurd construction. Thus, in the *Grundrisse* Marx mentions the existence of free, attractive labor that would define another realization of the individual, as opposed to what people become in the labor process. He writes, "man, as the tamed force of nature, in the production process appears not only as a simple force of nature but also as an activity directing all natural forces" (Marx 1974:506). In the *1844 Manuscripts* he says, "There is the production of human activity as labor that is, as an activity quite alien to itself, to man, and to nature . . . the abstract existence of man as a mere worker" (Marx [1844] 1969a:73). Thus, labor, far from defining human activity, is instead an activity that is alien a condition in which the person has

only an abstract existence. Marx calls this existence a "filled void which at any moment can crumble into the nothingness of nonbeing" (73).

In fact, throughout the *1844 Manuscripts*, labor is the activity in which humans retain their natural status and do not transcend these immediate determinations. In one passage, Marx puts forth these two determinations of the human essence:

Man is immediately a natural being, as a natural being he is given the natural life force and his natural activity . . . but man is not simply a natural being, he is a natural *human* being, that is to say, a being who exists for himself, a species being constantly affirming and manifesting himself as such in his existence and in his knowledge.
(138)

It is this immediate determination of humans as natural beings that capitalism uses, negating and suppressing people's determination of meaning. People are human beings existing for themselves, that is, their own means and ends (*selbstzweck* and *endzweck*), but only when they permit the practical force of autonomy to predominate at the center of their subjectivity, when they institute a relation of self to self that conforms to and is adequate to the expression of this practical autonomy. People make their free will, which seeks its own fulfillment and autonomy. The end which subjectivity assigns itself is nothing other than a revolution that makes autonomy the principle of a new world, a new reality principle for the world, in a world that has become human and leaves alienation and oppression behind. This new principle renders "impossible all that exists independently of individuals" (Marx 1968:97).

It is this definition of species being to which Marx refers when he writes that "man is a species being because he refers to himself as a universal, thus free, being" (Marx [1844] 1969a:61). This definition refers not to labor, but to Kant and to Hegel's conceptual universe. From Kant comes the concept of free will that Marx employs and from Hegel the opposition of the natural, finite will to an infinite will, as developed in his *Philosophy of Right*:

Man is in his immediate manifestation a natural being, outside of his concept; it is only through taking cognizance of himself as free that he takes possession of himself. . . . this is the act of realizing what he is as a concept. (Hegel 1963:57).

Humanity does not attain its ideal (as in all anthropologies) by means of an aboriginal turning away from nature by means of a conscious act that definitively separates it from an animal determination. Hegel refuses this anthropological, fundamentally natural determination of humanity. Instead, self-consciousness marks the passage from the natural order, defining the only consciousness as that of the practical historical order. The latter opens up for humans the dimension of the practical power of autonomy. This corresponds to the possession of self, of which Hegel speaks and which is equivalent to a freedom that has liberty as its content and aim (Hegel 1970:482).

Marx takes the concept of the realized essence of practical autonomy from Kant. Kant's concept of "personality" appears in different places in Marx's text (Marx [1844] 1969a:85), and forms the cornerstone for all of Marx's views and critiques of the capitalist world. This is why he could declare in the *German Ideology* that the entire revolutionary movement to that date appeared to him to have completely forgotten that "if the proletariat wants to affirm themselves as people, they must abolish labor" (Marx 1968:96). Eliminating labor is imperative for, as he writes, it is the "activity that is passivity, a force that is powerless, a procreation that is emasculation" (Marx [1844] 1972:156). This is what happens to the practical power of autonomy when it is lost in the activity of labor. The becoming of subjectivity that is in itself the negation of personality is apparent in labor, where personality, as in Kant, defines the subject that has realized in itself a moral law. In other words, the subject, by means of a return to the self, stops the motion of the heteronomous determination of the sensuous, tearing itself away from the chain of causality, positing itself as autonomy. It becomes a practical, autonomous subject whose action no longer responds solely to the imperatives of the moral law and the universalism of maxims; the subject becomes its own maker, liberated, and the practical incarnation of liberty that has itself as its goal. For Kant, personality is nothing other than this subjective moment when it becomes both in and for itself, possessed of practical autonomy, of liberty disposing of itself independently of all empirical causality, subject only to the principle of free determination.

This is the state of subjectivity where the person becomes, according to Marx, "a man aspiring to the totality of human expression of life; a man in whom his own effectuation is an urgent internal necessity. . . . an essence that must owe itself its own being and for whom life is its own creation (Marx [1844] 1972:195). . . . the total man"

(189; see also Marx 1969c:450). This is what the communist revolution aims to implement by means of the radical abolition of all former modes of activity.

Notes

1. Heidegger 1972:103; translations from the German are by Santamaria.
2. The greatest difference between Marx and Hegel is not on an abstract level between idealism and materialism but derives from Marx's rejection of Hegel's reduction (and, thus, limitation) of the concept of autonomous, free activity to the single sphere of theory.
3. There is in Marx almost an echo of Fichte's *Leitmotif* "Um so schlimmer für die Tatsachen."
4. This corresponds to what Hegel recognized as "Das sum sich kommen der Autonomie."
5. Man is the animal whose essence is not to have one. Human nature is to be nothing, preserving the infinity of the possible which the contingencies of history come to determine each time in a particular form of practical power that exists at the core of subjectivity. This essence escapes all political knowledge because it is on the order of reflection and political decision.
6. The problem here is the phenomenon of loss of self, loss of self-control, of an estrangement from self, a set of determinations concerning the self in relation to itself that brings us back to the structure that subjectivity acquires under this alienating regime.

7. This destiny is determined in the relation of the person to the self.

8. Hegel could define labor as "sich zum Gegenstand machen" in "Jenaer Philosophie," where "sich zum Ding machen" is a veritable "Verdinglichung" of subjectivity, its reified negation.

References

Adorno, Theodor

1971

Jargon der Eigentlichkeit. Frankfurt: Suhrkamp.

Althusser, Louis

1966

Lire *le Capital*. Paris: Maspero.

Haarscher, Guy

1980

L'ontologie de Marx. Brussels: Editions de Bruxelles.

Hegel, G. W. F.

1963

Principes de la philosophie du droit. Paris: Gallimard.

1970

Précis de l'encyclopédie des sciences philosophiques. Paris: Editions J. Vrin.

Heidegger, M.

1972

Holzwege. Frankfurt: Klostermannverlag.

Kant, Immanuel

1965

Qu'est-ce que Les Lumières. *In* Kant et la philosophie de l'histoire. Paris: Denoel.

1980

Werkausgabe. Band XII. Frankfurt: Suhrkamp.

Mandel, Ernest

1970

La formation de la pensée économique de Karl Marx. Paris: Maspero.

Márkus, Gyorgy

1982

Langage et production. Paris: Denoel.

Marx, Karl

1967

Le Capital. Tome VIII. Paris: Editions Sociales.

1968

L'ideologie allemande. Paris: Editions Sociales.

[1844]

1969a

Les manuscrits de 44. Paris: Editions Sociales.

1969b

La sainte famille. Paris: Editions Sociales.

1969c

Les fondements de la critique de l'économie politique. Paris: Editions Sociales.

[1844] 1972

Ökonomische philosophische Manuskripte. Leipzig: Reclam Verlag.

1974

Grundrisse der Kritik der politischen Ökonomie. Berlin: Dietz Verlag.

Meyer, Thomas

1973

Der Zweispalt in der Marxischen Emanzipationstheorie. Kronberg: Scriptor Verlag.

22

Marxism, Feminism, Deconstruction

Ben Agger

For the past fifteen years, I have been trying to understand how mainstream American social science is ideological, beyond its ostensible surface commitment to make the world a better place to live, resonating its avowed liberalism if nothing else (Agger 1989). Science under the sway of positivism sharply separates the putative objectivity of its validity claims from moral sentimentality, whether evoked in images of concerned scientists protesting the military uses of technologies that they themselves invented or in terms of their vigorous electoral participation as private citizens. I am interested in this schizophrenia between science and politics as a validity claim in its own right or, to put this differently, I want to rethink the issue of value-freedom. While I come from Marxism, among other places, it strikes me increasingly that theoretical Marxism is too often either a left-wing hagiography, lacking an empirical referent, or is simply denied any specificity at all by being swallowed in specialized disciplines. Political Marxism has been defrocked since the revelation of Soviet terror after Stalin's death. Thus, to be publicly regarded as a Marxist today means to most people, even or especially to intellectuals, a canonical participation in study groups devoted to reading *Capital* and an idolatry of various state-socialist countries and Third World political movements that, in Susan Sontag's terms, are only fascist with a human face.

This is emphatically not to begin with a tired neoconservative confession that I sinned in my youth and now come to atone, for I still believe one cannot (or more directly, I cannot) be a critical intellectual today without having some commerce with Marxism, whether the aesthetic theory and dense philosophy of Theodor Adorno or the Byzantine constructions of recent Jürgen Habermas, not forgetting my own struggles long since repressed to work through, and understand, *Capital* (not to mention the *Phenomenology of Mind*). 1 I want to do Marxism and other things, with feminism and deconstruction as its buttresses by applying it to one of the most imperious and

entwining discourses of our time (in Marxist ideologies), the positivist behavioral sciences exemplified particularly by American scientific sociology. I want both to illuminate the fateful dominion of positivism, especially in an age that claims to be maturely postpositivist and to require Marxism itself to rethink its own claim to be a science.

Social Fact, Social Fate, Social Text

In beginning, let me regress about thirty years to some of the first leftist criticisms of the notion of scientific value-freedom, notably from within American sociology. Indeed the 1950s and 1960s books by C. Wright Mills (1959) and Alvin Gouldner (1968) that attack Talcott Parsons's celebration of Eisenhower's America only scratch the surface of what is insidiously political about a mainstream social science embracing Parsons's contention that industrial societyread capitalismis held together by the common values of patriarchy, free enterprise, Judaeo-Christianity, and the work ethic. While the critique of structural-functionalism, the dominant sociological theory framing most research, is certainly not wrong or ill-intended as such (Talcott Parsons metaphysically gilding the so-called iron cage that his mentor, Max Weber, lamented as the rigid purposelessness of a bureaucratized society), the standard leftist critique of structural-functionalism does not go far enough toward an adequate understanding of the politics of science. I want to look at science, especially social science, as writing that methodically suppresses its own literariness in order to provoke the enactment of a world it describes and thereby would reproduceMarx's notion of ideology understood quite differently as a textual practice. 2

My basic premise is that the suppressed subtext of positivist social science aims secretly to reproduce the supposedly naturelike necessity of the extant social order by reflecting it in a text that, in intention, will then be enacted by disempowered and (thus) self-disempowering readers. Social scientists model a world that they know is incomplete, running a deficit of obedience that they hope to make up or make good in the ingenious replication of a putatively unalterable world that they thus seek to perpetuate. The truth of social science on this understanding is the extent to which it can provoke what Friedrich Nietzsche called a love of fate among readers who quite literally bring into being the alleged truth of a reflected, patterned world, vindicating the text of social science ironically by

acting it out, in particular its alleged laws of such things as hierarchy, inequality, sexism, racism, the domination of nature, and, last but not least, scientism itself.

I want to understand how sociology as a paradigm of the positivist behavioral sciences portrays, and thus hopes to provoke, a heteronomous, closed world governed by overarching laws of adjustment and adaptation, adjustment being the reasonable person's response to the invisible hand of market economics and to the visible hand of the interventionist welfare state. ³ I want to read the text of empiricist social science modeled on a sociology written by August Comte, Emile Durkheim, and Weber as a literary production that peculiarly, and fatefully, conceals its own authorship in the cleansing processes of methodology, thus denying the problematic nature of its own intelligibility. This reduction to method only reproduces the extant world reproduction used here in the tellingly double sense of reflection/imitation, on the one hand what a positivist might call photography and reenactment/iteration, on the other. While positivist sociology has been written by some hand, pen, or typewriter, of course, it suppresses its literariness, the self-recognition of its own artifice and thus its own nonidentity to the world to which it is addressed, precisely in order to reinforce its claim to be an imitative posture toward an allegedly frozen object world.

Social science in this sense of social text is a notion replacing the concept of ideology drawing on but not simply synthesizing the complex lineage of Western Marxism, particularly the original Frankfurt School that included Adorno, Max Horkheimer, and Herbert Marcuse, and later Habermas, Jean-Paul Sartre, Stanley Aronowitz, Fredric Jameson, poststructuralism, especially Derridean deconstruction, and certain feminist theorists like Luce Irigaray and Julia Kristeva. A social text, less mechanical than Marx's original notion of ideology, mirrors a putatively lawlike social world because, ironically, it recognizes a certain deficit in the compliance of people with these ironclad patterns and interposes its text between readers and the world as the world's reflection thus hoping to serve as its reproduction.⁴ Science reproduces by literally reproducing the given world, eliciting its enactment as a way of guaranteeing its own supposed truth, where truth is read off, and in, a practice that a disempowered reading provokes in the first place but only exhibiting science's interest in political stasis. This happens in spite of the fact that on the surface, at least, science eschews politics as the bane of transcendental disinterestedness that it claims for itself, a value-freedom

it ensures by disabling and thus disempowering both author and reader, precluding their constructive and interpretive work, in reading and in social life. Science represses to deepest subtext its own desire not simply to reflect but also to reproduce the world in a political way, postured objectivity being a vehicle for an imperial subjectivitythe more potent, the more it disguises itself as a disinterested quest for knowledge, science for science's sake.

Science claims no deeper political interest no animating desire, passion, lust, or need that warrants its facile depiction/description of this-world as (falsely) a generic one, the freeze-frame of textual sociology eternalizing domination as a veritable fact of social nature, as irresistible as gravity. That people suffer the world does not, however, exemplify an eternal essence of our subordination before overwhelming social structure as such, for there are no essences in history. Subordination only defines a particular, inherently alterable history in which texts like sociology reinforce powerlessness by making it out to be inescapable (e.g., anatomy as destiny) and thus encourage their own enactment by readers who do not know any better or any different. This offers the peculiar image of a social science that in effect scripts a ritualistic obedience to authority simply by seeming to reflect authority's ubiquity. Science denies its own literariness in this sense, its own political project of closing an open world, precisely to put distance between itself and what it constructs as inappropriate nonscience, what Sartre called "committed literature," inferior to the disciplinarily vouchsafed and methodically cleaned knowledge of the normative community of science. Science at all costs avoids the muddying of text by authorial perspective or passion. As I will suggest later, deconstructive reading excavates the author's desire to write and thus deflates science's false authority as a text beyond perspective. It empowers heretofore muted readers who instead can become writers themselves, engaging the central text in political dialogue, that is, in new writing, re-search and new search, the fundamentals of gentle community building (and in this, extending some of Habermas's insights into a communicative ethics).

I want to understand today's discourses as yesterday's ideologies that disable not simply by freezing a heartless, hopeless world somewhat palliated by the emoluments of leisure, mobility, and spiritual plenitude. Instead I want to understand how these discourses disqualify any intellectual and, thus, political construction out of hand and so require us to accept science's secret constructions as the only

uncontaminated writing in the world. Science's message is quite literally its medium, its seemingly disinterested description of a generic social nature imitating the putative laws physicists make of inanimate nature. Texts oppress not simply where they proclaim the wrong laws but where they profess to reflect anything at all about the social world outside of history and people's desire to change it by understanding and rewriting/reliving it. Science makes history by seeming only to reflect it, thus usurping literary competence from readers who are, in Sartre's terms, born smart but taught to be stupid, that is, mute before the seemingly unalterably given, the numerous sociohistorical indignities that litter history, blown into unavoidable fate as History. "Text acts," like Searle's speech acts, are embryonic political relationships that a critical theory ignores only out of an unexamined belief in the primacy of the economic or the productive, as I will develop later. It is possible to understand the disempowering production and reproduction of the putatively iron laws of generic history as a power relationship between writer and reader that, I contend, is the modal power relationship today, even more fundamental, because more global, than the relationship between capital and labor, men and women, or white and black. Along with certain versions of heterodox Marxism and feminism mediated through a version of poststructuralist literary theory, a *critical theory of the text* addresses the crucial social relationship between reproduction and production that Marxism ignores out of its essentially masculinist subordination of textual/sexual politics to the allegedly more real, more political, politics of productive relationsmen's work, accessible only to male science. 5

Social science entices from readers the enactment of a putative fate by describing seeming laws of social motioninequality, bureaucracy, division of labor, eternal patriarchythat it would have literarily and, thus, politically incompetent readers act out as alleged necessity. The so-called laws thereby become necessary when seen from the vantage of a history in which subordination seems to be the empirical rule. The text of science inculcates the love of fate when it disguises its own authorial subjectivity as the political possibility of any free subjectivity. This is more complex than Marx's originary notion of ideology, although I would hazard the guess that Marx's mechanism is not in the nature of Marxism at all but only reflects Marx's contextual debt to physics, the most credible text of the time in the nineteenth century and one shared by Comte when he called

sociology "social physics." While Marx in his terms writes a "natural science of history," I want to understand all textual practices, including Marxism, as world-constitutive engagements among author, readers, other writers, nature, and topic-text, in Wittgenstein's terms, read as a "form of life," mediating private and public realms. ⁶ While all life is not a text, every text is a life, a form of society. Broadening ideology in this way from an imposed false consciousness, with Marx, to a discursive writer-reader relationship opens all sorts of questions about the nature of social/political/sexual—that is, textual reproduction in a way that brings together discourse theory and a variety of themes in feminism, Frankfurt critical theory, and recent literary theory involving the nature of the relationship between production and reproduction, writer/reader, man/woman, capital/labor, white/black. Marx presaged a critical discourse theory in this sense, for example, deconstructing religion and bourgeois economics as enmeshing, occluding forms of psychic (and therefore political) oppression. He did not understand, however, the ruse of science, including his own, that pretends not to be a writerly practice or product at all but simply a presuppositionless reflection. He thus denied himself a crucial foundation for a new textual practice—his socialism—that avoids science's suppressed will to power by admitting socialism's fiction as a purposeful piece of artifice: an intersubjective, intertextual form of life, reflecting the most elemental desires, namely, to be autonomous and to transform, to create.

Understanding science as a textual act weakens its spell over muted readers by revealing its artifice as the possibility of more talk and text, and, therefore (I contend), of a genuine political community characterized by openness, heterogeneity, and peace. The notion of intertextuality here employed is as a utopian political imagery, a version of Habermas's ideal speech situation, but broadened to include all sorts of exchanges, including people-nature.⁷ The literary comprises science in spite of the impression that science appears methodically to suppress its own literary artifice, its mediation of concepts and world as authorial work, writing that produces a version of a world.

Yet there can be good science, science that refuses to blush at its own fiction but instead regards its artifice as an occasion for making intertextual connections, unabashedly writing its version as a mode of self-expression that solicits gentle correction by other writers. While literature comprises science, science claims validity, whereas literature need not. *King Lear* has no subtext, it is what it says. This

is not to say that *King Lear* does not in its own way intend to persuade, arguing its version of a perfidious world, but only to observe that science is the special case of a discourse whose fiction is heuristically suppressed *for the sake of argument*. This is so even if good science never forgets its ground in the perspectivity of the text, indeed setting in the foreground that perspectivity call it subtext as the text's main topic. Good science self-consciously argues for a version of the world, its validity claims made available for deconstruction or simply for rewriting, where other literary forms novel, poem, autobiography do not self-consciously claim validity (even if they intend it) but rather let it emerge in the unproblematic play of text and subtext. In other words, we do not doubt for a moment that *King Lear* expresses Shakespeare's world, the world that he intends, although under sway of positivism we are unclear about whether Margaret Mead's anthropology and Parsons's sociology also intend worlds in the same way or indeed are autobiographical, as all literature is. One might say in these terms that good literature, including science, allows readers to ingress into the sense of the text understood as the author's argument for this or that state of affairs, the *text's echo of itself writing*, whether Graham Greene's demythified world in which no one is innocent or the world that Marx would create out of the ashes of the old.

Durkheim's Socio-Ontology:
A Disciplinary Reading

Now let me move directly to scientific sociology as a paradigm case of positivist behavioral science that functions covertly as an enmeshing, disempowering social text, developed in the first few pages of Durkheim's *Rules of Sociological Method*, where he demarcated sociology from psychology as a legitimate discipline (Durkheim 1964:113). For Durkheim, sociology's object domain was to be the study of so-called social facts, the billion pieces of history marked by our subordination to an impinging social reality. He exemplified these social facts in his original case in his study of the religious correlates of suicide; they are now repeated in the extraordinary busyness of a discipline that maps the numerous correlations that only express the causality that Durkheim first suggested as the essence of organized social life: poverty causing crime, unemployment causing divorce, stress causing unhappiness. Sociology for him was exhaustively to map the numerous episodes of our subordination to the social

world's generic power as a way of reinforcing the notion now nearly second nature among social scientists as well as among the lay public that the seemingly unalterable necessities of industrial-age society such as inequality, hierarchy, and bureaucracy require what an earlier speculative idealism called Reason to be reduced to a conventionalized reasonableness the capitulation to necessity *written into text*.⁸ The reasonable person accordingly lives and hopes within the constraints of the allegedly given, the untranscendable horizon of Durkheim's social-factual, embracing our metaphysical susceptibility to a society that for sociology always overdetermines us. In charting the terrain of the social-factual, Durkheim wanted to reproduce the subordinate behavior that he willfully froze as the essence of social life our acquiescence to an overwhelming social structure played out in a putative everyday life, in which we allow ourselves to be imprinted with the imperatives of religion, economics, race, politics, sexuality.

While Durkheim as a liberal of sorts did not favor suicide, he wanted to affirm a world in which suicide is not an existential choice but merely a reflex of our various cultural and institutional affiliations, of our conditioning. The role of an ameliorating sociology was to *reduce* social problems like suicide by fine-tuning a social structure that is seen to cause them. While perhaps well-intentioned compared, for example, to Herbert Spencer's macabre Social Darwinism that would presumably have welcomed suicide as population control this remediating liberalism fails on deeply metaphysical/ political grounds to address *the role texts themselves play in reproducing a world that they would have us believe is basically impervious to our efforts to change it*. The minor adjustments of a surface liberalism occur only at the margins. Instead of providing a haven in a heartless world, sociology reproduces the heartlessness by depicting our social existence as generically subordinate. Durkheim crucially fails to understand suicide as an existential choice as a construct of sorts, as mediation. It is not the mechanical reflex of abject powerlessness that he takes/writes it to be.⁹ After all, the person who chooses *against* suicide might be tomorrow's author.

I want to turn to the question of how contemporary sociology writes and, thus, writes off, an indeterminate, open world as metaphysical/political illusion.¹⁰ At least four prescriptive things happen in the text to reproduce its topic in reality. First, science restricts writers and readers to the task of canonical iteration, proceeding

from an original literature that has endlessly to be explicated and exemplified sociology to be disciplinarily valid always requires the imprint of Durkheim's hand; nonsociology is nonscience, or science that proceeds from non-Durkheimian ontological assumptions. In consolidating itself as a discipline, the subsequent texts only reproduce his original literature reified into a canon. In the case of sociology, a division of labor emerges between those who would tend the canon faithfully by interpreting it and those who busily exemplify the model of Durkheim's study of suicide. This sort of disciplinary boundary-maintenance is inherently stultifying in the way it valorizes, and deepens, the overall social, economic, and intellectual differentiation that makes a concept of the totality virtually inaccessible except to expertswriters who conform to a given disciplinary aegis. Talk about sociology's reason-for-being is suppressed in the notion that essential sociology (because of Durkheim's first thirteen pages) is invariantly the study of social causality, and to dissent is shamefully not to be a sociologist at all, and to talk nonscience is *nonsense*.¹¹ Sociology's right to exist as a special science is suppressed as a sociological topic itself simply because once there was a Durkheim. This circumstance denies a purportedly advancing discipline precisely the dynamism that would spring from self-reflection, even self-abolition, as a specialized, prescriptive text and the love of fate it would inculcate.

Second, science relegates all traces of authorial presence to front matter and back matter: preface, footnotes, dedication, bibliography in order to deauthorize (and thereby authorize) its version of an imitable, iterable world available to a community of science. Authorial traces, such as the play between text and its underlying desire, are removed in bald imitation of what sociology mistakenly takes to be the natural sciences. Sociology reduces its prose to mathematical form as a further constraint on authorial perspective, thus reducing reading to little more than a competence in the analysis of tables, graphs, charts, and most important today statistics. Reading in this way is thought not to require mediation at all that is, thought whether it be the interpretive work of hermeneutic immanent criticism, analysis of reader response, or, outrageously, a deconstructive dialectic whereby reading itself becomes a new text, a strong writing in no sense inferior or derivative.¹² The textbooks invite a disengaged, nonperspectival reading, the implied reader being a mere receptacle for the piecemeal, supposedly unconstructed information

that the text accumulates toward the ultimate synthesis of all differences, what Western philosophy calls positive knowledge. The text's indubitability hinges on its neutralization of the authorial drive to burst out of the confines of the canon.

Third, science reduces theory to an instrument for provoking researchable hypotheses, thus keeping everyday scientists busy. The main text of science averages truth out of a plenitude of voices, but not because it is really ecumenical or epistemologically neutral—neutrality of course being the deepest commitment of all. It does so, first, to coopt what is threatening about writings that deny science altogether and oppose the world that science would prop, and, second, to crush the speculative project of theory. Instead, theories in their plurality are transvalued, *neutralized*, into tools that provoke iterative empirical research; their truth value lies only in their short-run utility in keeping everyday scientists busy. Once a discipline in the social sciences has been founded by so-called Grand Theorists, its original literature becomes sacrosanct, either to be followed slavishly or broadened to coopt renegades along the way. Theory is science's name for thought and is distinguished from non-theory, that is, from research, precisely to circumscribe speculation that might otherwise range far beyond the bounds of the permissible, that is, reproduction. Imagination is routinized as theory-construction or theory-building, thought that directly abets the normative research enterprise of the thousands of empiricists who, it is said, use one theory or another—it does not matter which one, or how many—to explain one phenomenon or another. Explanation is really only the accounting for statistical variance in one or another dependent variable (e.g., religion explaining whatever percent of the variation in suicide). Truth is whittled down to the technical operations of *methodology*, ever the aim of the Vienna Circle in their quest to reduce concept to pure number.

Science averages competing versions of the world in fostering an impression of its own busy pragmatism political passion and perspective relegated to the domain of nonscience, a useless passion when measured against standards of technical efficiency and productivity. But this middling, which seems to recoup something from every extant theoretical perspective in an orgy of epistemological pluralism, does not correct every writing in a truly heterogeneous, decentering synthesis but centers the defiant, recalcitrant ones and, thus, further disqualifies them as illegitimate.

13 Since the seeming re-

crudescence of intellectual ecumenism on college campuses after HUAC and since the war in Vietnam and the civil rights movement, U.S. sociology has girded its center by integrating a whole host of texts that, it claims, usefully supplement and complement the dominant positivist-functionalist mainstream. It has drawn phenomenology, ethnomethodology, and even Marxism and feminism to itself as partners in the enterprise of accumulative science. *But the center holds* as the dominant positivism reduces its opposition merely to versions of Durkheim's model of social causality, suppressing not only their surface politics, if they have any, but indeed their very opposition to a social science modeled on physics in the first place. In this way, theory is simply prose embellishing the text's statistical machinery.

Finally, the canonical text splits marginal, especially political, writing into good and bad versions of itself, centering the one and disqualifying the other as undisciplined and undisciplinary. Good Marxism becomes a legitimate version of science, giving phenomena the imprimatur of necessity. Marxism is ironically enlisted to explain, and thus explain away, the seeming inexorability of conflict among groups. Bad Marxism becomes the Gulag, laid at Marx's own feet as a supposedly inevitable outcome of *The Manifesto* and *Capital*. Feminism, for its part, is divided into safe liberalism, on the one hand women seeking bourgeois family plus bourgeois work alongside companionate men and, on the other, an incorrigibly antifamily, antimale, lesbian separatism. Good liberal feminism is then further reduced to a dispassionate version of male conflict theory a Weberianized Marxism for which conflict is eternal accepting but trying to modulate generic conflict between the sexes through the palliations of family and career.

Reading as a Rewriting

Let me turn deconstructively to two brief passages from recent introductory textbooks that would reproduce the world in their image. "Indeed, far from being dead, marriage and parenthood continue to be important goals for all Americans" (Hess, Markson, and Stein 1985:266). What is happening here? Even in its own terms, sociology fails to relate itself adequately to the extant world, muddling what it calls facts, for all sorts of people eschew the married state when only

one-seventh of Americans today live in a nuclear family. *If* the concept of family is meant to include people who may fall outside traditional patriarchal marriage but who nonetheless share an enduring intimacy, *then* the text has the responsibility to make this clear. It could, for instance, explicitly broaden the concept of family for political reasons—that is, in order to legitimize modes of intimacy that break the mold of the heterosexual dyad plus children. But the text does not extend family in this way, although it admits cultural variations within heterosexual universality. Instead, it uses the term *family* in the narrower sense, connoting requirements such as legal marriage, common domicile, economic union, and, not least, heterosexuality—exactly the notion of family called up by the Right today in its admonitions against the sins of feminism, promiscuity, and homosexuality that imperil what it means by traditional values. Why, then, does sociology with its own 20/20 vision seemingly bend the facts about the universality of family in this sense? While its surface text is avowedly liberal, even liberal-feminist, advocating a better world for all humanity and, in the context of family, particularly, more flexibility in sex roles and greater sensitivity between men and women—*sexism reduced to heartlessness*—its subtext is deeply suppressed. And the subtext here surfaces as a generic heterotextuality, the claim that "all Americans want to get married," *precisely to sustain what still exists of the reality of patriarchal family*, to inculcate student readers with a sense of their own normalcy, if and when they choose to follow the traditional habits of dating and courtship, betrothal and, finally, marriage. Even divorce is routinized by the text, not as the end of family but as an even more desperate yearning for what is socioontologically essential, namely remarriage. Subtext here intends that the fact of family's universality would be enacted by readers reinforced to want family—not the broad notion of family as any sustaining intimacy,

but family as legal heterosexual marriage *within* patriarchal capitalism.

Ironically, sociology itself shows that marriage almost invariably works out to the disadvantage of women. They bear an unequal share of housework and nurturance, are embattled in the realm of work, and are sexually victimized. In describing the bourgeois nuclear family as universal even if it is the companionate, ostensibly egalitarian family of Betty Friedan's 1981 book, *The Second Stage*, and not the old, heartless, overtly male-dominated family the liberal, even liberal-feminist, surface text hopes to provoke enactment

of family as a way of validating its own distorted writing. Thus a text that in 1984 may err by exaggerating family's supposed universality will by 1988 be corrected by its own writing and reading, a self-fulfilling prophecy operating on a deeply ontological and, thus, political level. Ironically, the claim that most Americans want to get married would eventually become truth.

Let me offer another example of sociology's master text as it plays itself out socio-ontologically, that is, politically. Science, since the Enlightenment, has not frozen the given world by declaring its metaphysical immutability without at the same time promising the powerless a future in which their powerlessness would be redeemed by the benefits of a universal freedom from toil, hierarchy, necessity. Sociology as a liberal text sweetens suffering by offering the emoluments of the redistributive welfare state and of the heartfelt family, including mobility, prestige, job satisfaction, spiritual plenitude, and companionship, in return for a work and home life given over to the enactment of certain alleged duties albeit somewhat different ones, of course, for women and men. Liberal social science rails against the so-called social problems of industrial society like poverty, racism, and sexism, while defending a universal subordination to the ironclad imperatives of industrialization, what Durkheim called social facts. The present is to be borne out of conviction that the future will be different. Science palliates subjugation with developmental optimism about an eventual postindustrial society in which technology conquers the realm of necessity altogether, precisely the text of so-called modernization theory. Sociology projects human betterment as an unalterable teleological outcome, so-called modernization moving us ever closer to the judgment day of an end of toil, end of politics, end of ideology, even an end of science. It presages a last-text that obviates its own reproductiveness altogether by so successfully reproducing a world in its own image the mediation of proseful ontology will no longer be necessary in a world that reproduces itself automatically, beyond the need of books.

Thus in the following quote, the master text announces that industrialization will be accompanied by putative democratization generally, and particularly by the shrinking of income and power gaps in the United States between blacks and whites, and women and men. Progress is preordained, and may be read in the small examples of social betterment today. "These are small but definite causes for optimism. . . . Full sexual equality will not be achieved in this century,

but milestones in that direction will be detectable each day, month and year. The signs are unmistakable; progress, though slow, is inevitable. . . . The glass is half full, not half empty" (Doob 1985:302).

Does the last sentence sound familiar? The texts end on a high note by promising women and blacks future reprieve from present inequality in annual incomes again, arguably a serious distortion given the feminization of poverty and high rates of black unemployment in a deindustrializing America as well as the deeper spuriousness of assessing overall wealth only in terms of so-called income. Just as family is a universal, so, it is said, is this sweeping democratization that inexorably resolves via technological advance social problems conceptualized largely in economic terms as unequal access to goods and services. This monetarization of social problems implies incrementalist welfare-state solutions that, like Johnson's mid-1960s War on Poverty, end up being no solution at all. The texts describe the easing of extant social problems both as fact and, worse, on the level of subtext, as fate not only happening but *bound* to happen given society's modernizing logic. We are to believe that not only subordination is unalterable but so, ironically, is the eventual technological transcendence of subordination in a promised postindustrial future, a construct designed to make the bad seem better in the meantime, the glass half full, not half empty.

It is incredibly difficult to resist, let alone deconstruct and, thus, relive, the massive chronicles of both fact and fate by a descriptive social science highly adept at depicting the seemingly inert. After all, social scientists can tell us with a high degree of statistical confidence about birth rates, crime, social correlates of drug use, the political economy of welfare. Their technical acuity undermines the deconstructive critique that the claims at the core of statistical social analysis have no valid grounds. It is tempting to relinquish the field of the empirical altogether to those who claim a monopoly of epistemological truth simply because they have succeeded in virtually mathematizing language and thus driving out thought. But this is only to exchange one fetish for another anti-empiricism for positivism where there can be other sorts of addresses to the empirical world, albeit discourses that do not pretend authorial mindlessness as a methodological first principle. 14 I still believe that we have to work through the enmeshing, occluding discourses what Marx called ideologies in the name of more authentic discourses that do not neutralize the imagination in order to provoke a dumb repetition of what has gone before.

Marxism, Feminism, Deconstruction:
Toward a New Textual Politics

The possible redemption of science hinges on the construction of a difference between good and bad science. The crude caricature of positivist natural science embraced by most U.S. social scientists has been untrue to natural science's own self-absolutism. Indeed, Albert Einstein was one of the first deconstructionists, and Heisenberg his expositor, in claiming that the natural universe is an inherently open, nonidentical force field of concatenating signifiers and signified. 15

Let me amplify the bad science/good science distinction further by reflecting on something I heard on the nightly news. NBC announced that 69 percent of Americans supported the president's actions in sanctioning Libya for their supposed support of terrorist actions against Americans. This is bad science, but not because it was untrue (I am not concerned with science's so-called validity *per se* but only with the ground of its claims for validity, its suppression of its own literariness again understanding science as a special case of literature). The problem with this piece of science was that, first, we are unsure of the protocol used in generating what it claims to be knowledge. Were people asked "Do you support the president?" or "Do you support the dropping of bombs on Tripoli?" or "Do you support the killing of Libyans, including infant children?" The science in question did not even understand the basis of its own validity claims, the idea that the very term *to support* is a construction and as such could be varied to produce the number of (say) 22 percent if, alternatively, Americans were asked whether they supported killing Libyan children. I am not saying that the number 22 is any truer than the number 69, but only that Tom Brokaw did not even stipulate the conditions of validity when he suggested that Americans supported the president. Even more important, the science in question did not *argue for* one construction of validity over another, showing the political interest behind one or another attempt to construct the generic notion of support in certain protocol statements. Good science here would not only understand its own version of the term *support the president* as a construction, for Thomas Kuhn told us that much, but would argue for that construction in a committed way, that is, with the intention to persuade, to provoke empathy, to change the world science no less than *King Lear* or the *Communist Manifesto*. So the problem with the Libyan question as science is both that we

do not know what the 69 percent signifies and we do not hear the argument

for that signification in terms of authorial desire that is, in light of political aims. Good science would exhume its own construction of the word *support* in other words, here, what question the sample was asked and then it would defend this construction in terms of its impact on text itself science as fiction in the sense that it listens to itself write and makes this echo of subtext directly a textual topic. In the case of Libya, deconstructive rewriting would probably conclude tellingly that many Americans wanted to drop bombs over Libya as retribution for alleged Libyan support of terrorists but, contradictorily, did not want those bombs to kill arbitrarily.

The concept of good science implies at once a concept of good politics (see Adorno 1973:406). A deconstructive politics better, deconstruction strengthened with critical social theory suggests that the best world is optimally heterogeneous, nonlogocentric, decentered, and open to the pleasure of the text, displaying the text's inherence in a subtext of desire that writing makes a topic in the back-and-forth of its own reflection and self-reflection. Where the scientific model of text wants only to communicate, a one-way process of production and reception, a deconstructive text builds community out of discourses self-understood as necessarily incomplete, decentering, and undecidable. A deconstructive text models an (call it) intertextual politics that does not short-circuit the dialectic of product and process a humane society *and at once* the route toward it. 16

For his part, Adorno suggested that the only credible textual politics in an era when language has been almost totally divested of its power to refuse, and to negate works through the world's contradictions "from within," undoing the secret affinity of text with a world to which it would unhesitatingly attach itself as its source of meaning. Such a notion of negation contrasts to Lenin's claim that the early twentieth-century Russian proletariat required texts "from without," from a vanguard. This sealed the subsequent history of that socialism as a dictatorship over the proletariat buttressed by a Marxist-Leninist scientism faith in dialectic no less disempowering than the scientism of industrial capitalist countries. This version of Adorno suggests a more explicitly political deconstruction that reads the objectivist texts of science and culture against themselves as the real fictions that they are.

In this sense fiction, unlike science, does not connote falsehood but writing's openness to its own desire as the foundation of a dialogical community of many writers, what Habermas calls the ideal speech situation. Science subordinates fiction as escapist illusion, affording

spiritual uplift in an otherwise implosive bourgeois culture. Yet deconstruction shows the untruth of a science that represses its own purposeful construction of a signified world and, as such, is a political strategy of sorts, if a somewhat rarefied one. In the fashion of Jacques Derrida, where he declares that the margins are really at the center, I would add that fiction is not adequate science but rather generic discourse, where science is a discursive version unprivileged with respect to other discourses. This helps us address the timeworn problem of educating the educator or, in different terms, a vanguard or new class. The very construction of a science/fiction contrast is science's way of gaining primacy over the merely conversational, commonsense, everyday and literary, basing political authority on epistemological privilege that derives from the derogation of non-science.

This allows me to return to my earlier critique of Marx's physicalist notion of ideology as a *camera obscura*, false consciousness inverting the world in order to sustain it. What might a different conception of science's ideology mean for a canonical Marxism still haunted by the Soviet experience of the vanguard partly sustained by a heritage of mechanism and scientism? In rethinking and thus, I hope, reliving ideology as a textual practice intermediating writer and reader in an embryonic political community, I am going beyond the notion of ideology simply as an inversion, to be made right—that is, turned right side up in a future social order. Instead, ideology is writing that in concealing its own literariness, its own artifice, reproduces a readership that lives out its own unfreedom freely, as it were, ever the irony of oppression.

I agree with Sartre that Marxism is the thought of our time in the sense that human practice cannot be understood without some reference to the immensity of the human resources harnessed for reproducing capitalism. But most Marxisms continue to fixate on the male proletariat, the supposed necessity of a dialectic of nature as an adequate model of history, and a quite reductive understanding of relations between so-called base and superstructure or between world and text. Like masculinist/mechanist social science, most Marxisms continue to make a fetish of the productive, the realm of largely male wage labor, ignoring the allegedly unproductive as a concern of superstructural analysis, whether women's studies, sociology of art, or literary criticism. They thereby entrench the masculinist/productivist subordination of reproduction whether housework or text to male wage labor and science.

A more adequate understanding of ideology as a disempowering writer-reader relationship is achieved not through this old Marxism but rather in a different version call it poststructuralist-socialist-feminist, call it critical theory whose theme is the relationship *between* production and reproduction as the central problematic of the age, addressing how and why people continue to acquiesce to their own victimhood. Texts, like housework, seemingly belong to the realm of the apolitically valueless, millennially reserved for women, a segregation that Marxism too often perpetuates in its denigration of the realms of domesticity, culture, and science as (merely) superstructure. Feminism in this reading is not simply about women, except as women have had most of the historic responsibility for child rearing and household maintenance. More globally it addresses the subordination of reproduction to production, private to public, fiction to science, women to men, and unpaid to paid labor. If feminism is understood as a critique of all reproductive relations, then a critical theory of the text is a feminist topic, even if the text in question is not by women or ostensibly about them.

It is increasingly obvious to some that Marxism is nowhere without feminism and feminism nowhere without Marxism. 17 Each comprehends the fractured halves of a world split between outside and inside, ever the epochal theme of Western dualism that the Frankfurt School contends is the deepest subtext of oppression.18 Yet Marxism, like mainstream social science, continues to deepen the subordination of reproduction (women, texts, the unwaged) by treating that subordination as somehow derived from labor's domination by capital a notion that is frequently wrong and, in any case, politically arrogant and that through science, whether Left, Right, or center, becomes merely a self-reproducing prophecy. This is not to say that so-called contradictions have been mechanically displaced from the economic sphere to the sociocultural and sexual as if the more fundamental contradictions were ever solely economic in nature. Rather I suggest that *any* distinction between production and reproduction, world and text, science and culture, work and household inevitably redounds to the advantage of production, the world, science, and work, respectively. The oldest form of domination is the split between center and margin, the useful and useless, that is only further amplified in the subsequent dualities of capital/labor, man/woman and black/white. Deconstruction crucially suggests a politics that blurs the reproduction/production contrast, so that margin is always center and vice versa, each equally worthy.

What we need, then to risk programmatism, even if in this I offend doctrinal deconstructionists who think they can avoid construction altogether is a writing that resists its own subordination to the putatively more significant practice of production. This writing argues, with a Marxist and feminist version of deconstruction, that the essential voice of humanity is not the tool but the text. The critique of sexual politics is subsumed under a more global critique of textual politics, of *heterotextuality*, that understands the various genres of social reproduction discourses from television to textbooks that tie us to our alleged fate, declaimed in sociology as a generic subordination to an overarching, overpowering social structure. It is no longer adequate and probably never was to combat disempowering ideology such as bourgeois science with more, albeit supposedly dialectical, science. This only perpetuates people's self-subordination to expertise, to deauthored texts that seem to require no reading. To the extent to which Marxism has become another lifeless, oppressive canon over against the effort to rewrite/relive it in the *permanent revisionisms of a deconstructive ethic*, it is no less oppressive than the bourgeois science it dismisses as a world upside down, to be put right by politically correct left-wing scientists. 19 Writing, as all reproduction, will only become worthy, that is, an archetype of free society, when practice is not split into the productive and reproductive, the useful and useless, choices that are the essence of politics today. Perhaps this is only to say that it is virtually but, luckily, not entirely impossible in these times to distinguish between the camera that reflects an upside down world and the world itself, no longer possible to separate the discourses that hem us in and the world to which they would bind us in a thoughtless enactment of what they purport to freeze in one-dimensional description. The text would not replace labor, for that matter, sex or race as a new postmodernist fetish in which each age embraces its own

supposedly unique logos only to acknowledge the thoroughgoing oppression of the discourses that disqualify our possible authorship.²⁰ Whatever space remains open for self-emancipation in an incredibly administered world must be cultivated and thereby enlarged first in writing, since our life-worlds are already saturated with the enmeshing signifiers of family, politics, science, religion, and entertainment. Today's texts (and yesterday's ideologies) defy ready demystification by a critical science that defines their falseness with reference to unambiguous standards of evidence.

While the deconstruction of positivist social science is not a mighty

contribution to overall emancipation, one of the insights of a decentering Marxist-feminism written under the sign of poststructuralism is that every contribution addressing local problems is as valid and necessary as every other, simply because people are dying everywhere for all sorts of ostensible reasons. And, as Merleau-Ponty once wrote, socialism cannot afford the luxury of letting even one person die for it. I do not mean to concoct a new master text a new social science, new Marxism, new feminism, new literary criticism that measures up to the logocentric standards of closure and iterability better than science does itself. That is precisely how Marxism got itself into trouble in the first place, thinking of itself as what Marx once called a natural science of history. 21 Indeed, the deconstruction of deconstruction and critical theory too frequently reveals a self-indulgent Nietzschean relativism that rejects the prospect of the negation of the negation as yet another mythic version of the gullibly, cheerfully positive an advertising slogan promising a whole new world, a whole new text, thus only subordinating readers anew. The notion of a negation of negation need not augur a brave new world as oppressive as it is unlikely but may simply offer a glimpse of the non-negative. This is an appropriate imagery of utopia in a world in which politics is so often terror and thought a mindless iteration of the already said, whether it is the clichés of popular culture or an intellectual productivism measuring thought in dollar signs or citations. Deconstruction is always new construction in its allegiance to the marginal and non-negative, a world that does not close or total-ize. An exceedingly, embarrassingly minimalist political agenda would urge writing to hold out against what Sartre called its own institutionalization, its own reduction to method, as a way of retaining at least a modicum of autonomy. Accordingly, Marxists, feminists, and poststructuralists would frequently need to take up the pen against those who, by calling themselves Marxist, feminist,

and poststructuralist, like social scientists, entrench a new center whose implacability precludes dialogue.

Writing, whether art or science, is inadequate politics, but we must interrogate the notion of adequacy as part of the political process. Otherwise, the texts that inspire us will be our tombstones.

Notes

1. Stanley Aronowitz (1981) makes a compelling case for the enduring centrality of Marxism.

2. This reinterpretation of Marxism as a textual practice has already begun. See, e.g., Jameson (1981) and Eagleton (1983).
3. See, among others, Adorno (1973), Habermas (1973), Derrida (1973, 1976, 1978). For reconstructions of various themes in critical and poststructuralist thought, see Martin Jay (1973, 1983), Michael Ryan (1982), Jonathan Culler (1982), and Agger (1984, 1985).
4. I am using the term reproduction in the dual sense of copy or imitation and perpetuation.
5. Jean Elshtain has discussed the parallel between men's domination over women and the domination of public over private spheres (1981).
6. The notion of language as a "form of life" is drawn from Wittgenstein (1958:8, 11, 88, 174, 226).
7. I differ with Habermas in many respects, including his truncation of the emancipatory agenda. See Habermas (1979, 1984) and Agger (1976, 1979).
8. A complementary expression of the politics of sociology is found in Agger (1989).
9. Marcuse suggests the utopian possibility of rethinking/reliving Freud's so-called death instinct as the very impulse to avoid pain, domination, and humiliation (1955:211216).
10. There is a current literature, as it is called, on the sociology of sociology and particularly of sociology textbooks.

11. The demarcation of science and nonscience/religion, common sense, philosophy is addressed in the 1944 work by Horkheimer and Adorno (1972 [1944], especially p. 9).

12. The model of reading is drawn from the so-called New Criticism, to which hermeneutics, reader-response theory, and deconstruction are among the most cogent responses.

13. In splitting these marginal forms of textual/political resistance, the dominant canonical center in this case, mainstream sociology carefully precludes versions of these oppositions that do not neatly fit its grid of good/safe and bad/wild writings.

14. See Norman Stockman (1984) for a comprehensive discussion of developments in the philosophy of science beyond positivism. See also the debate in Adorno et al. (1976).

15. The notion of a nonpositivist science is owed originally to Nietzsche (1974); the imagery was then appropriated by a variety of Frankfurt critical theorists.

16. I am trying to radicalize and historicize the practice of hermeneutics as a political practice.

17. The symbiosis and conflict between feminism and Marxism have been discussed by a range of scholars. See, e.g., Zillah Eisenstein (1979), Sheila Rowbotham et al. (1981), and Leslie Rabine (1983). The merge of feminism and poststructuralism owes much to European feminists such

as Irigaray (1980), Kristeva (1980), and Isabelle de Courtivron (Marks and Courtivron 1981).

18. Adorno presents the primordially grounding and subject-object duality as the source of Western domination (1978).

19. See, e.g., Habermas (1971; 1973); for a critical discussion see Paul Connerton (1980).

20. On postmodernism see Jean-Francois Lyotard (1984).

21. On the general relationship between Marxism and poststructuralism, see the special issue of *Diacritics*, "Marx After Derrida," especially Terry Eagleton's contribution (1985).

References

Adorno, Theodor

1978

Subject and Object. *In* The Essential Frankfurt Reader. Andrew Arato and Eike Gebhardt, eds. Oxford, U.K.: Basil Blackwell.

1973

Negative Dialectics. New York: Seabury Press. Adorno, Theodor *et al.*, eds.

1976

The Positivist Debate in German Sociology. London: Heinemann.

Agger, Ben

1976

Marcuse and Habermas on New Science. *Polity* 9(2):15181.

1979

Work and Authority in Marcuse and Habermas. *Human Studies* 2:191208.

1983

Marxism "or" the Frankfurt School? *Philosophy of the Social Sciences* 13(3):34765.

1984

The Dialectic of Desire: The Holocaust, Monopoly Capitalism, and Radical Anamnesis. *Dialectical Anthropology* 8(12):7586.

1985

The Dialectic of Deindustrialization. *In Critical Theory and Public Life*, ed. John Forester. Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press.

1989

Socio(onto)logy: A Disciplinary Reading. Champaign: University of Illinois Press.

Agger, Ben, and S. A. McDaniel

1982

Paradigms, Problems, Resolutions. *In Social Problems through Conflict and Order*. Toronto: Addison-Wesley.

Aronowitz, Stanley

1981

The Crisis in Historical Materialism. New York: Praeger.

Barthes, Roland

1977

Writing Degree Zero. New York: Hill and Wang.

Connerton, Paul

1980

The Tragedy of Enlightenment: An Essay on the Frankfurt School.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Culler, Jonathan

1982

On Deconstruction: Theory and Criticism after Structuralism.
Ithaca, N Y.: Cornell University Press.

Derrida, Jacques

1973

Speech and Phenomena. Evanston, Ill.: Northwestern University
Press.

1976

Grammatology. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press.

1978

Writing and Difference. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul.

Doob, Christopher

1985

Sociology: An Introduction. New York: Holt, Rinehart, and
Winston.

Durkheim, Emile

1964

The Rules of Sociological Method. New York: The Free Press.

Eagleton, Terry

1983

Literary Theory. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.

1985

Marxism, Structuralism, and Post-structuralism. *Diacritics* (Winter):256.

Eisenstein, Zillah, ed.

1979

Capitalist Patriarchy and the Case for Socialist Feminism. New York: Monthly Review Press.

Elshtain, Jean

1981

Public Man, Private Woman. Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press.

Gouldner, Alvin

1968

The Coming Crisis of Western Sociology. New York: Basic Books.

Habermas, Jürgen

1971

Knowledge and Human Interests. Boston: Beacon Press.

1973

Theory and Practice. Boston: Beacon Press.

1975

The Legitimation Crisis. Boston: Beacon Press.

1979

Communication in the Evolution of Society. Boston: Beacon Press.

1984

The Theory of Communicative Action. vol. 1. Boston: Beacon Press.

Hess, Beth, Elizabeth Markson, and Peter Stein

1985

Sociology. 2d ed. New York: Macmillan.

Horkheimer, Max and Theodor Adorno

[1944] 1972

Dialectic of Enlightenment. New York: Herder and Herder.

1973

Aspects of Sociology. London: Heinemann.

Irigaray, Luce

1980

This Sex Which Is Not One. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press.

Jameson, Fredric

1981

The Political Unconscious. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press.

Jay, Martin

1973

The Dialectical Imagination. Boston: Little, Brown.

1983

Marxism and Totality. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Kristeva, Julia

1980

Desire in Language. New York: Columbia University Press.

Lyotard, Jean-Francois

1984

The Post-Modern Condition: A Report on Knowledge.

Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.

Marcuse, Herbert

1955

Eros and Civilization. New York: Vintage.

Marks, Elaine, and Isabelle de Courtivron, eds.

1981

New French Feminism. New York: Schocken.

Mills, C. Wright

1959

The Sociological Imagination. New York: Oxford University Press.

Nietzsche, Friedrich

1974

The Gay Science. New York: Random House.

Rabine, Leslie

1983

Searching for Connections: Marxist-Feminists and Women's Studies. Humanities in Society 6(23):195-221.

Rowbotham, Sheila, Lynne Segal, and Hilary Wainwright

1981

Beyond the Fragments: Feminism and the Making of Socialism. Boston: Alyson Publications.

Ryan, Michael

1982

Marxism and Deconstruction. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press.

Stockman, Norman

1984

Antipositivist Theories of the Sciences. Dordrecht: D. Reidel.

Wittgenstein, Ludwig

1958

Philosophical Investigations. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.

23

Toward a Prophetic Radicalism: Notes on a Necessary Theory of Domination

Wolf-Dieter Narr

Like stones on a field reaching to the horizon. Symptoms, symptoms, symptomsa gigantic scattergram. States of war, genocidal processes: millions of people starving to death, millions of children without homes or shelter; refugees around the world, jammed into overcrowded cities in poverty-stricken countries; mass unemployment in rich countries; ecological catastrophes, violent and anomic actions of and against the state. . . .

A Negative Phenomenology: Phenomena Without Logic

Almost no one recognizes these phenomena or adequately relates them conceptually. At best, isolated outcries and highly selective activities accompany them. Sterile, nervous politicians affirm this state of phenomenal "art"; they reinforce their political production by carrying out as-if activities. As-if activity comprises today's misconceived and exhausted symbolism. Alongside this busyness is widespread apathy and compliance; the phenomena seem to be absorbed fatalistically. At best, one sees local unrest, some social movements that vanish long before any coherent solution might be imagined. The French adage *saute qui peut* serves as a pattern for life worldwide. Possessive or oppressed forms of individualism frame everyday life.

Meanwhile, intellectuals—usually people who are paid for their privileged mental labor—compete in a bizarre world of pseudo-revolutions, where new paradigms and catchwords spring from the

ashheap. New labels function as a marketing approach to politico-scientific products, disguising their content and effects.

Accompanying or in the midst of this marketing game are a variety of fashionable avoidances, as well as latent and sometimes blatant ideological services. The scientific expert, *Canis dominior* more often, *Canis dominationis* yaps to deter all threats to the order, especially the greatest danger: that people might start to see, analyze, and conceive of the relationships among the phenomena. Hence, scientists are irresponsible, regardless of their particular disciplines or professions. They fashion a pattern of the world and obscure reality at the same time: it is the treason of clerks.

A few symptoms can be observed:

The first is the intellectual's fantasy that anything goes. Methodological relativism made possible the destruction of influential remnants of positivismeven in its Popperian version. This relativism appears to have created an arena of freedom: a free science for free people everywhere. But this is a strange sort of emancipation. The new methodologists and their conspicuous crowd of disciples eradicate restrictive and, in a way, repressive rules of the master methodologists. But rather than seeking the social reasons for the limitations of positivism, they launch themselves toward an idealistic heavena pseudo-anarchism or "arbitrarism."

They act as if everyone could construe his or her own reality; they create a new cognitive straitjacket. Relative to the historicists of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, who became desperate because they saw no way out of pure relativism if everything moves, how can I know where to stand? the new methodologists seem quite contented. But they lack any theory of cognition that could ground them in any given world. They do not understand the dialectics between an already construed reality and the more or less arbitrary constructions of reality. Therefore, they totally ignore the power structure of present-day reality, a structure that limits not only relevant cognition, but practice.

A second symptom is the complexity of the present reality. The new terms in the labeling game are "highly complex" or "hyper-complex" or even "ultracomplex." But what can be done, faced with this complexity? Some trends are clear.

Reasoning does not keep pace with dizzying technical change. The complexity seems to be without an architecture. Therefore a seemingly sophisticated theoretical attitude of resignation occurs. The old formulas used to frame the world no longer fit they never

did, of course, but in retrospect there is nostalgic distortion. In any case, the old formulas are not at hand. Therefore, one goes about phenomenologizing.

Alternatively, cognitive helplessness attains theory status by adding the prefix *post-*. Typically in this or that post-theoretical creation, one or two phenomenal characteristics of the present are isolated and overemphasized. For instance, the new information technology is seen, in isolation, to change every aspect of the society. But these new developments are not analyzed contextually; they are not related to a conceptual framework that can be altered later. Instead, they are taken to be the launching pad for the new worldviews. Thus, they become part and parcel of the phenomena they intend to analyze.

A third symptom of our flight from reality involves evolutionary approaches, which pretend to conceptualize society and history in universal terms. Mentioning two variants will suffice.

First, we have the new analysis of the so-called project of modernity. (Jürgen Habermas is the most influential promoter.) On the one hand, the promises of the Enlightenment are reified. We are told that the "system" of instrumental reason—that is, capitalism and the state during the last two centuries—has propelled so much progress that a foundation has been created that makes a reasonable life for the members of these societies possible. This "lifeway" (*Lebenswelt*, as Schütz and others have defined it) has developed, and, correspondingly, communications of all sorts have been developed and can now expand exponentially (Schütz 1970). On the other hand, the dialectics of the Enlightenment—the intrinsically negative effects of statist and capitalist development, now conceived as a system—are reduced to external effects, linked somehow to the system of instrumental reason. Therefore, the so-called lifeway is jeopardized, but only by colonial intrusions, which remain extrinsic—external both to the system and to the consciousness and behavior patterns of the people.

The seduction used in the half-naïve pursuit of this "project of modernity" is the old Manichaean style of dichotomizing the world. Dichotomizing also immunizes both halves: here is the system, there the lifeway. The hazy reality seems to become clear, although even a child could see that crucial problems emerge out of the intersection of the dichotomy. Moreover, problems emerge permanently from the fact that system and lifeway constitute each other in such a way that the system dominates the process. In addition, the key term, *modernity*, has been puffed up beyond recognition: it carries emancipatory

connotations, not in a political-institutional, but in an atmospheric-idealistic, sense.

Typical of this form of misconceived terminological abstraction how terms become empty bags to fill with meaning as one will is the way Max Weber's work is used. He is now stylized as the theoretician of modernity. It is disturbing, of course, that in the end he had such a pessimistic outlook: bureaucratization as a fate; the "iron cage" as the social form of the future; alienated, marginalized individuals. If it can be summed up in a single phrase, his work must be understood as a theory of domination and, at the same time, an emphatically political theory. The latter characterization is conspicuously absent in Habermas.

A second evolutionary approach is to conceive of social organizations and social developments as systems. This can be done from a critical perspective. The notion of system that given phenomena constitute a system can be used to mediate the position that the phenomena called a system are characterized by specific qualities differentiating them from other qualities and other systems. Or, the term *system* could be interpreted as a critique. It could imply that social activities are determined by social institutions that have been alienated into systems, that is, objectified structures that then define people's interactions as "second nature." One analytical purpose, then, would be the discovery of structures and functions as petrified interests. In addition, one could think about ways to resocialize the systems.

Unfortunately, the very opposite holds true for the various strains of systems analysis. Going back to Hobbes' famous construction of the Leviathan if not further back to Platonic preformations institutions that are created out of specific historical circumstances and that have a momentum of their own are aseptically mythologized into systems. The new ahistorical subject *is* the system. The world is seen as a system of systems, with existential needs and procedures that guarantee its survival. But Hobbes aimed at the constitution of a bourgeois society, where members could pursue their own interests because of a state-derived peace, a peace ensured by the monopoly of legitimate physical force (to use Weber's apt phrase). Now the systems analystssuch as the German systems-guru N. Luhman (1984)hermeneutic servants that they are, have swallowed every pattern of behavior at least normatively related to human beings into the gargantuan maw of the system or, much more arbitrarily, of

systems. As an extremely abstract phenomenology with unmediated hints of evidence, these systems have some descriptive power: abstract objectifications determine what occurs.

But to characterize today's reality in terms of systems where systems become the reality from which everything is more or less arbitrarily derived is nothing less than pure ideology. It is a kind of systematic misuse of language, so to speak. Terms that name, qualify, and visualize human agency (in Hannah Arendt's sense) such as self-reflection, autonomy, self-production through a substantially democratic social existence (e.g., autopoiesis) are transubstantiated into the abilities of the system. This effective naturalization of the market or of the state, exemplified in classical and neoclassical political economies, is continued by the systems theoreticians. The kernel of truth in the terminology makes it useful as a powerful ideology, a counter to any kind of enlightenment.

What is striking in all these conceptual fashions, which are relevant simply because of their analytical irrelevance, are the shared loopholes. Power becomes an aseptic, asocial, and ahistorical "medium"; at best, exploitation and alienation are invoked sometimes as labels; state and capitalism are used as metaphors. The specific form of domination, which defines every aspect of this social reality, is not touched on at all, or it is marginalized as the political system. Instead of grappling with the protean and chameleonlike capacities of the historically dynamic forms of domination, we hear only periodic cries about the so-called crisis of Marxism. When one leaves Marx and his work in the dark recesses of the nineteenth century, relegated to the orthodox ideologues, one is no longer pressed to realize how deeply the hegemony of capitalism and the reason of the state have influenced one's own cognition, one's own language and methodology.

Probably at no time in history has there been so much talk about self-reflection and the like. But it seems to be only a new form of the capacity for deception associated with rationalization in the Freudian sense. What can be said about self-reflection when the social conditions of it are ignored? Socially aseptic, abstract, and neutralized terms *system*, *modernity*, and *individualism* block our perception of interests and impede our understanding of structures as sclerotic compounds of interests. Instead of rereading daily the dialectics of abstract structures and functions, on the one hand, and concrete phenomena such as anomic behavior patterns of young noncitizens, on the other, abstract institutions and procedures are not analytically

broken down, but ontologized. Theories thus hop from one vanishing phenomenon to another; those that become relevant do so as ideologies, nothing more.

Old-Fashioned Radicalism

I take the very conservative position of an old-fashioned radical. (I have learned from Stanley Diamond about this kind of radicalism, as opposed to radical conservatism; our friendship was based on it.) What is old-fashioned radicalism? One that recognizes certain problems as priorities for understanding and action.

First, domination is the problem. There is no other problem as crucial and as universal as this, influencing as it does all facets of reality directly and indirectly. Focusing on this old and perennially updated problem in the continuity and discontinuity of various forms and contents, symbols and effects, requires an updated combination of the critique of political economy in a Marxian sense and the critique of political sociology in the footsteps of Weber. Freud's insights cannot be overlooked in the process.

Second, the unavoidably normative frame of reference is the old and new promise of a society with a structure of freedom and equality for all members (indeed, for all societies). No other frame of reference has the same fundamentally emancipatory and egalitarian human potential.

Third, the structure of a free and equal society must be measured by the concrete human agency of all members. This is to avoid the danger of an abstract conceptualization and subsequent concrete distortion, as in the classical utopias, parts of the so-called really existing socialist countries, the promise of the French Revolution, and the Jacobin trap. The potential for individuation is the gauge. 1 The concept of individuation as an emphatically social concept of individual consciousness and behavior is not to be confused with individualism as it is currently understood. The latter is simply the negative side of the bureaucratic mode of social synthesis.

Fourth, even taking into account so-called falsifications, the human potential for a qualitatively different society acts as a permanent stimulus to question and challenge past and present conditions. In this respect, it cannot and should not be denied that there is some continuity to the old Jewish apocalyptic-messianic tradition, although in a secularized and nonevolutionary form.2

Fifth, there remains a normative test, not to be proven, but to be demonstrated. There is some historical evidence for the validity of a value frame of reference, evidence that can be gathered systematically and interpreted in the light of a system of human values. Four sources have to be used for this historical evidence.

a. The history of domination has to be read at the same time as a history of the tools that construe and mediate the domination. These instrumentsnegative and positive sanctionshave to be analyzed as indications of the strength or weakness of power, its development, its social costs and benefits. But these instruments of exclusion, attraction, and repression can be interpreted in another way, too. They tell the typically unwritten history of people who resisted and rebelled, the needs and desires that have been suppressed. This hidden side of domination is as important as the visible side.

b. However and whenever the exchange of power became institutionalized and thus became domination, its history is one of rebellions and emancipatory movements. These movements articulate needs, promises, and wishes that can be generalized across time and ethnocentric divisions. From Spartacus to Solidarityand far beyond, to primitive societies organized *against* the state, to use Pierre Clastres's phrasethe call for participation, for equality, can be heard.

c. Human life if I can analytically separate it for a moment, knowing there is no such thing as nature per se is naturally constituted. Out of this human condition a few fundamental qualities can be derived: time- and space-relatedness; birth and death; forms of misery and happiness. But human life is not determined by natural conditions: as social beings who use symbols, people possess a restricted but unknown arena for manipulation. They use it for mediating all natural givens into social ones. They become historical; they create traditions; they become creatures and effects of their own activities. In short, almost all human misery and suffering is produced, influenced, and shaped by socially constructed circumstances and activities, decisions, and nondecisions.

Again, the circumstances of human suffering tell a great deal about miserable social conditions. They indicate from the negative side as much as the emancipatory efforts do. They verify emancipatory formulas as conditions of human behavior in the fullest sense of the term.

d. Human animals don't just cope with reality, they interpret and transform it. Alongside the Greek notion of the human as a social

animal (*zoon politikon*) is an equally important one: the human as the animal that interprets the world. This refers not only to language or speech, but to a plethora of symbols that are an integral part of life for the newborn child from the first day.

Therefore the history of myths, languages, and all forms of expression (e.g., art) presents a field of human experience and human longings. There is no unambiguous story to be told, no string of logical sentences. For this, among other reasons, all basic-human-needs approaches fail. But there are aspirations that converge, with results that can be drawn as well from the other three sources.

Seeking evidence that can be generalized for human rights and substantially democratic forms acquires an anarchistic accent. At the same time, all kinds of evolutionary approaches or ontological fundaments are to be rejected. 3

Sixth, to concentrate primarily, if not solely, on content purposes, material results, and so forth marks the beginning of the end of any emancipatory movement or any critical approach. Forms (e.g., instruments, organizational patterns) are always as good as the purposes for which they are used. But the reverse also holds. If the forms (e.g., procedural rules) are not adequate for given purposes, the unfitting forms gain a momentum of their own. The history of the Second and Third International and their parties and member states are a graveyard of purposes lost for the sake of preserving misfit forms. I am thinking here of the takeover of the state apparatus for the sake of emancipation the famous debate between Lenin and Luxembourg. Another example is the fundamental failure of social democratic parties of all types in Europe after World War I and especially after World War II (in the midst of success).

Theory and practice can become responsible, that is to say they can be controlled, as soon as every purpose is translated into preconditions, institutional forms, and procedural consequences. This quality makes theory and practice basically political. What are the social forms through which specific purposes are pursued? Or, put another way, purposes become specific and socially material only after it is known what kind of organizational forms will be used.

One drifts toward ideology as soon as one divides politics from other social activities. All social institutions have a political quality, unless they result from sheer fate, which remains to be demonstrated. Politics emerge whenever decisions are or are not made, especially within and among institutions. Put another way, politics are social syntheses in terms of forms, patterns of legitimation, and

effects. The distinction between public and private is not prepolitical, it is political. The same holds true for the separation of a political arena from an economic one. Where politics are identified solely with state institutions, whether constitutional or otherwise, we know much about the rest of the society: the politics of un-politics.

What is theory from an old-fashioned radical perspective today? Counteridentification is what counts foremost to refuse identification with the great identifier, particularly the state. To this end, political theory in the broad sense and this can include literary work has to become a kind of detective story, that is, empirical and speculative at the same time. On the one hand, theory must be built in such a way it has to have a form that it stimulates people's learning. It should not be an orthodoxy or a fixed worldview with which people can identify projectively. Theory should not be presented as a finished product with definitive results. Good theory is replete with ambivalences and ambiguities. Only the narrowest line separates lucid theoretical statements, validated with reliable evidence, and the suggestion of the formulation of symbols.

On the other hand, good counterdomination theory is fundamentally critical. It should and can extend far beyond the critique of the Frankfurt School. It should construe alternative modes of social organization. But it should avoid formulating blueprints for action. In its utopian reasoning, it should not use harmonious formulas or found itself on the shaky ground of an optimistic, liberal anthropology. In this respect, some of the anarchist tradition warrants criticism. This is not to abandon the prospect of a qualitatively different society, a society without domination. Quite the opposite. The prospect has greater power, both analytically and imaginatively, when grounded on a critical analysis of domination. The search for the primitive that Diamond discusses (1974) challenges the highly complex and highly civilized society of today. But this anthropology is neither reductionist nor romantic.

Theory and Domination

The overwhelming impression of complexity without the knowledge of its architecture has produced the misconceived conclusions discussed above. This impression robs the political imagination, but some conclusions can be drawn.

The concrete is always complex. 4 We can understand and perhaps

act, too, only through the art of analysis and the art of interpretation. But how far can and should the object of analysis be objectified for adequate understanding (the problem of modern science and its limits)? What are the gauges of adequacy? What factors produce the permanent dialectic between subject and object? How do these factors influence the result, the concrete phenomena?

The crucial phenomena of modern life are socially produced, but the social factors are organized so abstractly that the phenomena become ever more hermetic. In other words, social mediation and especially the social production of reality are not means to human understanding nor are they human activities in the sense of social activities aimed at an active society (cf. Etzioni's [1968] conception). Murky interdependencies and global assumptions obscure the structures of production and mediation, the historical reality of the phenomenal world. Indeed, it is precisely the intensity of socialincluding political and economicmediation and the global reach of social interaction that disguises the world.

In this situation new forms of reductionism and interpretive mythologies emerge. Bureaucratic-technological instruments, becoming ends in themselves, are the main forces of reductionism. The hermetic character of a world with an information overload but no clear concepts stimulates all kinds of conspiratorial assumptions, prejudices, and as-if catch phrases.

But modern societies, or modern society as an ideal type, are far less complex in a qualitative sense than are primitive societies. No complex institution has the ambiguities and ambivalences of ritual drama. Even the tragedies of Aeschylus and Sophocles, written in a proto-state period, 5 have more complex structures than modern drama has. Today dominant considerations influence and shape, if not determine, almost all facets of life on a global scale. So far as modernity is concerned, there are key features and patterns visible throughout the world. The main differences arise from historical contexts, premodern continuities, and their strange juxtapositions with capitalist modes of production. Instead of complexity in a qualitative sense, we see global reductionism. Complexity has become a characteristic of instruments, on the one hand, and a tool or instrument of domination, on the other.

To substitute catchwords and taxonomies for theories results at least partly from a misconception of what theory is and should be.⁶ In a Cartesian tradition, theory is understood as a mode of domination. The abstract and formalized ego (as *cogito*) seizes "the" world,

objectifying and identifying it. This understanding of the construction and functions of theory parallels social and political domination in the focus on ambiguous identification. In this sense Plato is the primary forerunner, as Diamond has argued.

Theory, if one is willing to avoid the sophisticated and scientific constructions of ideologies, has to be developed as a kind of learning behavior. Theory is always attracted to power and dominance, i.e., the style and instruments of identification. For this reason, theory and any science for that matter is inherently ambiguous. There is a dialectic of enlightenment within theory itself, implicit in its structure. But as soon as the *politics* of comprehension and cognition are understood radically, the search for a substantially democratic or anarchistic theory of cognition and for an appropriate methodology becomes paramount. Against the unavoidable tendency to objectify, the objects must also be acknowledged at least as potential subjects; against the tendency to isolate analytically, to strip every object from its context, understanding must emphasize the context and, thus, analyze configuratively. Against the danger of behaving like another force of domination, the objects as subjects must participate in the cognitive process: the subject has to transform him/herself as an object as well.

The purpose and manner of scientific enlightenment begins to change as soon as we grasp the new challenges of this approach. *Counterscience* may now be possible in a nonirrational, demystified manner. Theory under these conditions does not become a coercive instrument of identification. Theory discovers and accepts ambiguities, ambivalences, feedback loops that cannot be reduced according to causal norms that still dominate our thinking. Theory becomes holistic and individuated at the same time, a humane understanding of "the" world.

Domination Today: Competition and Capitalist-Statism

The hallmark of domination today is, on the one hand, a global reach and, on the other hand, the immediate application of globally produced processes on the level of individuals. This is the terrorism of everyday life: applied abstraction as the daily experience of both the unemployed and of those who have made it. The "it" is chance, ultimately defined by global events. But global reach is not the main

problem, although we have no way to conceive as yet how human activities might be organized on a global scale without the development of bureaucratized power structures. The main problem is revealed when one realizes that the global process of definition is not institutionalized. 7 There are procedural rules, so the process is not anarchistic it is archistic but also chaotic. This *oikumene*, the populated world, increasingly interconnected, is characterized by a visible and hidden power structure. Vastly unequal participants called states compete with one another in the definition game. The question is which state and bloc of states i.e., which interests will dominate the world market here or there and, thus, will be able to exploit it. The consequences of this competition over time can be seen in the staggering discrepancies of affluence and hunger, in peace in the sense of competition without murder or suicide or more or less permanent war. The structural inequality of states and, in a modified version, within the state societies, is a necessary outcome of the power struggle. In the struggle, power is a syndrome, what Kant called "the desire to have" (to possess) and the desire to overcome other people and other compounds of people (institutions, states, etc.).

This competition for power has, as I have said, an internal structure of inequality: it produces new structural inequalities that mirror as much as possible the main one. The major players are easily identified: states of the highly developed capitalist Western hemisphere and, until recently, in a minor way, the developed state-capitalist societies of the Eastern bloc. The states of the so-called underdeveloped or Third World are internally ranked according to their capacity to play minor partner roles in the game. Some, like South Korea, appear to catch up, but at tremendous social cost; others are more or less sacrificial victims.

Within the states, the multinational banks and industrial corporations pursue their own interests, whose reach extends further than their parent states. These multinationals cooperate and compete with one another in the various world markets for productive and consumption goods, depending partly on the parent states and influencing and exploiting the inferior states. This competition/cooperation depends on the dynamics of the world market, which they jointly produce and use, but which they do not really control.

The game, therefore, has rules and ruling factors, but no responsible procedure. It is *archaic* in the double sense of the classical Greek term. On the one hand, it seems strikingly existentialist. The politics

seem crude: compete, outrun other countries, become number one and stay there, influence other countries, develop spheres of influence and maintain them (and, to some extent, the living standard of one's own population) by securing sources of raw materials, markets, and the like, and develop new technologies to keep the competitive edge. The language is Darwinian, of course, since Darwin used capitalist metaphors. *Realpolitik* forms the frame of reference for "the ethic of responsibility," as Weber termed it, for all the "real politicians." On the other hand, *archaic* implies the Hobbesian construct of an original state of nature. This image is implemented at the level of states and multinational corporations, with their domestic substructure and propelling motives. Domination functions as an existentialist game on the abstract level of the world as a totality represented by abstract organizational givens.

Consequences of Competitive Capitalist Statism

The daily outcomes of this irresponsible structure, without any due political process are manifold. Three can be mentioned here.

1. Permanent negative effects are produced unintentionally as a result of unequal competition among narrowly interested parties. Multinationals invest, produce, and compete without reflecting on the side effects of these processes on national, regional, local, and individual levels. There is no effective means to address the social costs or to internalize the displacement and dislocation that are structural consequences of multinational and interstate competition. The International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, the various agencies of the United Nations, and the periodic conferences among the leading capitalist states are extremely skewed in composition and power. At best they ameliorate resulting conditions, but they do not have any steering capacity.

2. The most important and socially influential developments occur like fatalities. The best example is the development of the so-called new technologies, those with a synthetic capacity like the information technologies and genetic engineering. Of course, the Schumpeterian logic of capitalist-statist competition explains how research is financed and what technologies are developed and how they are implemented (Schumpeter 1942). It appears, however, that John McDermott's "*laissez innover*" becomes the mortal god, the new subject (McDermott 1986). But as soon as one analyzes the resources of this great human being borrowing here from Hobbes's language of the Leviathan one comes back to the capitalist-statist structure,

complete with the unknown effects of the competition and drive for power.

Who is in charge of these global dynamics? What factors can we identify, even if we can't reach or influence them? Who is accountable? Who bears greater and lesser responsibility for the sin? What makes them sinners? Can they avoid sinning? Indeed, who answers these questions? Going back to Schumpeter, questioning common sense, asking the representatives of some of the major factors/actors, the answer is always the same: no one can be without sin in this world. Moreover, they have to sin to stay alive and protect the citizenry. The result is a kind of secularized dogma of original sin, where only belief in the divine and its superhuman imputational capacity can help. It seems easy, even normal, to substitute for god a more or less modern version of capitalist-statist ontology, where the power struggle becomes naturalized. The state and capitalism, though organized quite differently throughout the world, are conceived as a kind of second nature with unavoidable calamities and fatalities as part of their growing promise. The brave new world is here already. Responsibility? What an ill-conceived, amoral postulate.

3. This loss of politics as a workable process allowing at least some responsible structure—that is, control with some accountability—places a hammerlock on democracy of every kind. One cannot exclude, however, the possibility of a national, regional, or local politics, which still counts in many respects. But the global depoliticization penetrates deep, with the end point being the isolated and fragmented individual. The *citoyen*—the engaged, political person—should not exist in this scheme of things.

Liberal representative democracy already functions for the most part as a symbolic use of politics. Periodic elections can only be characterized as simultaneously mass and individual projective behavior. They do not institutionalize a responsible and responsive structure that would allow relevant procedures on control. The arena of unpoliticized nondecisions is so large and powerful that the decision-making process remains marginal and highly determined, with little room for maneuvering. The projective and symbolic character of liberal democracy has been enlarged and strengthened by the great mediator and messenger of modern politics: television, together with other new channels of mass communication "*telematique*." We are in a paradoxical situation: on the one hand, social life is more than ever determined in the last instance by social structures and processes; politics seem to be everywhere; on the

other hand, politics is absorbed into rigid structures. We are confronted with a kind of multiple sclerosis: politics vanishes from the view of citizens and social groups, obscured and atrophied by huge and complicated systems.

Modern States and Political-Economic Processes

Modern societies are modern insofar as they are organized as states. The state is the institutional apparatus that synthesizes the scattered and competing social groups and individuals in the last resort by its monopoly of legitimate physical force, to use Weber's apt translation of Hobbes's concept. The state never has been and certainly is not today sovereign, if sovereignty is understood as the capacity to define autonomously (using its own resources) the destiny of a given state-organized society. The modern state requires a capitalist-industrial economy.

State institutions and the institutions of capitalism are not separate entities that touch each other: the main characteristic of capitalism is not private ownership of the means of production, but profit, growth, and surplus-value extraction, related to the national and global competition of states and corporations. State and economy are meshed, intertwined, incapable of separate existence. We cannot speak of the economy as an autonomous institution, or even as primary with secondary, subsidiary, or disruptive state interventions. To deny institutional and functional autonomy to either state or capitalist economy, and consequently to deny the enormous differentiations between public and private arenas in regard to Western societies, does not deny specific differences between state and economic organizations or ignore the changing forms and functions that keep state and economy simultaneously together and apart.

The so-called sovereignty of the state has never really existed, since representatives of the state have depended upon the distribution of historically changing, but limited, resources. But the state as the synthesizing form of modern societies guarantees national and global hegemony. Indeed, that is its primary function, not providing the institutionalized means to achieve human progress. As the gate- or norm-keeper of a given hegemony, the state is effective. Multinational corporations use and need the state and in some dimensions *are* the state. Corporate spheres of influence cannot be maintained without it. The securities of both state and economic positions are fused. Therefore, militarism cannot be understood apart from the political economy, since the latter is inherently militaristic. The organization

of states supports and makes possible the resource-exhausting capitalist market structure. The nation-state operates as the main frame of reference, source of the major symbols, and apparatus of socialization. Paradoxically, the state has been developed as the best device for depoliticizing society, for defusing national and international inequities and destructiveness. The state absorbs and concentrates the remaining phenomena, which are then called political by a fantastic symbolic sleight-of-hand. Notwithstanding the global reach of the multinationals and the imperialistic activities of the state (especially in its Western capitalist clothing), it is the home base that counts most and that gives all other activities their relative weight.

Modern Domination:

The Reduction of Social Space and Time

Under modern conditions, domination can be conceived as involving a series of reductions of social space and time. These reductions can be seen in the social obsession with quantification, abstraction and identification, legitimation, and individualization.

From another angle, the main feature that stimulates domination and, in turn, becomes a resource for it is increasing quantification. A sociology of quantity constitutes the root of Weber's diagnosis and prognosis of an unstoppable bureaucratization of the world, with the Kafkaesque iron cage as its metaphoric form. There are a number of historically and functionally interrelated symptoms of this quantification.

1. The growth of populations organized in single societies requires the state as the synthesizing form, not just the stimulator and organizer of growth.
2. Goods to be produced and distributed are related to population growth and geographic expansion and signal the explosion of needs conditioned by capitalist development as both its premise and its result.
3. The amalgamation of large societies into single states, an increasingly intricate web of government, and the interdependence of state societies on the global level are all enlarging the political arena.
4. Specific social and personal spaces become hindrances for quick political and economic penetration and unification. These must therefore be disallowed, dissolved, or otherwise destroyed. The mod-

ern genesis of domination could be characterized as the increasing robbery of social space; space must be marginalized.

Benjamin Franklin recognized early on that time is money. Therefore social time is condensed and limited as much as possible. Even the time to consume becomes an obstacle to accumulation and has to be overcome as much as possible.

The history of domination during the last two and a half centuries can be read as a history of conquest over social time and social space. The dominant measurement becomes bits of time, quantities of time. Until now there has been no domination possible or even imaginable without reference to space in time. But the resistance of sociohistorical configurations of specific social spaces and social times had to be crushed to the extent possible. To the extent that people need specific social spaces and social time, they stand in the way of further development. The goal, it appears, according to geneticist Glass (1970), is the production of a human being that can overcome its nature, that is, a humanness no longer gauged in relation to a cultural context.

Abstraction and Identification

Another aspect of quantification is abstraction, a word taken from the Latin *abstrahere*, to get rid of, to disregard, dismiss, dismantle, or dismember. But if abstraction is not used to indicate emptiness and shallowness, the focus is on specific traits apart from this or that intention. Consciously, or, more often, unconsciously, we abstract permanently. Within all dominated and dominating societies, abstraction tends to simply dichotomize reality as in constructing prejudice to claim or disclaim people as friends or enemies, in short, to project. The generalized Other is either hero or traitor/conspirator. The development of modern societies is nothing more than an interconnected process toward abstraction. Abstraction is in a way synonymous with domination, but to qualify as domination, one has to ask: abstraction for what, how, in what forms?

The oldest mark of domination is the endless search for (collective) identity. Plato's *Republic*, albeit on the basis of a statist economy and rather small societies, shows this thirst for identification as a peculiarity of domination. At best, no social phenomena should exist that are not channeled, that do not function predictably. At best, everyone has a single function, and should fulfill that function optimally. Through myth, Plato tries to ontologize the main functions when he creates natural-born waiters, servants, or philosopher-kings. His mania for identification reveals a hatred for all phenomena that are, by

their very originality, ambiguous or ambivalent: Homeric and other poetry, tragedies like those of Euripides, and music (see Diamond 1974). Creon, the powerful antipode to Antigone, incorporates the same all-encompassing and therefore tragic longing of the dominator to determine everything by identifying everything.

The archaic prototype persists. Qualitatively, the style of identification has changed as economic structures have changed and the modern state with its monopolies has emerged. The monopolies in question are linked through physical coercion, taxation as coerced donation, and generalized legitimation. 8 Other monopolies, especially over declarations of war and peace, derive from these. But the hallmark of domination has been and remains identification, the ability to calculate exactly, to suppress unrest, to root out anarchistic phenomena wherever the apparatus can detect them. The modern state creates its citizens by marking them as state-citizens through the identity card or the social security number. Tax, criminal, and civil law the Gordian knot of the legal apparatus cannot be understood except as tools of identification. Indeed, all instruments and measures of the state are intended to identify, even though the purpose of identification does not exhaust their functions.

The purpose of identification has a context as well. There are qualitative differences between social formations and their corresponding forms of domination. Although the capacity to mobilize and use people marks domination from the outset, the archaic city-state of Athens and Plato's utopian state in the range of mobilization needed, extent and intensity of domination, and so on differ from the mobilizing capacity of the modern state with its different purposes.

The modern ability to identify all persons in a given society is one difference: the state and its corporate relatives separate and identify the mass of the people according to changing needs and threats. Paradoxically, the search for a perfect identity can be seen in the underlying purpose: to use people whenever and wherever necessary, to make them stop and go, to move them from one occupation to another, to socialize them into this or that behavior pattern. Between flexibility and mobility, on the one hand, and identification, calculability, and stability, on the other, superficial tensions even contradictions and conflicts can arise. And this paradox persists. For the sake of the more or less permanent purposes of domination, the paradox can be deemphasized or disguised almost totally as the

process of domination separates people from their social spaces and social times.

Legitimation and Anomic Behavior

Identification, as a type of abstract selection and a measure of sorting out what cannot be identified (and used), and flexibility, as the compound of measures to use population as a resource for various purposes, are productive factors for all kinds of anomic behavior. 9 The persecution of criminal acts and persons functions as one of the primary legitimations of the given domination and its apparatuses (criminal prosecution and crime prevention, of course). This is one of the critical holes in Weber's concept of domination. Weber adequately defined the state as the monopolization of legitimate means of physical coercion. In defining specific forms of domination, Weber pointed out the relationship of dominator as a person or institution to its immediate power base, followers or apparatuses (the bureaucracy, the institutions representing coercive monopolies police, military, etc.). In addition, Weber emphasized three ideal types of legitimation. But what he failed to do in more than a passing manner was to relate forms of domination to forms of economy. He also failed to link the changing processes of daily implementation through which the institutions of physical coercion are present everywhere in a society to the dynamically conceived processes of legitimation. He therefore missed the capacity of the modern state to produce its own legitimation. Moreover, most of the time, as Michael Mann (1973) has aptly observed, what is called legitimacy is merely compliance.

But alongside this cycle of self-generated legitimation is the production of anomic behavior and its reproduction by the very means used to repress it. It is nonsensical or merely ideological, for instance, to analyze modern terrorism outside its historical context of national and international antiterrorism and of state-sponsored terrorism. The manner in which states attempt to prevent terrorism represents an institutionalized displacement of the reasons for terrorist acts and the instruments used. The Socratic question, the question of genesis Why do terrorist acts occur? is suppressed by a dizzying mobilization of almost all conventional means of terrorizing public opinion. In addition, the fight against the new enemy "the" terrorists is used to further expand the security apparatus and to erode civil rights in the name of the safety of citizens. Put another way, the social reasons for national and international terrorism lie,

all conspicuous differences notwithstanding, in the multiple overlapping processes of abstraction and consequent alienation. But the reasons are covered up and thereby underscored by the very form and cost of fighting against the phenomenon. Terrorism legitimizes the new little wars that have been sought for so long.

To sever bonds and ties, to isolate for the sake of identification, to select for the purposes of mobilization are aimed at individualization of the ruled. Individuals are the most abstract phenomenon today, and processes aimed at even further individualization can be glimpsed.

The trajectory toward this individualization in Western capitalist societies is quite different. There are still influential traditions. Alexis de Tocqueville's observations about the United States in 1840 could not be transposed onto the semiconstitutional monarchies and duchies of Germany at the time, or to the already bourgeois class society of England with its still influential nobility. Tocqueville's characterization of the United States as John Locke's beloved country, where the individual desire to possess permeated all social phenomena, was meant as a prototype of modern development, but even more as a caution about that development's potentialities and ambivalences (Tocqueville 1966). The possessive individualism, as C. B. MacPherson (1962) phrased it (referring to Hobbes and Locke), was balanced by a widespread and closely knit web of religious and secular clubs and associations. Tocqueville also noted that the lively institutions of a grassroots democracy were strong: town meetings, voting on a wide range of issues and for a range of representatives, strong localism and regionalism. But already individualism had threatened to become depoliticized through the concentration of economic and political power. The rather conservative Tocqueville closed his work by underscoring the danger in greater monopolization and the need for fundamentally democratic measures to limit the process of abstraction and to link it to the people.

Today the process not only has realized Tocqueville's anxieties but extends to the global level. With regard to the so-called Western democracies, even the former political classes have been stripped of their political qualities. A strange pluralistic monism defines the outcomes that in general nobody really wants.

The so-called traditional societies (widely disparate as those traditions are) are forced into ostensibly modernized structures and functions without the half-bourgeois, half-citizen intermediate phase that

the Western industrialized societies experienced through the Enlightenment. What we find are societies without specific social qualities. I say this not out of cultural despair, but out of a sense of a social conception that has not totally given up on the unfulfilled human promise of the Enlightenment.

To sum up, there are three crucial characteristics of this process of quantification, individualization, and abstraction, and one consequence:

First, from the establishment of the modern capitalist state, a secular process has taken place, freeing society and its citizens. Abstract institutions and mechanisms have dissolved and absorbed locally and regionally restrictive social ties and meanings. The process of individualization has corresponded to the process of monopolization (see Elias 1978). There is a dialectical development between the identification that characterizes modern domination and the bourgeois identity of an expanding number of the population. But is there too much liberation in the form of dominant abstraction, that is, is freedom through the state a loss? Does a state- and capital-dominated emancipation mean people lose the social and psychic ties and the muscle to organize themselves and help each other?

Second, nonparticipatory structures of present-day domination aggravate this problem. The institutional integration of new classes complemented the development of capitalist states and societies in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. One of the main, if not the main instrument of this integration was the extension of the right to vote. Representatives of the people are increasingly elected by all adult people, at least in the ideology of the state. Almost everyone recognized as a member of a given state has the rights of a citizen. This phenomenon changed the form of domination. The extension would never have happened in the way it did without wave upon wave of challenge by different disenfranchised groups (workers, women, blacks). But this democratic development halted at the level of representative democracy and is allowed to function solely in the restricted sector of legally licensed public life. Even there it is undermined by the chronic, war-stimulated process of bureaucratization.

Even more importantly, the process of monopolization and centralization discussed above as global reach, quantification, and abstraction has not been balanced by increasing participation, but quite the contrary: the emancipation of state and capital happens not through the people, but at their expense. Today we face an almost

deadly absence of democratic precautions. There are almost no functioning democratic institutions only symbolic ones. Ted Lowi (1979) puts it well: today it is politics, not policies, that counts.

Third, we live in a time of substitution. While individuation and authenticity are relics of an archaic time or represent utopian hopes, the terms *identity* and *authenticity* become fashionable catchwords used by those in search of a lost identity.

Substitution has been part of the human experience from the outset, of course: the extension of the hand found in a spear, for instance, or in a plow. But the story of human implements differs qualitatively from that of modern substitutionism. The capacity to define and the frame of reference to qualify human activities emerge out of socially constituted instruments and institutions. Marx provided an example when he discussed the power to define that industrial machinery exercised on the labor process for the working class.

The state and its Hobbesian legitimation are another example of this circular process. The state is legitimated by its purported main function, that is, to save the world for the security of the citizenry. The conflation of the security of the state with the security of citizens and, thus, the reduction of the latter to the former is an early manifestation of state ideology. Substitution reaches new heights in the deployment of new technologies. Today, these function as a kind of bureaucratic extremism bureaucracy, as Weber recognized, being a powerful instance of substitution. These new technologies have a global reach, penetrating the consciousness and behavior patterns of people themselves. The global extension, then, is immediately individualized and, thus, strengthens individualization (i.e., subjectification).

This form of substitutionism replaces the frame of reference, the power to define, the essence, with the substitute. Even more important than this process, however, is the substitution for social interactions and social organizations of bureaucratic-technical ones. In a way, society itself that is, the ties and mediating arrangements is swallowed up. Instead of an active society, an active technology defines, and it needs people only as marginals.

The consequence is a pervasive loss of politics. This global and specific phenomenon has already been observed as a core paradox in such societies. The social definition of reality has approached the Cartesian dream. The miseries are socially created, as are the distribution, forms, and contents of happiness. But what does *socially created* mean?

The social construction of reality is the result of myriad interests that have already become structures, represented by powerful institutions. These interests are altered and reproduced according to the already sclerotic ones. Change is stimulated and directed by the fact that these interests are similar and competing. The interests are pursued by commodifying and objectifying all natural and, increasingly, all more immediately social phenomena. Actual (individual) interests and structured (petrified and socially dominant) interests reproduce one another.

But there is a restrictive structure that favors those interests that have become dominant institutions and that are intrinsic to the main procedures and their rules. Thus, actual interests cannot respond to actual challenges without extraordinary difficulty. The content and especially the form needed to pursue the content is given by the existing structures. The cycle, then, is one of production and reproduction out of old and structured, and new but dependent, interests. But because of the myriad (individual) interests and the given structures that determine but are not responsive let alone socially responsible the result cannot be controlled or steered. The reality is a compound of interested and unintended results.

What becomes of politics? What kind of institution is in charge? What process and criteria of control can be held responsible? The second nature of objectified interests that came into being by objectification seems more hermetic and, at the same time, more flexible than the so-called first nature. Politics becomes a promise no one can keep: it may take place only on a microlevel within the loopholes and interstices of limited maneuvering left open by the operation of the statist-capitalist power and commodity system.

Domination and Emancipation

There is almost no argument about the given reality and its internal dynamics where there is no qualification, no "but. . . ." So it is with this description of present-day domination. Any phenomenology as yet there is no analysis of domination that focuses solely on the structures and functions and leaves out the ruled, the dominated, the people is vulnerable to becoming a slave of the logic of domination, even if its intention is to destroy domination. It is an old pattern to identify the victim with the aggressor. Then, too, there is Hegel's famous representation in the *Phenomenology* of protesting slaves

with masters, so long as they remained master minded. There is, in short, the mimetic danger between the objects analyzed and the objectifying analyst.

But . . . the processes of quantification and abstraction seem at the very least ambivalent, from the perspective of people living under these various forms of domination and exploitation.

Emancipation in Latin (*e manu cipere*), literally to take someone from the hands of a personal owner, a *dominus* necessarily implies some abstraction, that is, the abstraction of the master, to become a person. Looking carefully at the web of personal dominance existing in Western Europe in the twelfth, fifteenth, or seventeenth centuries and considering the distribution of resources material, educational, and so on one is immunized against misplaced romanticism. The birth of the bourgeois individual and the potential in any case for other classes, too, provided an enormously expanded room for maneuvering, at least with regard to geographical and social mobility. In this sense progress has been conspicuous: the actual and potential satisfaction of quite a few needs and desires. This phenomenon fascinated many observers, not least the great critic of capitalist development, Marx.

The radical critique of modern domination cannot be done in an attitude of abject adoration of the (or even a) past. There is an emancipatory actuality and potential implicit in the dialectics of quantification and abstraction. Or, to put it more correctly: the emancipatory achievement.

New patterns of domination produce new problems as well. A dialectic exists between forms of domination and forms of resistance. The dispossessed appropriate to some degree the new circumstances and find novel resources to enable resistance. Of course, this requires substantiation through historical materials.

Two counterarguments should be recognized. One is Bertolt Brecht's "Questions of a Reading Worker": At whose expense? As a cosmopolitan, worker-citizen of the world, one would have to ask to what extent the emancipatory progress of Western Europe was a result of ravages inflicted on colonized peoples around the world. To modify E. P. Thompson's title a bit, can the history and presence of the English working class be understood without an analysis of colonialism, from the East India Company to Margaret Thatcher's minor and sublime imperialism? Of course, one must pose this question against all Euro-American professions of progress (see Brecht 1967; Thompson 1966).

The second counterargument does not question the observed emancipation-domination dialectic. But one must bear in mind that the structures and operations of modern domination are in form and content structurally superior to the dependent and socially dispossessed individuals. These individuals form out of the dominant institutions nothing other than a nongroup, a summation without ties.

Tandem Forces and Motives of Domination: In Praise of Marx and Weber

Intellectuals at least, social scientists are vulnerable to behaving epigonally simply because they take any means to avoid being epigones. This explains in part, the search for original theories. One cannot prove that the present stage of development represents a new social paradigm, that we are faced with a new social formation. Therefore, I continue to tread in the footsteps of Marx and Weber, by updating their theories and combining them to illuminate the two main factors in this specific social formation, state and capital, and to attempt to explain the dimensions of present-day reality and its trajectories. So, let me point out a few characteristics in addition to those outlined in the previous sections.

The State as a Social Problem

The organization of society by the state does not solve social problems but becomes the problem. The state, of course, does not exclusively shape society, but it impedes and excludes other ways of posing solutions. The state prevents different social experiments, forms of nonbureaucratic organization. The exclusionary rule is the first and most fundamental principle of state monopoly. The state attracts esteem because of its presumed civilizing capacity: Norbert Elias naively proposes the notion of a world-state. It is accepted in the role of peacekeeper and peacemaker. This security-legitimation cycle is reproduced continuously in interconnected stages: insecurity to anxiety to laws to monopoly of coercive power to coerced implementation of laws to produce security to security of a sort that produces the next phase of insecurity. The monopoly of the state unburdens citizens: it functions amid anxiety and turmoil as a fixed point of projection. Nationalization of the state greatly enhances this projective behavior. At the same time, the state prepares room for specific interests especially the new possessive

onesto maneuver. The dissolving and formally equalizing measures of the state act to conserve those structures of inequality that are the result of capitalist expansion or that do not impede it.

But the apparent peacekeeping state never reveals the reasons for violent behavior, nor does it do away with violence. It simply concentrates specific forms and applications of violence. The state can be viewed as a structure of norms and instruments that licenses and prohibits the use of violence. Beyond the representation of violence by the state and its socializing effects violence is as pervasive as the state the state conserves precisely those structures of inequality that guarantee a dialectic between apathy and violent protest, including most forms of so-called apolitical criminal behavior. In addition, the state is war born and war bent by its very constitution, its essential instrument. In the midst of negative peace the potential for conflicts without their existence the state is always prepared for internal war and preparing for external war. In *Cassandra*, German novelist Christa Wolf (1984) aptly calls these stages of the state "pre-war periods."

Just because the state stores, accumulates, abstracts, and disarticulates violence, just because of its capacity to make the untrue true and to keep social reasons for violence alive, anarchism as an organizational, social concept as opposed to an individualistic extremism poses its most fundamental challenge. Whether or not anarchism is realizable as a concept for the organization of large societies is an intriguing problem, but not my central concern. Anarchism keeps human promise alive. Anarchism as a social concept can be a pattern of orientation. Those who defend the state as an organizational principle of modern societies must prove again and again that this war-prone institution is unavoidable. The main problem, of course, is that the state destroys the very conditions that would allow alternative modes of human organization to emerge.

Political Economy as Domination

Because their genesis is multifold, as soon as state and capitalism have been established, they cannot be analyzed separately. They are structurally and functionally semiautonomous, but they are simultaneously united both institutionally and functionally. A modern state cannot be conceptualized without an economy that is normatively related to, and dependent upon, a world market and its competitive structure. This also holds for the so-called really-existing socialist countries and their bureaucratic-political definition of the economy. The means of production are not

privatized and the domestic market is small and highly regulated, but the economy operates according to state-defined principles and is not oriented toward use values. The state cannot be conceived without a state or private capitalist economy, so the growth-, power-, and commodity-oriented economy cannot be understood without the state.

Capitalism and its driving forces cannot be adequately identified without an updated concept of Marx or some parallel invention. To analyze capitalism in the context of a theory of domination, it is necessary to explore more deeply than did Marx the dimensions of capital as a social relation. That recognition is lost in economizing Marxism, let alone in the neoclassical and Keynesian schools. As a long-overdue consequent, it implies that the economy must be conceptualized as both institutional-political and as a specific and changing pattern of domination. Lately, a few historians and social scientists have been taking this approach to the labor process. In Michael Burawoy's terms (1985), the politics in and of production are a politics of control.

But to date the tandem of state and capital organization has not been conceptualized adequately. Weber still knocks at the Marxists' door if they have not changed the name on the door after the latest crisis in Marxism just as Marx knocks in vain at the door of the newly fashionable Weberians, whom Weber would disavow.

The exponential growth of capitalism and its commodities could probably be called the most successful (or pervasive) historical phenomenon. But capitalism not only produces the so-called external effects that are internally defined: the structural inequities, the forms of alienation, the ecological disasters. Capitalism outdoes even the state as an aggressive form. It destroys possibilities for alternatives, even the very motives of the capitalized individuals. The citizen of this or that state the state-citizen is accompanied by the citizen of this or that capitalist economy the capital-citizen. As the state exploits all kinds of anomic behavior to expand and intensify its apparatuses, so capitalism capitalizes the externalized effects, the destruction of the lived world.

As anarchism challenges the state as a progressive form of organization, so socialism challenges capitalism as a form of material production. The concept of socialism has been misunderstood and mispracticed even more than has the concept of anarchism. The range of objections to it cannot be dismissed easily. Nevertheless, socialism as a concept represents the only counterframe of reference to the

capitalist one. As state and capitalism form a diversified unity with strains and contradictions, so anarchism and socialism are complementary.

Alternatives:

Limiting Everyday and Inner Life

The strength of a given system of domination is found in the very structure of present-day reality. This reality of domination is represented by the objective and abstract structures and processes defined by them. But this reality also extends to the psychic structures of individuals. It is incorporated in the concrete needs, longing, feelings, anxieties, and satisfactions of the people. This is more than an applied abstraction: it is abstraction that has become concrete, personified. This is why the (political) psychology of the person has to focus on the factors and functions of the abstract first, to be able to understand the psychology of individuals. It is the realization of Hegel's seeming paradox: the concrete is the abstract and the abstract, the concrete.

Because of this incorporation and internalization of state and capitalism that is the modern form of domination, it is extraordinarily difficult to imagine alternative modes of social (political and economic) production. The ever-hungry motive of possessive individualism, in a strange analogue to the driving hunger for surplus value, is accompanied by kinds of anxieties and needs for security and satisfaction that are riddled to their core by the structural motives of domination. The human search for security, for a life without omnipresent anxiety, and so on, is not just an ahistorical and abstract thing. But when the needs and satisfactions, the prejudices and projections of people have been mediated in such a way that they have changed qualitatively, what happens to the frame of reference? Does it become obsolete, if not reactionary, like the substantially democratic one? What could or should be the social and individual basis for any kind of opposition or alternative movement reaching beyond the systemic limits of modern domination?

The difficulties loom like mountains. What social scientists like M. Olsen call the "logic of collective action" is nothing but the collection of individuals whose fundamentally private interests converge with respect to a single action, issue, or institution. ¹⁰ The social fact is always conceived as derivative primarily, if not exclusively, of individualized interests—the sum total of individual preferences. The plural derives from the singular. Social institutions, first instrumentally conceived for the isolated but competitive private (i.e., asocial) interests,

are therefore built to coercively synthesize the individual to "we, the people." On the one side, we find the statist nation and, on the other side, a sublime violent struggle, a Darwinian competition.

It is much more difficult today than during the constitution of the modern state to argue from a point of view of collectivity, of communality, of a fundamentally social concept of human being the *zoon politikon*. First, there is almost no living tradition of communal orientation left. Nevertheless, one can see a search again and again for new communal ties and forms of participatory democracy, which may show a need beyond the asocial logic of collective action marking state and capitalism.

Second, after Stalinism and especially after German fascism, we are twice burned and fear the fire: "Arbeit mach frei"; the nation and the people are all and you are nothing. Auschwitz survivor Cordelia Edvardson, however, in her courageous book *Burnt Child Searches for the Fire*, sets us an example. Two kinds of recognition are needed. First, as Christopher Hill (1975) has aptly observed (referring to Hobbes), it is difficult to break the chain; its very assumption, its psychology, must be challenged. Second, the traditions we work in must be reread in recognition of modern forms of suffering. Hill quotes, among others, Gerard Winstanley, who looked deeply into the core of domination and who spoke always from the basis of an existing and promised pluralthe people, the communal tradition. "This same power in man that causes divisions and war is called by some men the state of nature, which every man brings to the world with him. . . . Here is disorder, therefore, this subtle spirit of darkness tells the people, You must make one man king over you all and let him make laws, and let everyone be obedient thereunto" (1975:387). Simply because of individualized and privatized interests, because of their helplessness with regard to social organizations, the need for bureaucratic and technical substitutes is reproduced and produced on an expanding scale.

Science and Technology as Domination

Any analysis of domination that does not focus on the process of embedding "scientism" and "technologism" misses the instrumental essence and the essential instrumentalismor in Max Horkheimer's language (1974), instrumental reasonof domination. Weber concentrated on the most advanced form of dominationbureaucracyas an instrument that he conceived as a machine with its own definitional momentum.

But it is insufficient to recognize the increasing role of science and technology as instruments of domination. What does it imply analytically and practically if the media are the messages, as Marshall McLuhan would have it (McLuhan 1967)? Science and technology make domination more hermetic; that they affirm and emphasize the abstraction is only symptomatic. Rarely are science and technology recognized as forms of domination in themselves. Usually they are dealt with as black boxes emitting wonderful results that may have unhealthy consequences because of human error. To break the hermetic character of science and its organization is a key dimension of analysis of domination. It is easier to reach back to the early modern genesis of science and show the style of domination implicit in its methodology, as Josephine Diamond has done (M. J. Diamond 1982). But it is crucial, too, to trace the methodological and organizational developments to today's genetic engineering and biotechnology. Through its social organization alone, science is embedded in the capitalist and military bureaucracy. But how can one discern the internalized violence of scientific methods? How can one detect the methodological analogy to political-economic domination? What is it specifically that science and technology add analytically or synthetically to the form and content of domination?

The Importance of Forms of Domination

When an analysis claims to be historical it must avoid reasoning that smells evolutionary. Almost all social scientists criticize Marx, Hegel, and others for their different philosophies of history. But nearly all social scientists argue implicitly or explicitly in an evolutionist manner. The vocabulary belies this: development, modernization, increasing complexity, and so on. Of course, if societies did not change, there would be no sort of institutionalized fury of disappearance, to use the Hegelian metaphor; social analysis would be either unnecessary or a strictly functionalist game. But it matters whether one analyzes changing patterns and reasons for them and points out potentials and actual shortcomings, or whether one assumes a specific beginning and end. The analysis of domination and its structural momentum should be kept as distanced as possible from any evolutionary approach, leading as any will to an ontological trap.

It is important to try to grasp the historical meaning of a given

form like state and capital, as Marx persuasively did. But it is similarly important to examine, through time, the specific forms that the state and capitalism have taken in specific circumstances. Awareness of a pluralism of forms that differ conspicuously saves us from a misplaced and almost always misleading reductionism. For example, it can make a profound difference whether the economic crisis of 1929 was solved through a New Deal or through German fascism. The great danger today is that acting in accordance with an overgeneralized conception of state and capitalism may facilitate its realization.

Without a permanent historical analysis that looks at stateless societies, to that explores any kind of human experience the hermetic character of established modern domination stands to acquire an aura of omnipotence that would increase its hermetic strength. As has been observed earlier, there is a dialectical development of contradictions (structurally) and conflicts (in social activities). The specific form of domination produces its own contradictions, conflicts, and oppositional practices. This phenomenon produces no sanguine satisfaction, but it is a starting point, presenting material for any critical analysis opposed to functional totalitarianism and total functionalism. One of the greatest dangers today is, of course, that domination in all its forms will exploit its own contradictions, integrating and marginalizing the conflicts.

Consequences

Pessimism should not be taken for apathy or resignation for an aesthetic attitude in the face of catastrophic events. As a nonparticipantobserver one nurses a hybrid resignation. But even as Ernst Bloch's "principle of hope" tends to become wishful thinking, simply because one cannot stand the results of sober analyses, hope and self-deception get jumbled, and the negative dialect can be supported even by a misconceived principle of hope (Bloch 1986). Hope can only be sustained as a hope against hope, as a necessary source of radical critique. All remaining, even increasing, contradictions notwithstanding, despite conflicts and emancipatory social movements from time to time, the juggernaut of domination has not slowed. The barbaric potential has increased, as have the barbaric actualities. To put it in A. Hirschman's terms: there seems to be no exit from the system

of domination (Hirschman 1970); at best, an all-out effort can make a difference in a specific form of domination. Voice, but at the same time, cooptation is the name of the game.

Those at least who keep an undogmatic, substantially democratic, anarchistically informed, and socialist frame of reference must be able to face this situation. No evolution toward a more humanely reasonable society can be assumed. No revolution as a revolutionary process toward new socially active forms of social organization is implicit in the structure and function of history. We thus have a motivational paradox. Motives for another society must become themselves abstract, since the immediate motives of anger and desire are rather easily absorbed and coopted by the given capacity to positively and negatively sanction.

Repoliticization is crucial. As the social construction of reality increases and is disguised at the same time, the political process of construction must be detected continuously. Intellectual work has to be a detective story whether as social science analysis, as literature, or as poetry is merely a question of mediation and ability. The more entrenched a given form of domination becomes, the more it excels in depoliticizing its genesis and structure with regard to the functions pursued and the forms through which it operates.

11 The bureaucratized language that the normal social sciences hand their true believers constitutes treachery. The jargon neutralizes and depoliticizes, covering up more than it reveals.

It is not by chance that almost all emancipatory movements have begun by politicizing neutralized arenas of given societies. One recent example is the women's movement and its challenge to received notions of politics: the private and personal are political. Yet movements fail as soon as they accept the rules of the game of the given political system.¹²

Alongside the problem of motivation for another logic of collective action, the most crucial challenge for any reasoning about a radical alternative is the problem of inventing new social forms. How do we conceive social synthesis on a world scale without falling into the trap of an illusory and terrifying world state? How do we organize nonrepressive communities and mediate them with nonbureaucratized means of coordination? How do we keep or redevelop a reduced but still highly differentiated division of labor, where the labor process is democratic?

The radical discovery of the politics of cognition has to be combined with the use of cognition for the sake of politics. To use Vico's

phrase, a new science is needed: a science that self-reflectively realizes its own social form and content. Whatever intellectuals might still be around would realize their responsibility and their duty to work toward understanding domination and alternative constructions of a social synthesis against the dominant, asocial bureaucratic and technocratic one.

It is not enough to be fascinated by the cataclysmic tendencies and results of a given momentum of domination. We need all kinds of socially imagined, alternative modes of organization. That, at least, was Epimetheus's other and imaginative reason for looking back: to re-inform and re-humanize the unbound and progressively, one-dimensionally reduced Prometheus. We need to be in search of the primitive.

Notes

1. Diamond discusses individuation, as opposed to individualism, as a characteristic process in primitive societies (1974).
2. Evolutionism is not normally found in the Jewish tradition. See Gershom Scholem's interpretation (1965).
3. The latest examples of Habermas' philosophy of language are unpersuasive and dangerous. See, e.g., Habermas (1987).
4. *Concrescere* means growing together; a totality that does not automatically explain its constituent parts, that does not readily show the circumstances out of which it came into being.
5. Diamond (1951) introduced the term proto-state to describe a society in a (reversible) process of class and state formation.

6. Taxonomies are cherished by social scientists with an undying Parsonian pleasure.
7. To put it more precisely in terms of phenomenology, definition occurs through overlapping, contradictory, but ultimately cumulative processes.
8. See Diamond's (1951) discussion of the taxation-conscription-census configuration as a feature of state formation.
9. The language of economics is a good example of this abstraction from human conditions.
10. Cf. the fashionable discussion of "rational choice" and "justice," etc.
11. J. J. Schattschneider (1960) discussed this politics of depoliticization a generation ago.
12. See Frances Fox Piven and Richard A. Cloward (1977).

References

Althusser, Louis

1972

Lenin and Philosophy. Trans. Ben Brewster. New York: Monthly Review Press.

Bloch, Ernst

1986

The Principle of Hope. Trans. S. Plaice and P. Knight. Cambridge, Mass.: M. I. T. Press.

Brecht, Bertolt

1967

Questions of a Reading Worker. *In* Gesamelte Werke. Frankfurt: Suhrkamp.

Burawoy, Michael

1985

The Politics of Production. London: Routledge, Chapman, and Hall.

Clastres, Pierre

1977

Society against the State. New York: Urizen Books.

Diamond, Marie Josephine

1982

The Social Configuration of Descartes' "Discourse on Method." *Dialectical Anthropology* (Fall):19.

Diamond, Stanley

1951

Dahomey: A Proto-State in West Africa. Ann Arbor, Mich.: University Microfilms.

1974

In Search of the Primitive: A Critique of Civilization. New Brunswick, N.J.: E. P. Dutton/Transaction Books.

Elias, Norbert

1978

The Civilizing Process. New York: Urizen Books.

Etzioni, Amitai

1968

The Active Society. London: Collier-Macmillan.

Glass, Bentley

1970

The Timely and the Timeless: The Interrelationships of Science, Education, and Society. New York: Basic Books.

Habermas, Jürgen

1987

The Theory of Communicative Action. Trans. T. McCarthy. Boston: Beacon Press.

Hegel, Georg

1931

The Phenomenology of Mind. Trans. J. B. Baillie. London: George Allen and Unwin.

Hill, Christopher

1975

Change and Continuity in Seventeenth-Century England. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.

Hirschman, A. O.

1970

Exit, Voice, and Loyalty: Responses to Decline in Firms, Organizations, and States. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.

Horkheimer, Max

1974

Critique of Instrumental Reason. New York: Seabury Press.

Lowi, Theodore

1979

The End of Liberalism. New York: Norton.

Luhman, Niklas

1984

Soziale Systeme: Grundriss einer allgemeinen Theorie. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp.

McDermott, John J.

1986

Streams of Experience: Reflections on the History and Philosophy of American Culture. Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press.

McLuhan, H. Marshall

1967

The Medium Is the Message. New York: Random House.

MacPherson, C. B.

1962

The Political Theory of Possessive Individualism: Hobbes to Locke. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

Mann, Michael

1973

Consciousness and Action among the Western Working Class. London: Macmillan.

Olsen, Marvin

1982

Participatory Pluralism. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Piven, Frances Fox, and Richard Cloward

1977

Poor People's Movements: Why They Succeed, How They Fail.
New York: Pantheon Books.

Schattschneider, J. J.

1960

The Semisovereign People: A Realist's View of Democracy in
America. Hinsdale, Ill.: Dryden Press.

Scholem, Gershom

1965

Jewish Gnosticism, Merkabah Mysticism, and Talmudic Tradition.
New York: Jewish Theological Seminary of America.

Schütz, Alfred

1970

On Phenomenology and Social Relations. Chicago: University of
Chicago Press.

Schumpeter, Joseph

1942

Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy. New York: Harper.

Thompson, Edward P.

1966

The Making of the English Working Class. New York: Vintage
Books.

Tocqueville, Alexis de

[c. 1840] 1966 Democracy in America. Trans. G. Lawrence. New
York: Harper and Row.

Vico, Giambattista

[1744] 1984

The New Science of Giambattista Vico. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press.

Wolf, Christa

1984

Cassandra. Trans. Jan van Heurck. New York: Farrar, Straus, Giroux.

24

In Pursuit of the Postmodern

Richard Falk

For the creator created not only the world, he also created the possibility itself; therefore, he should have created the possibility of a better world than this one.

Arthur Schopenhauer
Essays and Aphorisms

Once the inevitabilities are challenged, we begin gathering our resources for a journey of hope.

Raymond Williams
The Year 2000

Stanley Diamond sustained a single focus over the years, whether as a poet, an anthropologist, or as a humane citizen: the need to make fundamental adjustments, that is, the need to be genuinely radical. To be genuinely radical is by itself deeply antagonistic to the *Zeitgeist* of the United States, and especially, to its deeply complacent embrace of incrementalism. Such an embrace, in the face of the profound challenges of nuclearism and ecological decay, as well as of mass anomie, has induced a mood that swings between poles of despair and an escapist optimism. The presidency has drifted unknowingly from pole to pole.

Stanley Diamond's call is for "an authentic politics," a politics that goes deep:

It represents a form of neo-primitivist striving, proclaiming sacredness of life, communal forms of society, the esthetic dimension of human nature, the continuity with nature at large and culture as ritual. (Diamond 1974:356)

Such an outlook cannot be reduced to any of the "isms" or even to an ongoing movement, although its tone and substance anticipates the

Greens, deep ecology, and aspects of feminist thought. Diamond's originality had to do with a mixture of seriousness and integrity, a willingness to stand for something difficult, even impossible, but to do so with assurance, even if it meant standing alone. In this respect, Diamond had about his life and work that quality we associate with American heroeshe took on fighting with courage and conviction, and, in the end, somehow, quite miraculously, prevailed.

As the modern age winds down, something else is emerging. This unformed emerging social and cultural reality can be labeled the postmodern, at least for now. The name suggests, by the juxtaposition with the modern, that there is a before as well as an after, that the premodern, with its many embodiments, provides us with rich imagery of alternatives to modernism that have actually existed as life forms on the planet. Without quite formulating it as such, *In Search of the Primitive* is a contribution to the dialogue about what we might hope for and struggle to achieve in the postmodern, especially the normative imperatives quoted from Diamond in an earlier paragraph. His imaginative leap into the future was guided by an informed, sympathetic recovery of the premodern, a reassessment that revealed what was lost by our civilizing compulsion and what might still be recovered, not re-created in a literal sense, but acting to remind us of what we could yet become as a species by showing us what we had already achieved. In this regard, Diamond remained true to his vocation as poetic anthropologist or anthropological poet by illuminating for us the outer, generally hidden, boundaries of human nature, and thereby reassuring us as a species. Such reassurance underlies my attempt to depict the postmodern possibility.

Modern and Postmodern Imagery

The challenge of articulation begins with terminology. The most extensive discussion of postmodernism appears to be in literary and cultural circles. In these settings, the modern is associated with an effort to establish an elite set of standards by which to assess the progress of civilization and pass judgment on its deficiencies, especially its emphasis on materialist and technological achievement. The postmodern sensibility registered a strong reaction by way of both taste and values. Postmodernism denies the capacity of language, mind, or spirit to establish anything by standards in an objective manner. It is radically deconstructionist, destroying, if it can, all illu-

sions that anything whatsoever can be singled out as truly significant. The postmodern mode is characterized above all else by a critical turn of mind, both skeptical and ironic. At its best, this postmodern sensibility helps emancipate us from colonizing forms of knowledge associated with both evident and disguised structures of domination: statism, nuclearism, patriarchy, and others.

Now this sense of postmodern is quite different from the spirit that animates this essay. My attempt, following upon Diamond's inspiration, is reconstructionist, optimistic, and normative. I do not repudiate the achieving side of modernism but seek to displace its negative features. A postmodern possibility implies the human capacity to transcend the violence, poverty, ecological decay, oppression, and injustice of the modern world. The failures of the modern world are here overwhelmingly associated with false and constraining boundaries that then become springboards for conflict, violence, and suffering. The most prominent false boundaries are the borders of sovereign states and the refusal of the larger, more ambitious states to respect the autonomy of other states. Additional false boundaries—those of race, class, religion, ideology, gender, language, age, and civilization—interact and intensify the forms of conflict associated with the state itself.

Closely connected with these divisions of the whole that have become invested with emotive content are a series of splittings that underlie the efficiency of modernism: above all, the expropriating potency of specialization of labor and inquiry. Specialization as an organizing principle endows instrumental reason with a superior status in human affairs, creating the familiar hierarchical dualism of mind and body, of thought and feeling. The modernist bias is to act in the world as if these hierarchies expressed and exhausted the real structures of experience, providing both orientation and guidance. Postmodernism, by way of contrast, is trying to "reinvent" reality in more holistic, less hierarchical imagery.

The practical problems of modernity, but not necessarily the metaphysical ones, would be less severe if separateness could be consistently sustained by careful organizing categories, but it cannot. It is the intensifying interdependence of the modern circumstance conjoined to this fierce sense of specific identity that makes the world so dangerous and frightening. Of course, these conditions are aggravated in the extreme by technology and by the cultural reign of mechanistic and seductionist understandings of science. Most obviously, nuclear weapons as instruments for struggle by part against part

dooms the whole and overwhelms any possibility of modernist sanitythe relation of means to ends is so radically disrupted by insisting that my identity validates ending the world as we know it that any genuine form of collective happiness is precluded. Indeed, the prevalence of drugs, escapism, and mind-numbing popular music, especially among our young, is a warning that those inevitably entrusted with the future are tuning out of a world with no solidity or promise.

Yet the challenge of modernity is much more than the need to overcome fragmentation and division. Wholeness, in other words, is not nearly enough. Part of our challenge has to do with the rescue of the spirit. Already toward the close of the nineteenth century, Friedrich Nietzsche delivered the startling message that god is dead; a message with prophetic consequences that continue to reverberate. If god is dead, then these partial identities become new absolutes, and totalizing approaches to politics and society are bound to emerge, and have. Secular religions become either redundant rubber stamps for science and the state or become demonic historical forces, with idolatrous tendencies invisibly embedded in the whole edifice of modernism. Jean-Paul Sartre epitomized the absurdity of modern existence by associating it with nausea in the face of reality. The modern circumstance is groundless in the fundamental, ultimate sense of endowing our existence with a meaning beyond our mortality. When my death means everything, the death of others means nothing. The ethos of the terrorist becomes as natural as it is disruptive in such a world. And this pertains whether those relying upon terror do so with kidnappings and hijackings, with covert operations and high technology attacks on civilian targets, or with weaponry of mass destruction. The revolutionary and functionary who rely on violent means tend to become mirror images of what they purport to deplore.

The postmodern in this broader sense implies the rediscovery of normative and spiritual ground upon which to find meaning in human existence. It does not imply a return to the past, even to the early modern or premodern reality of a world given coherence and religious sanction by the acceptance of the reign of the great monotheistic religions, with their faith bestowed in a centralized, hierarchical, patriarchal deity reigning over earthly matters from a heavenly throne. The postmodern horizon of spiritual recovery proceeds on a different basis: a dispersion of spiritual energy that is associated with the sacredness of the whole universe, and a related

feminization of political life that finds power in relations rather than in capabilities for dominance and destruction, in earthborne, more than skyborne, energy. Unity without centralization or hierarchy provides the only firm constraint upon the design of desirable world order arrangements for the future.

Two Texts

To clarify the orientation, I wish to comment upon two passages, each written by a prophetic postmodern voice. The first is taken from Martin Buber:

The vision of 'what should be' independent though it may sometimes appear of personal will is yet inseparable from a critical and fundamental relationship to the existing condition of humanity. All suffering under a social order prepares the soul for visions and what the soul receives in this vision strengthens and deepens its insight into the perversity of what is perverted. (Buber 1950:7)

Buber's rooting of vision in the actuality of suffering assures that the essence of our political endeavors will be centered on those who are most victimized by present arrangements. Unless we understand "the perversity of what is perverted," all the goodwill in the world cannot help. At the same time it becomes critical not to reproduce perversity in our struggle against it; in questioning the role of violence in political life we are reacting to the experience of betrayal that has been associated with so much revolutionary violence in our century. A posture of struggle seems predicated upon perversity, but we need to critically assess the place of violence. We need not reject violence unconditionally, but require a heavy burden of persuasion to set forth those exceptional, limited justifications for it.

The second passage is from Lewis Mumford:

The emergence of New World culture, in a completed form, in our time has produced in itself a world crisis. As far as records tell, this is the first planet-wide crisis that has taken place since the last glacial period. But the menace that then came from nature now comes from the busy hands and minds of men. (Mumford 1956:95)

The crisis of which Mumford writes is an outcome of technology and its appropriation for modernist purposes, that is, promotion or the supremacy of certain fragments at the expense of subjugating others. Such patterns that in pure form produce slavery are also represented in more diluted forms by the relations between the Western and non-Western worlds, by the relation between white peoples and peoples of color, by the relations of industrializing societies and indigenous peoples, by the relations of men and women. The result of these structures is suffering, victimization. Mumford calls our attention to the new dimension its global scale and yet does so in the patriarchal, patronizing idiom of modernity, writing of humanity and personhood by reliance on the species-splitting rhetoric of "man" to denote the whole. Nuclear weaponry is both the culmination of modernism and a new circumstance suggesting that superior technology as a basis of dominance is now analogous to the once active threat of a catastrophic resurfacing of the planet by glacial formation. Nuclear winter is the sequel to the historical possibility of "glacial winter." A dramatic difference is that now we have fashioned our own jeopardy and might be in a position to overcome it, whereas with respect to glaciers, the natural forces at work were beyond our control, and still are.

Contra Disneyland Postmodernism

The first requirement for a curative response is confidence in the future. Such confidence involves both a vision of something desirable and a willingness to risk a great deal to attain it. Without sacrifice, commitment, and risk, it is impossible to confront successfully a well-entrenched system of beliefs, institutions, and practices. In this regard, it is important to appreciate the resilience and continuing success of the state as a focus for political loyalty, of nationalism as a mobilizing ideology, of the market as basis for allocating resources, of war potential as the fulcrum of international stability, and of nuclear weapons as providing the only deterrence capable of avoiding world war. We cannot achieve a postmodern reality without transforming the essential nature of these main pillars of modernism, and yet the pillars continue to be so firmly in place that they cannot be successfully challenged by direct action. This underlying situation has created a widespread condition of cultural despair, even if it is often unacknowledged. The failures of the United Nations and of disarmament-

ment and foreign aid efforts add to this despair, as does the general atmosphere of acrimony in international relations that has set the tone since 1945, the reliance by the superpowers on military means to uphold their global position, and the incidence of warfare and poverty in many Third World countries.

To accept this difficult setting and yet to find a hopeful basis for understanding and action is what we need to concentrate our mental energies on. We need to avoid the pitfalls of various categories of false hope: the utopianism of muddling through, the utopianism of a technological fix (e.g., SDI), the fundamentalism of an assured true path, and the fundamentalism of an unavoidable Armageddon.

The critique and the jeopardy are plainer than a direction for response. Living amid American affluence, societal change requires nothing more than the cumulative effects of personal will. It is necessary to be cautious, even skeptical, about such claims. To posit a new age shift in civilization without any accompanying struggle invites a variety of misunderstandings, even deceptions.

My concern is this. There is a cultural disposition evident in certain circles, especially prominent in California, to suppose that we can complete the transition to the postmodern by taking an appropriate psychological stance without ever engaging concrete sources of resistance, including human depravity and greed. I am suspicious of "the Aquarian conspiracy," "the Hunger Project," "World Beyond War," and many other well-intentioned navigational guides premised on seductive recipes for inner work and smooth sailing. Epitomizing what I regard as misguided orientations toward the postmodern are the recent publications of the Ark Foundation, especially the two edited volumes of soft advocacy put out by Don Carlson and Craig Comstock (1986a; 1986b). I cannot conceive of useful knowledge that is not somehow grounded on specifics, particularly on the dirty hands of our own governing process when it comes to such matters as the unabated legacy of destruction directed at the indigenous peoples of our own continent, the moral scandal of financing and promoting contra terrorism in Central America, the still unacknowledged criminality of dropping atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki and of preparing for nuclear war, the incredible discrepancy between our overall affluence and the growing numbers of homeless and hungry persons scattered about our cities.

My reasoning here relies on the fused insight of Buber and Mumford: in line with Gandhi, Tolstoy, Jesus, Martin Luther King, Desmond Tutu, Henry David Thoreau, and all others who insist that

moral concern is serious only if it includes active participation in ongoing struggles against injustice and suffering. Such a process may reject violence as a means of struggle or reserve it for extreme situations and limited roles, but it cannot dispense with criticism and explication of power structures or with exposure and indictment of abusive elites. The contrary soft style of peace advocacy searches obsessively for validation and encouragement from established leaders, especially former heads of state and military commanders, to demonstrate a supposedly uniform and shared commitment to rid the world of nuclear weapons, or even war. The implicit intention is to suggest that power-wielders are in good faith and share the objectives of peace-seekers, that a new world order can be brought about by inner shifts in consciousness and by mutual recognitions of good faith. No conflicts are inherent, and the posture of opposition or struggle is regarded as superfluous, and destructive of opportunities for cooperative, curative efforts. In their eagerness for support, soft advocates often rip rhetorical flourishes of officials from the overall context of their careers, beliefs, and convictions of such leaders; frequently, peace-oriented assertions amount to rearview mirror wisdom delivered from the largely detached sanctuary of retirement from public life. Perhaps, the most notorious illustration of soft advocacy is the constant iteration of Eisenhower's warning about the military-industrial complex in his Farewell Address. Over the years few have paused to ask why Eisenhower waited until retirement from public life to deliver this warning and why he did so much to conventionalize the role of nuclear weapons in the armed forces while he led the country as our most popularly elected postwar president. Rarely is it observed that those who gain access to militarized power structures cannot govern effectively unless they accept the overall legitimacy of the national security consensus, that co-option and careerism operate as potent conscience-numbing forces on those

who act prominently on behalf of modernist and highly militarized structures. It is not surprising, then, that glimmerings of conscience reemerge as individuals are released from these structures by retirement, but neither is it appropriate to regard such expressions of concern as related to prospects for change in the structures themselves.

My view is this: Until we pronounce clearly upon these concrete issues of modernist illegitimacy, the quest and promise of a postmodern world is, despite all protestations, a disguised, if unwitting, ex-

pression of acceptance of the destructive character of modernity. This critical imperative entails an overall attitude of resistance, or at minimum, skepticism toward the policies and proposals of established structures and elites. For these reasons, soft advocacy is rejected as misleading and diversionary, although its focus on shifting values and life-styles is a helpful emphasis, as is its implicit rejection of bloody revolutionary tactics. In essence, my critique comes down to an indictment of soft advocacy or Disneyland postmodernism that acts as a kind of opiate, promising an eventual salvation without any transitional unpleasantness. In some ways, this critique is analogous to Marx's indictment of religion as "the opiate of the people," having in mind the Christian message of patience for the rewards of the next world if one's lot in this life seemed demeaning or unfair.

Five distinct problematic aspects can be identified as associated with Disneyland postmodernism:

1. An abstract affirmation of a holistic, harmonious future as implicit or imminent can be an evasion of the ethical injunction to engage concretely in the struggle to overcome suffering and to help sustain the life prospects of present and future generations.

2. Some integrative dynamics move toward a homogenized, mercantile holism that ensnares the imagination and the human spirit; whether we conceive of the future by the acculturating music played in international hotel chains or in the manner of the Merrill Lynch bull that roams the world in search of investment bargains beneath the slogan, "Your world should know no boundaries," such a future may organize the planet globally, but by colonizing logics (for example, the injunction "Think Global" highlighted in newsprint advertising on behalf of the Scudder Global Fund, given spatial form by a logo that consists of a global map girdled by double bands of ticker tape filled with stock quotations).

3. The tendency to reinterpret science and natural reality as confirmatory of a spiritual grounding for human endeavors is useful as a basis for healing the cultural wounds of modernism, but it is not necessarily indicative of an overall transformation of the civilizational

worldview, at least not in accordance with a time frame relevant for the solution of the main world order challenges: war, famine, disease, oppression, environmental decay, alienation, poverty.

4. The emphasis on holistic possibilities of encompassing conflict needs to be convincingly reconciled with the preservation and extension of diversity; planetary ecology on an axis of concern is better served if diversity is seen as a resource that is nurtured simultaneously with an awareness of wholeness and oneness of our identity as a species; a style of dialectical interpretation is needed to convey the interplay of wholeness and diversity as positive elements.

5. A detached imagery of postmodernism is largely an expression of the privileged status of the West, and does not take enough serious account of the urgent preoccupations of non-Western peoples or of those who are "losers" in the West. As such, its claims of provincial flavor, and these claims risk dismissal elsewhere as frivolous diversions.

Taking heed of these caveats enables the difficult search for political pathways to a postmodern world. This undertaking needs what Raymond Williams identifies as "the difficult business of gaining confidence in *our own* energies and capacities" (1983:268).

A Second Axial Upheaval

Lewis Mumford, Karl Jaspers, Paul Tillich, and Elise Boulding have called our attention to an initial axial age several centuries before Christ, in which several great religions became established under diverse cultural and geographic conditions. The essence of the axial idea is a profound alteration in the shape of civilization and the content of human consciousness and a reorientation of normative outlook and guiding values.

With the exhaustion of modernizing energies, and the various types of normative reactions taking hold in opposition to specific forms of domination and destructive potential characteristic of the modern, it seems appropriate to conceive of the possible emergence of a second axial age. The tentativeness of this assertion arises from

the difficulty of interpreting inchoate social forces and contradictory types of evidence. The time interval of emergence is surely likely to be a matter of decades, if not considerably longer. Yet, there is something helpful about the imagery of a foundational reality that is bound up with the axial notion. It is also at the basis of the postmodern possibility.

Put differently, if we are experiencing the early stages of a second axial upheaval, then this is what will enable establishment of a postmodern world. At present, the axial upheaval seems mainly an expression of oppositional imagery active at only the margins of modernism, as a kind of snapping at the heels: initiatives contra violence, bureaucracy, centralizing technology, hierarchy, patriarchy, ecological carelessness. But it is also beginning to nourish some new modes of action: nonviolent practices, participatory organizations, soft energy paths and gentle technology, democratizing politics, feminizing leadership and tactics, spiritualized nature, Green consciousness. It is the mixing of these axial elements in a variety of concrete embodiments as innovative forms of social action that provide an inspiration: The Green Party, Greenham Common, Ground Zero (Seattle), Lokayan, the Chipko movement, Solidarity, The Great Peace Journey. As moving in history, these expressions of creative energy each work out tensions between different pulls, given the historical setting and felt urgencies of specific conjunctures of time and space. Each initiative may wither, or succumb to mainstream modernist conventional wisdom about "winning" in "the real world." But each is worthy of study and help because it is informed by the postmodern possibility of a new axial breakthrough.

Let me be clearer. These axial gropings contrast with modernist impulses toward reform, whether initiated at the level of state action or the grassroots. Examples of modernistic reform: the Freeze Movement, Superpower Summits, arms control negotiations, the antiapartheid struggle, the law of the seas treaty, elimination of gross abuses of human rights. Each has useful, even crucial, elements that could contribute greater stability to our world, but each is dependent upon either violence or state power, or both, as the focus of its action—that is, violence or governmental initiative must be used as means, and a new configuration of state power is the main goal. In other words, this style of action may uncover the normative potential of modernism, and even strengthen our capacity to make the transition to the postmodern world in a relatively gentle, less abrupt manner. Yet, my argument is: Modernist politics, however effective as a

holding operation, is unable to help supersede fragmentation, technicism, violence, and statism, which assure normative entropy and threaten us with various forms of catastrophic collapse. The implicit distinction is between holding the modern world together and transforming it for the sake of the postmodern possibility.

Toward a Postmodern Ethics

The ground for action in the world is a combination of normative outlook and personal identity. The postmodern identity is constituted by a deep feeling of unity with others (what Erik Erikson regards as species identity), an intimacy with nature (a coevolutionary relation), and a reverence for life. It is also constituted by a sense of freedom and responsibility for one's own behavior and a refusal to accept as unconditional the authority of any external source of truth. These shared orientations provide a foundation for a postmodern ethics that is beginning to take shape in many distinct settings of challenge and response. Postmodern ethics has ancient roots that can be associated with the lives of Socrates, Jesus, the Buddha, even Saint Francis, more in the character of an embodiment in action than an abstract precept of conduct. Some features can be identified:

React to the Intolerable

There is room for disagreement as to individual and societal goals, but there is no reason to accept avoidable suffering and every reason to oppose deliberate efforts to inflict pain and cause suffering. The concreteness of pain and suffering (psychic humiliation as well as physical torment) provides us with an assurance that our intentions and actions to ameliorate them are beneficial.

Refuse to Lie or Manifest Mistrust

If any institution seeks obedience by insisting that lies be told, it is essential to resist even if it means confinement and pain. If a system of order implants distrust, it is essential to base personal relations on openness and truthfulness. Adam Michnik has expressed this stance of sacrificial nonviolent defiance as the basis of an ethical life in authoritarian Poland, identifying the state and the Communist Party as associated with an ethics of pervasive lying and mistrust. There is no way that an institution can deprive us of this capacity to be truthful and trusting, and so long

as we are, a crucial domain of freedom is retained, however repressive the regime.

Regard Personal Relations as Models for the Good Society

The practices of everyday life reproduce and prefigure the patterns of more complex impersonal relations. Our sense of order and authority is expressed by the way we live our lives and organize our activities at every level of social organization, starting with the family and the clan. There is a close bond between desirable governance for the family and for the human family. A patriarchal social movement cannot contribute to the construction of a beneficial postmodernism.

The Future is Now

Within our zones of autonomous existence we can live as if . . . , and by so doing, bring the desired transformation about.

The Primacy of Conscience

Trusting others depends on trusting and acting on one's own sense of right and wrong. Such attitudes encourage nonviolent, yet militant, resistance and expectations of accountability, especially by those with power. There is also a burden to adopt a critical view of what is near, within the range of ethical reach. Criticizing one's own government is an especially valuable expression of patriotism in our historical epoch, especially if carried on within an ascendant state that associates its security with superior military prowess and with the control of extraterritorial developments. This latter disposition to project power and influence strengthens the impulse toward intervention and violent encounter.

Journey to the Future

Although we can model the future, we must not deceive ourselves that it is in place already. Such a pretension overlooks suffering and structures of domination and distortion, and it facilitates escapist flights of fancy. The unifying struggle that informs reactions to various modernist failures is to establish a nonviolent, encompassing political community that allows distinct and diverse identities to flourish, overlapping and intersecting from individual to individual and group to group. It is not a specific project, as such, in the manner of promoting nuclear disarmament or the democratization of a given society, but rather it is a perspective that animates action to a sufficient degree that over time a cumulative dynamic of transformation gathers force and eventually displaces the

old superseded order. It is not an event but a process, a shift in the ground of beliefs and values sufficient to overcome the prevalence of the modernist mind-set. Optimistically and probably prematurely, it has been identified as "the silent revolution." Interpreting the weight of new normative forms is virtually impossible, as much of what is significant seems to occur at unconscious levels of awareness or is subject to partisan perceptions that inflate or unduly minimize. The old order retains control over most flows of information, manipulates from a modernist mind-set, and may create an impression that the desired future is more remote than is the case. Experience with unexpected revolutions at the societal scale suggests that resentments often accumulate in latent form, creating illusions of stability that are discarded after the unexpected eruption takes place. There is the analogous ecological resilience of living systems that "hide" their deterioration until almost at the verge of collapse.

Be Receptive to the Vibrations of Feminized Consciousness

Women are primary bearers of the socially constructed "feminine" role. Long ago Schopenhauer, despite reactionary intentions, intuited this powerful vocation of women:

Because fundamentally women exist solely for the propagation of the race and find in this their vocation, they are altogether more involved with the species than with individuals, and in their hearts take the affairs of the species more seriously than they do those of the individual. (Schopenhauer 1970:84)

This earthly sense of the whole provides a way of reanimating our political life.

Develop the Ideal of the Citizen Pilgrim

The pilgrim is one who is on a journey in space and time, seeking a better country, a heavenly one (Hebrews 11:13-16). There are no illusions that the present is an embodiment of what is possible. The citizen pilgrim is loyal to this quest, not bound by any sense of duty to carry out the destructive missions of a given territorial state to which he or she owes temporary secular allegiance.

There Are no Messiahs.

The belief that only a charismatic presence can break the bonds of oppressive structure invites quietism and co-option. The movement makes its heroes more than heroes produce a

movement. If we wait for a messiah, we wait; if we react to the challenges of present and future as responsible moral agents, as aspiring citizen pilgrims, then we act. By acting, a cumulative process unfolds, leaders emerge, and new horizons of realistic aspiration present themselves.

Toward a Postmodern Politics

This period of transition imposes particular demands on the level of political action. The quest: nurturing the new while muting the destructive features of the old, partially superseded yet still prevailing political order. It is essential to reject a polarization of choicerepudiating the old as decadent and obsolete, disregarding the new as irrelevantly utopian. The ongoing debate between realists and utopians implies a false either/or choice. Instead we emphasize both/when, clarifying the province of reform and the domain of radical restructuring. At this stage, the political effort needs to be one of integration, first of all, in the imagination"Time present and time past are both perhaps contained in time future." Even my separation of modernist and postmodernist possibilities is based on a dichotomy of convenience only. The displacement of modernism invites recovery of the premodern past as well as pursuit of the postmodern future. Or, as we conceive of postmodernist possibilities, it is helpful to infuse premodern understanding and wisdom. In many respects, the premodern anticipates the postmodern more helpfully than does the modern, especially by its implicitly ecological worldview, its sense of the religious life as embodied in the totality of individual and social practice, and its imagery of spirituality as often genderless and as dispersed among feminine and masculine centers of energy (called gods and goddesses, or deities). The messy circumstance of action involves the implication of past and future in the present, not a sequence based on lapsed premodernism, modernism now, postmodernism later. The process of moving toward a postmodern world requires that premodernist, modernist, and postmodernist forms coexist and interpenetrate within our lives and consciousness for the indefinite future.

Some Modernist Achievements

In our critical response to statism, war, and nuclearism there is a tendency to turn from present structures in disgust. Equally harmful

is a tendency to suspend a critical demeanor because of an implicit or explicit conviction that these existing structures and their presiding elites are "the only game in town." To be critical yet receptive to normative opportunity seems the appropriate political outlook.

Modernist politics have achieved some impressive gains over the past decade that can be enumerated for purposes of illustration.

- India and Bangladesh have had some success in achieving self-sufficiency in basic foodstuffs. Relying on modernizing agriculture, the Indian subcontinent has managed to avoid the specter of famine, despite widespread, dire prophecies of doom made in the 1970s. This success is controversial, partly because ecological side effects raise the whole question of techno-agricultural manipulation and abuse of soils and plant stocks, and partly because it is not clear whether such agricultural productivity can be long sustained. Of course, simply because a country is "self-sufficient" in food grown or processed does not mean that it is distributed domestically or equitably.

· The Soviet Union, even without the benefit of democracy, was in recent years governed by a leadership that was seriously committed to achieving a breakthrough in disarmament negotiations at least, stopping the nuclear arms race and reducing, if not eliminating, the nuclear weapons dimension from East/West political conflict. Under Gorbachev, the Kremlin took serious unilateral initiatives (including a sustained moratorium on the test ban and the virtual adoption of U.S. official positions to circumvent negotiating obstacles) and set forth far-reaching credible proposals; at Reykjavik in late 1986, the leaders of the superpowers agreed for some hours on a framework of total denuclearization to unfold over the course of the next decade: 50 percent reduction in nuclear missiles and warheads during the next five years, the remaining 50 percent in the subsequent five years (including balancing and reassuring adjustments in conventional force levels and a moderating of political antagonism). The breakdown of such a promising prospect should not blind us to the significance of its occurrence. For a brief interval, at least, the leaders of the most powerful states apparently associated their security with the complete abolition of nuclear weaponry. Such a dramatic departure from security through nuclearism is something that not even the mainstream Western peace movement dared demand (consider the U.S. freeze movement or European resistance to the deployment of Pershing II/Cruise missiles). Note, also, that both superpowers repudiated the morality of nuclear deterrence, the United States pur-


porting to rely on the drastic technical fix of the Strategic Defense Initiative, while the Soviet Union seemingly committed to fostering a disarming process.

- Greece, New Zealand, and now the Philippines, have tried to limit their participation in nuclearism by challenging the prerogatives of the nuclear superpowers in specific ways. The new constitution for the Philippines has a non-nuclear provision: "The Philippines, consistent with national interest, adopts and pursues a policy of freedom from nuclear weapons in its territory." In a harsh editorial, *The Wall Street Journal* called this stance "a real time bomb" and an "ostrich policy of declaring oneself a nuclear-free zone" (January 14, 1987:22). The most explosive aspect of this issue arises from the well-known "secret" that the United States government uses its huge bases in the Philippines as depots for the storage of nuclear warheads.

- Argentina, Brazil, Uruguay, and the Philippines have experienced transitions from dictatorial and military rule to some form of constitutional order. There are many democratizing movements in different countries seeking to soften the relations between state and civil society, making the former responsive to the will of the latter. There is ample evidence, despite the fragility of each of these transitions, that the militarized state cannot permanently extinguish the flames of public discontent, no matter how brutal its repressive means. Popular sovereignty is alive and well in many parts of the world, suggesting that the centralized, modern state can be challenged and reformed by nonviolent means.

- Several governments, including that of Bolivia, have shown the capacity to overcome triple-digit inflation. Hyperinflation, if unabated, destroys the social fabric of modernist arrangements, inviting nihilism and fanatical political responses. To constrain inflation allows other constructive societal developments to gain strength.
- Several governments have displayed a willingness and capacity to give up their reliance on hard drugs as a source of foreign exchange earnings, although the overall record of response remains mixed and inconclusive.
- The United Nations and its large family of more specific international institutions, despite numerous difficulties, remain intact and obtain quasi-universal participation.
- Governments have established and continuously expand cooperative frameworks of varying strength in areas of trade, money, antipollution control, and antiterrorism and have almost succeeded in

establishing a comprehensive global framework to regulate the use of oceans.



Each of these achievements has a shadow side, making assessment complex. Yet, the evidence exists that governments have room to maneuver, and popular sovereignty can successfully challenge bureaucratic power and military/paramilitary styles of rulership. Positive, modernist action remains possible and could be strengthened by postmodernist pressures and perspectives. We do not yet reliably know what is the outer limit of normative potential for modernist structures, but it is essential to keep probing.

. . . Because in 1985 blind faith in your
leaders, or in anything, will get you
killed . . .

Bruce Springsteen (in concert)

Postmodernist Gropings

Beyond the modern, a politics is emerging with new dimensions: nonviolent, militant, feminized, transnational, grassroots, informal, and inspired by a postmodernist wisdom and insight. In an industrialized democracy with a functioning constitution, this emergent postmodern politics doesn't entrust the future to traditional forms of indirect participation: traditional parties, electoral campaigns, congressional lobbying, representative institutions, enlightened presidential leadership. The emphasis is either on a radical reorientation of traditional vehicles (Green Party) or on "antipolitics" (forms of collective expression that are extranormal).

A postmodern politics can develop on the basis of social movements of varying character:

The New Social Movements

In the 1970s and 1980s a series of powerful societal initiatives was associated with movement activity: in opposition to nuclear power plants, on behalf of environmental protection, in opposition to specific weapons and deployments, on behalf of women, on behalf of sexual preference, and on behalf of indigenous peoples. These movements originated out of normative

grievances or fears as well as a sense of skepticism about the character of conventional political mechanisms of change and control. As these movements evolved, splits emerged, paralleling the modern/postmodern divide, especially between process and substance. Beyond renouncing violence and shifting expectations for renewal and reform away from the political center, there was significance attached to finding practical ways of organizing that did not reproduce hierarchical, patriarchal patterns.

Popular Sovereignty Ascendant

There is a widespread withdrawal of deference to the centralized state apparatus in all sectors of the world, although not in every society. The legitimacy of the state is being contested in many forms on both efficiency and normative grounds, usually expressed as demands for democratizing reforms, including procedures enabling access to governmental authority and making leaders accountable for abuses of state power, either by way of economic corruption or repression of dissenters. Each struggle has its own specific character, but the overall claims of popular sovereignty are being asserted as existential demands; these cannot be satisfied by abstractions about a fictitious social contract vesting power in the state in exchange for public order or about the inherently liberating character of postrevolutionary proletarian rule. Both liberalism and Marxism/Leninism are no longer presumed legitimate, especially by those who reject the view that nationalist or class identity of a government is the decisive test of legitimacy. The appeal of premodern politics, especially when not hidden by layers of sentimental nostalgia, is its experience with holistic patterns of practice and with minimal institutional structure.

Secular Supremacy Challenged

In many forms religious deference to the state is also diminishing, and being reversed. Secular doctrines of separation of church and state are under attack from both fundamentalist and postmodernist outlooks. The association of religious convictions and solidarity with the poor provides a ground for mass mobilization against modernist orientations toward politics. "Liberation theology" in its many varieties aspires to a reunion of secular goals and spiritual identity. Even mainstream churches on issues of nuclear weaponry or poverty are seeking to reclaim authority, at least to the extent of eroding the legitimacy of the state by counterpoising contrasting normative imperatives that are addressed to the individual consciences of adherents, challenging modernist assumptions

that obedience and respect for the state were aspects of good citizenship.

Reclaiming Law

Another field of postmodern political action is in relation to law. By invoking international law and personal conscience as justifications for violating domestic law, individuals and groups are calling into question unconditional notions of sovereignty and statist national security policy. Appeal to a global normative order suggests that bonds among societies take precedence over the state/society nexus. This postmodernist priority is emphasized by adherence to international human rights standards and by the Nuremberg Obligation that holds leaders and policy makers criminally liable for violations of international law in the war/peace area and imposes responsibility on individual citizens to implement the legal order against their own leadership; a freely elected government acquires no exemption from accountability. The establishment of judicial frameworks by informal and populist initiative is another expression of a wider view of justice. In many countries populist tribunals hear evidence, interview witnesses, and render judgments on issues of public policy. Several tribunals have assessed the reliance on nuclear weaponry under varying conditions, on controversial uses of military force (e.g., in Vietnam, Afghanistan, Nicaragua), and on denials of human rights (e.g., in South Africa, Philippines under Marcos). This process of informal adjudication has been given institutional expression in the Permanent Peoples Tribunal (a project of the Rome-based International League for the Rights of Peoples) that carries out its assessment of public wrongs in relation to its own constitutional document—the Algiers Declaration of the Rights of Peoples.

Transnational Relief; Cultural Activism

Rock concerts (live-aid) for overseas famine and disasters have created a new idiom for helping acute victims of calamity. Such events tend to be multiracial, multiethnic, and multinational in character, creating psychological bonds of solidarity that circumvent normal diplomatic channels and are not at all delimited by territorial boundaries.

Transnational Information

Widespread awareness of the general tendency of the state to confuse information with propaganda has generated distrust of both official sources and state motives. Just recently it has been established that intelligence agencies of the

United States government intensified the Iran and Iraq War by a deliberate campaign of disinformation; a few months earlier a similar campaign was uncovered designed to portray Muammar Qaddafi as an arch-terrorist, evidently to build public support for punitive violence against Libya. Our expectations of government have fallen so low that we tend to accept such disclosures as "routine" and fault leaders not for what they did but for their failure to come clean or step forward with a ritual apology. In reality, the distortions that are part of this geopolitical power game the negative pole of modernist politics are quite lethal in their impact on life and community, either by building a false case for military force (as with Libya) or through encouraging hostile misperception (as with Iran and Iraq).

In view of this statist tendency to distort information, private associations with small resources but high integrity can help reshape public debate and perceptions. Amnesty International and Swedish International Peace Research Institute are two independent initiatives that provide generally reliable information in contested arenas such as human rights abuses and militarization.

Conclusion

The promise of a postmodern world depends on human initiative, as well as on historical tendencies. The prefiguring of the future in our imaginations and lives gives each of us the possibility and also a responsibility to act, but not merely by a leap in time. It depends on bringing postmodern ethics and politics concretely to bear as therapy for the wounds that bring so much pain to those with whom we share the planet. Taking suffering seriously is the best indication that we care about the future in a way that matters.

One source of inspiration for these endeavors is Martin Luther King's exemplary life and practice. He once told his congregation at the Ebenezer Baptist Church in Atlanta that "dissent and nonconformity were the essence of true Christianity" (quoted in Garrow 1986:459). I am inclined to emphasize dissent and nonconformity as equally indispensable for an authentic embrace of the postmodern possibility. Unless we link our bodies and resources to the various struggles against the specific crimes of modernity, we are not ethically and politically fit to cross that great divide linking present to future. Contrariwise, if we become immersed totally in antimodernist projects, however valuable, we lose contact with the most powerful set

of liberating energies at work in our personal and public lives during this historical epoch. To be postmodern we need to develop the practices and nurture the consciousness that simultaneously inhabits premodern, modern, and postmodern realms of actual and potential being.

References

Buber, Martin

1950

Paths in Utopia. New York: Macmillan.

Carlson, Donald, and Craig Comstock

1986a

Citizens Summitry. New York: Jeremy Tarcher/St. Martin's Press.

1986b

Securing Our Planet. New York: Jeremy Tarcher/St. Martin's Press.

Diamond, Stanley

1974

In Search of the Primitive: A Critique of Civilization. New Brunswick, N. J.: E. P. Dutton/Transaction Books.

Garrow, D.

1986

Bearing the Cross: Martin Luther King and the Southern Christian Leadership Conference. New York: Harper.

Mumford, Lewis

1956

The Transformations of Man. New York: Harper.

Schopenhauer, Arthur

1970

Essays and Aphorisms. New York: Penguin.

Williams, Raymond

1983

The Year 2000. New York: Pantheon.

25

Our Endangered Species

Alger Hiss

It is fitting that a volume honoring Stanley Diamond should include at least one piece on the current state of world politics. Diamond's scholarly interests and his professional investigations were worldwide. His dedication was consistently to the understanding of man and culture. But he did not limit his area of concern to the societies that were the subjects of his professional work. He was an active participant in the political events through which he lived. Outspoken, courageous, and incisive in his analysis of world problems, he was always a man of politics, in addition to being a man of scholarship and letters.

As well he might, for the political activities in which Diamond took a vigorous role have increasingly become focused on the threat to actual survival of the species whose culture he both studied and influenced. As he says readily, his abiding interest was the welfare of humanity.

This is a grim moment to undertake a survey of world affairs. Never before has man been forced to recognize himself as a member of one among many species with no absolute certainty that his species is assured of survival. No other species has any such assurance. The geological records and even our modern recordings tell of the extinction of a growing list of species. Now, humanity has become an endangered species with the unique distinction that our threatened disappearance would be of our own devising. True, no form of life has a guaranteed leasehold in perpetuity on the planet. But humans are the only sentient form, the only one capable of forefending against its ouster. Yet, at the moment we seem unable even to prevent self-decimation, or worse, from the pollution by ourselves of the environment, the self-inflicted poisoning of our food and water, and the exhaustion of the natural resources on which we are dependent.

The dangers of this newly perceived instance of humans' propensity for self-wounding are relatively long-term ones, still only potential in their direct impact. In theory at least, there is still time to avoid

catastrophe. There is concern about some of these threats, together with encouraging, if modest, efforts at remedial action.

To reduce the towering pile of atomic weapons, however, more than a slight stirring of official affirmative activity must be taken. The danger has grown steadily that a holocaust would in a few hours reduce the major cities of the disputing nations and their allies to the ruins that have been the work of centuries in the fabled, great abandoned cities of the Near East, Latin America, and East Asia. Unimaginable carnage would dwarf the combined massacres and genocide, famines and bloody wars of a great part of human history. The priceless cultural treasures accumulated in our long, slow march through history would be destroyed. More, the aftermath of *Gotterdammerung*, we are told, would spread a life-destroying pall over the rest of the globe, dooming human and most other life.

The danger of the eventual disappearance of humanity in firestorms and rubble or amid suffocating smog of our own doing has produced, in a number of countries, some first public protests aimed at prevention. But the immediate threat of a sudden self-imposed ending of human history, our extinction as a species a threat that should be apparent to all has thus far brought about only rudimentary practical steps away from the impending catastrophe. Humankind, truly capable of cooperation beyond any other species, capable of mastering the planet and its seas and air, capable of incredible feats of engineering and enduring art, capable of understanding and probing the vastness of the universe, cannot even begin the process of avoiding self-destruction.

The great Greek dramatists were able to discern and depict remorseless and unavoidable tragedy that grew inexorably from the compulsions of the participants. The awe and horror of the spectator arise from the realization that these are not accounts merely of doomed individuals, unrepresentative of their fellows. These characters are metaphors for the human condition. This observation fills me with a nightmarish sense of *déjà vu*, that we of the general public are spectators, watching with horror and terror the unfolding of inevitable, relentless tragedy. But this time, the spectacle is not a play but ultimate reality, in which actors and spectators alike will be returned to original chaos. But then, figuratively speaking, I pinch myself out of the nightmare and say: Surely, the wisdom of the classical Greek thinkers has alerted us to the destructive folly of permitting ourselves to be trapped in the hypnotic grip of a scenario of unavoid-

able tragedy. There are many who see the awesome danger. Some of them must be among the actors, and the army of spectators are themselves not wholly without power, certainly not without voice, even persuasive voice.

This proposition, based on hope rather than rational conviction, has at least the merit of avoiding paralysis based on despair. And it has the further merit of resting on the inspiring hypothesis that some of the leading actors are not caught in the grip of ineluctable tragedy. These same ones, we can hope, may yet be able to convince their fellow actors that the latter are badly mistaken in their calculations or will see to it that the misguided ones will be replaced. At all events, we spectators must not assume that the jig is up. While we do whatever is in our power to support in current politics the sanity of the case for human survival, we must also concern ourselves with other cogent issues of world affairs, most of which are not without some connection with the threat of annihilation, our modern sword of Damocles.

Military confrontation anywhere contains the seeds of mutual destruction and must be regarded in these terms. But the seemingly subordinate issues have their own moral and political imperatives, and must be dealt with on their own terms.

For any American with a respect for the good opinion of the rest of the world and a continuing belief in the desirability of the comity of nations, present United States foreign policy is dismally wrongheaded in area after area. We attempt by counterterrorism to stem terrorism bred by conditions in the Middle East. Ignoring the causes of Palestinian desperation, in our turn we visit destruction disproportionate to that destruction for which we retaliate. At best dubious in its effectiveness, our policy seems, in large part, an infantile response to frustration and a ploy to obtain the plaudits and political support of a frightened and uninformed public. That support tends to become the basis for still further adventurism and the use of force as a major element in our foreign policy.

How different might be the prospect for possible settlement of heretofore intractable regional conflicts if cooperation instead of confrontation between the United States and the Soviet Union were possible. Our rivalries, which have enlivened ancient disputes in the Middle East, in Africa, East Asia, and the more recent tensions in Central America, do not in reality further the national interests of the two great powers. Not only do they increase the risk of mutual

destruction, but they also increase the heavy burdens that these rivalries themselves impose. Cooperation, however limited, might transform the now forbidding crop of regional conflicts that cause such bitter suffering throughout the world. We really can imagine, perhaps for the first time ever, the possibility of escape both from the threat of extinction and the curse of war, our most persistent scourge. The ancient questions, old when they were phrased in the Messiah, with their biblical overtones, are still the world's most agonizing cry: "Why do the nations rage so furiously together?" and "Why do the people imagine a vain thing?" Today the martial lure is for our country a vainer thing than ever before. But daily its continuing potency for the people is incontrovertibly demonstrated. Yet we may at long last have the possibility of stilling that cry. The alternative may well be the extinction of all human cries.

This is not the first time that the threat of destruction has raised hopes and even the possibility of a world at peace. The ravages of war and the glories of cultural achievement are the twin products most associated with humanity's long history. The species is at once builder and destroyer, nurturer and killer, by turn compassionate and ruthless. Both traits have always been present, if one looks at our world with any sense of history. Rare moments of tranquillity have led to illusions that the peaceable kingdom has come, a reward for spiritual growth.

In my youth the vast toll in lives and property in World War I led those of thought and feeling, at least in the Western world, to assert that warfare must be eliminated. The generation that produced *What Price Glory*, *All Quiet on the Western Front*, *Goodbye to All That*, the Oxford Oath against military service, and the other expressions of revulsion at the horrors of World War I, led to the imperfect arrangements of the League of Nations. Again after the far greater devastation of the Second World War, there was universal desire and hope for a new start. That time, an improved model for international cooperation, the United Nations, was the result. Formed without awareness of the imminence of atomic weapons, it, too, has not produced a viable mechanism for the resolution of national rivalries. If we are unable to learn from the past, to benefit from the metaphors of classic Greek drama, there will be no third chance to repent of insensate animosities.

EPILOGUE
APPRECIATING THE ARTS OF STANLEY
DIAMOND

Gary Snyder

I scarcely knew this man Stanley Diamond, first from his books when I still lived in Japan; then we talked on the phone and wrote letters across Turtle Island in the early seventies. And I got to know him better. I found his work so valuable, confirming, exploring, throwing different lights on the insights and thoughts I was beginning to permit myself. I was beginning to be able to say that perhaps civilization is new, shallow, anomalous. That human character was rich and complex for millennia before the rise of the early states, that artistic taste, moral discrimination, accurate observation of phenomena, meticulous and detached appreciation of craft, and so forth were ancient strengths of our far ancestors and that the rise of the state was built on a capacity for self-governance that was established in vernacular societies and not the reverse, i.e., that order flows up from the grass, and is paraded as an icon by the self-serving imperium even as it describes its role as teaching order to below. These and other fascinating notions were not easy to voice (and are still not) in a world in which education has convinced the professors, let alone the students, that prehistory is a fog, that literacy is a key to freedom, that lessons from history can only begin in the state, and that serious people do not handle tools, grow food, talk dialect, sew their own buttons, do their own car tune-ups, or play too long with children. Do you get it? As the storyteller always is saying. The elegance of Japanese Zen Buddhist high spiritual and aesthetic culture is but a step away from laughingly admitting that the simplicities of a 40,000-year Australian aboriginal culture might contain all the insights and accomplishments gloriously described in the Lotus Sutra and be a pinnacle of human achievement. Can we imagine Rome or Damascus or Moscow admiring that, or admiring Laotzu's village where the cock crows? No. But Diamond was one of the few thinkers who helped us turn our view that way. It is art, it is poetry, it is most profoundly political, this angle, this exploration of

his and mine, this angle of the persistence and ineluctable value of the primary, the vernacular, the local, the essential, the single, the imperfect, the sexual, the feast, the song, the afterbirth. I have made this my art, my politics, my homestead. So my salutations to Stanley Diamond, on whose couch I have napped and in whose college halls I have stood up and lectured. A suitably difficult and thorny friend I did not always understand, whose poetry, oddly, can be more formal than mine, but I have gotten high on it, and have elsewhere honored its power and clarity. I could say more about complexities and intellectualities of all this, and the dharma-combats of Euro-American ideas. But life slipped along, for both of us, and the bones that are left when the soft parts rot are the poetics, not the dialectics (lovely as they may be.) And if you think Stanley didn't agree, read pages 8384 in *Totems*, his ode to a Russian Poet. So I close this celebratory book with a poem, an offering to Stanley, himself a Seneca Bear brother, that was given me by the Bear Mother while napping one afternoon last summer in the Brooks Range.

She veils herself
to speak of eating salmon
Teases me with
"What do you know of my ways"
And kisses me through the mountain
Through and under its layers, its
gullies, its folds;
Her mouth full of blueberries,
We share.

Gary Snyder May 5 40087

PUBLISHED WORKS OF STANLEY DIAMOND

1951

Dahomey: A Proto-State in West Africa, Ph.D. Dissertation in Anthropology, Columbia University. Ann Arbor, Mich.: University Microfilms.

1957a

Kibbutz: Utopia in Crisis. *Dissent* (Spring).

1957b

Kibbutz and Stetl: The History of an Idea. *Social Problems* 5.

1957c

Eruption in the Middle East. *Dissent* (Winter).

1960a

Anaguta Cosmography: The Linguistics and Behavioral Implications. *Anthropological Linguistics* 2:3138.

1960b

Plato and the Definition of the Primitive. *In Culture in History: Essays in Honor of Paul Radin*, edited by Stanley Diamond, 11841. New York: Columbia University Press.

1960c

Essay on William Bascom and Melville Herskovits, eds., *Continuity and Change in African Cultures*. *American Anthropologist* 62(6):108590.

1962a

Communication: Culture and Race. *Science* (March 16):96164.

1962b

Nigeria I: Still a Key but not a Showpiece; Nigeria II: Collapse in the West; Nigeria III: The Conflict with Ghana. *Africa Today* (July, September, November).

1962c

Reflections on the Heritage of Colonialism: Ghana and Northern Nigeria. *Revista de Ciencias Sociales* (December).

1963a

The Search for the Primitive. *In* *Man's Image in Medicine and Anthropology*, edited by Iago Galdston, 62-115. New York: International Universities Press.

1963b

Nigeria IV: The Weight of the North; Nigeria V: The Sardauna of Sokoto; Nigeria VI: The Trial of Awowolo. *Africa Today* (January, April, December).

1963c

Modern Africa: The Pains of Birth. *Dissent* 10 (Spring):16979.

1963d

Indians: Red, White, and Blue. *Dissent* 10 (Spring):25562.

1963e

Comment on the Sociopsychological Analysis of Folktales. *Current Anthropology* 4:27576.

1963f

Statement on Racism. *Current Anthropology* 4:323.

1963g

Overkill and Understatement. *Dissent* 10 (Summer).

1963h

Moral Colonialists. *Dissent* (Fall).

1964a

On the Origins of Modern Theoretical Anthropology. *American Anthropologist* 66(1):12729.

1964b

A Revolutionary Discipline. *Current Anthropology* 5:43237.

1964c

Nigerian Discovery. *In* *Reflections on Community Studies*, edited by A. Vidich, M. Stein, and J. Bensmen, 11954. New York: John Wiley.

1964d

What History Is. *In* Process and Pattern in Culture: Essays in Honor of Julian Steward, edited by Robert Manners, 2946. Chicago, Ill.: Aldine Publishing Co.

1964e

The Nature of Primitive Society. *Voprosy Istorii* (September). Moscow.

1964f

The Uses of the Primitive. *In* Primitive Views of the World, edited by Stanley Diamond. New York: Columbia University Press.

1965

Black Farce, White Lies: Sonny Liston and Cassius Clay. *Dissent* 12(4):47477.

1966a

Nigeria: Model of a Colonial Failure. New York: American Committee on Africa.

1966b

Africa in the Perspective of Political Anthropology. *In* The Transformation of East Africa: Studies in Political Anthropology, edited by Stanley Diamond and Fred G. Burke, 329. New York: Basic Books.

1966c

Nigeria VII: The End of the First Republic. *Africa Today* (February).

1967a

The Anaguta of Nigeria: Suburban Primitives. *In* Three African Tribes in Transition, edited by Julian Steward, 361505. Champaign/Urbana: University of Illinois Press.

1967b

The Biafran Secession. *Africa Today* (July).

1967c

Primitive Society in its Many Dimensions. *In The Critical Spirit: Essays in Honor of Herbert Marcuse*, edited by Kurt Wolff and Barrington Moore, 2130. Boston: Beacon Press.

1968a

The Biafran Possibility. *Africa Report* (February 16). Reprinted in *Soll Biafran Uberleben*. Lettnerverlag, 1969.

1968b

War and the Dissociated Personality. *In War: The Anthropology of Armed Conflict and Aggression*, edited by Morton Fried, Marvin Harris, and Robert Murphy, 18389. New York: Natural History Press.

1968c

Radin, Paul. *Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences*, edited by David Sills, 300303. New York: Macmillan.

1968d

Communication: Moral Engagement of the Scientist. *Science* (March 8):104951.

1969a

Anthropology in Question. *In Reinventing Anthropology*, edited by Dell Hymes, 40129. New York: Pantheon Books.

1969b

Collective Child Rearing. *In The Family: Structure and Function*, edited by Rose Coser. New York: St. Martin's Press.

1970a

Un ethnocide. *Les temps modernes* 283 (February):11941206.

1970b

Reflections on the African Revolution: The Point of the Biafran Case. *Journal of Asian and African Studies* 5(1-2):1627). Toronto.

1970c

Who Killed Biafra. *The New York Review of Books* (Feb. 26):1727. Reprinted in *Kroniek van Afrika*, Leiden, 1970; and by the Britain Biafra Association, London.

1970d

The Great Black Hope. *In Black America*, edited by John Szwed, 17178. New York: Basic Books.

1971a

Primitive: The Critical Term. *Alcheringa* 2 (Summer):6670.

1971b

The Rule of Law versus the Order of Custom. *In The Rule of Law*, edited by Robert P. Wolff, 11544. New York: Simon and Schuster. Reprinted, inter alia, in *Social Research* 38(1):4272, 1971; *Les temps modernes* 309:162454; and in *Criminal Justice in America*, edited by Richard Quinney (New York: Little, Brown, 1974).

1971c

Paul Radin: An Appreciation. *In* Paul Radin, *The World of Primitive Man*, xiii-xxvii. New York: E. P. Dutton.

1971d

Man and Superman. *Partisan Review* 2.

1971e

Response to Dennis Wrong. *Commentary* (March).

1972a

Anthropology in Question. *In* *Reinventing Anthropology*, edited by Dell Hymes, 401-29. New York: Pantheon.

1972b

Introductory Essay: Job and the Trickster. *In* Paul Radin, *The Trickster* (new edition), xix-xii. New York: Schocken Books.

1972c

Job and the Trickster. *Alcheringa* 4 (Autumn):74-82.

1973

Nigerian Aftermath. *The New York Review of Books*.

1974a

In Search of the Primitive: A Critique of Civilization. New Brunswick, N. J.: E. P. Dutton/Transaction Books.

1974b

Introduction. *In* Jules and Zunia Henry, *Dollplay of Pilaga Indian Children*, ix-xv. New York: Random House/Vintage.

1974c

The Myth of Structuralism. *In* The Unconscious in Culture: The Structuralism of Claude Lévi-Strauss in Perspective, edited by Ino Rossi, 292335. New York: E. P. Dutton.

1974d

End Games of Empire: Response to Edmund Leach. The New York Review of Books (Oct. 17):3738.

1975a

Personality Dynamics in an Israeli Collective: A Psychohistorical Analysis of Two Generations. *History of Childhood Quarterly* 3(1):141.

1975b

The Marxist Tradition as Dialectical Anthropology. *Dialectical Anthropology* 1(1):16.

1976a

The Primitive and the Civilized. Tract 18 (February). London.

1976b

The Paris Commune in Communist China: An Anthropological Perspective. *Dialectical Anthropology* 1(4):38386.

1977

On Reading Vico. *Dialectical Anthropology* 2(1):1932.

1979a

Legal Anthropology in Germany. *Sociology of Law Review* (Spring). Berlin.

1979b

Introduction: Critical versus Ideological Marxism. *In* Toward a Marxist Anthropology, edited by Stanley Diamond, 110. The Hague: Mouton.

1979c

Toward the Definition of a Sacred Society. *Humanitas: Journal of the Institute of Man* XV(1):10112.

1979d

Biological and Cultural Evolution; and The Anthropological Study of Complex Societies. *In* *People in Culture*, edited by Ino Rossi. New York: Praeger.

1980a

Anthropological Traditions: The Participants Observed. *In* *Anthropology: Ancestors and Heirs*, edited by Stanley Diamond, 116. The Hague: Mouton.

1980b

Theory, Practice, and Poetry in Vico. *In* *Theory and Practice: Essays Presented to Gene Weltfish*, edited by Stanley Diamond, 30929. The Hague: Mouton.

1981a

Beyond Convention. *New Literary History* XIII: 17177.

1981b

Paul Radin. *In* *Totems and Teachers: Perspectives on the History of Anthropology*, edited by Sydel Silverman, 67100. New York: Columbia University Press.

1982

Subversive Art. *Social Research* 49(4):85477.

1983a

The State of Being Jewish. *Dialectical Anthropology* 8(12):16.

1983b

Communication/Conversation: Jacobo Timerman and Stanley Diamond. *Dialectical Anthropology* 8(12):12960.

1985

Questions. Introduction to the Special Issue "Anthropology 1984: The State of the Art and the State of Society." *Dialectical Anthropology* 9(14):16.

1987

The Beautiful and the Ugly Are One Thing, the Sublime Another: A Reflection on Culture. *Cultural Anthropology* 2(2):26871.

1989

Revolution and Culture. *Dialectical Anthropology* 13:27990.

1990a

Jung versus Freud: What It Means to Be Funny. *In C. G. Jung and the Humanities*, edited by Karen Barnaby. Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press.

1990b

Primitive Afterword. *In Writings for Gary Snyder*, edited by Jan Halper. Sierra Books.

1992

Dahomey: Dynamics of a Proto-State. Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, forthcoming.

Edited Volumes

1960

Culture in History: Essays in Honor of Paul Radin. New York: Columbia University Press.

1964

Primitive Views of the World. New York: Columbia University Press. Reprinted 1968.

1979

Toward a Marxist Anthropology. World Anthropology Series. The Hague: Mouton.

1980a

Anthropology: Ancestors and Heirs. The Hague: Mouton.

1980b

Theory and Practice: Essays Presented to Gene Weltfish. The Hague: Mouton.

Co-Authored Works

Diamond, Stanley, William Sturtevant, and William Fenton

1964

Memorandum on the Seneca Indian-Kinzua Dam Case. American Anthropologist 66(3, part 1):631-33; submitted at Seneca request to the Joint Senate-House Subcommittee on Indian Affairs and read into the Congressional Record.

Diamond, Stanley, and staff

1967

The Culture of Schools. Five-volume report. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Education.

Diamond, Stanley, and Edward Nell

1970

The Old School at the New School. The New York Review of Books (June 18):3843.

Diamond, Stanley, Bob Scholte, and Eric Wolf

1975a

The Marxist Tradition in Anthropology. Critique of anthropology (Fall).

1975b

Anti-Kaplan: Defining the Marxist Tradition. American Anthropologist 77(4):87076.

Co-Edited Volumes

Diamond, Stanley, and Fred G. Burke, eds.

1966

The Transformation of East Africa: Studies in Political Anthropology. New York: Basic Books.

Wax, Murray, Stanley Diamond, and Fred Gearing, eds.

1971

Anthropological Perspectives on Education. New York: Basic Books.

Poetry

1966

Intent. Columbia Forum (Summer).

1969

Sunday in Biafra. The New York Review of Books (May).

1982

Totems. Barrytown, N.Y.: Station Hill Press.

1986

Going West: Narrative Poems. Northampton, Mass.: Hermes House Press.

INDEX

A

Absolutism, 35961, 364, 367, 372, 378, 38384, 441, 490. *See also* State

Abstraction, 45354, 459, 46768, 47072, 47476, 478, 490, 505

Addiction, 3, 57, 490

Agency, 159, 194, 316, 31922, 324, 328, 330, 341, 34546, 35253, 355, 358, 366, 368, 370, 37577, 38082, 40712, 41422, 424, 434, 455, 461, 464, 46970, 474, 498;

 in social change, 68, 104, 274, 37476, 423, 494, 5067, 511

Alienation, 12, 6, 12, 1618, 189, 194, 202, 220, 241, 249, 253, 259, 268, 328, 339, 361, 40810, 41423, 451, 45455, 469, 475, 477, 479, 487, 490, 496

Anarchism, 47678, 482, 491

Animism, 35, 25152

Anthropology:

 advocacy, 6, 5456, 58, 79, 104;

 Boasian, 2, 13, 169, 21011, 214, 281, 286;

 critical, 69, 1011, 1318, 25, 7778, 8283, 85, 202, 204, 219, 279, 327, 410, 424;

 cultural evolutionism (*see* Evolution);

discipline of, 7, 13, 2627, 55, 77, 80, 129, 131, 169, 21011, 21718, 258, 263, 270, 274, 27879, 303, 393;

feminist (*see* Feminism; Theory, feminist);

Marxist, 2627, 3032, 3536, 54, 58, 39499, 40910, 41314, 41822;

and poetry, 13, 24950, 254, 256, 260, 262, 265, 268, 270, 27273;

social, 30, 210, 391;

Soviet, 17, 3233, 391400

Anticommunism, 8, 16, 26, 31, 38, 58, 77, 437;

Petrov Commission, 2728, 5354

Art, 1112, 1415, 23035, 320, 32930, 345, 460, 510, 513

Atavism. *See* Heredity

Authenticity, 12, 90, 14858, 160, 165, 167, 239, 303, 327, 32930, 415, 440, 472, 487, 507. *See also* Representation

Autonomy. *See* Agency

B

Bureaucracy, 2, 1618, 12024, 12627, 138, 167, 21112, 36061, 363, 369, 372, 381, 428, 431, 434, 454, 460, 462, 466, 468, 471, 475, 479, 48283, 489, 497, 504. *See also* State

C

Capitalism:

and consciousness, 1, 3, 6, 1415, 18, 213, 223, 235, 24445, 249, 252, 25961, 26568, 27578, 300, 328, 384, 472, 496 (*see also* Modernism);

and crisis, 14, 6, 16, 18, 7778, 84, 130, 253, 255, 261,

Capitalism

(continued)

27577, 384, 475, 488, 493, 496, 50910, 512;

and culture, 12, 113, 130, 138, 141, 147, 15051, 172, 260, 329, 513;

culture of, 13, 5, 78, 10, 12, 1416, 18, 73, 8485, 8889, 9192, 96, 111, 14748, 154, 162, 16466, 192, 249;

identities in, 12, 132, 141, 202, 264, 267, 328, 342, 467, 471, 490;

and madness, 3, 18185, 190, 193, 204, 242, 26162, 26465, 272, 276, 278, 301, 328, 334, 350, 490;

self-reflection in, 187, 35153;

thought in, 3, 7, 1112, 16, 18, 261, 339, 444

Civil society, 2, 69, 408, 41314, 471, 503

Class, 8, 69, 7273, 140, 363, 368, 421, 472, 505;

formation, 197, 201, 25961, 360, 385, 443, 471, 474;

struggle, 148, 153, 162, 17576, 199, 361, 37576, 471, 47475

Colonialism, 10, 255, 466;

anthropology and, 7, 13, 18, 2627, 5558, 128, 16970, 21112, 22122, 258, 26366;

discourse in, 17073, 17578, 18183, 187, 189, 192200, 203, 21315, 259, 267, 283, 28995, 49596, 499;

dislocation in, 36, 1045, 223, 281, 504 (*see also* Ethnocide; Genocide); in Haiti (*see* Haiti);

impact of, 8, 1314, 3637, 40, 4546, 50, 5558, 103, 11217, 147, 21314, 223, 253, 260, 267, 29192, 453, 47071, 474, 49192, 511;

reservations in, 6, 57, 1035, 11617, 22025, 281.

See also Capitalism; Conquest; Domination

Communism, 2728, 53, 56, 134, 409, 411, 414, 41718, 420, 425.

See also Anticommunism; Socialism; State, Stalinist

Community, 5, 78, 10, 15, 68, 78, 104, 11316, 203, 212, 221, 259, 32931, 345, 350, 35859, 371, 385, 391, 39597, 400, 418, 430, 432, 435, 442, 479, 482, 487, 499

Conquest, 36, 25960, 269, 467

Consanguinity. *See* Kinship

Cosmology, 191, 251, 25354, 373. *See also* Ideology

Counter-discourses, 8083, 8687, 96100, 175, 213, 461;

defined, 79. *See also* Language; Resistance, cultural

Creativity. *See* Culture, creation of

Crime, 35760, 364, 367, 37071, 380, 440, 469, 476, 5067

Cultural diversity, 96, 3056, 328, 331, 496;

decline of, 1, 40, 13435, 137, 223;

need for, 12, 1415, 1718, 234, 302, 496

Cultural relativism, 169, 250, 265, 329, 34243, 398, 446

Culture:

and class, 8889, 94, 96, 15152, 15963, 167, 317, 329, 33132, 381, 421, 471;

concept of, 1, 5, 25, 329;

creation of, 1, 3, 68, 1012, 1415, 17, 19, 21213, 230, 233, 235, 254, 272, 275, 298300, 306, 310, 32732, 34546, 457, 497, 512 (*see also* Ethnogenesis);

and identity, 3, 5, 7, 10, 12, 1617, 34, 40, 57, 88, 9092, 9497, 1045, 117, 13132, 135, 13738, 141, 212, 224, 234, 254, 329, 34647, 35053, 498 (*see also* Ethnicity);

mass, 5, 80, 89, 9091, 93, 122, 125, 149, 232, 3056, 327, 329, 33132, 363,

373, 441, 44546, 464, 480, 487, 491, 495, 500 (*see also* Sport; Wrestling);

and personality, 2, 9394;

of primitive societies, 1214, 34, 33031;

and social reproduction, 1112, 19, 89, 117, 212, 224

D

Death, 252, 25657, 26162, 26568, 27677, 490

Development:

capitalist, 57, 103, 108, 11011, 115, 466, 471;

models of, 13843, 439, 45253, 470, 48081, 502;

technological, 45253, 463, 472, 47980, 48889, 492, 49798, 502

Dialectical anthropology, 1617, 202, 204, 215, 225, 239, 241, 27475, 279, 455, 509, 513

Dichotomies. *See* Abstraction

Difference. *See* Representation

Domination, 6, 16;

cultural, 26, 9091, 132, 14749, 154, 161, 19899, 202, 213, 220, 223, 255, 259, 283, 297300, 302, 320, 373, 414, 43031, 434, 460, 471, 47879 (*see also* Colonialism);

discourse in, 36265, 36771, 376, 380, 382, 43034, 43739, 441, 44546, 45257, 46063, 467, 47980, 513 (*see also* Ideology);

state, 1, 11, 1517, 132, 13843, 36166, 369, 37980, 407, 455, 46465, 46970, 475, 489, 49798, 503 (*see also* State, repression);

technocratic, 1819, 293, 360, 427, 430, 436, 43940, 44445, 45153, 455, 460, 464, 467, 472, 477, 47980, 483, 489, 49495. 506 (*see also* Bureaucracy; Knowledge, scientific);

theories of, 37377, 37980, 38285, 408, 45459, 46181. *See also* Theory, social

E

Ecology, 18, 32, 57, 25253, 25657, 26061, 265, 267, 29798, 451, 477, 48789, 492, 49697, 500502, 509

Emancipation, 2, 5, 7, 11, 19, 275, 32021, 324, 385, 4078, 413, 42025, 445, 45258, 461, 47071, 47475, 48182, 489

Ethics, postmodern, 498501

Ethnicity:

conceptions of, 95, 128, 13135, 13738, 141;

and conflict, 10, 109, 11617, 13031, 136, 140, 142;

self-perception of, 90, 13637, 14142, 310;

and the state, 15, 120, 12728, 13043, 220, 360, 363, 468;

uses of, 10, 90, 13132, 140, 310, 468.

See also Ethnogenesis; Ethnocide; Fang; Gypsies; Jews; Hungarians; Racism; Saxons

Ethnocentrism, 78, 140, 236, 457, 496

Ethnocide, 1, 67, 13, 13738, 140, 213, 220, 223, 265, 267, 275, 281, 493

Ethnogenesis, 5, 140, 142, 497

Ethnography, 28, 30, 40, 55, 169, 171, 189, 203, 272, 279;

autobiography in, 9, 92, 94100, 10412, 433;

critical, 25, 154, 186;

"new," 6, 78, 8082, 8587, 93, 213, 297300;

reflexivity in, 1011, 25, 105, 119, 170, 172, 177, 182, 18586,
188, 191, 194, 2013, 256, 267, 277;

and subjectivity of "the other," 9394, 173, 17578, 180, 182, 185,
191, 194, 199,

Ethnography

(continued)

2023, 21012, 215, 253, 25658, 263, 266, 270, 297300. *See also* Representation

Ethnomusic, 3017, 327, 33031. *See also* Music

Ethnopoetics, 229, 249. *See also* Poetry

Evolution, concepts of, 6, 17, 30, 3536, 58, 219, 235, 255, 341, 374, 391, 39396, 398400, 45354, 456, 458, 480

Exploitation, 16, 33, 147, 16162, 16566, 274, 361, 399, 409, 455, 474. *See also* Colonialism; Gender, hierarchy; State formation

F

Family, 23, 9, 6771, 114, 43740, 445, 499;

and dynastic traditions, 89, 71, 85, 9395, 9798;

naturalization of, 7374, 438

Famine, 39, 451, 496, 502, 506, 510

Fang, 21314

Fascism, 13334, 363, 365, 427, 479, 481

Feminism, 231, 328, 427, 432, 43748, 44446, 471, 482, 488

Feudalism, 6772

Fieldwork, 14, 1035, 202, 21920, 304;

politics of, 8, 10, 17, 2529, 38, 40, 5456, 12022, 12733, 22324, 305, 394, 397;

relationships in, 20910, 212, 214, 222, 301;

by Stanley Diamond, 2, 1034, 219, 222

G

Gender:

and authority, 2, 3234, 41, 4446, 69, 71, 91, 114, 180, 188, 192, 223, 253, 263, 44344, 500, 505, 514;

division of labor by, 3435, 103, 1069, 11316, 22324, 298, 43940, 444;

hierarchy, 2, 5, 15, 31, 33, 4146, 67, 90, 94, 97, 113, 142, 147, 217, 331, 358, 428, 431, 43739, 44345, 48991, 497, 504;

and kinship, 69, 7274, 109, 113, 221, 437 (*see also* Family);

relations, 2, 34, 37, 4143, 48, 114, 165, 180, 189, 19799, 209, 213, 263, 27072, 28790, 298, 358, 43738, 492

Genocide, 4, 67, 134, 26062, 267, 26970, 27475, 279, 329, 451, 479, 493, 510, 512

Gypsies, 120, 12425, 12732, 13738

H

Haiti:

religion in, 17274, 17678, 182, 18688, 19091, 2023;

under U.S. occupation, 10, 16970, 17273, 176, 179, 191, 19497, 200, 202 (*see also* Colonialism).

See also Racism; Representation

Heredity, 8, 67, 7073, 193, 198

Hermeneutics, 26566, 279, 433, 435, 454, 458

Human condition, 34146, 350, 355, 364, 41012, 418, 420, 423, 45758, 479, 496, 50910. *See also* Human nature

Human nature, 7, 1112, 1517, 215, 235, 328, 337, 34042, 344, 347, 407, 409, 41112, 41819, 42124, 43031, 454, 46364, 467, 479, 487.
See also Ideology

Human rights, 8, 127, 130, 139, 325, 458, 5067

Hungarians, 13637

Hunger. *See* Famine

I

Ideology, 18, 74, 7778, 88, 91, 95, 132, 141, 16162, 337, 361, 367, 37273, 378, 38182, 384, 39192, 395, 399400, 410, 437, 440, 44244, 45456, 461, 47172, 490;

as practice, 42729, 43135, 43740, 445, 452, 458, 473, 493

Individualism. *See* Abstraction; Capitalism, culture of

Individuation, 3, 16, 412, 456, 472

Inheritance, 6773

Intellectuals. *See* Knowledge, production of

Iroquoian peoples:

Allegany Seneca, 10317, 222, 225, 514;

Onondaga, 11, 22025

J

Jews, 88, 95, 218, 240, 363. *See also* Ethnicity; Genocide

K

Kalapuya, 28195

Kin communities. *See* Community

Kinship:

ambiguity in, 42, 5152, 221;

in Australian aboriginal societies, 25, 2834, 3839, 4153, 394, 397;

and authority, 34, 6872;

in capitalism, 7, 438;

clanship, 2930, 3839, 4647, 49, 90, 103, 22324, 391, 393, 39597;

consanguinity, 67, 69, 7273;

evolutionary models of, 3031, 72, 39496;

lineality in, 6769, 71, 90, 113, 221, 223, 391, 394, 397;

study of, 2831, 38, 5153, 5658, 67.

See also Family; Gender; Marriage

Knowledge:

as learning through others, 1056, 11217, 18889, 21011, 21326, 218, 222, 253, 257, 264, 269, 284, 303, 328, 331, 343, 350, 513;

and power, 78, 90, 147, 214, 26768, 33132, 350, 359, 375, 380, 430, 432, 461, 489, 510;

production of, 271, 27374, 338, 361, 36869, 37880, 423, 42730, 436, 44142, 446, 452, 459, 474, 482, 493, 513;

scientific, 217, 25051, 270, 329, 345, 37375, 38384, 39192, 394, 399400, 42733, 43537, 44146, 46061, 475, 47980, 483, 489, 495.

See also Ethnography; Ideology

L

Labor, 17, 36, 104, 10816, 15960, 16263, 165, 412, 41524, 444, 472, 477, 482

Language:

and culture, 5, 11, 19, 104, 108, 11516, 126, 131, 136, 142, 224, 23031, 252, 254, 257, 264, 283, 332, 355, 458;

degradation of, 1, 80, 192, 442, 455, 482;

narrative, 13, 8587, 99100, 105112, 174, 192, 26869, 272, 28386, 299 (*see also* Ethnography; Writing);

poetic, 13, 23132, 235, 24952, 25456, 26465, 26874, 276, 285;

and resistance, 5, 11, 7980, 91, 116, 136, 15354, 164, 187, 193, 199201, 224, 350, 429, 442

Law, 51, 6768, 71, 73, 142, 362, 371, 373, 438, 468, 475, 479, 497, 506

M

Marriage:

changes in, 4344, 4648, 5253, 57, 114, 20910, 396, 437;

and division of labor,

Marriage

(continued)

32, 42, 438;

monogamy, 34, 4142, 50;

rules of, in Groote Eylandt, 2930, 3233, 40, 4244, 4851;

theories of, 3235, 39495

Marxism, 15, 17, 58, 79, 316, 374, 391, 39395, 397, 399400, 40925, 42729, 43133, 437, 44346, 45556, 458, 47475, 477, 495, 505. *See also* Anthropology, Marxist

Memory, 10317, 349, 351, 35354, 369, 377, 512

Migration, 10, 39, 116, 128, 13337, 139, 142, 223. *See also* Colonialism; Development, capitalist; State, repression

Militarism, 4, 6, 18, 12023, 12628, 170, 200, 427, 465, 469, 494, 497, 499, 5034, 507, 511. *See also* Domination, state; War

Missionaries, 8, 11, 25, 29, 3638, 40, 44, 50, 55, 57, 113, 11617, 213

Modernism, 12, 1415, 18, 78, 80, 230, 23233, 23536, 263, 268, 270, 30911, 31415, 317, 322, 32425, 4078, 412, 43940, 45354, 460, 465, 467, 47071, 476, 48081, 48890, 492, 494505, 507

Modes of production, 392, 41718;

articulation of, 6, 460, 470;

capitalist (*see* Capitalism);

debates about, 14, 39799;
feudal (*see* Feudalism);
laws of motion of, 37475, 395
Music, 15, 23134, 298, 3017, 330, 490;
Adorno on, 31721;
Bloch on, 32123;
romanticism in, 310, 316;
Weber on, 30917

N

Nationalism, 46, 10, 15, 115, 130, 132, 13543, 197, 329, 466, 475, 479, 492, 505

P

Patriarchy. *See* Gender, hierarchy

Peasants, 2, 19394, 358

Performance, 14, 14748, 232, 234, 299, 3014, 306, 330, 362

Petrov Commission. *See* Anticommunism

Poetry, and poetics, 22934, 23946, 24956, 26970, 274, 278, 28995, 433, 468, 488, 513. *See also* Ethnopoetics; Language, poetic

Primitive, the:

as a critique of civilization, 7, 1113, 80, 212, 229, 239, 259, 26364, 271, 281, 327, 457, 481, 483, 488, 513;

as a dynamic, 7, 12, 1516, 18, 212, 235, 245, 250, 266, 297300, 327, 332, 479, 483, 48788, 508, 51314;

as a projection of civilization, 10, 12, 138, 17172, 17576, 181, 185, 189, 19394, 200, 202, 204, 209, 263, 467

Primitive societies:

aesthetic expression in, 1214, 28995, 299, 302, 328, 33031, 487;

authority in, 104, 115, 269, 327;

characteristics of, 1213, 3132, 35, 113, 259, 32728, 331, 39497, 457, 460;

community in, 393, 39598, 400 (*see also* Community);

consciousness in, 11, 13, 24950, 25254, 25859, 26365, 268, 271, 27679, 295, 513;

cultures of, 23, 11;

destruction of (*see* Ethnocide; Genocide);

and history, 30, 3536, 39899;

inequalities in,

4446, 331;
as "the other," 80, 204, 209, 263, 278;
persistence of, 14, 104, 266, 297300, 504 (*see also* Resistance);
production in, 32, 45, 289, 392, 398;
reciprocity in, 11314, 293, 298, 396;
religion in, 3031, 38, 45, 104, 114, 116, 253, 262, 264;
tensions in, 30, 40, 4344, 50, 115, 331;
thought in, 31, 285;
transformation of, 3134, 36, 29195, 297300, 39899; violence in
(*see* Violence)

Production, 32, 140, 395, 41822, 431, 443, 46566, 478;
commodity, 5, 15, 45, 57, 69, 11415, 473, 477;
and identity, 1046, 398, 416, 41822, 424, 431;
and reproduction, 418, 431, 44345, 452, 460, 473;
for use, 32, 72, 289, 477

Progress, concepts of, 1415, 17, 213, 255, 300, 31516, 322, 324,
340, 343, 367, 385, 395, 408, 43840, 453, 465, 474, 488

Property:
communal, 68, 115;
private, 255, 260, 41317, 465;
transmission of, 6870, 73

Q

Quakers, 107, 11317

Quantification, 46667, 471, 47374. *See also* Abstraction

R

Racism, 2, 10, 3637, 57, 73, 132, 14042, 14748, 165, 17072, 174, 187, 19395, 197201, 260, 267, 329, 434, 440, 445, 471, 492, 497

Rationality:

in civilization, 1213, 175, 246, 251, 266, 310, 321, 324, 338, 376, 384, 410, 420, 434, 453, 455, 479, 489 (*see also* Abstraction; Knowledge, scientific);

in music, 14, 30925, 332

Refugees, 6, 10, 36, 360

Representation:

of Australian aboriginal peoples, 30, 35, 55, 513;

of Haiti, 10, 16974, 176, 188, 19394, 196;

of other peoples, 68, 10, 1314, 77, 83, 148, 169, 26566, 3057;

self-, 77, 85, 9394, 28995;

of wrestling, 14954 (*see also* Wrestling)

Resistance:

armed, 4, 7, 37, 19293, 363, 457, 468;

cultural, 3, 57, 1011, 1318, 2628, 5051, 54, 5758, 7982, 84, 95, 1034, 11417, 13637, 148, 154, 16061, 16467, 176, 199, 201, 212, 220, 22324, 236, 300, 332, 350, 385, 437, 467, 474, 481, 493, 49596, 49899, 504;

passive, 37273, 429, 500;

to the state, 12, 37, 79, 127, 134, 137, 360, 362, 376, 451, 457, 459, 468, 476, 500, 5035.

See also Agency; Social movements

Revolution, 7, 16, 279, 407, 40910, 413, 417, 451, 456, 495, 505;

as practice, 11, 1819, 5859, 408, 410, 415, 417, 420, 42325, 442, 482, 491, 498500

Ritual, 35, 10, 44, 89, 91, 103, 16364, 178, 18182, 18586, 19092, 203, 213, 22223, 225, 23435, 253, 26162, 264, 283, 298300, 304, 312, 332, 362, 460, 487

Romanticism, 13, 246, 24950, 256, 301, 3045, 310, 315, 474

S

Saxons, 13436

Schizophrenia. *See* Capitalism, and madness

Science. *See* Knowledge, scientific

Sexuality, 4143, 18283, 189, 198, 243, 274, 28990, 360, 365, 434, 438, 504

Slavery, 421, 47374, 492

Social formations. *See* Modes of production

Social movements, 57, 8081, 224, 376, 494, 497, 500, 503;

 antisystemic, 231, 362, 376, 451, 457, 47879, 48182, 488, 492, 497, 504, 410;

 religious, 209, 211, 213, 224, 505

Social sciences, 42729, 431, 43536, 440, 446, 475, 478, 480, 482

Socialism, 7, 19, 382, 417, 432, 442, 446, 456, 47678;

 and Romania, 12532, 13743;

 and the Soviet Union, 28, 361, 36364, 367, 374, 376, 378, 395, 44243, 502;

 and the state, 1617, 133, 427, 458, 462, 477

Sociology, 42840, 445, 456, 466

Species being. *See* Human condition

Sport, 14767;

and class, 151, 16263, 16566.

See also Wrestling

State:

capitalist, 429, 43940, 46365, 471, 476, 481;

modern, 4, 18, 453, 46263, 46566, 46869, 472, 47576, 489;

and legitimation, 46973, 175, 492, 513 (*see also* Ideology);

repression, 78, 12, 1617, 2628, 37, 5355, 57, 59, 11931, 143, 358, 36062, 36465, 37780, 383, 385, 408, 413, 451, 462, 465, 469, 47576, 489, 503, 511;

Stalinist, 36064, 37778, 380, 384, 427, 437, 479

State formation, 466, 513;

clientship in, 37, 70;

dislocation in, 13437, 139, 141, 143;

dynamics of, 2, 8, 67, 70, 130, 132, 13843, 36162, 372, 378, 383, 393, 39899, 468;

incorporation of ethnic groups in, 37, 131, 13339, 142;

kin/civil conflict in, 8, 70, 359, 362, 370;

resistance to (*see* Resistance);

taxation and forced labor in, 11, 134, 136, 468

Subjectivity. *See* Agency

Syncretism, 104, 114, 117, 213, 22324

T

Technology. *See* Development, technological

Theory, social:

deconstruction of, 17, 178, 215, 230, 340, 413, 417, 420, 427, 42930, 432, 43536, 44042, 44446, 452, 48889;

feminist, 17, 80, 427, 429, 431, 44445;

functionalist, 39899, 428, 433, 437, 473, 48081;

idealist, 410, 41213, 418, 423, 454;

materialist, 17, 34, 46, 37475, 39195, 409, 413;

Marxist (*see* Anthropology, Marxist; Marxism);

positivist, 17, 77, 81, 250, 374, 395, 4078, 414, 419, 42730, 433, 437, 44041, 445, 452, 461;

poststructuralist, 6, 7879, 215, 429, 431, 446;

postmodern, 6, 18, 78, 211, 230, 23233, 23536, 445, 452, 488508;

radical, 44146, 45661, 474, 48183, 487, 491, 494;

reductive, 3, 13, 17, 31, 46, 278, 443, 460, 481;

stadial, 6, 32, 392, 39596,

- 39899;
 - structuralist, 8, 13, 3031, 36, 24143, 246;
 - systems, 78, 345, 433, 45355, 481;
 - universalist, 2, 4, 199, 453, 460;
 - utopian, 7, 83, 21819, 385, 432, 446, 456, 472, 493, 501;
 - world-systems, 1, 5, 15, 113, 115, 139, 325
- Time, concepts of, 10, 171, 181, 199, 209, 21116, 23334, 25257, 261, 26869, 272, 285, 298, 332, 342, 370, 375, 46668, 501
- Totalitarianism, 37273, 37880, 383, 385, 446, 481, 490. *See also* Domination, state; State repression
- Trade. *See* Capitalism, mercantile; Production, commodity
- Tradition, dynastic, 88100
- Trials (show), 357, 361, 36567, 370, 372, 374, 37985;
- accusation in, 36163, 365, 369;
 - and audience, 361, 363, 37172, 380;
 - confession in, 357, 359, 36362, 36465, 36768, 37071, 37576, 379;
 - denunciation in, 359, 362, 365, 36971, 379, 384;
 - and legitimation, 368, 37981, 383;
 - and purges, 37980, 38384;
 - Stalinist, 357, 360, 36772, 374, 383;

witchcraft, 35760, 366, 37072, 374, 380, 38384.

See also Absolutism; State, repression; State, Stalinist;
Totalitarianism

Trickster, 3, 1213, 176, 18990, 244, 254, 264, 285

U

Urbanization, 11, 69, 13436, 197, 201, 212, 262, 266, 26869, 276,
334, 451

V

Violence, 4, 18, 126, 253, 259, 272, 278, 299, 362, 36566, 370,
37980, 385, 411, 413, 451, 46870, 476, 47980, 48991, 494, 497;

in colonialism, 3637, 127, 193, 195, 260, 274;

in primitive societies, 4041, 44, 52

W

War, 1, 35, 7, 18, 37, 67, 113, 133, 143, 231, 27374, 383, 385, 437,
451, 462, 468, 47071, 476, 479, 492, 496, 5067, 512;

nuclear, 487, 489, 49294, 499, 5023, 5056, 50910, 512.

See also Colonialism; Conquest; Genocide

Wrestling, professional, 10, 14867;

as a labor process, 15560, 163, 165;

as subversion, 16162, 16567;

violence in, 15660, 16267.

See also Capitalism, culture of; Sport

Writing:

"Africanist," 10, 16971, 174, 17678, 181, 18990, 196200;

and audience, 6, 13, 80, 100, 135, 26970, 375, 432, 437;

and authority, 6, 79, 264, 274, 33031, 42830, 433, 435, 437,
44042, 445;

and civilization, 11, 331, 375;

and subjectivity, 11, 80, 99100, 17375, 189, 264, 274, 297300,
428, 434, 44546, 494, 509, 512;

travel, 10, 16973, 18788, 190, 192, 203